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Abstract 
Capital dominates labour through the social relations which constitute the 
possibilities for both the labourer in production and the wage labourer in exchange. 
Domination in capitalism is achieved through both subordination and freedom. It is an 
economic form of domination consisting of an articulation between the labour process and, 
what I have called, the apparatus of calculation. Within it the human attributes of will, 
knowledge and need take on their historically specific forms. 
The coal industry in Queensland (Australia) is examined to draw out the 
transformations within the economic form of domination. Up until the Second World War 
a despotic form of domination existed as the qualities necessary for work were housed in 
the worker himself, and so personal relations of power ensured production. Within the 
labour process, knowledge and will were under the dominion of the miner, although they 
operated within an exploitative logic. Need was also attached to him. A precise 
accounting of the relation of need to the wage within the apparatus of calculation, meant 
that a labouring population was kept at hand, despite the poverty of the workers and their 
families. 
In the middle of the century both the apparatus of calculation and the labour 
process were transformed. Needs disappeared from bargaining. The calculus 
surrounding the wage was reworked around the "neutral" requirements of the economy 
and the fine gradations of wage labour. With the advent of mechanisation the labour 
process was also changed. Real subsumption of labour occurred when the attributes of 
will and knowledge became visibly aspects of capital in their new forms contained in 
technology, management and the organisation of work. Need also took on a different 
shape at the same time. It became available to capital through the discourses of "human 
relations" and safety which centred on the psychological needs of workers for recognition 
and security. The real subsumption of labour was deepened. 
VI 
The changes in both the apparatus of calculation and the labour process produced a 
hegemonic form of domination. Personal relations of power were replaced with a 
disciplinary form of power in both of its aspects. Rather than being articulated around the 
body of the labourer it was hinged on the "soul", and a more economically useful and 
politically docile worker was produced. 
INTRODUCTION 
The question addressed in the thesis is: how does capital dominate labour? The 
answer is: through the operation of an economic form of domination which constitutes the 
possibilities for both the labourer in production and the wage labourer in exchange. 
However, I did not start with that question, but rather with a series of puzzles. 
Why was there almost always a disjunction between theoretical and empirical analyses? 
Why was it so difficult to link control, consent and conflict into the labour process, when 
they were so clearly evident in relations at work? What is academic work all about if it 
merely repeats the immense variation that is before us? 
1 eventually found an answer in the distinction between social relations and 
relations between empirical entities. The rather unlikely combination of Marx, Oilman, 
the realist philosophers Bhaskar and Sayer, and Wittgenstein and Foucault provided the 
means for my speaking that difference. We constantly deal with the empirical relations 
between things and people in our normal intercourse, and have tended to take that as 
providing the model of how to analyse social phenomena. However, social relations are 
not graspable in that way, for they are the conditions of possibility of our action and not 
the actions themselves. They have to be "discovered" by looking at the contingent 
phenomena of the world, from a point of view that is different from the one we use in the 
everyday attitude. The distinction between social relations and relations between things 
solved the puzzles I had been confronted with. It seemed to me that most writers did not 
differentiate the two levels of analysis, and so stayed within empiricism, while trying to 
make claims that could only be made of social relations. That created the disjuncture 
between theory and analysis. The problems within the labour process literature also fell 
into place within the context of the distinction. Marx's claims are made about social 
relations. However, most of the literature explored the empirical relations at work 
capturing them with the concepts of "conflict", "control" and "consent". The two 
approaches are not commensurate, yet many tried to hold them together. It was therefore 
not surprising that the labour process had increasingly appeared to be an inadequate 
analytical object. The problem, however, was not with the labour process but with the 
failure to distinguish between two levels of analysis. The distinction also pointed to the 
fact that academic analysis could do more than repeat the infinite variation of the world: it 
could aim to capture the social relations which made the variety possible. A scientific, 
rather than a journalistic enterprise was possible. 
While the philosophical excursion had clarified the sources of the problems which 
had confronted me 1 was left with no ready answer on how to analyse the social relations 
at work. The labour process was the obvious place to start. However, from the point of 
view of social relations, there was no space within it for an examination of bargaining over 
wages and conditions. Yet, that is a central element in relations between capitalists and 
workers. 
Marx's category of "economic form of domination" provided me with a partial 
solution. His claim that the specific nature of domination within capitalism involved a 
double relation of freedom in exchange and dependency in production, rang true. It was 
puzzling that analysis had not been developed around it. The academic division of labour 
between labour process and industrial relations, and the mystifications of exchange itself, 
however, no doubt minimised its availability. Still there was more work to be done. 
Although Marx had devised the labour process, as the object through which the social 
relations within production could be explored, he had not developed one for exchange. 
Nor was there one available within the industrial relations literature. 
I was confronted with the chance to engage in that exciting and arduous work of 
"discovering" a social relation. It was not a matter of looking more carefully, for there 
was nothing to be seen that was not already familiar. Rather, it involved reordering what 
I saw, so that it made new sense to me. Eventually, I organised the relations in exchange 
around the concepts of need and bargaining. Need, is a universal feature of humans 
although it takes very different historical forms. In capitalism, it is primarily and initially, 
the need for money which is acquired through the wage. Hence, it seemed a suitable 
human attribute around which to organise the analysis. The next step involved finding a 
term that would suitably capture the nature of the relations within exchange. Marxists 
within industrial relations have tended to employ the concept of "conflict". It, however, 
reduces the possibilities in analysis, particularly when the relations become consensual. I 
chose to conceptualise them through the concept of "bargaining". The sale of labour 
power for a wage is after all a market relation: it is how our freedom is constructed within 
capitalism. 1 called the object of analysis for exchange relations, the apparatus of 
calculation, for it is the means through which we distribute the wealth which is produced. 
I have used the coal industry in Queensland, from the last decades of the 
nineteenth century to just after the middle of the twentieth, as the field on which to explore 
the relations in the economic form of domination. During that period there have been two 
patterns within it: one despohc, the other hegemonic. Before the Second World War, the 
subsistence and safety needs of the worker dominated bargaining and, in the labour 
process, production was organised around the knowledge and will of the contract miner. 
The articulation of the two sets of relations ensured that the requirements of production 
would be met. The needs of the miners and their families tied them to the intermittent 
form of production which characterised the coal industry. Their abilities enabled coal to 
be produced even when it was impossible for owners and managers to adequately 
supervise work. It was a despotic form of economic domination because it centred on 
personal relations of power; pitting need against need within the apparatus of calculation, 
and will against will within the labour process. 
During and after the Second World War, the demand for production escalated, 
undermining the previous meticulous calculation of the wage in relation to need. It had 
been made in the context of intermittent production but once that altered, high wages were 
possible. As a result, need no longer tied the miner to work, and he chose leisure, much to 
the horror of the owners and the government. During the war extraordinary methods of 
discipline, including fines and goaling, were used to enforce effort. After the war, they 
were replaced by a series of rewards and penalties designed to produce a new desire to 
labour. Their effect was to transform the economic form of domination. 
The apparatus of calculation was the first to change. The introduction of a series of 
rights: sick pay, holiday pay and weekly pay shattered the old relation between need and 
work even further. In its place, a new calculus was produced. The neutral field of the 
economy replaced the opposition of needs. At the same time, the virtual ending of the 
contract system, meant that the old status distinction between contract miner and day 
labourer ceased to inform bargaining. Both homogenised the wage labourer, and within 
that context, the fine gradations of skill assumed significance within bargaining. The 
capitalists and their profits disappeared from view and a disciplinary wage labourer was 
formed as the new object of calculation. 
The labour process underwent a transformation as well, although somewhat more 
slowly. The introduction of mechanisation reshaped the forms of knowledge and will that 
are always necessary for production. In the earlier period, they had been housed within 
the person of the labourer. With the introduction of the continuous miner, in particular, 
they were transferred and reformed. Knowledge and will came to be situated in an 
expanded role for management, in the technology and in the new division of labour which 
surrounded it. The shift marked the real subsumption of labour, for the attributes of the 
worker became visibly aspects of capital. The process of real subsumption was deepened 
when another human quality, the need for recognition and security, became available for 
management, primarily through the development of a discourse on "human relations". It 
too, was reconstituted as it became incorporated within the practices of a new stratum of 
personnel/human resource managers. The double subsumption of labour within the 
labour process perfected a disciplinary form of power, which made the worker's own sense 
of him/herself the principle of subjection. The transformation of both the labour process 
and the apparatus of calculation created a hegemonic shape for the economic form of 
domination. 
Need always drives labourers to work, but the particular shape of it varies. In the 
early period, subsistence needs ensured production. A precise calculation of the wage 
meant that the needs of the contract miner and his family would tie him to production. 
Those needs disappeared from bargaining during the Second World War and a new, 
double form of need was constituted. It appeared within production as the need for 
recognition and security. It also arose within consumption as infinite desire. The double 
needs were the new way in which production was guaranteed, for our sense of who we 
are, tied us into the needs of capital. Our subjectivity becomes the means of our 
subjection. 
The hinge around which the two aspects of the economic form of domination 
articulate has undergone a metamorphosis. Within the despotic form the body of the 
worker, as a repository of needs and capabilities, is the point of connection. The 
hegemonic mode of domination is centred on a different object: the psychological 
attributes or "soul" of the worker. 
The transition to the hegemonic form of economic domination was fraught with 
tension and hatred. In the middle of the century, the apparatus of calculation and the 
labour process had become disjointed. Subsistence needs had ceased to be the way work 
was guaranteed, but no new mechanism had been developed to fulfil that crucial role. 
Not surprisingly, it created havoc for all involved in the industry, and the tensions erupted 
in the cataclysmic 1949 coal strike. However, within a decade of it, a harmonious balance 
had once again been established, although the relations in exchange and production had 
altered dramatically. A new more economically useful and politically docile worker had 
been constituted. 
It is perhaps not the most opportune time to address the question of the 
domination of labour by capital. Marxism seems to have died a natural death, both 
historically and theoretically. Capitalism has gained almost universal acceptance. 
Former communist states are rushing to the free market, and within capitalism there is a 
general consensus as to its value. The change is reflected in theoretical analyses, which 
mirror the glitter of the market and reject Marxism. However, it is my contention that 
capital still dominates labour. The thesis is offered as an attempt to show how we can 
understand it, even in the midst of consent and hegemony. 
CHAPTER 1 
AN ECONOMIC FORM OF DOMINATION 
An outline of the economic form of domination is presented. It is argued 
that capital dominates over labour through a double relationship. One 
aspect occurs within exchange where there is a relationship of freedom. 
The other aspect is within production where the relationship becomes that 
of subordination. It is acknowledged that there is difficulty in accepting 
freedom as an aspect of domination rather than as being in opposition to 
it. Some support is provided for the assertion. However, it is argued, 
that the thesis itself will serve as a test of the viability of seeing 
domination as involving both freedom and subordination. 
The central claim of the thesis is that the form of domination within capitalism is to 
be found in the manner in which the specifically capitalist labourer is constituted. The 
relations between capital and labour, through which the constitution occurs, are to found 
in exchange and production. They revolve around freedom and subordination. 
This chapter provides an initial outline of the features of our present form of 
domination. It is necessarily abstract. Much work has to be done before an 
understanding of the constitution of the labourer in capitalism can be adequately grasped. 
However, the outline is presented here as a means of providing a map of the terrain which 
will be explored in the thesis. 
THE ECONOMIC FORM OF DOMINATION 
Capital dominates over labour because it is able to extract more value from labour 
than it returns to it. As such, capitaUsm is like any other form of domination. However, 
the domination within capitalism is remarkable for it consists of a double relationship 
which presents domination under the guise of freedom. The wage contract is the hinge 
around which the illusion of freedom operates and by which domination is ensured. We 
need to explore more carefully how this takes place. 
The first aspect of the relationship of domination is marked by freedom. Within 
the sphere of circulation of capital two commodity owners, one possessing labour power 
and the other the means of production and of subsistence, meet. A purely financial 
exchange occurs. One freely exchanges the use of his/her capacity to labour for a certain 
period, for a wage which is the money form of the means of subsistence. The relationship 
is free in that each disposes of only what is his/hers. It is equal in that both are merely 
commodity owners and both are following their own interests. There may well be a 
systematic inequality, between the two parties to any bargain. However, it does not 
negate the nature of the contract as being between two free commodity owners. 
InequaHty does not rule out freedom, it merely means that it is circumscribed. Neither 
party is forced to engage in the contract by anything external to their own desires. As 
Marx (1954:172) notes this sphere "is in fact a very Eden of the Rights of man" where 
"Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham" rule. The wage relation is thus a purely 
economic exchange. 
The other aspect of the economic form of domination within capitalism is marked 
by "supremacy and subordination" (Marx, 1976:1027). To find it we leave, as Marx notes 
(1954:172), the "noisy sphere" of exchange and enter that of produchon. Here the owner of 
the means of production, by the right given through the exchange of the wage for labour 
power, sets it into motion. Again, by right and by necessity, he/she supervises and directs 
labour. The capitalist has a double necessity to control the labour process (Marx, 
1954:314). On one hand, it is the production of use values by a group of workers. As 
such, it will require the co-ordination of tasks. On the other hand, the labour process is 
the valorization process, that is the process of creating surplus value. It becomes 
imperative that no more than the socially necessary labour time is contained in any 
commodity. Capitalist control is thus "despotic" (Marx, 1954:314) for it is a necessity 
within the system. 
The necessity of control for the capitalist is the reality of subordination of the 
worker. Within capitalism the labour process has to be a process for the valorization of 
capital. The worker is thus a mere tool within it and is subordinated to the control (in 
whatever form it takes) of the capitalist. Thus within the labour process there is a relation 
of "supremacy and subordination" (Marx, 1976:1027). 
It is tempting to think that control and subordination in the labour process are 
equivalent to the whole relation of domination of labour by capital. Subordination 
appears to have all the hallmarks of what counts as domination. However, it is only one 
aspect of the particular form within capitalism. All domination will involve 
subordination. The specificity of capitalist domination lies in its organisation through 
freedom. The task is to understand it. 
Whereas other forms of production have had to legitimate and enforce 
subordination, through political or religious or other means, capitalism does not need to. 
The subordination of the labourer within production is a result of nothing other than the 
free exchange of a wage for labour power. It requires no force or further legitimation 
(though it may rely on these at various times). "In consequence", as Marx (1976:1027) 
notes, "the process of exploitation is stripped of every patriarchal, political or even 
religious cloak". There is no need for such legitimations, or indeed, for force, because 
dependency and subordination flow from a free exchange and from the rights of the 
parties to the exchange. 
We are not to be misled by the appearance of freedom. It is an essential aspect of 
the way domination is organised. Freedom mediates the labourers' "subjugation to 
capital" (Marx, 1976:1063): 
Through the mediation of this sale and purchase it disguises the real 
transaction, and the perpetual dependence which is constantly renewed, 
by presenting it as nothing more than a financial relationship. (Marx, 
1976:1064) 
Capitalism involves domination and as such is like slavery and serfdom. What has 
changed is the way in which it is organised: "The form becomes freer because it is 
objective in nature, voluntary in appearance, purely economic" (Marx, 1976:1028, 
emphasis in original). This is the nature of the economic form of domination. 
FREEDOM AS AN ASPECT OF DOMINATION 
It is difficult for us to accept that freedom is an aspect of domination. There are 
two major reasons. The first relates to our common sense understanding of freedom as a 
site of opposition to domination. The second reason lies in the academic division of 
labour. It has relegated the two aspects of domination to two separate fields of academic 
enquiry: the labour process and industrial relations. Both common sense and academic 
understandings thus seem to preclude a conceptualisation of domination as crossing 
exchange and production and thus involving both freedom and subordination. 
We all experience difficulty in understanding freedom as an aspect of domination. 
We wish to take freedom as something external to domination; as something opposed to it. 
In a sense this is natural and correct. Yet, we need to be careful when we are dealing with 
the freedom which underlies the wage relation. 
The economic form of domination crosses exchange and production. Yet, these 
two aspects fall within two separate academic disciplines. The labour process literature 
deals with aspects of the capital/labour relation within production. On the other hand, 
industrial relations is primarily concerned with phenomena in the sphere of exchange. 
The academic division of labour makes any analysis which crosses the two fields 
difficult. Both the labour process and industrial relations are necessarily constituted as, 
more or less, hermetically sealed areas of enquiry. They are also often carried on in quite 
separate departments within the university. Thus any incorporation of one field within 
the other is often only partial. The separation makes it difficult to imagine that an analysis 
of domination must explore both exchange and production^. 
The demarcation of academic knowledge leads to a further, more serious, 
hindrance to the analysis of domination. The labour process appears to cover the enhre 
field of subordination and hence, it is assumed, of domination. The questions of control 
and subordination have been central in the labour process literature. Burawoy (1985) has 
1. The academic demarcations arise, at least in part, from accepting the "surface" appearance of exchange 
and production as two separate realms. They do appear to be separate, but a Marxist analysis reveals 
their connection. It is surprising that more Marxist writers have not sought to explore the nature of the 
link. Perhaps, they have been as easily misled as the Tree-trader Vulgaris' (Marx, 1954:172) who accepts 
the surface appearance of things and does not enquire into the real relations. 
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been the most explicit about the link to domination. He has relegated undisputed 
domination to the labour process. While most writers do not go as far, they do remain 
within the general form. It is apparent in the hesitant and problematic entrance of 
resistance into the labour process debate. As a consequence, resistance is generally 
understood as indicating an opposition to the domination of capital. It plays this role in 
both sections of the academic division of labour. 
There are indications that the academic division of labour is unsatisfactory for a 
Marxist account. The analysis of resistance has created difficulties. It entered the labour 
process debate as a corrective to the view that capital dominated labour. However, its 
presence split asunder the labour process as a coherent object for analysis (see Chapter 3). 
Marxism has fared even less well in trying to cope with resistance within industrial 
relations. It has not been able to define either an appropriate object of analysis or produce 
a specifically Marxist account (see Chapter 2) of the capital/labour relations within 
exchange. 
Both common sense and academic theorising conspire to make it difficult to see 
freedom as an aspect of domination. Two analogies will be presented in the hope that 
they will open the possibility of perceiving domination from the point of view of 
containing both freedom and subordination. 
The first analogy is drawn from our knowledge of what it is to play a game. If we 
play chess, then each time we use the rules to make a move we may be increasing our 
chances of winning or of loosing. Whatever the possibility, while I am following the rules 
1 am engaged in chess. It is in this sense that we can understand domination as 
necessarily including freedom, as I have spoken of it. While we bargain over the value of 
our labour power - an activity predicated upon our freedom - we are playing the "game" of 
capitalism. We may win (obtain a very significant increase in pay or conditions) or we 
may lose. Whatever the outcome we never cease to be within capitalism. 
The other analogy calls upon our understanding of paradigms. For a considerable 
time, at least since Khun's (1970) Tlie Structure of Scientific Revolutions, we have been willing 
to consider truth and falsity relative to specific paradigms. The criteria for truth and 
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falsity are generated within the same paradigm. Perhaps, we can use this as an analogy to 
understand freedom as an aspect of domination. Let me elaborate. The economic form of 
domination is like a paradigm. A scientific paradigm contains the rules for what will 
count as normal science. Equally, an economic form of domination contains the rules for 
what is to be regarded as natural and normal economic practices. One refers to an 
organisation of scientific practices and the other to an organisation of social (specifically 
economic) practices. However, from the aspect of the organisation of practices they are 
not essentially different^. We accept that a scientific paradigm generates what will count 
as true and what false within it. Similarly, we could consider that an economic form of 
domination generates the equivalent: what will count as freedom and what will count as 
subordination. If we can see it in this mcinner then we have begun to change our notion of 
freedom. It ceases to be an absolute. However, within the economic form of domination 
it is all the freedom we are offered-^. 
Analogies will not make us change our point of view. They are there to create an 
openness to change. The thesis, itself, will be the test of the value of the new point of 
view. 
The thesis attempts to show the worth of understanding domination as involving 
both subordination and freedom. It is argued that there is a specific form of capitalist 
domination. It crosses both exchange and production and involves both subordination 
and freedom. The argument and the analysis are aimed at showing that such an approach 
makes good sense: both philosophically and in the analysis of the empirical data. 
2. Possibly, it would be better to refer to an economic form of domination as a "form of life" 
(Wittgenstein, 1958:par.241), rather than a paradigm. The present discussion, however, does not depend 
on us finding an exact term but only an appropriate analogy. As well, both "paradigm" and "form of life" 
refer essentially to the same features: the organisation of practices in terms of how they produce 
possibilities of action/thought etc which are natural and normal to us (Cavell, 1979:111). Hence, the 
discussion will stay with the concept of "paradigm". 
3. I am not at all suggesting that there are no sites of opposition to the economic form of domination. 
What I am implying is that these sites of opposition will be outside the economic form of domination. 
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CONCLUSION 
It has been claimed that there is a specific form of domination within capitalism. It 
involves both freedom in exchange and subordination in the labour process. The 
particular combination makes capitalism what it is: a form of domination organised 
around freedom. 
It is hard to accept freedom as an aspect of domination. The academic division of 
labour has created particular difficulties. It has separated the analysis of the relations 
between capital and labour into two different fields. Moreover, it has taken resistance to 
be the site of the opposition of labour to capital. Thus it precludes any understanding of it 
as an aspect of domination. 
We can understand freedom as an aspect of domination. Analogies may help us to 
be open to the possibility. However, it is claimed that the thesis is itself the test of the 
viability of this new point of view. 
Before beginning the analysis of the empirical data there is quite a considerable 
amount of ground work to be done. The fields of industrial relahons and the labour 
process deal with the phenomena of both freedom and subordination. Yet, they have both 
run into problems in exploring these. As a result they are, on the whole, not in a suitable 
form for the examination of the relations of domination between capital and labour. The 
first step involves an examination of the reasons for the dilemmas which are presented in 
these fields. 
The next chapter addresses the serious problems that have confronted Marxist 
work in the field of industrial relations. It will show they follow from using the common 
sense concept of conflict as the central concept for analyses. It is designed as a first step to 




THE FATAL ATTRACTION OF THE OBVIOUS: CONFLICT 
The chapter notes that Marxism has always had difficulty dealing zvith the 
phenomena of industrial relations. Initially, the problem was taken to lie in the 
nature of industrial relations itself That led to replacing the empiricist concepts 
that were readily available with others, notably Marxist ones. However, the move 
was not adequate: the familiar dilemmas arose again. 
It is argued that the real difficulty for Marxism is within it. The organising 
concept of "conflict" reduces all Marxist categories to empiricist ones. In that 
form they cannot support any of Marx's claims. Two suggestions are made. The 
first is that "conflict" he replaced with "bargaining" as the organising principle. 
The second is that "bargaining" be used to develop a suitable object for the 
analysis of the relation of domination of labour by capital. 
Industrial relations would seem to be a site par excellence for Marxist theorising, for 
it deals specifically with relations between capitalists and labourers. However, Marxism 
has always had difficulty with the area. Although Hyman developed a Marxist theory of 
industrial relations in the 1970's the problem was not solved. There was growing awareness 
that Marxist analyses were not very different from those produced from within pluralism. 
As a result, Marsden (1982:233) argued that Marxism had reached an impasse in industrial 
relations. 
The later attempts to resurrect a more satisfactory account of industrial relations 
phenomena through Marxist theorising also met with difficulties. The problem was seen to 
lie in the empiricism of industrial relations. It was argued that it was not a suitable object 
for Marxist analysis. New "theoretical concepts" were employed in the place of the 
empiricist concepts found in industrial relations. However, as each of the authors used the 
"theoretical concepts" to understand specific struggles between capitalists and labourers, 
they met familiar problems. Their work was drawn back into being, at its best, good 
"investigative journalism" (Guille,1984:487), a criticism which, ironically, Guille had 
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intended for the non-Marxist writers in the field. At its worst, it led to unsupportable 
claims. Something was wrong. 
The problem seems to lie in the form of Marxism employed to analyse industrial 
relations phenomena. It operated with empiricist concepts and yet, wanted to retain the 
general claims that Marx made about the social relations within capitalism. 
Marxist discourse was drawn to empiricism through its organising concept of 
"conflict". "Conflict" had many seductive features. It seemed to refer in an easily 
understood manner to class struggle, a key term in Marxist discourse. It also gave Marxist 
work legitimacy in the industrial relations field, for "conflict" was at the centre of pluralist 
analyses. Moreover, it provided a chance of criticising the pluralists for their inadequate 
conception of conflict. However, the attraction of "conflict" was fatal. 
The concept of "conflict" reduced all of Marx's categories to the empirical level. In 
that form no general assertions could be made, for the empirical refers to the contingent 
events of our everyday world. More importantly, the specific claim about the undisputed 
domination of labour by capital could not be sustained. "Conflict" led Marxism into a 
quagmire. 
It is necessary to re-think how to provide an organising principle for Marxism in its 
analysis of industrial relations phenomena. "Bargaining" is put forward as an appropriate 
principle. It allows an analysis of all the features that are traditionally included in industrial 
relations research. It also picks up the key relation between capitalists and labourers within 
exchange: bargaining over the sale and use of labour power. We can use "bargaining" as a 
means of "seeing" the changing forms of the domination of labour by capital. 
THE SIMILARITIES OF OPPOSITES: PLURALISM AND MARXISM. 
Marsden (1982:233) noted the impasse which Marxist theorising in industrial 
relations had reached by the beginning of the 1980's. It was signified by a curious 
phenomenon. Although pluralism and Marxism were obviously political disparate, there 
was no clear divide in the forms of their analyses. 
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A pluralist first pointed out the similarity between Marxist and pluralist analyses. 
Clegg (1979a:450-456) claimed that pluralists and Marxists would produce almost the same 
analyses of industrial relations phenomena. He noted that the pluralist emphasis on "job 
regulation" necessarily implied a study not only of the rules that circumscribe conflict but 
also of the "sources of dispute and disorder" (1979a:452). He considered that there were 
only two areas of dissimilarity between Marxism and pluralism. The terms of the analysis 
would be different. Whereas Marxists would use "class conflict", the pluralist would 
employ the term "pressure group conflict". Additionally, he argued, the two approaches 
differed in their attitude to socialism. However, he indicated that the differences were not 
crucial. Clegg (1979a:455) claimed that the difference in terminology would not lead to 
qualitatively different analyses because "translation" was easy. Furthermore, he pointed out 
that the athtude to socialism would not impinge greatly, as questions of revolution and 
socialism were "remote from the analysis of contemporary British industrial relations" 
(1979a:455). Clegg's argument could be dismissed as pluralist misunderstanding of key 
categories of Marxist discourse within industrial relations. However, he was not alone in 
his conclusions. 
Others, including Marxists, recognised that Marxism was not significantly different 
from pluralism^. Hyman (1980:53) notes the convergence of different theoretical 
approaches. More importantly, he (1980:44) acknowledged that the more specific an 
analysis is, the less traditionally Marxist it will tend to be. Another Marxist, Griffin 
(1986:222) recognises that Clegg's (1979a) claim was "sound". Winchester (1983) is not as 
certain about the lack of a clear distinction between Marxism and pluralism. However, his 
(1983:102) doubts about whether Hyman and Fox had constituted a "new paradigm" 
indicate that the distinction between Marxism and pluralism was, at least, blurred. 
The apparently unchallenged distinction between Marxism and pluralism was their 
political or moral difference. As Griffin (1986:222) noted, Marxism left the impression of 
"moral indignation". Certainly, many saw the difference in these terms. Fox (1973) 
1. Textbooks , in general, do not deal with these hesitancies and so merely portray the two theories as 
opposed views of the industrial relations world. See, for example, Deery and Plowman (1991). 
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acknowledged a moral distinction and Clegg (1979b) pointed to a political one. It is also 
acknowledged by Shalev. According to him (Shalev,l980:26) the debate between pluralism 
and Marxism concerned (among other things): 
the question of whether theory should be "reformist" and built on 
assumptions of consensus and stability or "critical" and rest on 
assumptions of conflict and change. 
However, a specific moral or political viewpoint is not held by Marxists alone. 
Marxism may give sensitivity to the phght of the working class. However, other political, 
and even religious view points will do the same. Hyman (1980) makes this point. He is not 
convinced that Marxism will provide a distinguishing political and moral position. He 
states that it is also available to others with a "natural sensitivity" (1980:45). 
The failure of Marxism to be significantly different from pluralism pushed Marxists 
into clarifying their theoretical positions. Recent Marxist literature has addressed the 
problem indexed by the lack of a clear distinction between pluralism and earlier Marxist 
theoretical work. Hyman (1980), Marsden (1982), Guille (1984) and Griffin (1986) all 
maintain that the problem lies in the way Marxist analysis relates to "industrial relations". 
They agree that "industrial relations" cannot immediately be transposed into Marxist 
analysis. Its concepts are seen as not being the same as those in Marxism. Marsden (1982), 
Guille (184) and Griffin (1986) specifically argue that it is the empiricism inherent in 
"industrial relations" that renders its analysis problematic. 
THE ENEMY WITHOUT: EMPIRICISM IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. 
The problem for Marxists writing about industrial relations phenomena seemed to lie 
outside Marxism and in the nature of industrial relations itself Many early authors within 
industrial relations saw its problem as being its lack of a theory (for example, see 
DunIop,19582). For the Marxists in the 1980's the difficulty lay elsewhere. They argued 
that industrial relations itself was an inappropriate object about which to theorise. Hence, it 
2. Dunlop (1958:vi) describes industrial relations in the words of Julian Huxley: " 'Mountains of facts have 
been piled up on the plain of human ignorance'". 
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was replaced with Marxist objects of analysis (Hyman,1980; Guille,!984; Griffin,1986) or a 
new object was developed (Marsden,! 982). 
The argument for the replacement of industrial relations as a theoretical object 
generally rested on some account of the empiricism within it. However, most of the authors 
do not avoid empiricism within their own analyses. 
The arguments for the move away from industrial relations are of two kinds. First, 
Hyman (1980) produces both historical and theoretical reasons for the failure of industrial 
relations as an object of theorising. Marsden (1982), Guille (1984) and Griffin (1986) all 
critique "industrial relations" as being empiricist and therefore not a suitable object for 
theoretical development. 
Hyman (1980) argues that it is not possible to have a Marxist theory of industrial 
relations as it is not an autonomous set of practices. He claims that empirical evidence 
shows that the phenomena of industrial relations is not separate from other social relations: 
The interconnectedness between the various levels and elements of the 
social formation...(is) now increasingly transparent" (Hyman,1980:53). 
Therefore he (1980:55) maintains that, as industrial relations lacks empirical coherence, it 
cannot produce it theoretically. Hence, neither a Marxist nor any other theory of industrial 
relations is possible. The argument then allows Hyman (1980) to substitute what seems a 
more appropriate object of analysis. The phenomena of industrial relations, the relations 
between employers and trade unions, is to be replaced by the relations of production and 
class struggle (Hyman,1980:42). 
Epistemological arguments are also produced to show how the phenomena of 
industrial relations are not in the appropriate form for any (specifically Marxist) theoretical 
analysis. Marsden (1982) rests his argument on a distinction between the ontological and 
epistemological status of theoretical and empirical concepts. He argues (1982:234-5) that, 
while theoretical concepts refer to real "things", empirical concepts, have only an ideological 
reference. Behind such an assertion is Althusser's distinction between science and non-
science. Althusser's claim is that sciences produce their own concepts through theory, while 
non-sciences are still engaged with empirically based concepts. The distinction enables 
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Marsden (1982) to show the unsuitability of industrial relations as an object of study for 
Marxist analysis. He (1982:235) claims that "industrial relations" is an object taken from the 
common sense definitions of the practicioners themselves. It has been empirically rather 
than "theoretically given", Marsden (1982:245) asserts. Therefore, he concludes, it is not in a 
suitable form for Marxist analysis which has produced its objects through theory. 
The juxtaposition of Marxian political economy and industrial relations 
highlights an opposition between two epistemologies and theoretical 
objects (Marsden,! 982:247). 
Both Guille (1984) and Griffin (1986) support Marsden's epistemological position. They, too, 
argue that the empiricist nature of industrial relations means it is not a suitable theoretical 
object'^. 
All authors look beyond industrial relations as a means of producing a theory of its 
phenomena. Hyman (1980), Marsden (1981), Guille (1984) and Griffin (1986) claim that the 
phenomena of industrial relations are significant, but that they must be understood through 
the categories used by Marx. The point is best summed up in Hyman's (1980:42) words: 
"There is an obvious need for Marxist theory in 'industrial relations'". 
Despite the claims made by these authors an adequate Marxist theory in industrial 
relations has not been produced. The reason lies in the incomplete nature of their 
suggestions (Marsden,! 981) or of their critique (Hyman,1980; Guille,1984 and Griffin,! 986). 
Marsden (198!) suggests a way of producing a new theoretical object for the analysis 
of industrial relations phenomena. However, the move, though interesting, is not 
developed. He (1982:246) claims that the rules and practices in industrial relations should 
be studied not as rules, but as "objectified ideologies". Marsden's approach would, 
doubtless, bring an element of critique into the analysis of industrial relations activity. As 
such, it is potentially at least, a provocative turning of pluralism on its head. However, the 
idea remains only an idea. Marsden's (1981:246-7) brief outline of his analysis is fraught 
3. Griffin (1986) relies on a similar Althusserian position to Marsden (1981). Guille (1984) primarily calls 
upon the notion of "abstract empiricism", a phrase coined by C.W.Mills. 
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with difficulty. Its major problem is the paucity of detail. Moreover, his central concept, 
that of ideology, remains un-explicated^. 
Guille (1984) and Griffin (1986) also fail to produce an adequate Marxist alternative 
for the examination of the phenomena of industrial relations. Their failure arises from the 
fact that they did not carry their critiques of industrial relations into Marxism. The 
empiricist nature of industrial relations was subject to scrutiny by Guille (1984) and Griffin 
(1986). As a result, they dismissed it and substituted Marxist categories. However, they do 
not explore these. They assume that Marx's categories are materialist, and not empiricist, no 
matter how they are employed. This is not the case. In their use of the categories, they 
reduce them to empirical concepts. Hence, their analyses remain within empiricism. 
Moreover, ironically, the empiricism is rendered even more problematic, by the use of 
Marxist claims. 
The problems inherent in Guille's (1984) analysis lie in his inadequate exploration of 
empiricism. He assumes that empiricism necessarily leads to a causal and institutional 
analysis, which may well be correct. However, he does not examine why that is the case. 
As a consequence, his attempt to substitute a "process" analysis merely repeats the errors he 
finds in traditional industrial relations research. 
Guille (1984) strays into empiricism despite the use of the Marxist categories of 
"capital" and "labour". He (1984:493) suggests replacing traditional static analyses in 
industrial relations with a "more dialectical account of change" which will explore "the 
strategies of employers, imions and state agencies". It is conceptualised in terms of the 
"contestation" between labour and capital which certainly are Marxist categories^. They are. 
4. The unexamined notion of ideology is evident in Marsden's (1982:246) use of "objectified ideologies" 
(my emphasis). Presumably, Marsden means that laws and rules are coded in some form and hence have 
an "object"-like existence. They are, thus, apparently distinguished from ideologies as "forms of 
consciousness" (Marsden,1981:234). The difference in terminology may have little significance. Yet, it 
seems to indicate that Marsden has not grasped that a materialist analysis is one that examines social 
relations. From this point of view, that some rules are coded and others are not, makes no difference. 
They all lead the same kind of social existence. If he has not grasped this, it is easy to fall back into a form 
of empiricism. Whatever the case, the fact that Marsden's key term is unclear is unfortunate. 
5. Guille (1984:494) asserts the contestation is in four areas: industry structure, structure of the labour 
force, distribution of wealth in terms of wages and prices, and the structure of industrial organisations. 
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however, understood in an empiricist manner. They are translated into terms which refer to 
individuals or groups of capitalists and labourers who "collide"^. There is nothing wrong 
with examining the relations between capitalists and labourers. However, Guille should 
have realised it would lead to difficulties. From it he could only produce an account which 
is essentially no different from "investigative journalism" (Guille,1984:487) a term with 
which he chided the empiricists''. He may well have broadened the analysis of industrial 
relations phenomena but not removed himself from empiricism^. He is thus hoisted on his 
own petard. 
Griffin (1986) also replaces industrial relations concepts with Marxist categories. She 
(1986:221) is conscious of difficulties involved and attempts to overcome them. The 
reproduction of the capitalist mode of production is posited by Griffin as the appropriate 
object of analysis of industrial relations phenomena. She attempts to link this structural 
level with the level of action through the concept of possibilities. It can be examined, 
according to Griffin (1986:231), through the analysis of the possibilities'^ available to capital 
to increase "the rate of appropriation of surplus value". Although they are structural 
possibilities they become, according to Griffin (1986), options for action. She (1986:235) 
argues they are translated into a range of strategies "available to employers, employees and 
trade unions". From her point of view, industrial relations can be seen as one (significant) 
mechanism through which the possibilities are carried out. 
However, Griffin (1986), also succumbs to the empiricism she criticises industrial 
relations as displaying. She slips into making the structural level akin to that of acHon. 
6. Nothing could be more empiricist or mechanistic than the choice of the verb "collide". 
7. I am not arguing against analyses of the specific strategies of capitalists and labourers. They have an 
important place. However, the point is that they do not enable Guille (1984) to escape empiricism, which is 
his aim. 
8. Guille effectively opened the possibility of exploring a larger range of phenomena within industrial 
relations. His (1986) later work attests to the interesting questions to which his redefinition of the subject's 
boundaries leads. 
9. The range of strategies for producing surplus value are given as: lengthening the working day, 
intensification of labour, and increases in productivity. 
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Unfortunately, the result is an unsupportable claim. Griffin (1986:237) claims that capital 
had only one option to increase the rate of surplus value in Australia after World War 11. 
The only option remaining was to reduce the socially necessary cost of 
labour power 
It was "affected through the support of the state". Industrial relations thus became, 
according to Griffin (1986:237), the mechanism through which the possibility of increasing 
the rate of surplus value was realised. Her account is provocative and interesting, but it 
cannot be given in the terms that Griffin (1986) outlines. Once the structural necessity is 
translated into the actions of capitalists and workers, it leads to the traditional problem 
within Marxism: absurd and unsupportable general claims. Increases in productivity will 
only raise surplus value if they occur in workers' socially necessary goods: a point about 
which Griffin (1985) is quite clear. However, to suppose that this could be achieved by a 
conscious strategy is clearly ludicrous. Nevertheless, on Griffin's (1986) account, capitalists 
are viewed as collectively and consciously carrying out the structural necessities of the 
system. In addition, the state is seen as unproblematically lending its support. The 
empirically based concepts of "capitalists" and "workers" cannot support the claims made of 
the categories of "capital" and "labour". Once concepts are given an empirical reference then 
only contingent claims can be made. Griffin (1986), despite her care, fell into the trap of not 
being careful enough of the concepts she employed. She ended up in empiricism, and 
moreover, with claims that appear ludicrous. 
Marx is careful of the difference between what can be claimed of social relations, and 
what can be asserted of empirical relations. Social relations indicated, for example, by the 
category "capital", point to general tendencies in the system. However, empirical relations, 
for example, those involving capitalists, display only contingent qualities. Sometimes, it is 
true, Marx seems to use "capitalist" interchangeably with "capital". He does not. In these 
contexts Marx uses "capitalist" not to refer to the activity of individual capitalists, but to refer 
to them as a personification of capital. For example, Marx warns care must be given to the 
way in which he dealt with capitalists in his discussion of relative surplus value. He 
cautions that he has treated the general result of increasing surplus value by increasing 
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productivity, as if it were the aim of the individual capitalist. However, he stipulates that it 
must not be read in this fashion, for no sense can be given to capitalists carrying out the 
tendencies of the system. They will follow their own, very divergent logic. 
Whenever an individual capitalist cheapens shirts, for instance, by 
increasing the productiveness of labour, he by no means necessarily aims 
at reducing the value of labour power and shortening pro tanto, the 
necessary labour time. But it is only in so far as he ultimately contributes 
to this result, that he assists in raising the general rate of surplus value. 
The general and necessary tendencies of capital must be distinguished 
from their forms of manifestation (my emphasis) (Marx,1954:299). 
If we use Marxist categories in an empiricist manner, and combine them with claims 
made of social relations, then we end up in a quagmire. Not only are we still caught in 
empiricism, but the addition of Marxist claims makes our work absurd^*^-
Hyman (1980) is also aware of the difficulty in combining different levels of analysis. 
He attempts to solve it by developing the idea of mediating institutions. However, it fails. 
The move reduces his analysis to being no different from a sensitively produced one from 
conventional analysts - a fact of which he is very well aware. 
Hyman (1980) attempts to solve the problem of integrating levels of analysis by 
introducing the concept of mediating institutions and processes. However, he meets 
difficulties in two directions. He fails to show how the two levels can be united. As well, 
in the process of trying to achieve the unification, he reduces his analysis to being essentially 
the same as a sensitively produced "bourgeois" one. Hyman (1980:51) claims that the 
differences in the "pattern of development" of West European countries are attributable to 
the specific nature of the mediating institutions and processes. The analysis of the pattern, 
he argues, must thus be carried out at the level of these institutions, rather than at the level 
of a "generalized characterisation of the economic and political conjuncture" (Hyman, 
1980:51). However, he points to the necessity of conducting the analysis against "the 
background" of the conjuncture. The concept of "mediating institutions and process" is 
introduced as a means of uniting the two levels. It does not solve the problem of integration 
10. It may be that one could read back over the post World War 11 years in Australia and find a strategy of 
increasing surplus value largely by increasing productivity. Griffin's (1986) work is certainly thought 
provoking. However, much more work needs to be done to describe it in such a manner that the 
explanation makes sense. The primary task would be a thorough elimination of empiricism. 
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but merely sidesteps it. Moreover, the move has dire consequences. The level of analysis is 
made equivalent to that of the empiricists - the "surface phenomena " of capitalism where 
trade unions and employers interact. 
Hyman (1980) recognises the weak position in which he is left. He strives to find a 
distinguishing feature of a Marxist analysis in its perspective: 
the major contribution of Marxists has been as much in the questions 
asked as in the answers given or in the methods of their attainment. It is 
the framework of what is taken for granted and what is regarded as 
problematic that most clearly differentiates Marxists from conventional 
"industrial relations" analysts (Hyman,!980:44). 
However, he immediately (1980:45) recognises that anyone with a "natural sensitivity" will 
be able to produce such an analysis, no matter what their theoretical background. 
Something is surely wrong^^. 
Hyman is undeniably correct, both about his form of Marxism and about the types of 
analyses produced by such as Griffin (1986) and Guille (1984). The problem arises from 
using Marxist categories in an empiricist manner. When this occurs the analyses are not 
logically distinguishable form empiricist ones^^ 
Marxists sought the solution to the problems of theorising within industrial relations 
by examining the nature of it. Not surprisingly, given their starting point, they discovered 
that the problem lay outside of Marxism, and in the nature of industrial relations. New 
objects were introduced in order to allow the exploration of the phenomena in question. 
Despite the efforts to produce a specifically Marxist analysis they fell back into a more 
sophisticated form of empiricism. The next section examines Marxist discourse itself, to 
find out why it falls into empiricism. 
THE ENEMY WITHIN: THE FATAL ATTRACTION OF "CONFLICT". 
It is not surprising that conflict should be given prominence in industrial relations. 
The obviousness of the conflict between capitalists and workers forms the very raison d'etre 
11. Hyman is one of the very few Marxist writers who dare to confront the reality of their position. Most 
ignore the difficulties, and continue to violently draw together incompatible levels of analysis. 
12. The argument for this position is developed at length in chapter 4. 
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of the practice of industrial relations. Industrial relations is a discipline which has been 
produced to a considerable extent as a response to policy imperatives (Winchester,1983). 
Hence, conflict as the major concern of employers, managers, unions^^ and even 
governments has become the focus of the discipline. Not surprisingly, conflict has also been 
an organising principle in most industrial relations research. It has provided both pluralists 
and Marxists with the core of their analytical activity. 
Pluralist notions of the centrality of conflict rest on the Hobbesian view of the "war of 
all against all" which would be engaged in by self-seeking individuals, but for the order 
imposed by the rulers. Clegg (1979b) uses such parameters in his analysis of plurahsm in 
industrial relations. Within his theory, the field of industrial relations is constituted as "a 
continuous process of concession and compromise" (Clegg, 1979b:309). Clegg (1979b) is a 
little unclear as to the site of final authority. In some ways he wishes to refer to the rules 
generated through collective bargaining as the source of stability. However, he 
acknowledges that while agreement is ideal it is not inevitable^"^. At other times, managers 
are seen as filling, through the doctrine of "managerial prerogative", the place of final 
authority. Their position is equivalent to that of political sovereignty, claims Clegg 
(1979b)^^. His ambivalence no doubt reflects divisions within his thinking and in the world. 
On the one hand, there is the liberalism of "concession and compromise". On the other, 
there is the authority of managers. It is precisely the contradiction on which capitalism is 
built: subordination through freedom. However, Clegg (1979b) could not see the ambiguity 
for he was merely describing (more or less accurately) the surface phenomena as he saw 
them. 
13. What counts as Conflict' for unions is quite different from what it means to managers but industrial 
relations has not explored this. 
14. Clegg (1979:316) notes that his contemporary Britain displayed signs of much political disorder as the 
"pluralist stabilising mechanisms" had failed to contain social disorder. The lack of harmony was not a 
theoretical problem for pluralism. It operated both as a description of an ideal and of reality. As well, it 
was supposed that advanced Western countries were in the process of coinciding with the ideal. 
15. It is interesting that in Clegg's (1979:311) analysis managers are given all the status of final authority. 
Clegg (1979:309) had claimed that pluralism rejected an analysis of power based on the role of the king as 
final authority. 
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The Hobbesian assumptions in pluralist analyses are deeply problematic. They rely 
on the assumption of the "eternal" nature of humans as being self seeking individuals^^. In 
addition, they automatically lead to a justification for and legitimation of the existing ruling 
group which is able to produce order because individuals cede their powers to it. It is not 
surprising that Marxists and neo-Marxists rejected the Hobbesian assumptions. However, 
they maintained the centrality of the concept of conflict and in doing so they only partially 
rejected a flawed problematic. As a consequence, most Marxist analyses have remained 
within the general framework provided by pluralism. 
The organizing principle of "conflict" was carried into Marxism through the early 
work of Hyman. He claims (1975, 1977) that conflict is inherent in the employer-employee 
relationship. It arises from an inherent inequality in power which occurs because of the 
different relationships to the means of production and from the concomitant 
commodification of "labour" (Hyman,1975:19)^''. 
The concept "conflict" can easily gain hegemony within Marxism. It is apparently 
isomorphic with Marx's analysis of the necessarily antagonistic relations between capital and 
labour. Hyman (1975:23) spells this out clearly: 
Between these two classes^^ there exists a radical conflict of interests, 
which underlies everything that occurs in industrial relations. 
Unfortunately, and as a result of the link with Marxism, "conflict" has become a talisman. 
Its use heralds that a radical critique is being conducted. The effect is that its political and 
theoretical obviousness has precluded it from any examination. 
The way in which conflict operates in Marxist analyses has not been subjected to 
scrutiny. Marxists have been particularly caught by the seductive quality of the concept. 
16. Human nature is a social product. Self seeking is doubtless a trait available to all humans at any time 
(as is also any other trait). However, it is drawn out of humans and generalised within capitalism. It thus 
appears to us now as definitive of human nature. What an impoverished view of humans it represents. 
17. In a later work Hyman (1989a:21) refers, more accurately, to "labour power" rather than to "labour". 
18. Hyman (1975:22) collapses classes and social groupings. The classes he refers to consist of two types. 
First, there are the "men and women who make an obvious contribution to production which is not 
adequately reflected in their pay and conditions" The other class consists of "those whose property allows 
them to live from the labour of others; and the top levels of managers". It is a problematic notion of class, 
and very close to the Weberian one. The adequacy of the concept, however, is not a matter of concern here. 
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Certainly, they were able to introduce a much needed critique of industrial relations 
phenomena with their examination of its bases in the nature of capitalism. However, the 
incorporation of "conflict" into their analyses has prevented other developments. 
The aim in the following pages is to show how (to borrow words from Hyman 
(1978:16) and to use them in relation to Marxist, rather than pluralist discourse): 
certain affinities in terms of orientations and underlying 
assumptions...have shaped the (Marxist) academic analysis of industrial 
relations; and how this has encouraged a conception of the subject and of 
the dynamics of the (relations between capitalists and workers) which 
obscures or excludes altogether from consideration what should be an 
important part of the subject's focus (my additions in brackets). 
The failure of Marxists to examine the qualities inherent in the concept "conflict" has 
led to a diminution of analytical possibilities. The concept has tended to lead to a 
problematic, and ideological, examination of what counts as conflict. The result has been 
that the actual relations between capitalists and workers have not been able to be explored 
fully. Moreover, the use of "conflict" as an organising principle has pulled other Marxist 
categories to the empirical level. Consequently, Marxist analyses can neither support 
general claims nor adequately examine the power involved in the capital/labour relation. 
It used to be fashionable to examine all industrial action as various forms of conflict. 
Marxists no longer engage in the activity. Others who are continuing to work with forms of 
conflict, notably Edwards (1986;!992), are producing sophisticated analyses of the meanings 
of behaviour at work^^: 
the key question is not whether a given form of behaviour is a type of 
conflict but how the conflictual aspects of work are organised, expressed, 
and regulated (Edwards,! 992:362). 
Despite the change in analytical focus, it is necessary to examine both the origin of this form 
of analysis and Hyman's way of dealing it. It will highlight the way in which conflict is an 
ideological organising principle. 
19. Edwards (1986) analyses are very useful. However, they do not entirely remove him from the original 
problematic in which the questions were first explored. He tends to be trapped into exploring only those 
activities which are conflictual from the point of view of common sense understandings: the activities of 
workers. See further in the text for a discussion. 
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The origins of the debate on various forms of conflict lies in a Hobbesian view of the 
world. It can easily be seen in the work of an early exponent: Kerr (1964). He drew upon 
the Hobbesian idea of the "war of all against all" and transferred it to the industrial arena. 
According to him labour and management relations are a "classic form of conflict" (1964:169-
70). Kerr (1964) saw both possessing insatiable desires, yet with only limited means to 
achieve them. As a result, he argued there was an "eternal opposition of interest"^'^^ His 
analysis provides the rationale for seeing all types of industrial action as forms of conflict^^. 
However, the ideological obviousness of what counts as conflict limited the actions 
that were to be analysed under its rubric. Kerr (1964) lists only workers' practices. They 
include sabotage, absenteeism and personal turnover. Perhaps, one would expect a Marxist 
analysis to be sensitive to the oversight. Management practices, such as speed ups, 
redundancies, promotions and failure to pass on increases in productivity could have been 
seen as forms of conflict. However, they were not. The concept "conflict" was taken from 
its home in common sense and pluralism and its meanings accompanied it. It is evidenced 
in Hyman's (1975) dealing with forms of conflict. He too, only explores workers' practices. 
It leads to a one sided and conservative view of industrial relations behaviour, a point which 
Hyman recognises later (Hyman 1989b). 
The recognition that "industrial conflict" arose from a management orientation 
(Hyman,1989b:98) doubtless led to its demise as an analytic tool in Marxist analyses. Yet, 
the concept of "conflict" was assumed to be untainted, and so it continued to inform Marxist 
theory. 
Marxists failed to probe the ideological baggage which the concept of "conflict" 
carried into their analyses. Rather, they merely provided a radical critique for its existence. 
20. Kerr (1964) notes that are further bases for conflict. They lie in the instability of any compromise and in 
the need for both managers and labour to be in conflict in order to maintain their identities. 
21. Kerr (1964) cannot see the logic of his position for two reasons. One is that the everyday world only 
called workers' actions conflictual. The second is that the Hobbesian view legitimises a place that will 
arbiter the incessant war. In industrial relations, that place can be seen as being with management through 
the legal doctrine of "managerial prerogative" - a point that Clegg (1979a:311) makes plainly. Both 
positions should be able to be seen as ideological, from a Marxist perspective. 
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However, the ideological character of the concept had its effect: it created difficulties. All 
organising concepts must open up possibilities and close off others. The concept "conflict" 
is no exception. However, the possibilities it closed off were vital for Marxism. It 
prevented access to Marx's general claims about the nature of capitalism. 
The form of the relation between capitalists and labourers is set by the ideological 
conceptions inherent in the concept "conflict". Marxist explanations of conflict continue the 
ideological form given within the common sense view of seeing it as relating only to 
workers' practices. Marxism seeks to provide radical reasons for the existence of conflict in 
terms of a greater power residing with capitalists, which necessarily creates conflict in 
workers. It produces a one sided explanation: here is conflict, here its cause. 
The concept of "conflict" was given a radical interpretation through the explanation 
of the greater power of capitalists. Hyman pointed to the nature of capitalism as generating 
a conflict of interest between capitalists and labourers. However, capitalists were seen as 
having the greater power in the relationship on at least two counts. First, they and their 
managers operate in a system which gives them the advantage of being accorded legitimacy. 
Hence, in many respects, according to Hyman (1975:26) they could "preclude opposition 
from arising". Additionally, capitalists, it was claimed, possess greater economic power. 
Hyman (1989c:227) argues that they are in a better position to bargain than workers: 
The superficial equality of buyer and seller conceals underlying 
inequalities of market power which underpin the terms of trade. ...This is 
particularly true of the labour market where the employer represents the 
concentrated power of capital whereas workers participate in the 
employment contract as vulnerable individuals. Combination in trade 
unions is, most simply, a means of partially offsetting this built-in 
inequality. 
Such an analysis of the power of capitalists was a necessary corrective to the pluralist view 
which saw power as equally balanced. Nevertheless, it mirrored the one sided explanation 
set in place in earlier analyses of conflict. As such, it has led to difficulties within Marxism. 
The first effect of the structuring of the discourse by "conflict" is that it leaves the 
actual relations between capitalists and workers as residual. The analytical activity logically 
concentrates on a few possibilities. It either provides a radical explanation of forms of 
conflict or it examines why conflict does not occur. Hence, its concerns are with either the 
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reasons for, or the outcomes of, the relations between capitalists and labourers. There is a 
need for such work. However, it does minimise the possibility of other interests. The most 
problematic absence is that actual relations slip from view. The theoretical parameters, 
themselves, mitigate against seeing them as relations. In itself, it may not be a difficulty^^, 
however, it certainly becomes one when the question of power is considered. 
The disparity of power between capitalists and labourers is the dominant theme that 
emerges in Hyman's work. Yet, it is also his achilles heel. Power is, after all, a notoriously 
difficult concept in any field. Hyman's use of it, viewed through the parameters provided 
by conflict, is no exception. The analytical problems it produces will be traced in the two 
areas where Hyman (1989a; 1989c) claims power operates: the sale of labour power and 
control over the use of it. 
The Marxist claim that there is an inequality of power between capitalists and 
workers in terms of bargaining over the sale of labour power is weak. Hyman (1989a:39) 
asserts: 
there is no serious basis for the assertion that this power (of trade unions) 
even approaches, in any general and systematic sense, that of the agencies 
with which unions are engaged in continuous relationships. 
Clegg (!979b:313) is quite correct to point out that "it is extremely difficult to measure 
bargaining power". As he maintains, the question of the balance of power will lie with an 
assessment of the outcome, in the light of the demands made. It does not automatically 
reside with capitalists. Most employers do not find themselves in the fortunate position 
outlined by Hyman in his early work. He (1975:23) asserts employers have more power as 
they can "shut up shop" or they can "count on decisive support from the state and from other 
dominant sections of society"^^. The reality is that only very few can do this. The very fact 
that companies bargain, a process that involves concession and compromise on both sides, 
22. Griffin (1986:223) refers to this form of analysis as "workerism". It views capitalism as "an externality 
imposed on workers". She also notes the untheorised nature of class struggle in Marxist analyses in 
industrial relations. The two points are connected I feel, however, they will not be explored here. 
23. Only some major, and politically and economically strategic companies can claim such support from the 
State. Then any government, of any political persuasion, tends to give them total support. As well, most 
firms cannot easily move off shore to cheaper labour areas, though some do. They are often as tied to a 
local situation as is labour. 
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indicates that power does not reside with them. Companies need to hire suitable workers. 
They are forced to meet the industry average, at least, in their locality. Thus, workers have 
power over the company to the extent of comparisons in terms of wages and conditions. It 
is also true that unions may have more power than the company with which they are 
bargaining. Companies, for example, forced to put on two workers to run one machine, 
companies faced with wage demands at the time of a cement pour, or a large order, know 
that they are in a weak bargaining position. There is no point in denying these possibilities. 
They do not negate the many cases of the abuse of power by capitalists^^. It is quite 
appropriate to acknowledge that Clegg (1979b) is correct: that bargaining power is not a 
given. It also is necessary to note that there will be a tendency for an unequal distribution 
of power, favouring capitalists. However, that important question cannot be fully explored 
when it is collapsed into the claim that capitalists have undisputed domination over 
labourers. 
What really is at issue is the fact that workers are confined to making the demands in 
the terms that they do. That rationality in terms of spreading employment has to be fought 
for through the irrational means of getting more people employed than are necessary for the 
work. That rationality in meeting the needs of oneself and family has to be converted into 
antagonistic battles where all are the poorer for it. The form of power attached to this 
cannot be understood from the parameters provided by conflict. 
The second area of unequal power relation, according to Hyman, involves the 
relafions of control at work. Hyman (!989a; 1989c) notes that managers have been given the 
right to manage and hence they have control over the labour process. He accounts for the 
24. Hyman also addresses the question of why workers are not militant. It leads to interesting analyses of 
facts often ignored by other writers. For example, consider his examination of the contradictory positions 
of trade unions and the effects on wage and condition bargaining. Hyman (1989a:27-28) points to the effect 
of "fair comparisons" which means that 
wage bargaining typically involves the contestation of the relative economic 
advantages of different sections of the working class, rather than the general process 
of exploitation affecting all trade unionists (emphasis in original).. 
Metcalfe (1988) has explored this in relation to the miners in New South Wales. However, very few other 
Marxists have. It is an area that is ripe for further analysis. 
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obedience of workers to their commands both in terms of the threat of getting the "sack" and 
of consent. Hyman notes that the "sack" cannot be frequently used, hence forms of consent 
become the dominant means of ensuring acquiescence. It follows from the ideologies 
surrounding management and work, as well as from the habits and good will of the workers 
(Hyman,1989c:229). As a result of management control, Hyman argues that there is a 
conflict of interest over how work is to be performed which can surface at any time: 
In every situation the terms of the relationship involve a constant process 
of negotiation with antagonistic implications which are often suppressed 
but at times erupt into open conflict. 
Certainly, there is no denying Hyman's claims. Management does stand over the workers 
as a "manifestation of an alien power" (Hyman,1989a:24). There is power in the hand of 
management to control the labour process. Yet, have we understood the power of capital in 
seeing it? 
The parameters of understanding imposed by the concept "conflict" hinders the 
analysis of the power of capital over the nature of work. The concept "conflict" forces the 
analysis into one where one side has more power than the other. From this point of view, it 
is difficult to understand the relationship of power between capitalists and labourers. When 
we note that managers have the right to control, we do not see that managers and employers 
too are forced to behave in this manner. After all, it is clear that a capitalist only has power 
because of the operation of capital. The investment of capital provides jobs. In that 
(capitalist) sense it is a gift, and moreover, one that trade unions and governments actively 
seek. Once capital is invested, it becomes a power over both capitalists and workers. If a 
person wishes to remain a capitalist, then they are subject to the iron laws of compefition. 
They have to act as capital personified. They must organise work at least to the average 
efficiency (both technically and in terms of co-ordination) of the industry in which they 
operate. They must achieve an average number of sales. Failure to do either of these 
reduces the value of the capital and consequently, threatens the well being of both the 
capitahst and the workers^^. The relation between capitalists and workers is therefore not 
25. It is assumed that workers are more vulnerable than capitalists when there is a failure in a company. It 
is not necessarily the case. A capitalist may loose everything, including his/her home. Workers will 
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so simple. Capitalists do have the right to organise work within production. The effect is 
often disastrous for the well being of the workers. It can also be pleasant, and sought after, 
though that occurs less often. However, capitalists are doing this in order to remain 
capitalists, and hence to remain the employers of the workers. What is at fault is capitalism, 
and the power of capital. It makes efficiency at work take inhuman forms. Of course, it is 
humans who insist on these forms, but they do not have the choice if they wish to remain as 
capitalists. Also, it must be remembered that the inhuman forms are caught up in 
ideologies which hide their effect upon workers^^. As a result, capitahsts will, in general, 
see that they are performing a social service - which in one sense they are. 
Hyman is right in his recognition that there is a power at work in capitalism which 
makes the efforts of the workers seem puny. His research has continually circled it, 
attempting to catch it. The result is that many facets of the nature of capitalist/worker 
relations have been explored. Yet, the mysterious power within capitalism has eluded his 
grasp. 
Ironically, it is the use of the concept of "conflict" which prevents the power of capital 
being grasped. It is a concept which functions in an empiricist manner and so reduces any 
categories with which it is linked to its own level. The power of capital is, however, not able 
to be captured from concepts which operate in an empiricist manner. Thus the concept of 
"conflict" prevents the very analysis which it sought to achieve. 
Empirical concepts and Marxist categories are different. Empiricism rests upon a 
particular view of the relation between knowledge and reality. Empiricism claims that 
experience (through any of the senses) is the sole criterion for a thing's existence 
(Bhaskar,!979:2). "Things" are perceived as discrete but able to interact with other discrete 
"things". The concepts in most theories operate in this manner. They refer to persons and 
usually be able to keep their home. The event can be a great leveller. However, it is equally true that 
many capitalists will seek legal means to ensure the safety of many of their assets. 
26. Consider the case of Taylorism. The scientific ideology which accompanied it was so powerful that 
even the Soviet Union was convinced of the value of it as a form of work organisation. 
33 
things, their behaviours and interacfions and insfitufions: "things" which are "perceivable"^^. 
However, the categories in Marxist analysis refer to different "things": social relations^^. 
Thus, for example, "capital" refers to a social relation and "capitalist" to a person. Some 
theoretical claims can be made of "capital" which become quite ludicrous when transposed 
onto "capitalists". 
Marxists, within industrial relafions, have confined their criticism of empiricism to it. 
The critique was not carried into Marxism. As a result, empiricism invades their work. The 
problem with empiricism, according to both Hyman (1975:10) and Guille (1984) was that it 
collected "facts" and hid its theoretical assumptions. The solution, for Hyman (1975:10) was 
to advance theoretical propositions which would give the criteria for the selection of facts. 
Others (Marsden,1982; Guille, 1984; Griffin, 1986) criticised the empiricism of industrial 
relations from a different perspective. Their solutions were the same as Hyman's: to 
substitute other objects of analysis for those provided within industrial relations discourse. 
None of them fully explored the empiricism within Marxism. 
When Marxist theory is woven around the concept of "conflict" it reduces Marx's 
concepts to empirical ones. Hence it creates problems in terms of the claims that can be 
made. Hyman differentiates two levels of conflict. One occurs at the level of interests 
given by class positions. The other refers to a range of workers' actions. The two are 
connected through the concept of power. However, they both are drawn into the 
parameters made available by the concept of "conflict". "Conflict" refers either to a separate 
thing, or to a relation between two separate things. It is an empiricist concept and so pulls 
the categories it associates with to an empirical level. Thus "capital" and "labour" must 
become "capitalists" and "labourers", for they also refer to separate "things" which can 
interact. Yet, Hyman wishes to make claims relating to the undisputed domination of 
labour by capital. When these assertions are made of capitalists and labourers, they are 
informative, politically important, but also problematic, as has been noted. They cannot 
27. Strictly speaking none of the "things" are merely perceivable. However, they are treated as though they 
were. 
28. See Chapter 4 for an exploration of the crucial difference. 
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deliver, the certainty that is contained in claims about the social relations between capital 
and labour. The general claims about domination are not reachable through the analyses of 
the power of capitalists. Similar problems were seen in Griffin's (1986) work. 
The concept of "conflict" has infected Marxist analyses for it is not a Marxist category. 
Hyman recognised that "conflict" was a concept taken from the everyday understandings. 
He was not wary of it, whereas he should have been. It appeared seductively perfect. It 
appeared to reveal something about the nature of capitalism (Hyman,1975:186). Its use, he 
claimed, showed an awareness that "work relafions (within capitalism) are an inevitable 
source of dispute''^*^. In taking on the concept, Hyman was able to achieve much. His work 
was immediately recognisable as industrial relations, for it was organised around the same 
concept as the pluralists' analyses. Moreover, he was it seemed able to link this to the 
Marxist claims about the antagonism between capital and labour, thus it provided a critique 
of pluralism. However, he and other Marxists using the concept have not been able to move 
out of its limitations. The result is that there is a contradiction at the heart of their work-^^. 
REPLACING "CONFLICT" WITH "BARGAINING". 
The phenomena with which industrial relafions deals is of importance to a Marxist. 
Hyman (1980:42) emphasises the point: "the empirical realities (of industrial 
relafions)...remain of considerable pracfical and theoretical importance to Marxists". After 
all, the phenomena which industrial relations describes are the interactions of capitalists and 
labourers. In order to understand capitalism, surely that requires serious analysis. The 
problem is, however, how to incorporate it into Marxism. 
There are a couple of spaces within Marxist theory which could accommodate the 
phenomena of industrial relations. They could be analysed through the concept of class 
29. Probably, the awareness was merely the result of historical accident: that was the form the relations 
were taking then. 
30. The contradiction is picked up in the ritualistic, but correct, mode of rejection of Marxist theory in any 
field. Dabscheck uses the available forms in his assessment of the inadequacy of Marxism within industrial 
relations. The "amorphous breadth of Marxism" (Dabscheck,1983:504) is cited as a problem . As well, 
Marxism is understood as failing to treat the specificities of particular situations, particularly those relating 
to collectivities (Dabscheck,!983:497). 
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struggle, or they could be approached through the notion of capitalism as an economic form 
of domination. Hyman's work concentrates on the first area, though the concept of class 
struggle remains untheorised. However, he also has attached to it the notion of power, 
which as we have seen proved problematic. This thesis attempts to explore industrial 
relations through the second opening within Marxist theory: capitalism, as an economic 
form of domination. 
The economic form of domination opens a space for the analysis of industrial 
relations. The exchange relations between capital and labour are the site for their 
examination. However, work must be done to use it. The phenomena of industrial 
relations cannot just be transposed into Marxism. Its concepts are, naturally, at an empirical 
level. Hence, it is not in a suitable form for melding with the categories for social relations 
in Marx's analysis. In addition, and connected to that point, no object for the analysis of the 
relations in exchange has yet been developed within Marxism. 
Developing an object of analysis is hard work. However, it cannot be avoided if 
social relations are to be analysed'^^. As Bhaskar (1979:62) argues: 
In systems, like social ones....the problem of constituting an appropriate 
object of inquiry becomes particularly acute. 
Most Marxists take the existing objects developed by Marx (for example, labour process, 
relafions of producfion) and apply them-^^. However, there is much more work needed to 
develop new objects in areas not touched on by Marx. 
The thesis shows how a new object, the apparatus of calculation (Turner,!990) can be 
used to explore the relations between capital and labour in exchange. It explores how the 
apparatus of calculation allows the analysis of significant aspects of industrial relafions from 
the point of view of the domination of labour by capitaP-^. It argues that domination, which 
31. This requires much more explanation, which is given in chapter 4. 
32. Marsden (1982) is the only Marxist who has started to construct an object for the analysis of industrial 
relations phenomena. However, his work is undeveloped. It merely hints at possibilities. 
33. The apparatus of calculation, therefore, deals with the phenomena in terms of a fairly abstract, though 
real relation. It is not the only level of interest. The multi-faceted quality of social phenomena enables, 
and indeed, demands different understandings. 
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is so hard to grasp analytically, can be seen in the way capital constitutes the very being of 
the wage labourer'^4 
The apparatus of calculation makes bargaining the central interest in the 
capitalist/worker relation. It is explored more fully in Chapter 5, however, it is mentioned 
here in order to distinguish this approach from that of other Marxist writers in industrial 
relations. Traditionally, Marxists have analysed through the concept of "conflict" but it 
leads to problems. Moreover, it becomes more cumbersome once the relations between 
capitalists cind labourers assume a hegemonic form. 
Despite the fact that industrial relations phenomena continually refer to bargaining, 
it has not been accepted as an organising principle. Laffer (1974:72) did suggest it. 
Marxists, however, continued to work with "conflict". Dunlop apparently rejected it as it 
pushed industrial relations into an obsession with "labor peace and warfare" 
(Laffer,1975:72)'^5. Bain and Clegg (1974:95) also discounted it, claiming that the term was 
too narrow: 
(it) tends to exclude, or at least not to provide a very fruitful basis for 
analysing, those rules of job regulation which are established and 
administered unilaterally by unions, employers or the state, as well as 
those rules which exist as custom and practice. 
Thus pluralists and Marxists agreed that "bargaining" was not a suitable organising 
principle. 
Care must be taken with the the term "bargaining". It is meant to refer beyond the 
overt activity of bargaining. It is designed to pick up the specific nature of the employment 
relationship. Within capitalism, neither the wage nor the effort is given, but subject to 
constant pushes and pulls from either workers or capitalists (and their managers). There 
are myriad ways of shiffing the bargain. The point is to see all these various activities as 
bargaining, whatever their surface appearance. 
34. It constitutes possibilities not actualities. 
35. Laffer (1975) is citing a letter from Professor Henemann which retells a conversation between himself 
and Bain and Clegg. Bain and Clegg (1974:95) make the same point in their article. 
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From this point of view, the extent of bargaining within capitalism is considerable. 
There is bargaining over the wage. We can recognise it in any of its forms: in the 
negotiations around a table, in the use of tactics and strategies to enhance a bargaining 
position, in the role of the State in conciliating and arbitrating. There is also bargaining over 
effort. It is not a given-^^. We employ the same range of mechanisms to get a better bargain 
in this area. Trade unions and employers might lobby the government, workers may 
engage in myriad forms of resistance to the current level of effort, employers also have their 
own range of tactics and strategies. Workers and employers may even sit and negotiate 
over it. 
Bargaining is a term which allows a multitude of industrial relations phenomena to 
be explored. It can deal with even those aspects (for example, health and safety) which have 
been difficult to incorporate in the more traditional approaches. As Laffer (1974:73) claims 
"bargaining" can be used to explore informal as well as formal processes, and also processes 
that appear to be unilaterally imposed. Edwards^^ (1986:74) also indicates that it is fruitful 
to explore work relations in terms of bargaining: 
Terms such as bargaining and negotiation should be taken as referring not 
just to explicit collective bargaining ... but also to informal practices that 
affect the terms of the effort bargain. 
There is constant bargaining over wages and effort. It occurs at many sites and involves 
many means. The State may be involved, in terms of arbitration or in something like health 
and safety legislation. It may occur only at the workplace and involve over award 
payments or custom and practice. It occurs at an individual and a collecfive level. It 
necessarily draws in social values. Gender, race, age, disability all get re-worked through 
36. Usually this has been explored from the question of the necessity of control which arises from this fact. 
I am suggesting a different way to approach it. 
37. Edwards (1986) provides very carefully crafted tools for the analysis of the relations in the workplace. 
However, his work is still caught within the confines of "conflict". Despite his recognition of the 
significance of bargaining, Edwards (1986) does not organise his analysis around that. Instead it is 
structured through the concept of "conflict". Hence, Edwards is still confined to an exploration of those 
behaviours which have been ideologically called "conflict": sabotage, absenteeism etc. That is a pity. 
Edwards' (1986) work is also limited by its confinement to the "workplace". 
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bargaining into the particular forms they take within "industrial relafions". It seems a 
fruitful way in which to capture the myriad relafions contained in "industrial relations". 
Pluralists doubtless could not "see" bargaining over both wages and effort for they 
took "industrial relations" as a given. Hence, "bargaining" did not seem a suitable 
organising principle to them. From their point of view, there is no bargaining over effort for 
it is apparently, excluded by the doctrine of "managerial prerogative". The pluralists' 
rejection of "bargaining" and their organisation of the discipline of industrial relations in 
terms of "rules", is thus a neat solution to a potential problem-^^. It enables them to maintain 
both the doctrine of managerial prerogative, and their recognition that there are significant 
features of work outside of collective bargaining. However, the ideological solution has its 
affect. It has left many areas of work relations outside main stream industrial relations 
research. Clegg (1979:2), for example, notes his difficulty in including custom and practice. 
Also, other very significant areas, such as that of health and safety, were even less at home in 
the discipline. 
Marxists equally could not "see" that bargaining was the form of the relation between 
capitalists and labourers. They set up their analyses partly in terms given by pluralism, but 
re-worked into Marxist concerns. "Conflict" was retained as the organising principle, but 
given a Marxist gloss. The control inherent in managerial prerogative and the power of 
capitalists and their managers-^^ was emphasised as the source of conflict. In the process, 
there was no chance of recognising bargaining, for the analyses were structured in terms of 
causes (power) and consequences (conflict). 
Common sense should not dictate the boundaries for the analysis of industrial 
relations phenomena. It excludes or minimises what can be explored through the question 
of bargaining. "Conflict" is merely the ideological name that is given to bargaining. It only 
38. Clegg (1979a:2-3) differentiates the sources of rules in industrial relations. While collective bargaining 
is mentioned it is only one source. The others he notes as being employer or managerial regulation, trade 
union regulation, statutory regulation and custom and practice. He cannot see any of these as being about 
bargaining, yet they all are. 
39. Hence, Hyman's (1979:12) redefinition of the area of interest as "processes of control over work 
relations". 
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refers to (some of )the tactics and strategies employed by the workers. But bargaining is a 
dual process. By using "bargaining" as an organising principle due weight can be given to 
the actions of all parties in the exchange. 
This thesis will be examining only one aspect of the bargaining relations between 
capitalists and labourers^'l It examines bargaining to see what form the social relations of 
the domination of labour by capital takes. 
CONCLUSION 
The chapter has noted that Marxism has been plagued by difficulty in its dealing 
with industrial relations. All authors have looked for the problem in the nature of industrial 
relations. Its empiricism was seen to preclude theoretical development. Hence, its 
empiricist concepts were replaced with Marxist categories. However, the problem was not 
solved: the dilemma of the relation of general to specific claims was still present. Hence, a 
sound argument could not be produced for the central claim that capital dominated labour. 
It was argued that the real dilemma lay within Marxism. The organising principle of 
"conflict" reduced all categories to the empirical level. In that form they could not support 
general claims. As a step towards one solution to the difficulty, it was suggest that the 
organising principle should be "bargaining" rather than "conflict". It is possible, using 
"bargaining", to develop an object (the apparatus of calculation) for the analysis of the 
relations of domination of wage labour by capital within exchange. 
However, before the apparatus of calculation is developed, the other face of 
domination, the labour process, must be explored. Marxism has felt much more at home 
here, after all it is a Marxist category to begin with. Despite this, the labour process 
literature has been beset by problems. The next chapter will argue that a similar canker is at 
work in it, as in Marxist analyses in industrial relafions. Its organising principle was that of 
40. An analysis organised around "bargaining" will not necessarily avoid empiricism. However, it is 
possible to look at bargaining and "see" the transformation in the social relations involving capital and 
labour. Chapter 4 more fully explains this crucial distinction. "Bargaining" is used in preference to 
"conflict" to free up what will be counted as relevant, and particularly to allow the analysis of consensual 
relations in exchange. 
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control. Like "conflict" it was enormously attractive; like conflict the attraction proved fatal 
for Marxist analyses. 
4! 
CHAPTER 3 
THE FATAL ATTRACTION OF THE OBVIOUS: CONTROL 
The labour process lias been developed by Marx for the specific analytical 
purpose of exploring the subordination of labour by capital. It is one half of the 
domination of labour by capital. The other aspect, is to be found in the relations 
of freedom in exchange. However, in the labour process literature, the original 
aim was replaced with others. "Control" became the organising principle, and 
it proved fatal. The labour process was forced into holding all the empirical 
relations between capitalists and luorkers. It is little wonder, it was found 
ivanting. 
It is claimed tJwt our lived experience of both control and freedom led to giving 
"control" analytical zveight. However, domination of labour by capital cannot 
be captured directly. In capitalism, domination is hidden and must be 
discovered. This chapter argues that the labour process needs to be returned to 
its original analytical purpose. It will enable a profound content to be given to 
both subordination and freedom, as aspects of domination. 
The previous chapter has examined the way in which the relations in exchange 
have been developed in the industrial relations literature. It suggested that the analysis 
was hindered by using the lived experience of conflict as an organising principle. In this 
chapter, the labour process literature is explored. One would expect it to be in better 
shape for the analysis of the economic form of domination. After all, it is employing one 
of Marx's own categories: the labour process. However, that is not the case. It too, has 
fallen under the seductive power of our lived experience. It has been organised around 
"control" and that has diminished its possibilities. 
The labour process was developed by Marx as the analyfical object for the 
explorafion of the subordination of labour by capital. However, the labour process 
literature has produced two unfortunate understandings of subordination. It was 
understood as being equivalent to domination and that was read as being about "control". 
These understandings have led to the present "crisis"^ in the labour process Hterature. 
1. Knights (1990:298) notes the enormous quantity of criticism and the "crisis" that has been declared to 
exist. However, he (1990:329) claims that it is not necessarily indicative of a "flawed theoretical 
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Most writers within the labour process literature have sought to explore the 
domination of labour by capital. They have assumed it to be present in production. The 
result is that there has been a fetishism of the moment of production. It was made the sole 
site for the analysis of domination. Ironically, that has been supported by Braverman's 
(1976) theorisation of the labour power/labour distinction. Domination, however, eluded 
them and the labour process was destroyed. 
In addition, subordination within the labour process has been understood through 
the concept of control. However, "control" proved fatal as the central concept. It 
undermined the value of the labour process as an analytical object. It necessarily drew 
into the labour process the questions of consent and resistance. As a result, there was no 
chance of returning, with sense, to the claims made by Marx (1954) and Braverman (1974). 
The labour process lost its coherence and privileged position under the weight of these 
concepts. 
The result was that the labour process, itself, seemed to be at fault. There is 
considerable agreement with Storey (1985:194) who argued that "the labour process 
bandwagon has run into the sand". It did not seem to provide an adequate field for the 
analyses of the relations between capitalists and workers. 
However, my claim is that, on the contrary, the dilemmas within the labour process 
literature point to an inappropriate use of the labour process. Tbiis chapter seeks to rescue 
the labour process as one of the key sites for the analysis of the relations between capital 
and labour. The project is definitely unfashionable. However, it is necessary if we want 
to grasp the way capital dominates labour now. 
Others also, have sought to re-theorise the labour process in order to capture its 
significance^. Burawoy (1985), Edwards (1986) and Cohen (1985), in quite different ways, 
try to hold onto the value of both the labour process and its traditional concerns. 
enterprise". I wish to acknowledge both the reality of the crisis and the worth of the theoretical 
enterprise. 
2. The other response to the difficulties in the labour process debate has been to shift the focus of the 
debate. Thus, an analysis of managerial strategies is developed (Littler and Salaman,1982; Storey,1985). 
Also, there has been an interest in assessing the mechanisms of power as they constitute individuals at 
work (Knights and Willmott,1989; Knights,1990; Willmott,1990). 
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Unfortunately, the conceptual clarity which they seek, eludes them. They fall into the 
same traps which were set in the earlier debate. They either seek to place all relafions in 
the labour process, and/or make the labour process the only site for the analysis of 
domination. 
It is suggested that conceptual clarity can best be achieved by exploring two areas 
of Marx's work. His account of the labour process and of the economic form of 
domination can reveal useful tools for analysis. A return to Marx's examination of the 
labour process reveals that his categories are quite different from those in the debate. The 
imperative he explores is that of co-ordination, not control. Marx's concern with 
valorisation, leads him to examine the form of co-ordination of all aspects of the labour 
process: the tools, the activity of work and the objects of work. Moreover, Marx's analysis 
is of subordination, not control. He certainly, examines the affects of the forms of co-
ordination on the worker. However, his analytical interest is not in the experiences of 
control or consent, but in a more profound level of subordination^. He examines the 
subordination of the attributes of the workers to capital. 
"Subordination" and "control" are thus different concepts. The labour process 
literature in reducing the concerns to those of "control" have produced a different object 
from Marx's. It is not surprising that they could not match their findings with those of 
Marx. 
It is true that resistance is given no space in Marx's analysis of the labour process. 
However, that does not mean that it is insignificant or absent. Far from it. It merely 
means that it has its analytical home in a different place. 
Marx's work on the economic form of domination can reveal the site for the 
analysis of resistance. Resistance is found in the relations of exchange, which are an 
aspect of the relations of domination. The other aspect, is the subordination in the labour 
process. Resistance is thus the twin of subordination. Together they constitute the 
parficular mode of domination within capitalism. 
3. Marx, also notes the affect, at a personal level of the nature of work. However, that can be explored 
without the analytical object of the labour process. In terms of the labour process, the organising 
principle is elsewhere. 
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When the labour process is placed within the economic form of domination a 
number of dilemmas can be solved. It is freed from the burden of carrying all relations. 
As a result, it can be maintained as an object for the analysis of subordination. At the 
same time, resistance can be given its due. 
Our lived experience of work has led us astray in the analysis of domination within 
capitalism. The control at work has seemed central, both because of its reality, and 
because of the existence of our experience of freedom. However, it is suggested that 
domination cannot be captured directly through our lived experience. We are dominated 
as much by our freedom, as by our subordination. 
THE LABOUR PROCESS DEBATE 
The labour process was developed by Marx (1954) and Braverman (1976) for a 
specific purpose. It was used as a means of exploring the subordination of labour. Both 
examined the way that capital shaped labour in the process of producing value and 
surplus value. Marx and Braverman use the labour process to show how the attributes of 
labour have become subsumed'^ into capital, and transformed. They argue that humans 
have the ability to reflect on their activity and to modify it in the light of the reflection. 
However, they point to the fact that as capitalism develops that ability passes to capital, 
and is consequently, changed in form^. It is held in technology and management. When 
that occurs Marx (1976:1054-5) speaks of the real subordination of labour. Then all 
labour's qualities are subsumed into capital: 
4. Marx refers to both subordination and subsumption. They are not synonymous, although they are 
close. They refer to the same "thing", but from different points of view. The terms refer to the relation of 
labour, as a social form within production, to capital. In particular, they indicate the way that certain 
attributes of labour become transferred to capital. "Subordination" is the category used by Marx to 
acknowledge the process from the point of view of labour. Labour as a social activity, and the labourer 
as the subject of the labour process become subordinated in their form and in their possibilities to the 
requirements of capital. On the other hand, "subsumption" picks out the same relation, but from the 
aspect of the activity of capital. It sucks the attributes of labour into itself, and in the process transforms 
them and itself. 
5. See Chapter 5 for a longer discussion of the transformation. 
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The social forms of their own labour - both subjectively and objectively'^ -
or, in other words, the forms of their own social labour'', are utterly 
independent of the individual workers. Subsumed under capital the 
workers become components of these social formations, but these social 
formations do not belong to them and so rise up against them as the 
forms of capital itself (emphasis in original). 
Braverman (1976) also describes the process whereby the attributes of labour become those 
of capital. He (Braverman,1976:136-7) sums up the process in the words of an editorial 
from the International Molders journal: 
When (the process of separating knowledge from the workman) is 
completed, the worker is no longer a craftsman^ in any sense, but is an 
animated tool of management (my emphasis). 
Both Marx and Braverman use their descriptions to emphasise the way the real 
subordination of labour diminishes the possibilities for humans. As workers, we are 
degraded, as Braverman (1976:139) points out by becoming merely a '"factor of 
production', an instrument of capital". 
The labour process is the site for an analysis of the relafions of subordination 
between capitalists and labourers both in Marx (1954) and Braverman (1974). However, in 
the literature that followed Braverman's work, "control" was subsfituted as the organising 
principle. 
Ironically, it was Bravermcin who provided the theoretical justification for a 
problematic concept of control^. He (1974) used Marx's labour power/labour distinction 
to explain the existence of an imperative to control, on the part of the capitalist, within the 
6. The subjective social forms of labour refer to qualities that are human (knowledge, intelligence, will). 
The objective social forms are those such as tools. 
7. These forms include the products of their labour including machinery, their form of co-operation, 
their intelligence and will (Marx,1976:1054). All these confront the worker as "something alien ... existing 
without their intervention and frequently even hostile to them" (emphasis in original). 
8. For a discussion of Braverman's use of the craftsman as the holder of a Utopian vision of the unity of 
conception and execution, see Chapter 5. Here, the point is to emphasise the way both authors see 
labour as becoming visibly an aspect of capital. 
9. Cohen (1987) correctly points out that Braverman does not give theoretical centrality to control in his 
analysis. Yet, it is his theorization of the significance of control which placed it on the agenda in the 
labour process debate. It has been given almost unqualified acceptance. 
Braverman's analysis is not concerned with control but with co-ordination. However, and ironically, his 
substantive analysis has, in general, been dismissed (there are some exceptions, for example 
Friedman,1990 and Wardell,1990), as portraying a mechanistic form of control. That has been a dis-
service to a remarkable work both in breadth and conceptual precision. 
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labour process. For Braverman (1974:56) human labour, as distinct from animal labour, 
has the potential of increasing its productivity. It is "intelligent and purposive" and hence, 
can continually adapt and change rather being tied by "instinct" to set forms of behaviour. 
He (1974:54-57) claims, that as labour is inalienable from the individual labourer, what the 
capitalist buys is not labour but labour power. As such, he asserts, the capitalist buys the 
potential for great productivity. Braverman (1974) reminds us that the potential is not 
actual labour. It therefore appears to Braverman (1974:57) that the capitalist is necessarily 
unable to calculate the exact amount of labour that has been bought: 
when he buys labour time, the outcome is far from being either so certain 
or so definite that it can be reckoned in this way, with precision and in 
advance. 
Therefore, according to Braverman, a capitalist must attempt to realise the potential in 
labour power in order to expand his/her capital. The "indeterminacy" of labour thus 
explains an imperative to control on the part of the capitalist, as the attempt is made to 
match ideal to reality. Braverman (1974:58) argues: 
It thus becomes essential for the capitalist that control over the labour 
process pass from the hands of the worker into his own. 
As a result of Braverman's theorisation of the labour power/labour distinction, 
"control" became the organising principle of the debate. It has been the "one major theme 
(which) has emerged and remained supreme" (Cohen,1987:35). It has provided the focus 
for the debate both in terms of directing analyses and in providing an arena for critique. 
Almost all authors have accepted the obvious significance of controfl'^. 
Within the labour process Hterature "control" was taken as being equivalent to 
subordination. As well, the hterature understood subordination as equivalent to total 
domination of labour by capital. The combination led to mechanistic and deterministic 
accounts of control. In turn, that fed into the growth of a whole literature devoted to 
pointing out the obvious. That workers were not totally controlled, nor was control the 
only relafion at work. 
10. A number of authors have pointed out that "control" should not be the focus of the labour process (for 
example see Campbell,1986;Cohen,1987). 
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Control is an unsatisfactory concept. It has led the labour process into quite 
unsolvable dilemmas. The most obvious problem, is that control itself, forced a split in its 
privileged relation to the labour process. Consent and resistance were drawn in. Once 
the labour process was opened up to all the relations at work, it ceased to have analytical 
coherence. As a consequence, the labour process appeared to be a useless analytical 
object. 
The major problem of organising the debate around the concept of control was that 
it forced the entry of consent and resistance. It was obvious that control was not always 
successful. Capitalists could not be certain about the implementation of any form of 
control. Their success was contingent upon the level and type of struggle engaged in by 
workers. Moreover, it was transparent that resistance was a natural on-going feature of 
work. Equally importantly, it was abundantly obvious that there was consent, as well as 
control, at work. Burawoy (1979), for example, was able to show that capitahsts did not 
necessarily have to control workers to produce effort. Labourers actively produced 
consent to the relafions in production and consent to the requirements of production. As 
well, as Friedman (1977) and Cressey and Maclnnes (1980) point out, managers must 
acfively seek consent as well as impose control. Thus, control was not the only, or even 
the most significant, form of relation between capital and labour within the labour process. 
Once the labour process was opened to the analyses of all these relations it ran into a 
number of problems. 
First, the concept of control lost its theoretical significance. Its analysis pointed to 
the equaUy significant presence of both consent and resistance in the organisation of work. 
As a result, its privileged relation to the labour process was denied. It was a short step to 
"control" losing its own identity. Littler and Salaman (1982) quite correctly declared that 
in such a form "control" was analytically too difficult to isolate. As well, Burawoy 
(1985:26) points to its empirical inadequacy: 
If there is a single concept that has served to generate ahistorical 
accounts of organisations and to mystify their operation, it is the concept 
of control. 
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Moreover, the concepts of resistance and consent were only able to lead a ghostly 
existence within the debate. They were given tenuous theoretical recognition. The 
concept of control had created mechanistic and deterministic analyses, hence, resistance 
and consent were called in as correctives. However, their relation to the labour process 
has been undertheorised. Resistance has been analysed in terms of class struggle, 
particularly over control (for example Friedman,!977; Cressey and Maclnnes,!980: 
Clawson,1980). Both Friedman (1977) and Cressey and Maclnnes (1980) attempt to 
produce a space for the analysis of class struggle within production. They argue that it is 
inadequate to understand class struggle only in terms of the abihty of workers to 
overthrow capitalism. This, however, neither theorises the existence of struggle, nor its 
relation to production. Rather, it points to where theoretical work must be done. More 
often, both resistance and consent were conceptualised through Braverman's method of 
underpining the centrality of control. The indeterminacy of labour which necessitated 
control, equally pointed to the possibility of resistance or consent to it. Braverman's (1974) 
weak theorisation of control was thus stretched to supply a theoretical basis for other 
concepts^^. The theoretical difficulties that it led to were dire. 
Once the unity of the labour process and an imperative to control was broken it 
was a relatively easy step to move outside of the labour process as an object of analysis. It 
became obvious that control, consent and resistance were produced as much outside of the 
labour process as inside it. As Littler and Salaman (1982:266) note "the subordination of 
labour, real or otherwise, cannot be understood at the level of the labour process". The 
labour process had shown itself to be unsatisfactory in terms of its conceptuahsation of the 
reality of the organisafion of work. 
Resistance, consent and control forced the demise of the labour process. Once 
these concepts drove the analysis into describing the relafionships between capitalists and 
workers, the labour process lost its coherence. There was, thus, an apparently 
indisputable logic in Littler and Salaman's (1982:257) conclusion that "there can be no 
11. Resistance was also clearly empirically inadequate as a concept. It failed to allow consideration of 
struggles over wages as Cohen (1987) has pointed out. 
49 
theory of the capitalist labour process". In its place, we were offered the "plethora of 
reality". 
It is not surprising that many moved out of the original concerns within the labour 
process literature. The interest surrounding the real subordination of labour appeared to 
be unworkable. Hence, some have sought to develop new areas of interest wtiich came 
out of the debate. Those such as Littler and Salaman (1982) and Storey (1985) took a 
logical step from an interest in control, to the examination of managerial strategies^^^ th^s 
moving outside of the confines of the labour process. Knights and Wilimott (1989), 
Knights (1990) and WilLmott (1990) and Sakolsky (1992) seek an alternative approach. 
They use Foucault's work as a means of giving more depth to the analysis of the 
consensual relations within the workplace. However, the use of Foucault has pushed the 
original concerns of the labour process into the background. While subjectivity is 
explored, its relation to capital is undeveloped^'^. The organisation of work still remains 
as an interest in these new approaches, yet, the relations between capital and labour have 
dropped from analytical centrahty. 
Other authors have sought to re-affirm the centrahty of the labour process by re-
theorising it. However, they have fallen into similar traps to that of the earlier hterature. 
They have accepted (with the exception of Burawoy,1985) that all the relations between 
capital and labour should be analysisable within the confines of the labour process. Both 
Edwards (1986) and Cohen (1987) seek to place all relations in the labour process while 
attempting to provide a more adequate theorisation of it in terms of exploitation. 
Burawoy (1985) takes a different tack. A new analytical object, the political apparatus of 
production/factory regime^"^, is developed to hold the relations of consent, resistance and 
control. However, they all have accepted, as unproblemafic, that the labour process is the 
12. Ironically, the concept of "control" asserted its influence on their work even though Littler and 
Salaman (1982) had rejected it. 
13. My aim, in part, is to show how subjectivity can be understood in terms of the capital/labour relation. 
14. Burawoy (1985:87) differentiates the two. The political apparatus of production is viewed as the 
"institutions that regulate and shape struggles in the workplace". The factory regime, on the other hand, 
is the "overall political form of production". It includes the ideological and political affects of the labour 
process as well, as those of the political apparatuses of production. 
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only site for the analysis of domination. Unfortunately, there are problems in each of 
these attempts to salvage the concerns in the labour process hterature. 
P.K.Edwards (1986) has attempted a re-theorisation of the labour process as the site 
of conflict, control and co-operation. The labour process is given significance through 
Edwards' (1986:69) claim that there is structured antagonism within capitalism as an 
exploitative mode of production. It produces contradictory tendencies within the labour 
process. Capitalists need to use the creative aspects of the workers but must keep them 
within the goals of the enterprise, and thus under their "general control" (Edwards,1986:6). 
Thus, he argues, both conflict and co-operation are simultaneously produced within the 
labour process. 
There is a fundamental difficulty in Edwards' (1986) work, for he is unable to 
provide an adequate theorisation of exploitation. He asserts (1986:53) that "(a) theory of 
exploitation is the necessary basis for a theory of conflict". Yet, it is exactly what he cannot 
provide. Edwards (1986) is a little unclear about his notion of structured antagonism, 
which carries the weight of the explanation of conflict. It seems that (1986:61) the basis of 
a structured antagonism is "the existence of domination" through which a surplus is 
produced and appropriated. Edwards (1986:66) is insistent on the fact that he is not 
referring to a contingent relation, but to one "inherent in production relations". It is a 
strong claim, but one that Edwards' (1986) work cannot support for two reasons, at least. 
His very systematic and remarkably clear reduction of Marx's concepts to the empirical 
level prevents the possibihty. Second, his analysis of exploitation as occurring in 
production only^^, also precludes his explanation of exploitation. Edwards' (1986) 
analysis of exploitation is built around the concept of a surplus, which is given an 
empirical referent. It seems (1986:61) to be equivalent to the "goods and services" which 
are beyond those necessary to replace the ones used up as means of production (including 
labour). However, such an empirically based concept cannot get to a structured 
15. Edwards (1986) seems a little ambivalent about the role of exchange. He does make reference to it. 
However, overwhelmingly, he finds exploitation within production. For example, Edwards (1986:61) 
asserts that "(e)xploitative modes are those in which producers are subordinate to others withui the 
process of production " (my emphasis). 
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antagonism which is inherent in the mode of production. Some capitalists will be able to 
appropriate more goods and services, others will become bankrupt and lose all. Hence, 
the appropriation of goods and services is a contingent relation. But Edwards (1986) is not 
interested in contingent relations, at this level of explanation. After all he (1986:66) has 
excluded exchange as the site for exploitation, for it only displays contingent relations of 
power. 
It appears that on Edwards' (1986) analysis there is no way of showing how 
structured antagonism operates within capitaHsm as an inherent relafion. Nor is this 
surprising. Edwards (1986:5) uses a universal/ahistorical concept of exploitation to 
capture it within capitahsm. Such an approach might work to capture exploitation in 
Feudalism. However, capitaHsm is unlike other modes of production. Exploitation is not 
immediately visible on the surface. It therefore cannot be captured by concepts which 
grasp reality as we immediately perceive it. Marx develops his account of exploitation 
through an analysis of value and surplus value, which are terms referring to abstract 
(though real) social relations. Moreover, he (Marx,1954) only grasps exploitation by 
looking across exchange and producfion. However, Edwards (1986) has systematically 
denied himself the possibihty of using Marx's analysis^^. The result is that, despite the 
seductive clarity of his empirically based concepts (in fact, precisely because of it), he 
cannot provide the basis which his analysis requires. 
If there is no basis for his claim that there is a structured antagonism in capitalism, 
there is equally no basis for privileging the labour process as a site of analysis. As a result, 
the labour process is reduced to the organisation of work. However, the organisation of 
work has no conceptual basis other than the empirical concept of place. In the end 
Edwards(1986) can only offer precision in the analysis of the relations of control, consent 
16. Edwards (1986:86) claims that his work is not Marxist, but materialist. It is not quite clear what 
Edwards (1986) understands as being materialist. However, it seems from his analyses that he appears to 
suffer from the limitations of a Feuerbachian form of materialism. Therein "reality, sensuousness are 
conceived only in the form of the object....but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively" 
(Marx & Engels, 1976:618). He explores the surface forms of things and not social relations. In that 
sense, his work is definitely non- Marxist. 
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and conflict^''. The care with which the tools of analysis have been crafted is welcome. 
Yet, they do not return us to the labour process as a significant object of analysis. 
Cohen (1987) has also re-worked theories of the labour process in an attempt to 
assert its continuing significance. Much of Cohen's (1987) work points to important 
aspects of the labour process which have been ignored in the debate. She (1987:42-43) 
rejects the analysis centred on control, and replaces it with an examination of exploitation 
and valorisation. It is correct, to point out that control has been problematic. It is also 
important, to argue the necessity of incorporating analyses of struggle over wages which 
were excluded by the emphasis on control. Moreover, the labour process needs to be 
returned to its place in relation to valorisafion as Cohen (1987:46) has insisted. It is also 
true, that the question of struggles over effort and wages needs to be explored in terms of 
exploitation. 
Nevertheless, Cohen's (1987) solution of including all forms of struggle within the 
labour process is unfortunate. In doing that, she reduces the labour process to the 
organisation of work, where it is true that resistance does occur. The transformation of the 
labour process into the organisation of work would become evident once Cohen attempted 
to analyse phenomena from her theorefical posifion. It is not possible to get from the 
organisation of work to surplus value, or to the specific forms of subordination of labour 
by capital. The organisation of work refers to the contingent relationships between 
capitalists and workers at work. Surplus value and the labour process refer to the social 
relafions which constitute our possibilities. The two levels of analysis are not 
commensurable. In placing all relations within the labour process, Cohen will end up 
drawing the labour process to the empirical object of the organisation of work. Thus, the 
labour process would again lose its value, despite being theorised under exploitafion. 
17. It is interesting to note that although Edwards' (1986) work can provide no theoretical justification for 
the existence of exploitation, it does provide excellent analytical tools for the analysis of the organisation 
of work. The reason is that the examination of specific historical events is different from that of social 
relations. The clarity with which he has explored the relations of conflict, co-operation and control will 
serve many well in their analyses. The concept of "conflict", however, is still not theorised sufficiently, 
even at the empirical level of abstraction (see Chapter 2 for some discussion of the problems). 
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Burawoy (1985) has also re-theorised the labour process. Unlike Edwards (1986) 
and Cohen (1987), however, he does not give it the task of holding all relations, Burawoy 
(1985) starts his analysis by recognising that the undisputed domination of labour over 
capital exists alongside the continued presence of resistance: 
for Marx, capitahst production is both the spring of class struggle and an 
arena of undisputed domination of labour by capital (1985:85). 
The presence of both phenomena appears paradoxical^^ to Burawoy (1985) and his work is 
an attempt to solve it. He gives the labour process significance by making it the site of the 
undisputed domination of labour by capital. In addition, he constructs another analytical 
object, the political apparatus of production. Through it, he examines the specific form of 
control within capitahsm: the means by which the surplus is both secured and obscured. 
Burawoy (1985) argues that struggles, in general, reproduce the relations of domination. 
However, as the political apparatus of producfion is causally separate from the labour 
process, there is the possibility that the domination can end. Thus, Burawoy (1985) 
apparently has solved the paradox of the existence of domination and resistance within 
capitalism. 
The separation of domination and resistance in Burawoy's (1985) work is however, 
deeply problematic. It is constructed on a strange reading of Marx, wherein Marx is 
understood as ruling out resistance. Moreover, it rehes upon an unsatisfactory notion of 
control. It feeds into a periodisation which, although intuitively correct, has an insecure 
basis. Finally, domination is left with no character at all. 
Burawoy (1985) takes the real subordination of labour within the labour process as 
signifying undisputed domination. His position follows from a particular reading of 
Marx. Burawoy (1985) calls upon Marx's discussion of despotism in the labour process. 
It is combined with Marx's argument (some three hundred pages further on) of the process 
of primitive accumulation. The two passages appear to Burawoy to give him authority to 
18. It is only a paradox if resistance is understood as being outside of domination. That is how Burawoy 
(1985) understands it. However, my contention is that resistance is part of the specific form of 
domination within capitalism. Under this understanding, it is no longer a paradox, although it does 
present a puzzle. 
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claim that Marx saw real subordination as pointing to the end of resistance within 
capitalism. He (1985:90) claims: 
Marx recognised, market despotism effectively undermined working-
class resistance to managerial domination. 
However, Marx (1954) does not make the claims attributed to him by Burawoy. 
First, it is clear that Marx's account of despotism does not rule out resistance. Marx 
certainly speaks of despotism, although what Marx covers by that concept should be 
carefully noted. He is primarily using the concept to explore the rigid nature of co-
ordination in the labour process. Marx claims that the form of co-ordination within the 
labour process is despotic because an "iron law of proportionality" (Marx,1954:336) guides 
it. This is opposed to anarchy in the social division of labour where "chance and caprice 
have full play in distributing the producers and their means of producfion" 
(Marx,1954:336). The concept is largely ironic but, Burawoy (1985:89) misses that. He can 
only see despotism as referring to a form of control within the labour process. It is also 
true, as Marx notes, that from the point of view of the workers, the relations are despotic 
because the capitahst has the right to command. However, neither form of despotism 
excludes resistance either logically, or in fact^^. 
Second, Burawoy (1985), is incorrect to argue that Marx claims there is no 
resistance within capitalism. Burawoy (1985) relies on a pecuhar reading of a passage 
from Marx in his attempt to show that Marx does not provide for resistance. He (1985:90) 
takes a section from Marx's analysis of the process of primitive accumulation. It is as well 
to quote the passage completely to bring out Marx's meaning as Burawoy only uses part of 
it. 
The advance of capitalist production develops a working class, which by 
education, tradition, habit, looks upon the conditions of that mode of 
producfion as self-evident laws of Nature. The organisafion of the 
capitahst process of production, once fully developed, breaks down all 
resistance. The constant generation of a relative surplus population 
keeps the law of supply and demand of labour, and therefore keeps 
wages in a rut that corresponds with the wants of capital. The dull 
compulsion of economic relafions completes the subjection of the 
19. An indication that resistance is not excluded can be seen in Marx's analysis of the worker's response to 
the introduction of machinery. As well, there is his analysis of the passage of the Factory Acts. 
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labourer to the capitalist. Direct force, outside economic conditions, is of 
course sfill used, but only exceptionally. The labourer can be left to the 
"natural laws of production", i.e. to his dependence on capital, a 
dependence springing from, and guaranteed in perpetuity by, the 
conditions of production themselves. It is otherwise during the historic 
genesis of capitalist production (my emphasis) (Marx, 1954:689). 
Marx, in the above quote, is referring to the fact that once capitalism becomes customary, 
resistance to its establishment ceases. The passage has to be read in the context of a 
description of the emergence of capitalism "dripping from head to foot, from every pore, 
with blood and dirt" (Marx, 1954:712). The quote comes after a long discussion of the 
historical route to capitalism where Marx analyses the various forms of force which were 
used to produce the "free" proletariat. It does not at all mean, as Burawoy (1985:89-90) 
claims, that Marx considers that capitalism will not produce forms of resistance. It merely 
indicates that there will be no resistance against the establishment of capitalism once it 
becomes the dominant mode of production (a point which might almost be regarded as a 
tautology). 
Real subordination does not indicate the end of resistance (Thompson,1983:52). 
Nothing could be more foreign to Marx. It is clear that Marx recognises resistance. One 
could easily say that his whole analysis of capitalism is premised on the concept of class 
struggle. However, because his analysis, particularly in Volume I of Capital (1954), is 
about the mode of production of surplus value, resistance does not have theoretical 
centrahty. Moreover, Marx has not produced an analytical object for the analysis of 
resistance. The question is how to produce one. 
A second problematic aspect of Burawoy's (1985) work is his re-working of the 
concept of control. Burawoy (1985:26) is quite correct when he claims that the concept of 
control has mystified the relations of capital and labour. He re-theorises it so that it 
becomes historicaUy specific to capitahsm. He argues that it is to be found in the need, on 
the part of capitalists to both obscure and secure surplus value. Burawoy (1985) places the 
mechanisms which produce control in the ideological and political realms of production. 
Burawoy (1985) claims that the specific capitahst dilemma is to secure surplus 
value, while keeping the source of it hidden. His concern is misplaced. There is no 
dilemma, nor any necessary uncertainty, for capitalists in securing and obscuring surplus 
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value. It is done, unbeknowns to them, as they follow the normal pracfices within 
capitaUsm. The source of surplus value in labour is hidden via the wage form, a point that 
Burawoy himself makes. Hence, consent is not the site for the obscuring of surplus as 
Burawoy (1985) claims. Capitalists will use consent to produce co-operation and greater 
profits^O. However, that is not the same as seeking to obscure and secure surplus value. 
To make sense of Burawoy's specifically capitalist dilemma, we must understand 
the process of securing and obscuring surplus value at the level of profit. However, in 
doing this, we undermine two aspects of Burawoy's argument. First, securing of profit 
does not involve the need to obscure the source of profit from workers. It is achieved 
through normal calculations. There are usually normal wages, normal working times, 
normal working speeds and normal levels of effort even though the organisation of work is 
subject to continual transformafion^l (Edwards,l986:73). Thus the capitahst, baring some 
problems, not usually to do with labour (except perhaps in a "strike prone" industry), can 
calculate his/her profit in advance. Second, profit does not indicate any necessary 
relation between capitalists and workers. Profit is secured as much by business acumen in 
the market, as through a specific relation with workers. We are back again with the 
"plethora of reality" where control does not indicate a theoretically privileged relation 
between capital and labour. 
The problem with Burawoy's notion of control extends further. He introduces the 
concept of control to provide for the analysis of only the most significant changes in the 
20. Profit, it must be remembered, is not the same as surplus value. If we think at the level of profit then 
exploitation cannot be grasped. Capitalists fairly or unfairly (but this is contingent) buy labour power 
and then by right use it. The profit thus generated is by right the capitalist's. Also capitalists may or 
may not force workers to work excessively hard, but again this is contingent. It follows, that any 
"exploitation" viewed from the point of view of profit, is contingent upon subjective judgements only, of 
what is too cheap or too hard. Thus the capitalist mode of production itself cannot be seen as an 
exploitative system. It is necessary to differentiate profit which refers to relations between people, and 
surplus value as referring to social aspects of those relations. The two concepts do not refer to the same 
thing. 
21 It is surprising that much of the labour process literature is built around the denial of these obvious 
features of work. 
57 
relations between capital and labour^^. However, it creates problems in his periodisafion. 
The theorisation of control as obscuring and securing surplus provides Burawoy with an 
alternative method of periodizing capitalism in terms of the force/consent dichotomy. 
However, he ends up on the horns of a dilemma. He either has to abandon his notion that 
interests are not pre-given and antagonistic or abandon the unity/separation of the 
reproduction of labour power and production which is the basis of his periodisation. 
Burawoy (1985) cannot show how the State's role of reproducing labour power is 
crucial in determining the hegemonic regime within capitahsm. The hegemonic regime is 
built around managers' needs to obtain consent from workers. It follows from the State 
guaranteeing the reproduction of labour power and curbing the arbitrary power of 
managers. In the hegemonic regime, the pohtical apparatus of production itself produces 
consent. Burawoy (1985) asserts, it obscures the production of surplus value in the very 
process of securing it. The explanation is very appealing. Yet, there are some problems. 
Burawoy (1985) claims that consent is produced via the way in which State legislation 
affects employers. They "must" seek co-operafion with workers and "must" give 
concessions. But why "must" they do this? There can only be a "must" if there are 
necessarily pre-given antagonistic interests. If these did not exist there would be no 
necessity to apply force or, even more significantly, in its absence there would be no 
necessity to produce consent. But Burawoy (1985:28-9) has denied theorefical significance 
to necessarily antagonisfic interests and claims that interests are in fact produced. If there 
are no necessary antagonistic interests, then there is no "must" in the relation between the 
State and the employers. There is a mere (at the moment unexplored) correspondence 
between State legislation and the formation of consent. As a result, there is no basis for 
22. Clearly there are numerous forms of political apparatuses of production. Burawoy (1985) makes two 
moves to give some shape to the endless possibilities. The first picks out four significant determinants of 
these apparatuses. With these tools he explores six political apparatuses of production within the cotton 
industry in the nineteenth century. However, even assuming that the four determinants do pick out 
major variations we are still left with a potentially enormous number of political apparatuses of 
production across all industries and all time. 
In the second move, Burawoy (1985), uses the concept of control to produce a periodisation into 
despotic, hegemonic and then hegemonic/despotic. 
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claiming that State legislation, in its role of reproducing labour power is a key determinant 
of the generic form of factory regime. 
The basis for the periodisation of the nineteenth century generic form of factory 
regime is also problematic. Burawoy (1985) claims the generic form in the nineteenth 
century is despotic. Yet, it is very unclear what the reference for despotic could be 
(Edwards,1986:50). He is at pains, after all, to show how in various forms of the despotic 
regime the interests of workers and capitalists are co-ordinated (for example, in patriarchy 
and paternalism). We are left with the possibility that all of these regimes are despotic 
merely by definition. Perhaps, it arises from the unity of production and the reproduction 
of labour power. Yet, even this is problematic. First, it relies on a notion that labour 
power was not reproduced outside of production. This is to deny the role of family 
members, charities and even unions in ensuring it. Second, if the pohtical apparatuses of 
production are despotic, by definition, then Burawoy has not produced a connection 
between them and the activity of the State. It does not point to anything other than the 
absence of State legislation, and the co-incidence of a despotic regime. 
Perhaps the greatest problem of Burawoy's analysis is that domination becomes a 
shadow. Burawoy (1985) has placed all relations within the political apparatuses of 
productions^. The labour process is left with domination. However, it is merely assumed 
to be forever present and forever unchanging. It has no character at all. The labour 
process may have been salvaged by Burawoy's theorisation of resistance and domination. 
However, the cost is enormous. The labour process and domination are left to haunt the 
shadow lands of analysis. 
Burawoy is correct, there is a need to introduce conceptual clarity. Within the 
labour process and post labour process hterature there is a degree of conceptual 
shpperiness. Most authors slide between domination, control, and subordination, seeing 
little difference in their referents and their analytical possibilities. Consequently, 
resistance is also illusive in its reference and basis. 
23. Ironically, Burawoy (1985:125) himself, accused many authors of putting all relations into the labour 
process. 
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Some clarification of the concepts of domination, control and resistance is necessary 
if they are to be used as analytical tools. In order to do this, it is fruitful to return to Marx. 
Most authors present their work as "going beyond" Marx. However, a return is necessary, 
though it may be unfashionable. In part, it is necessary because, whatever the level of 
rejection, the analyses are still produced on the terrain mapped out by Marx. Moreover, it 
reveals the conceptual and analytical clarity which Marx, himself, brought to bear in his 
examinafion of the capital/labour relafion. Indeed, it points us to a solution to the 
dilemmas that have plagued the labour process debate. 
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION 
When we examine Marx's analysis of the labour process we find that it is quite a 
different object from that employed by most others^^ Marx's interest is not in control. 
He explores a different imperative, co-ordination, and its affect, subordination. 
Marx's (1954) interest in the labour process is two fold. First, he explores it from 
the point of view of the creation of value (Cohen,1987). The second interest lies in the way 
the nature of work produces social relations which contain the possibilifies for being, for 
labour and capital within production. The two interests are intertwined. 
The producfion of value in the labour process leads to different forms of co-
ordination. For capital, to remain as capital, it must produce an average amount of 
surplus value, at least. It means that the capitalist's must ensure that no more than the 
socially necessary labour time is contained in any commodity. The imperative facing the 
capitalist is thus the adequate co-ordination'^ of all the factors in the labour process. Marx 
24. Braverman's (1974) work is very close to that of Marx's. Both have been seriously mis-read. See 
Friedman's (1990:17) analysis of "strawmania" in relation to Braverman's work. 
25. The imperative contained in the need of capital to reproduce itself, is fed through to the capitalist in 
the form of competitive pressures. 
26. Marx sometimes uses "control" to describe the activity of co-ordination. However, his analysis is not 
about the control of the labourer, but the effect of co-ordination on the social form of labour. In the quote 
below we can see Marx's (1954:180) broader interest in control: 
the labourer works under the control of the capitalist to whom his labour belongs; 
the capitalist taking good care that the work is dtine in a proper manner, and that 
the means of production are used with intelligence, so that there is no unnecessary 
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(1954:174) sees the "elementary factors" as being tools, the acfivity of work and the subject 
of work. Co-ordination of these factors may take the form of a personal or technical 
control. It may be experienced as control by the workers. It may equally, take the form of 
bureaucrafic rules, or team work, or quality circles. It may be experienced as involving 
consent. The point is to look at these relationships to see what social relations they 
produce. 
The subordination of the worker is the effect of the form of co-ordination in the 
labour process. The real subordination of labour occurred following a change in the co-
ordination of the factors in the labour process. When limits were placed on the length of 
the working day capital, itself, had to become more productive. The pressure, fed through 
to individual capitalists, via the mechanisms of competition, produced dramatic changes in 
the organisation of work. The immediate result was that the relations of tools and 
knowledge to the workers were transformed. Tools became machines, which use the 
worker. Labourers also lost their knowledge of the work process. It passed to capital in 
the form of management and science. The new form of co-ordination transformed the 
worker'^^. Marx (1954) refers to the new social relation of labour which is produced as the 
real subordination of labour. Labour is subordinated for its attribute of knowledge, in 
waste of raw material, and no wear and tear of the implements beyond what is 
necessarily caused by the work. 
Certainly, Marx also refers to the antagonism between capitalists and workers. He also refers to the 
cruelty and barbarism of methods of control. However, these are not his analytical focus.Some attention 
has been given to the fact that it is co-ordination, rather than control which should be explored. 
However, there is no consistent development of the implications of the change. Cohen (1987) has noted 
that "efficiency" is the major activity in the labour process. Knights (1990:300) speaks of the need to 
consider the social organisation of production. Both Edwards (1986) and Thompson (1990) capture the 
same phenomena with the terms "general control" or "general directive control". 
I prefer the term "co-ordination", because it emphasises the actual activity that is being engaged in. 
"Efficiency" is merely the capitalist word for the human activity of "co-ordination". Also, there is a 
danger in hanging onto the concept of "control". It tends to push analyses into the form of one will 
opposing another. For that reason, I also reject Edwards' and Thompson's terms. 
27. The transformation is of the worker as a worker, not as a person. However, work is so significant m 
terms of our view of ourselves, the effect also becomes more general. 
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relation to work, has passed into the hands of capital. It is real subordination for, at that 
stage, all of the worker's attributes'^, in relation to work, have become aspects of capital. 
Both subordination and control occur at work. However, they are very different. 
Certainly, there is control at work. It is contained in the doctrine of "managerial 
prerogative" which is assiduously protected by management. It is worthy of analysis in its 
own right. However, there is also subordination. It is more profound. It refers to the 
very constitution of labour. 
The recognition that co-ordination is the imperative within the labour process 
enables analysis to be extended. Marx (1954) claimed that the real subordination of labour 
occurred with the advent of machinofacture. However, it is not a stagnant relation. 
Certainly, at that time all of the worker's attributes had become visibly part of capital. The 
labour process, however, undergoes constant transformation. By the middle of the 
twentieth century, and particularly in the last quarter of it, the form of co-ordination 
underwent a dramatic transformation. When we explore it, we find that another attribute 
of labour, their need for security, passes from them (in relation to work) and becomes an 
aspect of capital. It too, becomes contained in a new stratum at management, and in a 
new science. Doubtless, there will be other forms of co-ordination in the future. 
Doubtless, capital will find other attributes of labour to take into itself and turn into ahen 
objects over labour. 
Both control and consent thus have a place in the analysis of the forms of co-
ordination. However, they are relegated to secondary concepts. They may be the most 
significant features of work for the workers themselves. They can also be the site for 
analyses in their own right'^. But within the labour process, they have a more minor role 
28. At the stage that Marx was describing, the attributes of the worker which had become part of capital 
were: their social co-operation, their will and their knowledge. 
29. Edwards' (1979) analysis of control is an excellent example of a thorough and sensitive exploration of 
control. It succeeds because it does not link the question of control to Marx's claims about the labour 
process. 
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to play. The question there is the social forms of labour (and capitaPO) which are 
produced. 
The analysis of co-ordination explores the relations between the "elementary 
factors" (Marx,l954:174) to see how they constitute certain possibilities for labour. 
Workers may be controlled, or may consent, but it is not significant for this analysis. It is 
the forms that are produced which are of interest. 
There is no space in the labour process for the analysis of resistance. However, this 
does not mean that resistance has ceased or is insignificant. Quite the contrary. 
Resistance is the definitive aspect of capitalism as an economic form of domination. Other 
modes of production have given the power of co-ordination to the owners (consider 
slavery). None, have produced resistance as a necessary feature of the organisation of 
production. The point is to find an analytical home for its analysis. 
Resistance can be given adequate recognifion within the parameters of the 
economic form of domination. It includes both subordination in production and freedom 
in exchange. Resistance is after all, merely the name we give to the freedom of the 
labourer to bargain over wages and effort. Its analytical home is in the apparatus of 
calculation as one aspect of our present mode of dominafion. 
By acknowledging the specific nature of domination within capitalism we can 
better understand both subordination and freedom. Both are partial and contradictory. 
Neither is an absolute. Capitalists, for all their desires, cannot maintain complete 
subordination. It is hedged around with the presence of freedom. Nor can workers 
experience complete freedom. Its other face is the subordination within the labour 
process. It is a specifically capitalist kind of freedom. The two aspects of labour and 
wage labour are thus both necessary and contradictory. There wiU always be a structural 
tension generated because of it. The tension will also be experienced by both capitalists 
30. Marx's analysis concentrates on the social form of labour. An analysis of the changing social forms of 
capital would be very interesting. 
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and labourers as people. Labourers will forever, be caught between the ideology of 
freedom and the subordination they experience at work^^. 
Despite the partial nature of both subordination and freedom, domination is total. 
We are dominated by capital because it consfitutes us as both workers and wage 
labourers^'. While capitahsm exists, the forms through which we live, will be suitable for 
its valorisation-^^. 
Why has it been so difficult to find the economic form of domination? Our lived 
experience has hidden it from us. 
THE POWER OF THE OBVIOUS 
Our lived experience of both production and exchange conspired to make the 
nature of domination invisible. The control which we have experienced at work seduced 
us into seeing it as the central relation in the labour process. The freedom which we 
experienced in exchange led us to believe that our resistance was outside of domination. 
The two combined to make the labour process seem the only significant site for the 
analysis of the capital/labour relation. 
Braverman produced the theorisation which situated "control" within the labour 
process as its central imperative. However, he made "control" central through a sleight of 
hand. Braverman's reading of the labour power/ labour distincfion, as a space between 
ideal and real productivity, is problemafic. He rehes on a double reference for the 
potential contained in labour. Yet, only one reference is acceptable. The combination, 
however, seems to lend credence to the claim that there is an imperative to control 
operating within capitalism. First, it is applied to human labour, to mark it off as distinct 
from animal labour. Humans' ability to be conscious of their activity, does mean that their 
31. The tension between freedom and subordination provides a basis within capitalism for the particular 
form of insecurity suffered by workers (and capitalists). 
32. The resistance of the workers plays its part in shaping the social relations of production. 
33. There is nothing functionalist about this statement. It is merely tautological. Once the forms do not 
lead to valorisation, capital ceases to increase, and capitalism would eventually cease unless valorisation 
was restored. 
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labour has the potential for great change. This is a general claim about the nature of 
humans and so is acceptable-''^. However, Braverman (1974) introduces a second reference 
to potential which is not so fortunate. He claims that the labour power/labour distinction, 
within capitalism, also indicates that labour has great potential: "it is infinite in potential" 
(Braverman, 1974:57). There is thus an apparent imperative to control as the capitalist 
attempts to reach an ideal level of productivity. The reading of the labour power/labour 
distinction authorises Braverman (1974) making control the central relation in the labour 
process. It is, of course, not the case that labour is infinite in potential. At any time, 
capitalists only have a limited range of possibilities of inducing work. These are socially 
produced and socially held in place. They may change, but that is not easy. There is a 
sleight of hand in pulling the two references to the "potential" in labour together. The 
acceptability of the first, lends its credence to an unacceptable second. 
The imperative to control loses its force, once the reality of the changeability of 
labour in capitalism is recognised. Control may be present at work, and is likely to be. 
However, it is not authorised as the central imperative within the labour process. 
Braverman's (1974) conjuring trick with the potential inherent in labour would not 
have been sufficient, on its own, to have given authority to his interpretation of the 
centrahty of control. It received its legitimacy from the obviousness of personal control 
both in reality, and in Marx's own analyses. 
There was an appealing isomorphism between reahty and theory which served to 
prove the adequacy of Braverman's (1974) reading of the centrality of control. Analyses of 
nineteenth century forms of control appear to offer verification for the theoretical 
significance of it. The nineteenth century was marked by a personal control in the form of 
capitalists or of one of their manifestations - inside contractors or foremen (Marx,1954; 
Edwards,1979; Clawson,1980; Littler,1982; Burawoy,1985). The right to hire and fire and 
set wages and even to have an entire paralegal structure to enforce discipline were aspects 
of it. As Edwards (1979) points it was essentially negafive and, moreover, it was visibly 
34. Cutler (1974) claims that Braverman universalises the concept of labour in defining it as involving 
both conception and execution. It seems, however, that Braverman is merely delimitating the field in 
which the concept "labour" can make sense for us now. There is no problem in this. 
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contained in a person. It is undeniably, for many, still the lived experience of work. 
Doubtless the co-incidence of the reality of control, and its theorisafion reinforced 
Braverman's account. 
Marx's own analysis also could lend credence to an understanding of control as 
theoretically central. Marx's analysis appears to be organised around control because of 
an historical co-incidence. His examination of the labour process is not made in terms of 
control. Rather, Marx (1954) gives theoretical centrality to the form of co-ordination of 
workers, their tools and their work. However, during the period of manufacture, personal 
control and co-ordination were synonymous, as co-ordination had a "subjective" form: 
Since handicraft skill is the foundation of manufacture, and since the 
mechanism of manufacture as a whole, possess no framework, apart 
from the labourers themselves, capital is constantly compelled to wrestle 
with the insubordination of the workmen (Marx, 1954:346). 
Even, at the beginning of machinofacture, when co-ordination was achieved through 
technology (Marx, 1954:365), control still remained prominent^^ yj-jg barrack like 
discipline of the period of manufacture is extended and an entire paralegal structure 
developed. The lived experience of control, in the first part of the nineteenth century, was 
thus both highly visible and personal, features personified by Marx in the Factory 
Lycurgus (Marx, 1954:400). 
It seems as though the obvious presence of personal control both in Marx's own 
analyses, and in reality, allowed Braverman's (1974) theorisation to acquire the status of 
truth. The essential indeterminacy of labour as a gap between an ideal and reality became 
the liet motif of the labour process debate^^. Control thus was easily understood as the 
core relation between capitalists and labourers. 
"Control" could also seem the central relation because our freedom seduced us. It 
is very difficult to see our activity of bargaining as an aspect of domination. We are free. 
We feel we are opposing the wishes of capitalist when we bargain, and we are. However, 
35. The reason for its continuing presence lay in the need for capitalists to conquer the desultory habits of 
the labourers who had not been used to the discipline of a factory. 
36. Thompson (1990:99) makes it the core of labour process theory. For him, however, it only authorises 
a general control. Others have not been as careful. 
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we are not opposing capitalism, we are merely playing the capitalist game. While we 
bargain we are bound to capital, even though the chains are invisible. Marx (1954: 538) 
notes that the wage labourer is 
bound to his owner by invisible threads (wherein) the appearance of 
independence is kept up by means of a constant change of employers, 
and by the fictio juris of a contract. 
We have been seduced by freedom into accepting it as the site of an absolute 
resistance rather than as an aspect of domination. As a result, it made it possible for the 
form of control in the labour process to seem the most significant site for analyses of the 
capital/labour relation. 
The lived experiences of control and freedom have led us to place our analytical 
emphasis on the labour process. It also could be understood as the site of domination 
through a particular reading of Marx and Braverman. Neither writer provides any space 
for the analysis of resistance when looking at labour as an aspect of capitaP^. Both have 
thus been taken as describing the undisputed domination of labour by capital, within the 
labour process. Generally, this reading has formed the basis for the critiques of their 
work, while at the same time privileging the labour process as a site for the analysis of 
control and domination^^. 
DOMINATION AND CONTROL 
Our lived experience is powerful and significant. Even those working within 
Marxism have succumbed to the power of the obvious. As Sayer (1987:48) remarks: 
37. Braverman (1974:378) is the most explicit: 
But since it (labour) in its permanent existence, it is the living part of capital....it is 
ceased, released, flung into the various parts of the social machinery, and expelled 
by others, not in accord with its own will or self-activity, but in accord with the 
movement of capital. 
He is speaking of the working class generally, and not particularly of the labour process. However, he 
analyses the labour process in the same manner. 
38. It is a great dis-service to two writers of the calibre of Marx and Braverman to suppose that they 
ignored the obvious presence of resistance. It seems better to assume that they were trying to capture 
something differently: which is precisely what they were doing. 
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It seems that "traditional historical materialism"....is no more immune 
than bourgeois economics to the fetishistic seduction of "natural, self-
understood forms of social life"-^ '^ . 
However, it cannot give us access to the relations of domination between capital and 
labour. 
The labour process literature has been involved in two related errors that have 
arisen as a result of our lived experience. It has taken domination to be equivalent to 
control. As well, it has situated domination only within production, in the labour process. 
It has been misled by the surface appearances of capitalism. 
The labour process literature has tended to understand dominafion in the image of 
a negafive personal control. Control has been the dominant concept within the labour 
process hterature. It shapes analyses in its own form. The relations between capital and 
labour have to be seen in terms of one force opposing and negating something else. The 
concepts of resistance and consent are also formed in its image: they are sites of "absolute" 
rejection of the control. It is a negative image of power, akin to the juridical concept which 
has been hegemonic in pohtical theories (Foucault,1978:86). However, domination in 
capitalism is not like that. 
Sayer (1987:137) notes that the negative forms of dependency relations may well 
have been crucial in past forms of producfion as a means of securing the surplus. 
However, it is not true within capitalism. In capitalism, the "objective dependency 
relations" are significant: 
Dominion over people is established through and expressed in command 
over things: above all means of production and labour power. 
If that is the case, the personal relations of dependency or control cannot capture the 
nature of the "objective dependecy relations". Hence, if we want to understand the 
relation between capital and labour we cannot use the most obvious personal relations as 
either our starting point of analysis, nor as the image of how to analyse. 
The second error that was made in the labour process debate was relegating 
domination to production. Exchange, at best, was given a secondary role. Marx, 
certainly argues that production relations hold the key to understanding the major features 
39. The quote is from Marx, Capital, Vol 1, Lawrence and Wishart,London, p75. 
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of a mode of production. Doubtless that, and the lived experience of the relations, have 
led many Marxists to giving analytical weight to production within capitalism'*". 
However, they have missed the fact that Marx is reshaping what is to be taken as 
production relations. As Sayer (1987:77) argues, in a slightly different contexf^l, 
(Marx) is precisely redefining "economic" relations - and thus the 
"economic sphere" or "economic base" of society. 
Marx argues that capitalism, is deceptive about what production relations are. By 
separating exchange, as the realm of freedom, capitalism hides the fact that it is 
exploitative. Yet, it is a crucial production relation. Marxists should not succumb to the 
deception and exclude exchange relations. The task is how to analyse exchange relations 
as part of the economic form of domination. 
The capitalist form of domination involves the coercive relafion of "command over 
unpaid labour" (Marx, 1954). It is not immediately given on the surface in capitalism, for 
unpaid labour is itself invisible in capitalism. However, if we take capitalism as a mode of 
exploitation, then its parficular form of "objective dependency" or dominafion can be 
grasped. To reach it, we must understand the operafion of surplus value for it is the 
unpaid labour which capital appropriates. It involves an analysis of the labour 
power/labour distinction in terms of both exchange and production. The "free" sale of 
labour power in exchange enables capital to appropriate surplus value in production. 
A return to the labour power/labour distinction reveals that domination occurs 
ttirough a double process involving exchange and production. Surplus value can only be 
understood by examining these two spheres. Value, it is true is produced in production. 
There is no other place for it, for value refers to the amount of labour in a commodity. 
However, surplus value, which is the main interest in terms of domination, is produced 
because of a relation between production and exchange. The sale of labour power in 
exchange allows capital to appropriate all the value produced in production. Hence, it 
makes surplus value possible. The labour power/ labour distinction thus spans the two 
40. Friedman (1990:5) argues that production is privileged within Marxism. He is correct. However, he 
misses what production is. For Friedman production only refers to what is obviously so in capitalism. 
41. The context is the relation of the base to the superstructure. 
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aspects of domination within capitalism - that of subordination in production and that of 
freedom or resistance in exchange. 
The lived experience of control and resistance is empirically real. However, it is 
also mystifying of the real social relations of domination in which we are embedded. As 
Sayer (1987:40) notes Marx recognises phenomena as possessing two attributes. They are 
both social and material. Marx continually shows that within capitalism the two 
attributes are confused; a process which he refers to as fetishism. The material attribute is 
the lived experience of the social, but it also hides the nature of it. This fetishism has 
occurred in the labour process debate. We have been seduced by the material reality of 
control and resistance. We have taken them as being the same as the social relations of 
subordination and freedom*'. As a result, we have missed domination. 
If we take the lived experience of control and freedom as providing both the 
immediate sites for analysis and, the form of analysis, then we cannot grasp domination. 
Control and resistance appear as two opposed and contingent forms of action. Given this 
understanding, the post labour process writers are correct to argue that they do not point 
to any necessary aspect of the capital/labour relation. It may well be legitimate to remain 
here and to analyse the contingent relations between capitalists and labourers. Certainly, 
there are many fine examples of such forms of analysis (for example Littler,1982; 
Stark,1980). The problem though, is in attempting to incorporate such analyses within 
Marx's theoretical parameters. This cannot make sense. It is evidenced by the remarkable 
disjuncture in much of the work, between theoretical and empirical accounts. We need to 
remember that empirical prominence does not necessarily indicate theoretical significance. 
We have been trapped in an image of control which is negative. It has prevented 
an analysis of the relations of domination within capitalism. Foucault (1979a:38) has 
claimed that while we have cut off the kings head in practice, we have not done so 
theoretically*-^. The same may be said of analyses of control within the labour process. 
42. Control and resistance are not the same as subordination and freedom but they are connected. They 
are the lived experience, of those social relations. However, different things may be claimed of the them. 
Hence care must be taken. 
43. Foucault (1978:86) has argued that power was theorised in negative terms because the form of power 
in the middle ages was negative and personal. However, it is Foucault's contenfion that power no longer 
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We have too long laboured under an image of control as negafive and personal. Control 
exists, and it is important to examine it. However, it does not give us access to the 
relations of domination which are both more subtle and total. 
Domination is undisputed, as Burawoy (1985) claimed. Capitalism, as an 
economic form of dominafion is the way in which we organise our production now. It 
constitutes certain possibilities for us as humans, in our activities of producing what we 
need. It dominates precisely because we are constituted as adequate to the requirements 
of capital. Domination holds us by "invisible threads" (Marx,1954:538). They have to be 
discovered. 
CONCLUSION 
The labour process is only one site of the domination of labour by capital. Labour 
is dominated through the double process of freedom in exchange, and subordination 
within production. Failure to be clear, about the nature of capitalism as an economic form 
of domination, has led the labour process writers on a merry dance. 
This chapter has explored the attempts within the labour process hterature, to come 
to terms with the labour process as an analyfical object. There has been a general failure 
to do so, because the role of the labour process in Marx's work has been ignored. 
It is suggested that our lived experience has led us astray. We have taken that, as 
providing us with privileged concepts, and obvious modes of analysis. However, no 
matter how fruitful such explorations are, they cannot grasp the domination of labour by 
capital. 
By considering capitahsm as an economic form of domination we can provide some 
solutions. The labour process, and the analysis of subordinafion, are maintained. 
However, it is not asked to bear the burden of supporting all relations that make up 
domination. Domination is also achieved through the consfitution of the wage labourer in 
exchange, within the relations of freedom. 
operates in that image. Hence, his injuncfion is to cut off the king's head in theory, as was done in 
practice. 
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Domination is more subtle and total than supposed in the labour process literature. 
In it, our very mode of being as workers and wage labourers is constituted. 
There is an absolutely crucial difference upon which all the arguments hang: the 
difference between empirical things, and their relationships, and social relations. Unless 
that distinction is grasped, then Marx's claims cannot be understood. The next chapter 




Common sense concepts appear the analytically correct starting point because of 
their practical adequacy. However, they pose particularly acute problems 
within Marxist analyses. Marx explores the social forms of labour and these 
are not phenomenally available within capitalism. Hence, common sense 
concepts cannot grasp them. 
It is suggested that social forms or social relations are analytically suitable 
objects of analysis within a Marxist framework. They are relatively enduring 
and any necessity that might exist does so at this level. Moreover, they can be 
understood as real, despite their lack of phenomenal existence. 
The previous two chapters have explored the problems within Marxist analyses of 
the labour process and industrial relations. It was argued that both areas suffered because 
they were organised around common sense concepts of conflict and control. The concepts 
had an appealing obviousness. They were of immediate concern to the workers involved. 
They also had the advantage of offering a critique of work, of the position of workers 
within capitahsm and even of "conservative" academic theorising. Yet, they created 
significant problems. 
There is a particular difficulty attached to using common sense concepts within any 
Marxist analysis. One of Marx's "enduring and central theme(s)" (Sayer,l987:44) is that the 
everyday world of capitalism is systematically misleading about the nature of the real 
social relations which generate it. If this is so, then the concepts with which we deal with 
that world will also be inadequate for explanations of the phenomena. It seems that 
Marxists are thus presented with a dilemma. Either they accept Marx's claim and refuse 
to use common sense concepts as organising principles. In this case, there is the danger of 
producing analyses which are not related to the specific instance being studied. On the 
other hand, they can reject one of Marx's central claims and use common sense concepts. 
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The research will be immediately intelligible but it will be very difficult to mesh its claims 
with those of Marx's. The chapter aims to show one way around the apparent impasse. 
The present chapter argues that the primary task, at least within a Marxist analysis, 
is the description of social relafions. Marx explores social relations (of production) and all 
his claims are made about them. In addition, social relations are relatively enduring, 
socially significant and real. Thus, they are appropriate objects for scientific examination. 
Social relations lead a peculiar existence and are thus difficult to grasp. They are 
not the same as interactions between people or things. They are not phenomenally 
available. Hence, they are not captured through common sense concepts and 
understandings which deal with the world in its immediate appearance. In addition, they 
are not found if we try to understand them on the model of an interaction between 
separate enfities. They are the condition of possibihty of our action, and so are not the 
same as it. 
The aim of the chapter is to reveal the necessity of taking social relations as the 
objects of analysis. It, therefore, has to differentiate them from things and people and 
interactions between them. The chapter is necessarily philosophical. 
COMMON SENSE CONCEPTS AS ANALYTICAL OBJECTS: THE DILEMMAS 
Common sense concepts are essential for our everyday existence. However, there 
are dangers associated with extending their range of apphcation. They cannot be used to 
perform all duties, although there is a tendency to do just this. Their obvious availability 
and pracfical usefulness are seductive. Thus we tend to take common sense concepts from 
their home m the everyday world, and use them to analyse it. Yet, within this context 
they are problematic. 
Our common sense concepts and understandings necessarily grasp things as they 
appear to us. They enable us to deal individually and collectively with the world. Part of 
being a member of a particular linguistic and social community involves agreeing on the 
meanings we assign to our concepts. Oilman (1976:5) refers to common sense as that 
which "strikes us as being obviously true" as well as being the body of unquestioned 
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knowledge and the approach to that knowledge (empiricism). We need to be a little 
careful with the referent of his definition. Clearly, we do not need to agree upon all facts. 
There is plenty of disagreement among common sense understandings and even over the 
existence of entities marked by common sense concepts. It is particularly true within the 
economic sphere where there is a fundamental division of function and consequently of 
experience and understanding. However, there must be agreement about what the 
common sense concepts mean otherwise there is no common discourse or activity. For 
example, because we agree on the meaning of control, we can argue over whether control 
exists or not. We can even disagree over whether it is an analytically significant feature of 
our world of work. Such agreement is at the level of "form of life", as Wittgenstein 
(1963:par241:88e, emphasis in the original) has shown 
...It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the 
language they use. This is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. 
Common sense concepts have a practical adequacy. One cannot imagine a society where 
this was not the case. 
However, scrutiny of the part played by common sense concepts reveals that they 
can be problematic in analytical terms. Although they are necessary for our everyday hfe, 
they may not be appropriate for the scientific investigation of it. 
It is possible that at least one of the dilemmas in the social sciences stem from using 
common sense concepts as analytical tools. There is a tendency within the social sciences 
for the knowledge produced by even quite considerable academic labour to be a repetition 
of the already known or to be tr ivial . The problem is evident in both forms of research in 
1. Bhaskar (1975:195) suggests that it is the failure to develop adequate concepts, rather than the failure 
to agree on paradigms, as Lukes (1970) claims, which lies at the root of the problem of theory 
development within the social sciences. 
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sociology: case studies and surveys^. However, it is not surprising. Common sense 
concepts will force analysis into their own terms which are everyday understandings. As 
such, analyses which are organised around common sense concepts and /o r concerns will 
repeat that which is already known^^. 
Interestingly, Marxists often appear to avoid the dilemma of repeating the obvious 
when they start with common sense concepts. The apparently fortunate situation occurs 
because there is both a pohtical division in terms of our practical understanding, together 
with the domination of one understanding. Economic relations are constructed around 
opposing needs and therefore they will have a political expression corresponding to that 
opposition. As Marx claims (1976:1027, emphasis in original): 
the relations of production themselves create a new relation of 
supremacy and subordination (and this also has a political expression) 
The pohtical difference wiU be expressed in understandings which have a practical 
adequacy. It will be grasped in the terms in which the world of production presents itself 
to the participants^. At the same time one political experience has achieved dominance. 
Not surprisingly, it expresses the world from the point of view of capital. Hence, many of 
the everyday and academic understandings are based upon its taken for granted reality: 
both in terms of the questions asked and the answers provided. 
Marxists can use the double feature of common sense understandings surrounding 
economic phenomena to produce "new" knowledge. When they use common sense terms 
2. A social science that produces endless empirical studies or which aims to produce generalisations as 
impoverished explanations is at a low level of development as a science. It would be as if chemical 
scientists spent all their research time finding yet more instances of the presence of sodium and water and 
determining, whether or not in this instance, the two substances reacted. It would be the same if each 
time they found a non-reaction they saw in it a reason for showing that the theory did not apply in all 
instances and therefore that the only appropriate way to do research was to record the contingent nature 
of all phenomena. It would also be the same if the chemical scientist devoted his/her time to counting 
instances of the reacHon of sodium and water and left it at that. We would find these very inappropriate 
ways for a chemical scientist to act. Why do we accept it so easily in the social sciences? 
3. Such studies can, of course, be useful. 
4. Underlying this is Marx's contention that concepts are '"aspects' of their own subject matter" 
(011man,1976:12). They are a "one sided" aspect of reality but nevertheless still part of that reality. They 
are "one sided" because they are the linguistic aspect of the physical activity. This should not be 
surprising for a particular activity (for example, buying or selling or love) cannot exist for us, is not 
known by us, unless we have conceptualised it as that. 
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of understanding which operate in opposition to the dominant ideology they necessarily 
reveal aspects of work relafions which are not generally seen. Labour process literature 
and Marxist writing within mdustrial relations do accentuate features of work relations 
which are easily glossed over by other interpretations. The labour process literature quite 
rightly brought to attention the fact of control as an aspect of work relations. Marxist 
analyses in industrial relations, equally correctly, pointed to the basic conflict between 
capitalists and labourers in their bargaining relation. As such, they have played a 
significant critical role. 
However, even within Marxism, common sense concepts force their understanding 
upon analyses. As control and conflict are common sense concepts, taken from our 
everyday hfe, they operate in a particular manner. Both are conceptuahsed as relations 
between separate individuals or groups. Indeed, this is how we understand them and 
how we experience them in our relations at work. Hence, the analysis will be geared to 
the relations between persons or groups of persons, and between things and persons. It 
will examine, for example, the relations between capitalists and workers or their trade 
unions and those between technology and workers. A number of quandaries result from 
the approach. 
Marxists who use common sense concepts are faced with an immediate difficulty of 
differentiating themselves from non-Marxists. Their research cannot point to any 
necessary relation between capitalists and labourers. Nor can it indicate even any 
necessary significance of that aspect of work relations. Common sense concepts operate at 
the level of the contingent nature of the everyday world. Here we are faced with an open 
system (Bhaskar,1979:12)5 where there cannot be any necessity. It is certainly evident that, 
within the open system, both control and conflict are aspects of the relationship between 
labourers and capitalists. However, it is equally obvious that so also are consent and a 
5. An open system is one where there are no constant conjunctions of events. Bhaskar (1975 & 1979) 
maintains that both the natural and social worlds are open. Natural sciences, he claims, can use 
experimentation in order to exclude all activity other than the operation of the law, a process which is 
denied to the social sciences. However, he argues that the constant conjunctions, so produced, are not 
the law. Rather the law has to be understood as a description of the powers of things and that it is only 
experienced in the open system as a tendency for things to act in certain ways. Consequently, he refutes 
the Humean notion of law which rests upon a constant conjunction of events. 
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mutuality of interest in the profitability of the firm (and even of the regional, national and 
international capitalist economies). Moreover, control and conflict are contingent upon 
many factors and do not merely flow from the relation between capitalists and labourers. 
Such a Marxism is considerably weakened in theoretical power and believability. It 
appears to offer a "critical" perspective but one that is also possible from outside a Marxist 
theory as Hyman (1980) has pointed out. 
There is also a much more serious difficulty for Marxists who use common sense 
concepts. They cannot make the same claims as Marx does. Although the way the 
capitalist world presents itself is necessarily of interest, it is not the analytical object of 
Marx's research. His claims are not made about the objects indicated by common sense 
concepts. He asserts that although the relafions which we experience in production are 
real (a feature that is hard to deny), they are only phenomenally so. The real social 
relations of production, according to Marx, are not phenomenally available yet they are 
knowable. Marx's analytical claims are made about these social relations. 
MARX'S ANALYTICAL OBJECT: SOCIAL RELATIONS 
Marx's specific objects of analysis are the social forms of labour which are 
displayed in the relations of co-operafion and dependence within production. We would 
all agree that every society^ must achieve some basic organisation. It is a requirement by 
which we will recognise something as a society, rather than as a random collection of 
individuals. In addition, Marx states that the primary form of organisation will be around 
subsistence. As he explains (cited in Sayer,l979:21) in a letter to Kugelmann, "every child" 
knows that each society must achieve some organisation in at least two areas. It must 
both produce its means of subsistence and must distribute the various labours so that the 
appropriate kind and quantity of products are produced^. It is evident that the first has to 
6. Strictly speaking, Marx is not talking of a society as we might distinguish it on geographic or 
language or cultural grounds. This is why he introduces the term "mode of production" for his 
categorisation made on the basis of the form of production relations. 
7. Of course, some societies will fail to produce sufficient means of subsistence for their whole 
population. This does not prevent us seeing them as societies, aifaeif with great problems. However, if 
the problem becomes generalised, and /or causes mass disruption, we are willing to say: here is a society 
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be true for without subsistence, there is no life. In addition Marx both assumes, and 
attempts to show, that it is these relations which will provide the best organising principle 
for understanding the major relations within any society^: 
this mode of production must not be considered simply as being the 
reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a 
definite form of acfivity of those individuals,...a definite mode of life on 
their part (Marx & Engels,l 976:37; emphasis in original) 
Equally, the second assumption seems necessary for any group of people who were not 
isolated producers. Because they relied on each other for the necessities of life some 
arrangement of dependence and co-operation, no matter how simple, would be entailed^. 
Thus we can say that the social production relations of any society are those of 
dependence^'^ amongst producers and correlatively the particular form of co-operation 
between them. 
Societies differ in their forms of co-operation and dependence. In some societies 
the relations are immediately knowable. Feudalism, slavery, the rural patriarchal system 
of production and even the isolated Robinson Crusoe are all examples of an immediately 
apparent distribution of labour. As a result, in each of these, the social forms of 
dependence and co-operation are visible. Capitalism, however, is quite different. 
in the process of disintegration. There is no hard and fast line between the two. The lack of precision 
should not concern us. 
The same holds true for all other distinctions. For example, we can distinguish a football game as a 
game, rather than as a brawl, although it may have elements of the latter in it. Sometimes there will be 
disagreement over whether or not it has passed from one category to another. In the process of deciding 
what it is we are refining, or re-defining, what we mean by "football" and "brawl". 
8. Production relations are also significant because of Marx's understanding of what it is to be human. 
See Chapter 5 for a discussicm of this. 
9. The assumptions should not be a concern for they are tautological: they are true by virtue of what we 
understand to be human and to be a society. 
10. Dependence, as a transhistorical category, must not be understood as involving hierarchical relations. 
It need not; it is only one of its forms. Here it only signifies that there is a division of labour with the 
various parts relying upon each other for the end result. It is to be understood exactly as if the division 
occurred within one individual. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the significance of the 
transhistorical/historical distinction in relation to categories. 
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Within capitalism there is a spht between labour as it appears and its social form. 
The relations of dependence and co-operafion are not immediately visible^^. Labour is 
organised around private production. Each individual labourer chooses (within limits) 
his/her job, and each capitahst (also within limits) chooses both what to produce and how 
much. Whether anything which is produced or any labour which was expended is part of 
social production cannot be known in advance but only after the commodities are brought 
to market. The quantity and the price at which they are sold are the direct indication of 
what were the socially required products and concomitantly what was socially usefully 
labour. Labourers are laid off or more are employed, and /o r capitahsts alter the product 
or the way in which it is produced. Then the cycle of the social organisation of production 
begins again. 
The social distribution of labour is made post festum (Sayer,l979:22) in capitalism 
with reference to the exchange value of commodities. It is not the result of any conscious 
individual or group decision^^ [[ jg adjusted as a result of the actions of the buyers of 
commodities. Their minds are not engaged in fixing the social distribution of labour but 
only in acquiring a useful product for their private consumpfion. Nevertheless, their 
actions set the exchange value of the commodity which thus determines the social 
distribution of labour. As a consequence, the relations between ah producers in terms of 
their dependence upon and co-operation with each other for the total production of society 
is not visible. Instead, we are confronted with relations between things: expressed as the 
exchange value of commodities. 
Marx's analysis is of the social forms of labour and a referent must be found for 
them. Yet they are not phenomenahy present within capitalism: they are not immediately 
available to our sense impressions. Exchange value, itself, cannot be the social form of 
labour, for it merely acts as an indicator of the need for adjustment. Neither can the 
11. Of course, such a situation is absurd. It is Marx's contention that the absurdity flows from the nature 
of capitalism and not from his analysis. 
12. Under war conditions this rule may be over-ridden (see later material on the mining industry during 
World War II). There may be other situations which also can change the rule. However, these are the 
exceptions. 
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adjustments within production play this role, for they are made after the event. In terms 
of timing, they can never be the actual forms of social labour. Moreover, they are 
necessarily imperfect: there is always the need for re-adjustment. However, social labour 
must exist within the confines of these relations. The only possible conclusion is that as it 
has no phenomenal form it must have a purely social existence^^ 
In order to find a referent for the labour which is part of social production it is 
necessary to approach the question of its existence from the opposite direction. Its reality 
in capitalism has been demonstrated via enquiring into the effect of the exchange value of 
commodities on production. Its indissoluble link with exchange value was also 
demonstrated from this point of view. Its existence is indicated by shifting the direction of 
analysis in order to ask what social form exchange value produces. The social form will 
be the referent for socially necessary labour. 
Marx relies on nothing other than the logic of exchange itself, to find the social 
form of labour produced by exchange. He begins with the point made by Aristotle (cited 
in Marx,1954:65), "Exchange cannot take place without equality, and equality not without 
commensurablity". When we exchange two objects we are necessarily equating them: that 
is the meaning of exchange. However, when we exchange two commodities they appear 
as two different things. Moreover, this is the most basic requirement for exchange: if their 
use values were not different there would be no point in the exchange. Marx (1954:43-53) 
claims that the only possible thing that the two objects have in common is that they are 
products of human labour. Yet, as he points out the labour which produced them is also 
different in kind. However, Marx argues that exchange itself produces a new form of 
labour. In bringing the two different useful labours into a relation of equality it reduces 
both to abstract labour: "homogeneous human labour, expenditure of one uniform labour 
power" (Marx,l 954:46). Abstract labour is the parficular form of social labour produced 
by a society based on commodity exchange. 
13. It is certainly an assumption that if something which exists (is known to exist through its effects) does 
not do so phenomenally, then it will have a social form. However, the assumption should not cause 
concern. It is familiar to many sociologists. Moreover, it has philosophical backing in realist philosophy: 
a point which will be examined later in the chapter. 
81 
When we exchange commodities^'^ we do distribute ah labour in society. In that 
we are willing to (effectively ) exchange, for example 7500 tubes of toothpaste for a small 
car we are placing a value relation between them. We have said that as far as our needs 
are concerned the car is 7500 times more valuable than toothpaste. As a result we are 
equating the different kinds of labours involved in the total production of the two 
commodities^^. We are effectively allocating our total human resources in this ratio^^. It 
is only through exchange and the equahsation of all labour, which it produces, that the 
private labour of individuals are related to the collective labour of society (Marx,l954:80). 
Abstract labour is a particular (perverted) form of equal labour. Different forms of 
labour can be equal and can be seen to be so. This is evident if we take the different kinds 
of labour that a single individual uses (Marx,1954:81). Capitalism produces labour as 
equal but only on condition that it is at the same time abstract: that is, it is not experienced 
as equal by those whose are labouring. Ironically, commodity production produces an 
"ideal" equahsation of aU labour precisely because it is built upon an ubiquitous unequal 
division of labour. Thus we have an "ideal" form of equality (most visibly portrayed 
within the employment contract) at the same time as having a practical inequahty. It is a 
perverted form of equality: just as perverted as the equality of ancient Greece where it was 
apphed only to men who were non-slaves. Marx caUs the "absurd" (1954:80) social form of 
labour "value"^^: 
When looked as crystals of this social substance, common to them 
(commodifies) ah, they are - Values (Marx,1954:46). 
Its magnitude is measured in terms of time. Thus value can be understood as the sociaUy 
necessary labour time for the production of a particular commodity. It is the pecuhar. 
14. It is facilitated by the money form though it remains essentially an exchange of commodities. 
15. Obviously all labour involved is being equated: from that required to produce the raw materials, to 
that used in the production of the means of production and the direct labour involved in the product. 
16. We are also clearly allocating natural resources. However, as these are caught up in commodity 
production they are just as much receptacle of human labour as is the finished product. 
17. Marx has to create a name for the "thing" which his analysis has revealed. The name connects the 
social form to an essential aspect of its empirical reality: its indissoluble link to exchange value.. 
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even highly irrational^^ way, in which socially necessary labour time is organised within 
capitalism. 
Value is both abstract and real, just as meaning is. As the social form of labour it 
makes aU commodities a "social hieroglyphic" (Marx,1954:79). The commodity thus 
contains more than it appears to. In the same manner, a word holds meaning though that 
is not visible from a mere inspection of its aspects which are phenomenally present. As 
such value is "just as much a social product as language" (Marx,l954:79). 
Marx's aim was to describe the social forms of labour within capitalism. Value 
indicates their existence and hence it is the most crucial category^^ in Marx's work. It is 
the general (undifferentiated) form of the social relations of production. It is little wonder 
that Marx (1954) refers to as "an economic ceU form". His work then consists of an 
examinafion and description of the "merry-go-round" (01lman,1976:187) of value into such 
forms as capital, variable capital and surplus value. It is also clear that the category of 
value delimits the extension of Marx's investigation. It provides a basis for judgement of 
what will be included as aspects of production relations within capitalism^O. 
However, none of the forms of value are phenomenahy present. Hence one of 
Marx's tasks is to develop categories to indicate them. The common sense concepts which 
are already available within our everyday life are not suitable. These are appropriate for 
18. It is irrational for the adjustments are post festum and are necessarily imperfect. As a consequence, it 
creates personal and social disruption. The adjustments often have to be made at great personal cost 
both to the labourers and to the capitalists. It is a mode of organisation by permanent crisis 
management. If the crisis is severe enough even the State has to become involved. 
19. I distinguish between concepts and categories. I use "concept" to refer to, for example, common sense 
concepts. It indicates that it is understood, in general, in an empiricist manner. Within that tradition the 
concept is understood as belonging to the ideal or mental in contrast to the empirical which is taken as the 
real. On the other hand, I use "category" to refer to those "names of things" which are conceived of from 
a realist position. Categories are thus understood as aspects of reality (a "one sided" accentuation). 
However, I think it is quite possible that we have been led astray philosophically and that even 
common sense concepts cannot be conceived of as being mental, as opposed to being real. This is the 
force of Wittgenstein's (1963) argument. If this is so, then "concept" would be an appropriate word to use 
in all circumstances. However, I shall use both "concept" and "category" differently as indicated above. 
In part, this is to bring home the essential difference in the way in which they have been understood 
traditionally. It is also to use words as they are being employed in debates within Marxism. 
20. This reveals the absurdity of those who seek to "apply" Marx's claims about production relations to 
other forms of production where they do not take the value form. It equally throws into doubt the 
attempts to "extend" Marx's analysis to other areas without first seeing if the value relation is pertinent. 
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grasping things as they appear to us in our practical activity. Because social relations are 
not given immediately to us they have no names within common sense discourse. 
Herein lies one of the major reason for the dilemmas faced by Marxists who use 
common sense concepts. They are not the concepts which Marx uses. Marx's objects of 
analysis within capitalism are the social relations of production or the various forms of 
value. He designates these by his categories such as "capital", "constant capital", "surplus 
value" and "variable capital". These categories are not the same as the common sense 
concepts of "capitalist", "technology", "profit" and "labourers". What Marx can claim of a 
category, for example, "capital", cannot be claimed of the concept, "capitalists". The 
problem faced by Marxists who are not conscious of the distinctions involved is that 
inappropriate claims are made. While quite general claims can be made of the categories, 
they cannot for the concepts. 
Marxists who use common sense concepts wih meet either of two difficulties. The 
failure of common sense concepts to uphold the claims made for social relafions will be 
apparent. If it is not addressed, then there will be an unbridgeable gap between the 
theory which is used, and the analysis which is made. If, on the other hand, it is 
addressed Marxists will be forced out of Marxism for, logically they must reject core 
aspects of Marx's theory. 
The "hard core" (Lakatos,1970:133) of Marx's theory consists of a claim that there is 
a necessary relation of exploitation between labour and capital. The assertion can only be 
understood if it is recognised that he is speaking about social relations, rather than about 
interactions between people. Marx claims that exploitation occurs because capital is able 
to gain surplus value from labour. CapitaL as a result of the wage exchange, acquires the 
right to the products of labour. As a result it has access to ah the value that is contained 
within the product. Because labour produces more value than the value of its labour 
power, capital in possessing the product, accrues that surplus value produced by labour. 
As such there is a necessary relation of exploitation between labour and capital. However, 
it only makes sense if we remember that it occurs through the social relations (marked by 
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value) through which we produce. Exploitation is not phenomenahy present within 
capitalism . 
At the phenomenal level of interactions between people, and the common sense 
concepts which are used to describe them, all we can see are contingent relations. There 
are negotiations over wages and activities surrounding profit. The outcome of the wage 
bargain may be more or less fair, but will be related to the laws of demand and supply. 
Exploitation will not be visible here, though ruthlessness and power may well be^l. 
However, they are not the same as exploitation. They are contingent aspects of the 
capitalist/labourer relation, whereas exploitation is a necessary feature of the 
capital/labour relation. If we explore profit, the other phenomenal aspect of the 
capital/labour relation, we are equally unable to see exploitation. Clearly, profit is 
reached as much by business acumen, luck and cheating as by the role of workers and 
their relation to capitahst. There are a plethora of relations in the contingent world of the 
capitalist/labourer relafion. Neither necessity nor exploitation is evident. 
If common sense concepts such as "profit", "wage" "capitahst" and "labourer" are 
used in an analysis it will fail to uphold any claims to necessity. Hence, in order to be 
consistent, any writer engaged in this activity will be forced to abandon Marx's core claim. 
The necessary relation of exploitation will appear, quite correctly, to be blatantly wrong. 
It is a wonder that more Marxists have not followed the logic of their findings and 
abandoned Marxism. 
Perhaps one reason that Marxism was able to survive for so long while carrying the 
burden of incompatible common sense concepts hes in the nature of the capitalist/labourer 
relationship. In the nineteenth century and in the first part of the twentieth century the 
labouring population suffered great hardship. Consequently, the needs of the labourer 
confronted the needs of the capitalist in, often, quite violent and visible forms. In such a 
context it appeared that exploitation and class struggle were there on the surface of society. 
Marx's claims could be read as referring to the interactions between people. As well, they 
21. It is clear that both generosity and equality may be present in negotiations over the wage. However, 
it is less likely. They are not qualities which are considered to be appropriate in bargaining which by its 
very nature is driven by self interest. 
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could be couched safely in common sense terms. Once the relationship lost its openly 
confrontafionalist quality Marxism did not seem so adequate22. 
The dilemma for Marxism is acute now. One reason is that the phenomenal 
relationship between capitalists and labourers has tended to move from coercion to 
consent. The gap between the everyday relations between capitahsts and labourers and 
Marx's apparent claims, understood through common sense concepts, has become too 
great. Many have jettisoned Marxism as a consequence. 
An alternative response is possible. If Marx's claims are examined, it is clear that 
they are not made with the common sense concepts which we employ in the everyday 
world. They are claims about the social relations through which we produce and which 
are not phenomenally available. One possible response to the crisis within Marxism is to 
test the viability of this reading of Marx within the context of the more consensual relations 
between capitahsts and labourers. However, it requires that we are very clear about the 
nature of social relations, for it rests upon them. 
THE CHARACTER OF SOCIAL RELATIONS 
We move in a world of social relations. In our everyday discourse and practice we 
recognise social relations designated by such concepts as "father", "teacher" and even "art". 
We know there is no father without a child and without a mother. We acknowledge that 
there is no teacher without a pupil^^. On a little reflection, we realise there is no art 
without materials and an art history. In each of these, and in the countless others with 
which we habitually deal in the everyday atfitude, we display a tacit knowledge of the 
essential feature of social relations. 
In the everyday attitude we recognise that within a social relation the terms are not 
separate. As far as the social relafion of, for example, teaching is concerned teacher and 
22. Clearly there are numerous reasons for the change, but it is the fact of the change which is being 
noted. In addition, the process took place over a long period. 
23. Clearly "pupil" here has a wide meaning applicable both in the formal educarion system and in, for 
example, that of the family. We do not have a term that will adequately convey the range of teaching 
situations. 
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pupil are internally related. We cannot explain teaching without reference to them. 
Equally, we cannot explain either teacher or pupil without reference to the other term. In 
this respect, teacher and pupil can be said to be internally related. That the terms of a 
social relation are internally, rather than externally, related is not mysterious to anyone in 
the everyday attitude. We employ that mode of explanation automatically whenever we 
try to explain what teaching or any other social relation is. 
As well, in the everyday attitude, we competently deal with the multiple realities in 
any situafion. We effectively employ internal relations when explaining social relations. 
We "see" the way in which "teacher" ~and "pupil" are necessarily implied by each other. 
At the same time we are not confused by the fact that there are external relations involved 
in the reahty before us. We recognise that quite separate people (or things) are engaged in 
those relations. We easily distinguish the teacher, as a person, as being separate from the 
pupil as a person. Their very separateness is necessary for our understanding of how, as a 
social relation, they are internahy related and hence not separate. For things (or people) 
which are not firstly separate cannot create a social relation: a point which is tautological. 
The differences are not difficult to grasp as tacit knowledge. We learn to move 
comfortably around these two realities as we learn how to act and how to communicate in 
our society. 
Yet, when we reflect academicahy upon what social relations are we tend to deny 
our tacit knowledge. Although most of sociology is built around a recognition of social 
relafions as its subject matter we are inclined to view them in a peculiar way. They are 
generally taken to be relations which occur when two separate things or people interact: 
which is correct. However, it becomes deeply problematic when the description is taken 
as providing the method for analysing and explaining social relations. Yet this is what 
happens. We see here a teacher and there a pupil and the social relation as if it were 
something passing between them (hke a ball). Here the social relation is understood solely 
in terms of external relations^^. 
24. The hegemony of empiricism is probably largely responsible for giving credence to this view. 
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Ironically, if we set about describing social relafions from the view point of external 
relations we cannot grasp them. When we take external relations to be the form of the 
social relation we are led away from its description. We may produce numerous 
generalisations, about teachers and pupils (for example). We may even produce 
generalisations about the manner in which the relate (their cruelty, kindness, success in 
teaching or learning). Yet, all the time, we are skirfing around the social relation but not 
actually describing it. Equahy, we may produce detailed descriptions of particular 
teaching situations. Even here, we are not directly attempting to describe the social 
relation of teaching but rather to describe a particular relationship. Both attempts touch 
upon some of the characteristics of the social relation but neither is speaking directly about 
it. 
Perhaps our tacit knowledge as participants in the everyday world affects our work 
as academics. It may well be the case that we, as academics, can treat social relations as 
external relations only because we tacitly know what the social relations in question are. 
Moreover, it is possible that the claims we make can only be understood to the extent that 
we already have a tacit knowledge of what the social relation is. Certainly Winch 
(1958:135) suggested that this was the case with generahsations. It seems likely to be the 
case for particular analyses as well. 
Social relafions are so much part of our tacit knowledge that it is difficult to make 
them the object of analysis. They underlie all of our understanding and our activity. 
They are, to borrow from Foucault's (1972:111) claim about the statement, "like the over-
familiar that constantly eludes one"25. Their familiarity, indeed the necessity of their 
existence for any of our practices to take place, makes them illusive both to study and to 
discuss^^. 
The familiarity of social relations lies in the fact that they are the condifion of 
possibihty of all of our practices. Because we have such social relations as teaching. 
25. Foucault (1972) is describing just such a level of reality as social relations, but in relation to discourse. 
Hence, he uses the category "statement" to name it. 
26. Hence, there is difficulty in coming to terms with analyses such as Marx's which are aimed directly at 
describing social relations. 
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fathering, mothering and working we are able to teach, be a father or mother and work, 
and we are able to recognise these when they occur. Social relations pre-exist our actions. 
We call upon our tacit knowledge of what they are whenever we engage in any activity. 
Social relations thus constitute the condition of possibility of our actions. 
Social relations pre-exist our action but they are also produced and reproduced by 
them (a familiar point. See, for example, Bhaskar,1979; Giddens,1984). If there were no 
human activity around teaching there could not be the social relation of teaching. Thus 
our activity produces the social relation while it at the same time enables us to act. In 
addition, as we act we re-produce that social relation. Teaching as a social relation exists 
for just as long as we engage in that activity. 
A social relation cannot be produced out of nothing. It is always formed through 
the mutation of an existing social relation. A new social relafion comes into existence on 
the basis of an older one and gradually becomes differentiated from it. One can think of 
the way wage labour became a social relation through its differentiation both from serf and 
craft labour. The process of the formation of the new social relation took place over a long 
period and because of changes in many other relations (Marx,1954:671-712). Once the 
social relation is estabhshed as a relatively sohd form our actions tend to reproduce it. 
However, there is always the possibility of change within a social relation. Our 
actions are necessarily varied. There are numerous ways of teaching and fathering, for 
example. Usually, we are comfortably aware of them as being just those actions. 
However, at some point the amount of variation becomes too great for us to say this is, for 
example, "teaching". If the variation achieves some social solidity, there will be debate 
over it (for example: Is this teaching and therefore eligible for government funding ? or Is 
this teaching or indoctrinafion?). At some point the social relation will either acquire new 
characteristics (we accept the changes as being part of what we call teaching) or it will be 
transformed into a new social relation. There will be no hard and fast hne separating 
reproduction of social relations and their change. The process will occur slowly and 
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perhaps with agony. It is only on looking back that we will be able to differentiate one 
from the other^^. 
The internal relations which constitute social relations are thus historical. They 
refer to "an ontological, not a logical relafion" as Oilman (1976:33) remarks^^. Usually 
internal relations are taken to be logical relations which have a necessary relation between 
the terms. Hume, according to Rubenstein (1981:185), saw them as "a logical relationship 
of ideas; its truth is not empirical but a priori"'^^. It is quite correct to analyse the 
relationship between the sections of a syllogism in a logical manner. However, a more 
appropriate understanding must be produced for the relations within a social relation. It 
does not take much thought to realise that the social relation of teaching has been 
historically formed. Quite clearly, it means something different today in Australia, than it 
meant with the Aborigines some 40,000 years ago. Yet at the same time, whatever it 
means the relations which constitute it wih be internal. In our society "teacher" will imply 
"pupil" and both will be contained in the description of teaching. Equahy, in Aboriginal 
society "elder" will imply "initiate" and both will be implied in teaching. The terms will 
bear a necessary relationship to each other, as though they were logical relations. 
However, they whl be socially produced. Hence, unlike logical relations they are subject 
to change and decay^^. 
Social relations create the possibihty of actions but do not determine what they will 
be. They "leave the final placing of the text in dotted outline" as Foucault (1972:75) notes 
about discursive formafions. Thus social relations and actions are separate aspects of 
reahty. 
27. The inability to draw neat boundaries is a common problem for almost all forms of categorisation. 
For example when does a child become an adolescent? 
28. See also Bhaskar, 1979:51-56 and Sayer,1987:19-23 as well as Oilman (1976) for a fuller discussion of 
Marx's use of internal relations. 
29. Rubenstein (1981:98-102) is ambivalent about their status. On the one hand he argues that the 
relationship is produced by people through time (thus historical) but he also wants to claim that it is a 
logical relationship. 
30. One thinks of Foucault's (1972:127) daring term "an historical a priori". While he has used it in a 
different context it admirably indicates the two apparently incompatible aspects which are contained in 
social relations. 
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We need to learn to be able to see the existence of social relations within our 
everyday activities. It requires a different point of view from the everyday atfitude where 
we take them for granted. The change in view point is difficult, but it can be acquired. 
The first task is to remember that social relations are not the same as our activities but 
neither are they separable from them. They do not lead an autonomous existence from 
our activities, nor can they be separated out empirically (as one might separate cream from 
milk). In order to recognise them we must be wihing to see them within our activities. 
This requires the ability to see different aspects of a thing - a process which we habitually 
engage in 
We are famihar with looking at an object and seeing it from different points of 
view, even though these are not phenomenally present. We are comfortable with, for 
example, seeing different aspects of a pitcher. From one point of view it will be a 
receptacle of water - a mere object of use. From another point of view, we may see it as an 
object of art - a receptacle of beauty. Almost everything we deal with has multiple social 
reahties which are discernible by picking up different aspects of it. In our everyday life 
we move competently around these, although we tend not to be aware of it. 
When we see different aspects of the same phenomenal object we are both seeing 
and interpreting (Wittgenstein,1963:193e). The interpretation wih depend upon the 
connections that are made with it. In the case of the pitcher, the connecfions could be 
those of a well and water or of an art gallery and the history of art. In either case, my 
"seeing it as" something has, as it were, activated different sets of discursive relations 
between things and people and ideas (Foucault,1972:45)'^^. These relations produce the 
possibihty of seeing just the object which we do see. As Wittgenstein (1963:210e) 
remarked of an arbitrary cipher "1 can see it in various aspects according to the fiction 1 
surround it with"32. All of our language and social intercourse are predicated upon our 
ability to see different aspects of the "one" thing. 
31. The sets of relations are also already in place before we see the pitcher as either an object of art or an 
object of use. They enable us to see in just that way. 
32. It is certainly possible that being a phenomenal object is not a basic characteristic of things. It may be 
only one aspect. That is, we can, if we choose, look at the pitcher as a material object, rather than as a 
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Social relations have a peculiar existence which makes them a distinctively human 
phenomenon. They straddle consciousness and materiahty; change and continuity. They 
are the result of conscious intentional activity and yet they are not the same as it, for they 
pre-exist it and make it possible. They are the result of the constant changes and 
variafions in our activities, yet they have a certain permanence. "In social hfe only 
relafions endure" as Bhaskar (1979:52) points out. Social relafions are thus disfincfively 
human productions. Usually, it is only those who study the detahs of the contingent 
world of human action who claim to be able to capture humanity. Yet, ironically, they 
miss out on the essential feature of our humanity: our ability to generate immense variety 
while at the same time producing an ordered knowable existence. Social relations are the 
point at which these two aspects of humanity meet. As such they make an admirable 
object for the study of human activity. They contain features which define them as human 
productions and features which make them amenable to study^-^. 
This section has addressed the question of the character of social relations. It 
argued that social relations are an appropriate subject matter for analysis. As well, it dealt 
with their major characterisfic: that they consisted in internal relations. Perhaps, social 
relafions do not yet seem adequate objects for a scienfific analysis. Maybe, there is a 
feeling that they are not quite real. Certainly, they are not phenomenally available. The 
next stage in the argument is a consideration of the question of "reality". It asserts that 
social relations are real and that they only appear impoverished in this regard because of 
the hegemony of empiricism. 
THE REALTTY OF SOCIAL RELATIONS 
This section argues that empiricism has limited what social science can do by 
limiting what can count as real. However, it is pointed out that empiricism is flawed as it 
social object. However, we have tended to take that phenomenal aspect and given it philosophical 
centrality. 
33, Social relations provide all the forms of what is enduring and necessary in human existence. 
However, they are not the same as the universal laws of nature that the natural sciences study for they are 
not permanent. This does not mean that they cannot be analysed but rather points out as Bhaskar 
(1979:52) notes that there is a specific object for a specific science: sociology. 
92 
gives an impoverished account of knowledge. It fails to recognise the necessary social 
conditions under which it is produced. Once this is accepted then it is clear that things 
can be regarded as real even if they have no empirical existence. Thus, it is argued, social 
relations can be known to be real, through the production of adequate descriptions of 
them. 
Social relations are not phenomenally present. When Marx invites us to see the 
"social substance" (1954:46), value, in the commodity, he (1954:54) is adamant that value is 
not phenomenally present. His description Ccin be applied to any social relafion: 
The value of commodities is the very opposite of the coarse materiahty of 
their substance, not an atom of matter enters into its composition. Turn 
and examine a single commodity, by itself, as we will, yet in so far as it 
remains an object of value, it seems impossible to grasp it. 
Yet social relations are also real. 
There is difficulty in recognising that non-phenomenal objects are real. Even Sayer 
(1979) and Oilman (1976) seem to fah into this trap. Both argue persuasively for the 
existence of value then weaken their claims by being ambivalent about its reahty. Sayer 
(1979:136) claims that value is an hypothetical entity that is not directly empirically 
testable. However, he argues that it is nevertheless testable indirectly through both 
comparison and prediction. The weakness of this claim is evident in Sayer's (1979:139-
141) recognition that Marx did not really engage in either activity. Marx is thus 
apparently left in the untenable posifion of resting his entire analysis on an hypothetical 
entity. Ohman (1976:174) equally reduces the reality of value: for him it is an 
"assumption": "its unity with labour is assumed". Both of these claims considerably 
weaken Marx's argument that value is a social reality. 
The hegemony of empiricism is largely responsible for the difficulty of seeing social 
relafions as real. It is a philosophy which attempts to justify knowledge claims with 
reference to the experiences of isolated individuals. In linking knowledge to existence in 
this manner it assumes a particular ontological position: that being is related to experience. 
In addifion, it ahgns itself with a view (empirical realism) that reahty must be confined to 
that which is indubitably percepfible to individuals. It logically follows, on the 
empiricist's view, that reahty must consist of atomisfic events and their (logical) relations 
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(Bhaskar,1975:16). Empirical realism and its twin, sociological individuahsm, underlie the 
hesitancy we experience in accepting social relations as the subject of enquiry. Social 
relations are, after all, not perceptible nor are they phenomena belonging to isolated 
individuals. 
Empiricism limits what can count as the objects of social scientific enquiry. 
Positivists most obviously fall under the hegemony of empiricism. They carefully confine 
their analyses to the closest counterpart they can find to the assumed atomistic and 
empirical reality of the natural sciences: quantifiable phenomena. However, those in the 
hermeneutic and Marxist traditions also fall under the sway of empiricism, despite their 
rejection of it^ "^ . It is most obvious in their adherence to the examination of phenomena 
which have an empirical availabihty. Thus analysis is confined to persons or groups of 
persons and to their actions. As Bhaskar (1979:26) indicates of the hermeneutic tradition 
(although usuaUy the same may be said of Marxists): 
..writers within the hermeneutical tradition have adopted the posifivist 
view that the objects of knowledge are events (or their counterpart in the 
domain of the human sciences, actions). Transposed to the 
hermeneutical perspective, this misconception has encouraged a 
definition of the social by reference to the category of behaviour, albeit of 
a particular, for example intentional or rule-governed, sort. 
The objects of study are conceived as discrete things whose, perhaps complex, relations are 
to be explored. They are the objects of our everyday existence, of our common sense 
concepts. However, the immediate appeal of empiricism and common sense concepts is 
lost once they are subjected to scrutiny. 
Empiricism offers an impoverished account of ontology and of knowledge. Its 
claims need to be explored so that the hegemony of analysis based on common sense 
concepts can be broken. 
34, The hermeneutic tradition discards empiricism as an adequate philosophy for explaining social 
phenomena. However, they accept its analysis of the nature of knowledge and reality in the natural 
sciences. Hence, they construct their view of the social sciences in opposition to it. This produces 
insights into the nature of social phenomena and an interesting range of questions to be explored. 
However it also creates problems of producing adequately general claims. 
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Empiricism rests upon empirical realism: it understands reahty as being confined 
to that which is perceivable by the senses-^^. It takes one type of criterion for the ascription 
of reality and turns it into the sole guarantee of existence. Certainly, we call upon 
perception as an arbiter of the reality of a thing (for example: "It does exist, I 
saw/felt / touched/smelt /heard it yesterday"). In general, a claim such as this, is regarded 
as "epistemically decisive" as Bhaskar (1975:38) notes. However, empiricism involves two 
additional and damaging claims. First, the particular criterion of perceptibility is 
transformed into being the only criterion for attributing existence. Second, and logically 
connected, is that an epistemological criterion (We know something exists if we perceive it) 
gets transformed into an ontological one (Something exists only if it is perceived or is 
perceivable) (Bhaskar,1975:28). 
In addition, empiricism is based upon a "sociological individualism" 
(Bhaskar,l979:25). Perception is necessarily a "private matter" within empiricism. The 
philosophical force of perception as a guarantee of reahty lies in the relation of perception 
to the individual. Empiricism rehes upon the truth that an individual cannot be mistaken 
about what he/she senses. People may lie about what they perceive or they may be 
deceived by the appearance of the thing, but they cannot be mistaken in their awareness of 
their perceptions. Empiricism extrapolates from this (basic) aspect of human perception. 
It claims that all perception and knowledge arises from the indubitable sense experiences 
of isolated individuals. Thus, on their account, the appropriate objects of knowledge are 
sense objects (objects capable of exciting one of our senses). The apparent quality of 
guarantee contained in this human phenomena has given empiricism its force. However, 
the guarantee of certamty is only possible if perception (and knowledge) are viewed in 
such a limiting manner. It cannot be maintained if perception and knowledge have social 
components. 
Experience is a social product (Wittgenstein for example 1963:par 293:100e). 
Hence, perception, and knowledge, cannot direcfly be linked to the world of sense objects. 
No experience is purely private. It needs a community of agreement to make it graspable. 
35. I will use the term "perception" to cover all senses. 
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If pain were a purely private phenomenon (and it clearly has private aspects) then no 
understanding about pain could be possible. What you called pain and what I called pain 
could be entirely different and there would be no way of knowing. There could be no 
communication in that area. We recognise the experience (as pain, red etc) because we 
have learnt to do that within our community. Private experience is made possible by 
agreement on its meaning. 
If perception is shaped by social forms of knowledge then it cannot give a 
guarantee of the reality of a thing. It was the nature of the private experience which was 
called on by the empiricists to provide the direct link between reality and the experience. 
It appeared to offer a guarantee of existence. A social base to perception introduces a 
break between the world and the claim of perception. It means that I can learn that I was 
mistaken, or be confirmed in what 1 saw by others. Thus whhe it is still true that 1 cannot 
make a mistake about the experience of perception, now it is possible that I can make a 
mistake about what I perceive. We can recognise the certainty of an individual's 
experience and at the same time differentiate that from a claim about the external world. 
As Wittgenstein (1969:par425) clauns: 
..it was right in the circumstances that give this sentence meaning, to say 
"I know (I do not merely surmise) that that's a tree"....And this too is 
right: I cannot be making a mistake about it. But that does not mean I 
am infahible about it. 
Once the question of knowledge is approached from the point of view of the 
community, in which knowledge is made possible, the particular power of the empiricists' 
claim to knowledge of existence through experience means little. 
Empiricism was cahed on as a guarantee of the scientific nature of the natural 
sciences. Not surprisuigly, it fahs here as weU for it cannot comprehend the social nature 
of scientific work, or the significance of their findings. 
Bhaskar (1975) argues that empiricism cannot perform the task which is allocated to 
it within the philosophy of science. It cannot guarantee the existence of laws. Bhaskar 
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uses a transcendental argument^^ to show that the empiricists account of scientific 
knowledge is impoverished. He argues (Bhaskar,1975:65) that if reality is confined to the 
perceptible then empiricists cannot account for both the universality of laws (for they are 
not generally able to be experienced in open systems) and for their reality. Laws can be 
understood as empirically available within the closed system of the experiment. 
However, this is all the empiricists can claim. It is an impoverished account of laws. It 
leads to a number of nonsensical positions. If laws are what is able to be experienced in 
the experiment then two points seem to inexorably follow. The first is that the scientist 
him/herself produces the law in which case the law is hardly of interest to anyone. 
Alternatively, the empiricist's posifion can imply that the law exists independently of the 
scientist. However, then no meaning can be given to the work of the scientist or to the 
nature of the law. It denies the causal role of the scientist in producing the regularity 
which is experienced. Moreover, in containing laws to the closed system of the 
experiment, it leaves open the question of what "governs phenomena in open systems" 
(Bhaskar,1975:65). Again the law seems to have been granted little significance within 
empiricism. It seems that empirical realism fails on its most favoured ground - the natural 
sciences. 
The empiricists sought a guarantee for knowledge through the question of the 
nature of reality. It lead to a remarkably impoverished view of what humans do, both in 
everyday life and in science. The problems they meet are not so surprising. They have 
begun with a strange question and so they have been lead to look in the wrong place for 
the answer. 
In everyday life we are comfortable in using the concept "real" although its use 
tends to be limited to particular situations. There are numerous language games 
36. A transcendental argument is one that seeks to show the conditions of possibility that allow a 
particular activity (in this case, science) to be followed. It asks: what must the world be like such that 
science is possible? 
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(Wittgenstein, 1963:23)'^ '^  where "real" makes perfect sense. However, we predominantly 
use "real" when we want to claim something is not real. We can say "unicorns are not 
real" or "that tree is not real - it was made in Taiwan". We sometimes use it in a positive 
sense when the situation is unusual and has created an appearance only of reality. For 
example, if we are in a hall of mirrors, or playing virtual reahty we might find it necessary 
to point out that something is real. In all these cases we understand their meaning. We 
have criteria which will count for the truth of our claim, although clearly the claim can be 
disputed. We know how to determine the truth or falsity of the claim. There is no 
problem with this "ordinary" sense of real. 
In everyday life the question of the reality of anything is not addressed. It is 
assumed in our practices. It is interesting, as Wittgenstein (1969:476) remarks, that 
children do not learn "that books exist, that armchairs exist etc. etc." In our everyday life 
such questions do not arise because we do not learn how to determine a thing's existence, 
but how to relate to it ("they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs etc. 
etc."(Wittgenstein,1969:476)). In relating to the thing through the set of social practices 
which surround it (and it can be of any kind: a book or a pain) we learn that it exists and 
what its character is. Apart from particular situations which can induce illusions of 
reahty, we have no criteria for determining the reality of a thing. Wittgenstein continues 
in the same paragraph: 
Later questions about the existence of things do of course arise. "Is there 
such a thing as a unicorn?" and so on. But such a question is possible 
only because as a rule no corresponding question presents itself. For 
how does one know how to set about satisfying oneself of the existence 
37, Wittgenstein (1963:par.23:11 e) uses the concept of language games to "bring into prominence that the 
speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life". His contention is that most of the 
philosophical puzzles about meaning, reality, truth and so on arise because inappropriate questions are 
asked by philosophers. In turn this sends them seeking in the wrong places for answers. Essentially the 
problem has been that philosophers have viewed language while it is "on holiday" (1958:par 38), The 
grammatical structure of a sentence has led them, for example, to seek a mental object for pain because 
"he has a pain" has the same grammatical structure as "he has a hat". This whole problem is avoided 
according to Wittgenstein if we look at the meanings these sentences have in our normal intercourse. 
Ironically, Wittgenstein (1963:par.23:12e) remarks 
It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the way 
they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians 
have said about the structure of language, (Including the author of the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosovhicus) 
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of unicorns? How did one learn the method of determining whether 
something exists or not. 
However, philosophers have sought an absolute guarantee of reality and 
empiricism is the fruit of their search. They have taken an ordinary "humble" concept (for 
"real" is just as ordinary as "table" when it is at home in its language game) 
(Wittgenstein,1963:par97:44e) and turned it into a "super concept". In doing that they have 
been led astray. They took a basic feature of a human's ability to understand the world 
(empirical objects and sense experience) and turned it into the only criterion for truth 
claims. Naturally, it lead to absurd questions and answers (Wittgenstein, 
1963:par308,103e). 
We should not start with the nature of reality when we are trying to understand 
how we can know if something is true or not. Rather we could start with observing how 
truth claims are made and recognised. 
Truth then becomes something arbitrary and non-arbitrary^^. However, we must 
not then think that we have made a retreat to a relativist position. Rather, we are 
recognising the complex relation between the things of the world and humans' 
understanding of them. Yet, what we claim is true also has the weight of certainty about it 
for, in terms of all of our current practices, it is certain. Perhaps, this is what Marx meant 
in his second "Thesis on Feuerbach" (1976:615) when he claimed: 
The quesfion whether objective truth can be attributed to human 
thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man 
must prove the truth, ie the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his 
thinking in practice. The dispute over the reahty or non-reahty of 
thinking which is isolated from practice is purely a scholastic question. 
(Emphasis in the original). 
Marx is arguing that claims for an absolute truth (objective truth) are not sensible. He 
points out that truth wiU depend upon practice. Surely this is not a problematic concept. 
It appears to indicate that truth depends upon two aspects of our existence. First, there is 
the whole range of activities which we engage in to find truth (looking, reading 
researching, checking etc). Second, and not separate from the first, there is our existing 
38. Wittgenstein in Zettel,352 (cited in Phillips,1977:85) refers to language as something "akin to what is 
arbitrary and what is non-arbitrary". 
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knowledge within which the truth claim is embedded. If the claim passes these stringent 
tests then we can assert that it is true^'^. 
Once we have a more complex understanding of truth then we can be open to 
recognising a broader range of real objects which can be studied scientificahy. A thing 
need not have empirical qualities to make it an object of research. It may even be that, that 
which is empirically available, is of the least interest for scientists (either natural or social). 
For the thing may already be known by those in the everyday attitude. 
Bhaskar (1975, 1979) has argued that within the natural sciences the objects of 
analysis are powers of things which may or may not be empirically available. He claims 
that laws are statements about the nature of things by virtue of which they have a 
tendency to act in certain ways. Laws do not refer either to the domain of the empirical 
(that which is observed) or of the actual (that which occurs and is in principle observable). 
For example, when we say that sodium wih combine with hydrochloric acid to produce 
sodium chloride and hydrogen, we are not saying that in the domain of the actual that this 
will invariably occur. We know it will occur in only certain circumstances. However, 
Bhaskar (1975:47) argues that the tendency is real whether or not it is realised. The 
tendency is a result of a specific power of sodium. He claims that the task of science is to 
discover these powers of things. They may be empiricahy available, with the invention of 
sense expanding technology. However, Bhaskar argues that at any time scientists might 
just have to rest with them as powers which are not susceptible to empirical scrutiny. A 
magnetic field is an example of such a power. It is known only through its effects. 
39. Surely, this is also Kuhn's (1970) point and also what lies behind Foucault's work. Bhaskar (1975:47) 
also states the complex relationship between things and knowledge clearly: 
The world consists of mechanisms not events They are the intransitive objects of 
scientific theory. They are quite independent of men - as thinkers, causal agents 
and perceivers. They are not unknowable, although knowledge of them depends 
upon a rare blending of intellectual, practico-technical and perceptual skills. They 
are not artificial constructs. But neither are they Platonic forms. Thus we are not 
imprisoned in caves, either of our own or of nature's making. We are not doomed 
to ignorance. But neither are we spontaneously free. This is the arduous task of 
science. 
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Moreover, it is possible that the "ultimate entifies" are just powers'^''. On Bhaskar's view of 
the objects of science, things appear as complex stratified objects with their empirical 
quahties being perhaps the least mteresting aspect for scientists. 
Once the hegemony of the empiricist conception of the nature of reahty is broken 
within the natural sciences there is the possibility of recognising social relations as objects 
of enquiry. Unhke the objects of the natural sciences social relations are "necessarily 
'theoretical'" (Bashkar,1979:57). They can never be empirically verified. They "can only 
be known, not shown to exist" as Bhaskar (1979:57) remarks. They are only ever present in 
their effects and experimental manipulation to demonstrate their presence is not possible. 
Despite this they can come to be recognised as real. 
There are criteria within the social sciences which provide good grounds for 
believing that a particular social relation exists. The criteria are related to understanding. 
For in social science the primary task is to convey an understanding of the social relafions 
through an adequate description of them. Our recognition of it will follow both from 
what we know as scienfists and as participants in the world which is being described. If it 
makes sense to us, if it produces a harmony of understanding within these contexts we will 
be willing to grant it reality. 
The reality of the social relation is doubly provisional. It exists only as long as 
those practices exist which enable us to recognise it. More importantly, it will only be 
recognised as long as the theoretical context which made it possible is itself recognised. 
Our claims for the existence of anything are theory dependent. However, we must not 
think that the truth claim is weak because of the conditions that surround it. It is the only 
type of truth which we can possess. 
Social relations are real and hence are appropriate objects for analysis. We can 
make claims about them which can be known to be true. The next secfion briefly 
addresses the analytical task which is involved hi the study of social relations. 
40. It is therefore possible that science will have to rest with this form of knowledge. However, we 
should not think of it as inadequate. It only appears to be so because of the dominance of the empiricist 
criteria for the ascription of reality (and truth). 
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THE ANALYTICAL TASK 
The analysis of social relations needs to be performed in a manner which is 
appropriate to them. They are constituted by internal relations and so are part of a 
connected whole. The key task in their analysis is therefore individuafion. The two 
means are description and naming. 
We take it for granted in the everyday attitude that different tasks may well require 
distinct methods. We know that we must lecture a class of two hundred quite differently 
from a class of twenty. In turn, we must discuss a thesis with a student, in a different 
manner once again. We also know that if we fail to distinguish the different approaches 
required we can fail in our tasks. In the everyday atfitude it is crucial to be sensitive to 
and knowledgeable about the appropriate way in which things have to be done. 
Yet when it comes to academic theorising we tend to simplify matters by calling 
upon the same approach for all matters. This has occurred with the question of social 
relations. We have taken the overt form of our everyday activity, the interaction between 
separate entities, as the paradigm of how to analyse all things. 
Mechanical relations constitute interactions and make a causal analysis of them 
appropriate. It defines the relationships between separate entities. As a result, the 
entities marked by the terms of the relation are necessarily viewed as separate but 
interacting. A mechanical analysis emphasises an explorafion of an interaction. The 
tracing and examination of the causal relations involved in an interaction is undeniably 
important. However, they are not the only things which can be studied and they don't 
provide the pattern for all forms of analysis. 
The analysis of social relations needs a specific approach for their terms are 
internally rather than externaUy related. The central analytical task involved in the study 
of social relafions is to individuate them (Oilman, 1976:25). It follows primarily^l from 
and their character of consisting of internal relations. 
41, The tacit existence of social relations within the world of common sense understandings also makes 
description and individuation necessary. We may want to point out an hitherto unknown social relation, 
for example, value. We may want to show the various unrecognised features of a social relation which is 
already acknowledged under some description in the everyday attitude, for example, teaching. In either 
case, individuation and description are essential in leading others to see what we have discovered. 
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Social relations consist of internal relations and hence acquire existence from 
connections which are potentiahy endless. However, we need to be careful of the 
meaning of this claim. Ohman (1976:261) tends to understand the whole as "the 
expression of universal interdependence throughout time": as covering everything. It may 
be true that everythhig is ulthnately connected. However, to regard that pomt as 
indicating the "whole" which has to be referred to in order to understand a social relation, 
is not helpful. It has very little practical or analyfical significance. It is little wonder that 
Bhaskar (1979:53-54) argues that Oilman's position is "extreme". 
The whole, through which social relations are to be understood, is circumscribed 
by our analytical and practical needs. Just as the social relation is produced through our 
practices and understood analytically through our study, so too are "wholes". There will 
be varying ones depending upon the nature of the world and upon our analytical interest. 
Marx's point is that by starting with production relations one gets the best chance of 
developing analyticahy the most comprehensive whole. It is also his argument, and our 
experience, that the nature of capitalism is such that it continuahy invades new areas - thus 
the "whole" is enlarged (and requires new analysis). The "whole" is thus thoroughly real 
for it is produced through our practices. Despite how the "whole" is understood its 
existence has appeared to make individuation a problem. 
A perennial problem with internal relations is the abihty to individuate. It is 
argued that if any part contains within it the whole then (logicahy) all parts are the same. 
It is true that any social relation can be described from the point of view of any part (for 
example, the teacher or the pupil). However, this does not rule out individuation. 
Inspection of the work of those who use descriptions of internal relations reveals that they 
do achieve individuation. As Olhnan (1976:265) points out he does successfuhy 
distinguish between different aspects of labour and so too does Marx while using 
descripfions of internal relations. Ironically, their critics have acknowledged 
understanding various differenfiated parts while claiming the impossibihty of doing that. 
The analysis of social relations seeks to take individuation seriously. The task is to 
bring out the essential differences in what is generally the same. It is to highlight 
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difference. One has only to think of all the various forms of labour which Marx traces 
through in Capital (1954) to acknowledge this point. Such an approach allows Marx, for 
example (Oilman,1976:265-8) to explore difference, whereas those who start with 
difference tend to be blind to any but the grossest variations. However, while 
individuation is not an impossibihty within internal relations, it does constitute the major 
analytical difficulty. Individuation has to be produced. 
Social relations will be individuated within a whole through that aspect of the 
whole that we choose to accentuate. The social relation will be approached through a 
particular point of view because of our analytical and practical needs. It will lead to 
certain aspects of the whole being chosen as significant for its description. Oilman 
(1976:268) explains it admirably and he will be quoted at length. He points out that for 
Marx: 
'labor' comes to be understood as a social Relation'*^ with productive 
activity as its core notion but including as well the necessary conditions 
and results of the kind of production that goes on in capitalism. From 
this structured totality, Marx individuates a notion of labor on each 
particular occasion that this term appears which is something more than 
simple productive activity and something less than its full capitalist 
conditions and results. How many qualities which belong to labor as a 
social Relation are included and which combination of qualities are 
stressed are functions of the particular problem under consideration, 
which is itself - to a large extent - a function of social conditions that 
make some problems more pressing and /o r easier to observe than 
others. 
The activity of individuating is not fundamentally different from what we do 
normaUy in everyday life. However, with the analysis of social relations the focus is upon 
the nature of the differences rather than upon the categorisation^S. Categorisation merely 
names differences, which, in effect, elides them. The whole point of individuating with 
social relations is to explore difference. 
42, Oilman (1976) capitaHses "Relation" when he is speaking of social relation as consisting of internal 
relations, 
43. We habitually use categorisation within everyday life where it is useful, for it is how we divide up the 
world. However, it is often less useful in academic analyses. In the everyday attitude categorisation 
rests upon perhaps centuries of human practice which has constituted the differences (for example "child" 
and "adolescent"). In academic theorismg it tends to be produced "out of the air". Moreover, and as a 
result of the failure to explore the differences, the categorisation is usually a form of "violent abstraction" 
(Sayer, 1987:53) which does little service to reality. 
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Description and naming are the two means through which social relations are 
individuated. 
Description is the technique which is employed to display the social relation. It is 
required because of the non-empirical nature of social relations and from their "non-
availability" within the everyday attitude. Social relations cannot be approached through 
quantitative analyses or mathematical modelling or experimental acfivity. All of these 
techniques are predicated upon a view of the world as constituted of separate entities. 
Hence, they have their use in the analysis of phenomena which are externally related. 
Social relations are, however, not things and therefore cannot be pointed at, or counted or 
manipulated. They require a technique which is suited to their nature. Description is 
well suited for it can trace out the internal relations which constitute the social relation. 
In addition, description is the appropriate means for the analysis of social relations 
for they are not available through the understandings within the everyday attitude44. 
Social relations underlie the possibilities of understanding here but they are not 
recognised. The task of a social science is thus to reveal their presence and their character. 
Each "new" social relation which is found to exist will be initiahy unfamiliar, even to social 
scienfists. As social scientists are also members of the everyday world they will have, in 
that area, taken the social relation for granted, rather than understanding it. Hence, a shift 
in viewpoint is necessary. It can only be achieved through leading others to "see" the 
social relation in question: through description. It alone can impart the understanding of 
the social relafion which has been discovered^^. 
As description is the vehicle of presentation of the social relation then conceptual 
clarity becomes crucial. As a result, as Bhaskar, (1979:59) notes: 
precision in meaning now assumes the place of accuracy in measurement 
as the a posteriori arbiter of theory 
44, Even once the social relation is recognised and accepted by the scientific community it will not be 
amenable to experiment, modelling or mathematisation. It is ruled out by the non-empirical nature of 
social relations, 
45, Descriptions of social relations will also be their definition. However, the definitions are real rather 
than nominal (Bhaskar,1975:211). That is, they do not arbitrarily name but rather carry ontological clamis 
which can be disputed. 
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The second means of individuating social relations is to name them. Finding a 
social relation is a discovery of something new. It thus needs to be named. To name 
something is to make it readily available to others. However, in naming care must be 
taken. It is desirable that the name perform two tasks. It should distinguish the social 
relation from common sense concepts which might be taken as equivalences. At the same 
time, it is helpful to refer to the entities in the everyday world through which the existence 
of the social relation can be seen. The double process shows what is new, while at the 
same time guiding others in their understanding. Thus, Marx uses the name "capital" to 
refer to "the value that sucks up the value creating power" (Marx cited in OlLman,l976:187). 
The name thus distinguishes the social relafion from the person of the capitalist. It is 
crucial that it do this. There is a strong tendency to read the descriptions of capital as if 
they were descriptions of capitalists: thus confusing things (and people) with social 
relafions. The name is aimed, in part, at minimising that tendency. In addition, hi 
choosing "capital" for the name of the social relation Marx is indicating that aspect of 
common sense which is most significant to the relation (money acting as capital). 
It is a discovery to first "see" a social relation. In order that others can also "see" it, 
description and naming most be employed. The final question is how such a social 
relafion can be "seen". How can a discovery be made? The method for achieving it is not 
a mystery, although it does involve hard work. 
METHOD 
The discovery of a new social relation is work. It is a matter of knowuig both the 
empirical and theoretical material. It involves systematic quesfioning of the data, in the 
double hght of the analytical concerns and the reality presented within it. Indeed, the 
process takes months and is beset by doubts, uncertainties and the occasional recognition: 
"Ah that is right!" 
There was a vast amount of empirical material on the coal mining industry. I 
began by not being clear about the actual period to be covered. However, as I moved 
through the data, in a first phase of analysis, it became obvious that a dramatic change 
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occurred after the Second World War. 1 decided to limit the analysis to the years from the 
end of the nineteenth century to the 1950's. The amount of sources which were available 
was impressive. 1 collected Government reports, reports of Royal Commissions and 
transcripts of their interviews and reports on mine disasters. I also used parhamentary 
discussions surrounding the introduction of, and changes to, legislation pertaining to 
health and safety and to arbitral matters. There was also information in newspapers, a 
source I particularly used for the end of the nineteenth century. In addition, there was 
from the very early part of the twentieth century, a government mining journal and later a 
journal belonging to the coal miners' union. Both were invaluable sources of information. 
In various archives (in Sydney and Canberra) there was a further wealth of material. I had 
access to the minutes of meetings of the various unions (delegate meetings, committee of 
management meetings and some records of meefings called to discuss strikes). Also, at 
these depositories, there was material dealing with the Governments' (Federal and States) 
involvement with the mining industry, which proved to be useful. The greatest wealth of 
information came from the transcripts of arbitral proceedings involving the coal industry 
for most of this century. Some of these were available in the archives in Sydney and 
Canberra. However, the greatest source was the Queensland Coal Association (formerly 
Queensland Coal Owners' Association). Almost every transcript of arbitral proceedmgs 
was there. They were invaluable. In addition, there were a number of books that have 
been written on the miners and the coal industry. 
The method which I used, to come to terms with what seemed a mountain of data, 
is close to the grounded theory approach expounded by Glaser and Strauss (1967). The 
primary aim was to link Marxist theory to the data about the relafions between capitalists 
and workers in the Queensland coal industry. The only way to achieve this was through 
grounding the theory in the data. At the same time, I aimed to develop theory which had 
greater potenfial apphcability than merely to the empirical material which was studied. 
Coding for social relations was the means of achieving the desired results. 
Coding for social relations was the major means used in producing a grounded 
theory. Strauss (1987:29) is clear that coding hfts the analysis away from description. It is 
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the technique he recommends to allow interpretation of the data to occur. Although he is 
not specific about what exactly is being coded, we can see from his descriptions that the 
object of coding is precisely social relations. However, most of the categories he develops 
are more informed by the substantive context than by an existing theory. 
The coding technique I used emphasised Marx's theorefical understanding. Marx's 
theory consists in categories which are thoroughly grounded in the material he had at 
hand. As such, they provided the "springboard for laying out potential lines of research 
work' (Strauss,l987:306). 
The process of coding involved a double move of dealing with the data and with 
Marxist theory. I was constantly interrogating the data as to what was going on there, in 
the hght of Marx's concerns. A particular code would be developed for one area. Its 
adequacy would be checked by comparing it with other data, and assessing how it fitted 
into the exisfing theory. In addition, its meaningfuLness was checked mentahy with other 
information. Although I was not studying ah industrial relations, my knowledge of some 
of the features of uidustrial relafions in other industries provided me with good 
comparative material. As weh, my knowledge of the development of work relations in the 
1980's and 1990's again gave me insights into what was going on in the data 1 had before 
me. As a result of the constant process of comparison and "theoretical sampling" 
(Strauss,1987) the code would be refined. 
The categories which were developed had to be conceptuahy dense. As a result, 
there was much more to the task than merely naming the new categories which were 
discovered. I used some aspects of Strauss's (1987:27-28) coding paradigm to help 
understand the character of the social relations which I was picking out from the data. 
First, 1 looked for the properties of the social relation (Strauss and Corbin,1991:69). In 
addition, I was interested in the conditions which made a certain social relation appear. 
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and the effect of that social relation on other relations'*^. Awareness of these not only 
filled out the description of the social relation but allowed assessment of when it was 
transformed into another one. 
The most difficult task was the development of suitable core categories. Core 
categories (Strauss,1987:34) are those under which the analysis of the data makes most 
sense. Finally, the core category of apparatus of calculation (Turner,1990) was employed. 
Under it all the relations of domination involved in negotiations over the wage and 
conditions of work could be explained. In addition, it enabled me to show the relations 
between it and the labour process. Thus it linked the two aspects of the economic form of 
domination within Marx's theory - exchange and production. 
The process of coding is both scientific and creative^^ (Strauss and Corbin,1991:27). 
It is scientific for it involves a careful use of questioning, hypothesizing, sampling, 
comparing and checking. It is also scientific for it attempts to use the existing scientific 
theory as a guide and at the same time it questions it for imprecisions and absences. 
Ultimately, the process is creative. The recognition of the social relation is finally an 
intuitive leap, but one that has been prepared for by ah the investigative work. Hence, the 
process leads the researcher to "create new order out of the old" (Strauss and 
Corbin,1991:27). 
46, Strauss's (1987:27-28) coding paradigm also indicates that one should look for: the interactions among 
actors and strategies and tactics. However, this appears to confuse what occurs in coding. Certainly, 
one is looking at interactions and tactics in order to find the social relation. However, when we are 
producing a code we are not describing the interactions but something quite different, although 
contained in them. These elements in the coding paradigm are unfortunate for they pull away from 
coding into descriptions of external relations. As well Strauss and Corbin (1991:90) speak of the 
conditions as causal. We must be careful here. For although, causality occurs, it is not part of an 
analysis based on coding. It is , of course, possible, that Strauss (1987) and Strauss and Corbin (1991) 
have begun to change the meanings of these terms. 
47, The scientific aspect and the creative are necessary for each other. They are not contradictory modes 
of thinking as is so often assumed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Our common sense concepts are seductive because they are so obvious. We need 
to learn to be wary of them when we are analysing the social world. We need to recognise 
the limits of their power. 
This chapter has argued that, at least within Marxism, things and people and their 
external relations are not appropriate objects for analysis. Social relations which are 
marked by internal relations are, however, suitable. They indicate the conditions of 
possibility of our actions while being unrecognised within the everyday world. They 
therefore have many of the hallmarks of an adequate scientific object. They are (relatively) 
enduring, socially significant and able to be described and known. 
The next chapter sets out the general form of the social relations within the 
economic form of domination. It discusses both the labour process, and a new social 
relation which has been called, the apparatus of calculation (Tumer,1990). 
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CHAPTER 5 
TWO FACES OF DOMINATION: 
THE LABOUR PROCESS AND THE APPARATUS OF CALCULATION. 
An outline of the basic features of the labour process and the apparatus of 
calculation is provided. It is argued that they rest upon Marx's view of the 
essential features of a human: needs, powers and consciousness. Hence, their 
analysis allows an exploration of the way the specifically capitalist worker is 
constituted. The labour process has already been used, by Marx and others, as a 
means of showing how the knowledge or consciousness of the labourer becomes 
an attribute of capital. The points are clarified in the chapter. The constitution 
of the wage labourer has not yet been considered. Therefore, the apparatus of 
calculation is developed as the site for the analysis of the relation of need to wage 
labour and capital. 
The examination of the labour process and the apparatus of calculation allows 
exploitation to be given a profound content. The exploitation of labour by 
capital, though real, is an abstract relation. Hence, it is difficult to recognise. 
It becomes even more ungraspable when the relations between capital and labour 
take the form of consent. However, if exploitation is considered from the aspect 
of domination it can be given a depth of reference. From this point of view, it is 
possible to explore the ways in which the very being of tlie labourer is 
constituted. 
Unhke other forms of domination, capitahsm has a double and deceptive form. As 
was shown in Chapter 1, domination within capitahsm involves both exchange and 
production. A capitahst exchanges a wage for the use of the worker's labour power. In 
return, and by the rights of the free exchange, he/she acquires the right to transform the 
labour power htto labour. In the first process the parties are "free"^. In the second, the 
worker is subordinated^ to the will of the capitahst. The two aspects are inextricably 
1. It is, of course, a perverted form of freedom. 
2. Because of the necessity of freedom in the wage relationship, the subordination can never, be total. 
Nevertheless, subordination is the definitive feature of work in capitalism. The law on the nature of the 
employment contract nicely captures the legal right of subordination as the essential aspect of capitalist 
work relations. As Creighton and Stewart (1990) observe "control" is the "key to the common law 
conception of the employee". 
The final test, if there be a final test, and certainly the test to be generally applied, 
lies in the nature and degree of detailed control over the person alleged to be a 
servant (Performing Rights Society Ltd v Mitchell & Booker Ltd 1924, cited in 
Creighton and Stewart,1990:101). 
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connected. Within capitahsm there is no subordination without first, there being the 
freedom of a wage exchange. The double relation between capitalist and labourer 
indicates the single social relation of domination of labour by capital. It is an economic 
form of domination, for it follows from nothing other than a financial transaction. 
Nevertheless, it is the means by which labour is exploited within capitalism. 
The analysis of capitalism as an economic form of domination gives exploitation a 
profound content. The domination of labour by capital is far more than a mere means of 
siphoning off surplus value. It is a mode of production which constitutes the workers as 
truncated humans. The social relations in which they work split off essential aspects of 
their humanity. While the effect brings enormous material wealth to some (even to some 
of the workers) it also diminishes all humans in their possibihties. 
This chapter sets up the basic (transhistorical) features of the economic form of 
domination. The aim is to use these to display the particular ways in which humans are 
constituted within capitahsm. Marx's (1977) account of the essential nature of humans is 
outlined. It provides the means for understanding the specific form and character that 
human quahties take within capitalism. 
The economic form of domination cannot be understood unless there is a 
recognifion of the essential features of humans. Marx (1977) claims that humans have the 
ability to constantly transform and develop themselves because of the way in which their 
needs, powers and consciousness are connected. It is argued that humans are motivated 
by needs. The work^ entailed to fulfil the needs develops the powers of humans. As a 
consequence, the powers of humans become "objectified" in their social and physical 
worlds. As well, humans have the ability to be reflective about their activity. Hence, they 
can constantly develop new needs and, as a result, new powers. If humans can keep these 
3, "Work" is a general term. Work is involved in fulfilling the needs for love and community, for beauty 
and understanding, just as much as in seeking subsistence. 
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aspects integrated within themselves then they will beghi to feel the power of being 
human^. 
However, capitalism as an economic form of domination changes the relations 
between humans, their needs, powers and consciousness. It splits needs from powers in 
relation to subsistence. Within capitalism they appear at two different sites: exchange and 
production. 
An analysis of the relations of domination in exchange and production reveals the 
way in which humans have been constituted within capitahsm. The labour process has 
already been developed as the site for the constitution of the labourer within production. 
It shows the way in which the labour process can grasp the relation of labourers to both 
their consciousness and powers. As yet, no object has been formed to analyse the 
constitution of the labourer within exchange. Hence, the basic features of the apparatus of 
calculation will be presented. It is developed to explore the way the wage labourer is 
constituted within the relations between capital and labour in exchange. 
THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF HUMANS 
Marx's critique of capitalism rests upon a view of what is essentially human. It is 
necessary to understand it in order to appreciate the significance that Marx gives to 
domination. 
Clearly, there are numerous ways in which to pick out the essential aspects of 
humans. There are as many "essential" aspects as there are means of exploration. A 
biologist would begin differently from a theologian, and both would be different from an 
4. It is as though we are doing at the level of our collective existence what we tend to do at the level of 
our individual existence. Here, I am thinking of lung's (1985) work on the self. He argues that we 
project our needs and desires upon an exterior object (imago) as our means of relating to the world. 
However, he points out that this process diminishes the self, Jung's (1985:61) argument is that we need 
to return the projections to their source within the self, then we will also have returned to us the power 
which they carried: 
The detachment of the imagos that give the objects their exaggerated significance 
restores to the subject that split-off energy which he urgently needs for his own 
development. 
This is precisely Marx's concern, not at the level of the individual but at the level of the social. 
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historian. Marx's account of the essential features of humans is constructed from his 
interest in the human ability to change. 
Humans have both powers and needs. Needs are the drives/wants/desires which 
force the hving creature to seek things outside itself in order to fulfil their needs. Powers 
are the abihties which enable the needs to be satisfied. In turn, the reality of the powers is 
displayed h> the work which is undertaken to reahse those needs (01Lman,l976:73-76). 
Thus powers and needs feed into and support each other. 
Marx argues that consciousness renders the constant development of powers 
possible and hence is the hallmark of humanity^. The human ability to change arises from 
the mediation of their activity by consciousness. They have the ability to be aware of their 
activity they can reflect upon what they do and can plan it. Hence, their work is 
essentially different from that of a bee or a spider (Marx,1954:174; Marx,1977:73), or indeed 
any other animal^. The difference is significant. 
The human ability to be conscious of his/her own acfivity produces two 
possibihties. First, and positively, consciousness allows humans to continually transform 
their world and themselves. As they do, their needs and their powers change. However, 
there is also a potential negative aspect. As humans are not at one with their activity, 
there is always the chance of splits. It is possible that their consciousness can be separated 
from their activity or their needs separated from their powers. It is, of course, Marx's 
claim that within capitahsm the sphts have become severe. 
5, As Oilman (1976:74) comments: 
This distinction (between animals and humans) is the generally unrecognised 
foundation on which Marx erects his entire conception of human nature. 
6, Animals display a relatively constant expression of their powers while humans change continuously. 
As Marx (1977:73 emphasis in the original) remarks: 
The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself 
from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will 
and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. 
It is necessary to point out the nature of the distinction. Clearly, animals change in response to their 
situation. However, the response, compared to that of humans is slow. The distinction thus does not 
refer to an absolute difference but to one of degree. We constantly employ such distinctions as when, for 
example we distinguish a baby from a child. 
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The essential characteristics of humans are the basis for understanding the specific 
form of humanity which is produced through capitahsm. Marx analyses the forms they 
assume within production. His contention is that, that is where humans have most 
developed their powers. 
Marx's abiding interest throughout his work is the way in which the manner of our 
production affects us as humans. According to Marx in Capital, Vol 1 (1954:179) 
production is the "everlasting Nature - imposed condition of human existence". He claims 
that, as we work, we transform ourselves. We create objects which are an objectification 
of our powers. Consequently, a human "duplicates himself...in reality, and therefore he 
sees himself in a world that he has created" (Marx,1977:74). Work thus cahs forth our 
powers and the result displays them. They become our reahty in the process. In turn, 
new needs and new possibilities for our powers are created (Oilman,!976:99). Marx 
(1954:173) states his position clearly: 
Labour is, in the first place, a process m which both man and Nature 
participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates and 
controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. He 
opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion 
arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to 
appropriate Nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants. 
By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time 
changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and 
compels them to act in obedience to his sway. 
Human work thus draws out the powers of humans and transforms them. 
However, it is Marx's contention that the manner in which production is organised 
may diminish human powers rather than enhance them. In particular, he shows this to be 
the case in capitahsm. Work itself is organised such that it separates the human power of 
consciousness from those who are working. While it enables the powers of humans to 
develop at an ever increasing rate^, it also produces the "spiritual"^ hnpoverishment of ah. 
7. It has provided a remarkable impetus to the power of the intellect. It has also shown the fruitfulness 
of production organised on a collective basis. However, as these are the fruits of the capitalist form of 
production, they also have quite negative effects. Intellect is developed, but only for some. For many 
the development of their intellect is almost totally denied, despite the years of education. While 
production on a social scale is impressive, its reality is consumerism and degradation of the environment. 
In addition, while some can consume endlessly, others have nothing. 
8. I use "spiritual" to refer to the human attributes of the worker. 
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In addition, as need and work are separated within capitalism, need is no longer directly 
related to the development of powers. An essential emptiness, marked by consumerism, 
fills the void. 
It is necessary to address the adequacy of making the essential human attributes a 
starting point of analysis. After all, for some time it has been quite unfashionable to begin 
in such a manner. The criticisms of both Althusser (1979) and Cutler (1979) have been 
accepted as negating it. They damned the essential attributes as being an idealist rather 
than a materialist base for analysis. However, I contend that there is no other place to 
start if the constitution of the labourer is to be explored. It is thus necessary to show how 
both Althusser and Cutler mistook the nature of the essential attributes of humans. 
It is neither essentialist'^ (Cutler,1979) nor "philosophical" (Althusser,1979:159) to 
begin with the essential features of humans. It is true that the essential features do have a 
transhistorical reference (Sayer,1979 & 1987) but it is a mistake to see that as a form of 
idealism. Marx's transhistorical categories are thoroughly materialist. They are 
grounded in present empirical relations. Additionahy, they make possible an analysis of 
the historicaUy specific forms of the essential features. 
Transbiistorical categories have an historical and empirical basis. No doubt it was 
the study of the historical forms of work within capitalism and other modes of production 
which allowed Marx to "see" the essential characteristics of humans. Certainly, Marx is 
not exphcit about the method he used to arrive at the essential attributes. However, we 
can infer it from the method he clearly displayed in relation to other transhistorical 
categories. Marx exphcitly bases his transhistorical categories on an analysis of historical 
material. He does not start with the transhistorical category as though it were an ideal 
given. As he comments in his Marginal Notes on Adolf Wagner (cited hi Sayer,1979:112): 
9, Cutler (1979) is critiquing Braverman's use of Marx's formulation. Here, I am taking the point as if it 
were made directly against Marx's formulation. 
Cutler is correct in noting a problem with Braverman's (1974) starting point. However, he is wrong in 
pin pointing the problem. The difficulty is not that of starting with the essential difference between 
humans and animals as he claims. It is Braverman's placing the "whole" labourer (where consciousness 
and activity coincide) in the craft worker. It is a form of romanticism, as Cutler (1974) notes. 
Interestingly, Braverman's (1974) work is not significantly marred by the error. For additional comments 
see footnote 13. 
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(Wagner) "has not even noticed that my analytical method, which does 
not start from Man but from the economically given period of society, 
has nothing in common with the German professional concept-linking 
method (emphasis in original). 
The transhistorical category had thus to be worked for through a procedure of comparison, 
starting with the analysis of the present. Sayer, citing Marx in the Introduction to the 
Grundrisse, (1979:113) remarks of the transhistorical reference for production: 
For (Marx), what pertained to production in general was by no means 
self evident; it had to be "sifted out by comparison". 
Marx was particularly careful with the development of his categories. The continual 
presence of the essential attributes throughout his work leads to the conclusion that they 
met his stringent criterion for being material, rather than ideal. 
Certainly, transhistorical categories, by their very nature, will be quite empty of 
content. Hence, they may mislead some into thinking they lack a material base. 
However, we must not be deceived. Transhistorical categories are empty for they do not 
describe any parficular historical form, but indicate a class of phenomena (Sayer,l987:54). 
That is their nature. Moreover, their emptiness is their strength. 
The emptiness of a transhistorical category enables the analysis of specific historical 
forms. Its purpose is to open up the possibility of specific descriptions. As Sayer 
(1987:56) explains, the concept "fruit", allows the description of the lemon. Equally, the 
general concept of consciousness or needs or powers in humans ahows for, and indeed 
necessitates, a particular description of the forms they take within capitahsm. Without 
some such starting point there is no analytical direction (Sayer,1979:lll). One must be 
able to recognise something in order to explore it^^. 
10, It is possible that Marx is wrong in his assessment of the essential features of humanity as they are 
visible now. In order to show this, however, work would have to be done to produce more appropriate 
transhistorical categories. It is also possible, and almost certain, that at some later time other 
characteristics wiU appear essential. At any time, we can only recognise those characteristics which are 
visible in the present (a point which is almost tautological). However, neither of these criticisms are 
made by either Althusser (1979) or Cutler (1979). They rest their case on the apparent idealism of the 
essential attributes. 
117 
Marx's claim that there are essential human attributes is therefore not a form of 
idealism as Althusser (1979) and Cutler (1979) claim. Rather, they are material categories 
which provide a practical way in which to begin particular analyses^!. 
Capitalism consfitutes the specifically capitalist labourer at two sites: in producfion 
and exchange. The labour process has been used by Marx and others for the investigation 
of relafions in producfion. Its main features will be outlined in the next secfion. No site 
for the analysis of the relations between capital and labour in exchange has yet been 
devised. A further section will therefore be devoted to developing one which will be 
called an apparatus of calculation. 
THE LABOUR PROCESS 
It is important to be clear about how the labour process can be seen as a site for the 
analysis of the constitution of the labourer within production. An outline of Marx's 
analysis will be given, for he provides a very clear exposition of the changing social 
relations within the labour process. He shows the specific capitahst form which 
consciousness assumes in the activity of work by examining the changes in the labour 
process. Marx builds an understanduig of the transformation of consciousness through an 
analysis of the formal and real subsumption of labour. His analysis brings out the way in 
which consciousness, passes from its appropriate place in labour and becomes a tool of 
capital over labour. Marx thus shows how a new social relation is formed and the manner 
in which the labourer is constituted within it. 
The labour process in capitalism has moved from formal to real subsumption of 
labour by capital. Labourers' ability to be conscious of their activity of work appeared to 
belong solely to them under the formal subsumption of labour. However, with the advent 
11. Marx's approach is different from those disciplines which rest upon idealist distinguishing features 
such as rationality (economics) or self interest (psychology). In these cases a specific historical 
phenomena (rationality/self interest) is made ahistorical. It is assumed that it applies unchanged in all 
societies. A further problem is that these concepts are then used to examine capitalism. It may very well 
be true that rationality and self interest do dominate as human characteristics within capitalism. 
However, as they are understood ahistorically an analysis of their particular historical forms and 
conditions of possibility is precluded. The result is that critique is not possible. This is certainly a case of 
idealism. However, it is very different from Marx's method. 
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of real subsumption it became obvious that consciousness was indeed an aspect of capital. 
It took the form of technology and managements^ g^ i^ j stood over the worker as an ahen 
power. As a result, a new form of labourer was constituted. 
Marx initiahy defines the labour process transhistorically m order to delineate an 
area of analysis. He (Marx,1954:174) hsts its "elementary factors" as: 
1, the personal activity of man, i.e. work itself, 2, the subject of that work, 
and 3, its instruments. 
Further, Marx accentuates the significance of consciousness within the activity of work. It 
is, after all the prime interest of his analysis, as it is human work which is to be explored. 
His (Marx,1954:176) definition of the labour process draws out the importance of 
consciousness. 
In the labour-process, therefore, man's activity, with the help of the 
instrim:ients of labour, affects an alteration, designed from the 
commencement, in the material worked upon (emphasis added). 
The category "knowledge" will be used to convey the aspect of consciousness in the 
labourer. Braverman^^ (1974) has used the term and it is very adequate. The word 
emphasises that the present form of consciousness is knowledge. The years of specialist 
training to become a scientist, a manager or even a worker point to the form consciousness 
takes when it is linked to capital. However, it must be remembered that the reference for 
"knowledge" is not that which is acquired: that is only the most obvious place to look for 
the social relation of knowledge^"* 
12, There should be no puzzle over the return of some knowledge to the labourer. We should now be 
able to see it acting as capital even though it is "housed" in the worker. Of course, the return of some 
knowledge to the worker will constitute a different kind of worker - one that is aligned with capital 
through their needs. 
13, Ironically, Braverman (1974) used the craft worker as the epitome of the whole worker where 
knowledge and activity are one. This has created problems in terms of criticisms of its reality and its 
relevance to capitalism. The real problem is different, however. The craft worker does combine 
knowledge and activity, and in that respect is more "whole" than the divided worker within capitalism. 
However, craft workers are not a satisfactory human symbol. They did not use consciousness freely in 
their activity. Knowledge was hedged around with rules which, for all their benefits, hindered change 
and development and limited the worker's ability to modify in the light of his/her reflection, Marx does 
not refer to the craft worker, but to the possibilities in human nature, which is quite a different matter, 
14, We need to be careful to remember that "knowledge" refers to an internal relation of the human ability 
for consciousness. In the literature it has often been read as "skill", but nothing could be further from the 
truth. The inadequacy of Braverman's (1974) and Marx's (1954) claims, when they are read in terms of 
"skill", is immediately apparent. The debate that has ensured is resolved if one bears in mind that the 
referent for "knowledge" is a social relation. The referent for skill, on the other hand, is a social attribute. 
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Marx delineates two stages in the development of forms of subordination within 
the labour process. They are recognised by changes in the relation of knowledge to labour 
and capital. In the first stage there is the formal subsumption of labour. In the second, 
there is the real subsumption of labour. 
The formal subsumption of labour is the basis of all capital/labour relations and is 
also their first form. As a result of the wage relation, the product of a labourer's work 
belongs, not to him/her, but to capital. The labour process, however, can remain in its 
pre-capitalist form. In particular, labourers hold onto old ways of workmg. The activity 
of work appears to be the same as before, despite the fact that it becomes more continuous 
and intensive. The capitalist, after all, has to ensure that no more than the socially 
necessary labour tune is spent (Marx,1976:1026). These changes do not essentially alter 
the relation of labourers to their activity. 
However, even in the period of formal subsumption, labour starts to be constituted 
in a capitahst form. It is no longer their own determination and will which ensures that 
the tasks are performed^^. It is the determination and wih of the capitahst. As Marx 
(1954:341) notes: 
the labourer is brought face to face with the intehectual potencies of the 
material process of production, as the property of another, and as a 
ruling power. 
To equate skill and knowledge/consciousness is to confuse an empirical thing with a social relation. 
Neither Marx nor Braverman do this. Most others are not as clear in their work, 
15. Despite the change in the relation of labourers to their will power, there is variation in terms of how 
they experience the work. It may give either the appearance of more or of less independence for the 
workers. Its appearance will depend upon the former work that they were engaged in. As Marx 
(1976:1027-29) notes, if the work replaces "slavery, serfdom, vassallage and other patriarchal forms of 
subjection", then it appears to be freer. However where it replaces: 
an earlier state of independence, to be found for example in all self sustaining 
peasants, farmers who only have to pay rent on what they have to produce..,,;rural 
or domestic secondary industry or independent handicraft (Marx,1976:1028-9 
emphasis in the original) 
then the work is experienced as a loss of independence. The variation in appearance highlights the fact 
that Marx is describing a change in a social relation: the relation of labourers to their will 
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One aspect of the knowledge of labourers, their will power^^, has become a visible aspect 
of capital. The social relations of labour and capital are being transformed, even in the 
period of the formal subsumption of labour. 
The second stage in the development of the labour process is that of the real 
subsumption of labour. Herein, "all aspects of labour" become aspects of capital and the 
labourer is metamorphosed into something new. In particular, knowledge becomes 
visibly an aspect of capital. The real subsumption of labour must not be confused with the 
control of the labourer by the capitalist or manager. It can occur without the overt 
presence of control. Moreover, whatever the barbarous outcomes of control, the real 
subsumption of labour has a much more profound affect. Within it, an essential feature of 
humanity, their ability to think, plan and modify, is split off from workers and becomes an 
alien power over them. 
The real subsumption of labour occurs, according to Marx, in Machinofacture 
where the worker's knowledge becomes contained in the "palpable" form of technology 
(Marx,l954:399). Marx claims that there is real subsumption when all aspects of the 
labourer come under the sway of capital. It is marked by the movement of the labourer's 
knowledge to capital in the form of management, science and technology. In the process, 
the relation of labourers to their work changes drastically. It is no longer directly related 
to their knowledge. They do not have to think, plan and modify to create a better way of 
working. Their knowledge in relation to work albeit transformed, is then contained in 
things which stand over and above them^^ and impose their necessity on them 
16, Care needs to be taken with the meaning of this. Labourers do not lose their will power generally. 
They clearly have it in relation to getring themselves to work and they doubtless employ it in many non-
work activities. Even at work, they may have to use will power, though there is variation here. The 
point is that now it is the capitalist or his/her manager which ensures that work is performed at a certain 
speed etc. They impose their will upon the labourer, who no longer needs to do it for him/herself. They 
merely have to follow the commands/expectations of another. 
17. We are not looking at the question of whether real subsumption occurred in the middle of the 
nineteenth century or whether it awaited the advent of scientific management. There is no "hard and 
fast" demarcation (Marx,1954:351) for the processes fade into each other. However, Braverman (1974) 
can be understood as showing how the process deepened with the advent of scientific management. 
Then knowledge was also contained in management. They acquired it as a means to their existence, and 
as a means of control of the whole labour process, including labourers. 
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(Marx,1954:365). In that vital aspect labour's quahties have become subsumed under 
capital. 
The social relations of labour and capital changed with the advent of real 
subsumption. Knowledge clearly became an attribute of capital. Under formal 
subsumption it appeared that labourers still had control of their knowledge and in one 
respect they did. That proved a fetter on the free operation of capital. In time, capital 
acquired command over the process of reflecting upon, planning and modifying the 
activity of work. The result was dramatic for both capital and labour^*^. 
THE APPARATUS OF CALCULATION 
In order to delhieate the features of the specifically capitalist worker, we must be 
able to explore the two aspects of the economic form of domination and how they 
articulate. The relation of domination between capital and wage labour, within the sphere 
of exchange, has been largely neglected. The task of this section is to outline the 
transhistorical features of the social relations which constitute exchange. 
As we have seen, humans possess consciousness which is the key factor 
differentiating them from animals. It has many aspects. The familiar one picks up a 
human's abihty to plan, modify, reject and develop their ideas and practices!^. However, 
consciousness has many facets. It also appears in a human's relation to his/her needs. 
18. Capital was freed from traditional restrictions once knowledge was aligned with it. Capital is driven 
by its nature to capture a greater share in surplus value. It must (if it wishes to remain as capital) 
constantly find means to achieve this. One essential way is to modify the labour process so that less than 
the socially necessary time is spent on production. Once capital acquired the knowledge and held it in 
science and technology this became possible. As a result, it was freed from the fetter of traditional means 
of production: 
a complete (and constantly repeated) revolution takes place in the mode of 
production, in the productivity of the workers and in the relations between workers 
and capitalists (Marx,1976:1035), 
As a result Marx (1976:1034) can claim that capitalist production proper is achieved with the real 
subsumption of labour, 
19. As a result, human life exhibits contmual change. It may take the form of progress, but equally it 
may be regression. 
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All humans have needs. They range from the most basic in terms of food to the 
most complex, such as the need for beauty or love. All needs refer to something outside 
the human who feels the need. Thus needs entail work to satisfy them. 
The human ability to calculate the means necessary for satisfying their needs is an 
attribute of their consciousness. Humans can be conscious of their needs and of the work 
involved in meeting them. They can modify, reject or accept either the need or the work 
entailed in its fulfilment. They can calculate both the value of the need and of the work. 
Clearly, many needs are filled automatically without calculation. Yet, the possibility of 
calculation is always there. 
One can say that there is an apparatus of calculation in which the relation between 
needs and the work necessary to fulfil them is carried on^O. Its elementary factors are the 
needs, the work required to satisfy them and the activity of calculation. 
Calculation always has a social form, no matter how privately conducted. The 
social nature of calculation is evident even in the most private and individual of needs, for 
example, love. The need itself must be socially recognised for it to be available to the 
individual. The social form will present certain possibilities for feeling, and for its 
fulfilment. It will differ according to, for example, whether we live in the neolithic age or 
in classical Greece or in the age of courtly romance or in the late twentieth century. The 
social nature of calculation is even more evident in needs connected to subsistence. 
Within production relations, the calculation wih relate to the work necessary to acquire the 
means of subsistence. The social relations surrounding production will produce the 
possibihty for both the needs and the means of achieving them. 
Individuals will carry out the calculation of the relation between their needs for 
subsistence and the means of satisfying them. However, the possibilities are social. All 
societies effectively calculate what will count as appropriate means of subsistence for their 
various classes and appropriate forms of effort to obtain them. However, how this is done 
will differ. 
20. Clearly, the existence of an apparatus of calculation can only become evident once there is some social 
institutionalisation of the calculation. This has occurred within capitalism. However, the process of 
calculation is as old as humanity itself. 
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The calculation of needs in relation to means of subsistence is not necessarily direct. 
Sometimes the relationship is direct, for example, in hunting and gathering societies or 
with self sufficient farmers. It becomes indirect with tradhig. Needs are met by putting 
effort not into the object of desire, but into an object which can be traded for that which is 
needed. The indirect relationship between needs and means becomes even more 
generalised with the use of money. Capitalism has institutionalised the indirect relation 
through the payment of the wage. 
Capitalism has a double aspect to the calculation of the relation of needs to means 
of subsistence. Workers do not produce their own means of subsistence. Rather, they 
exist as the commodities of capitahsts. They have to be bought by workers with the 
money acquired through the sale of their labour power^L Hence, the calculation of needs 
and means refers both to work and to the wage22. Work is the effort required to provide 
the means, and the wage is the means themselves. 
Bargauiing is the mechanism, within capitahsm, through which the calculation of 
the sociahy appropriate possibilities of effort and wage are set. It occurs both in relation 
to work and to the wage. 
The calculation of the value of work in meeting needs takes the form of a 
calculation of the conditions of labour. YeL that labour power is not hke any other 
commodity that the capitalist makes use of It is the labour power of a human^S which is 
expended to enable a person to meet certain needs. As such, it wih be subject to a 
calculation of the relation between it and the needs it is meeting. The questions that feed 
21, Marx (1954:716-724) shows how when labourers have access to the means of subsistence they do not 
choose to sell their labour power. The Wakefield scheme of "systematic" colonisation (Marx,l954:723) is 
an articulation of this fact. It proposed that land in the colonies have an artificial price put upon it so that 
many could not afford it, at least without considerable saving. Thus the scheme aimed to supply a 
population of workers for the capitalist. 
22, Usually bargaining over the conditions of work is understood in terms of the wage/effort bargain (see 
Baldamus (1961) and most of the labour process literature. When it is approached from this direction it 
leads into the question of control. I wish to address it from a different perspective, that of needs, as a 
means of exploring how the labourer is constituted within exchange, 
23, Most writers (for example, Braverman (1974)) have used the human element of labour power as a 
recognition that it is variable and, hence, capital is involved in a necessary control of labour. To a certain 
extent this is true. Of equal significance, is the fact that it necessarily, in capitalism, leads to bargaining 
over the effort involved at work. 
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into the calculation are of the nature of "how long?", "with what effort?" "with what risks?". 
The questions are familiar: they are the kind of considerations anyone would bring to bear 
on any calculation of the relation of means to needs (whether it be finding someone to love 
or buying a boat). What makes them distinctive is how the calculation is performed. 
The distinctive form of the calculations surrounding effort in capitalism arises from 
the way it is performed through a bargaining relationship. Capitalists cannot acquire 
unfettered right over the use of their labour power, though they may try. Certainly, they 
have vahantly attempted to do so through the legal doctrine of "managerial prerogative", 
as weh as through brute force. However, they cannot, because of certain features of 
capitahsm which work against their desires. The significance given to the individual 
within capitahsm presents obstacles to the full employment of managerial prerogative24. 
The more significant barrier to capitalists' desires is the dominance of market rationality 
within capitalism. As labour power is a commodity, then how it is used can be haggled 
over^S. As a result, the normal rational calculations surrounding effort has taken the form 
of bargaining. The normal rational questions which are used in any calculation of the 
relationship between means and needs, become, in capitahsm, a matter of battle. 
Rationahty loses its place^^. 
The second area of calculation between needs and means which must be entered 
into in capitalism, concerns the level of the wage. Doubtless, ah societies engage in some 
calculation of what wUl be required to meet their basic needs. However, in many the 
24. I am speaking of developed capitalism and its tendencies. Clearly, there are numerous examples of 
capitalism operating, particularly in the third world, where the individual is of little count. 
25. There are numerous precedents for such behaviour: notably rented property of any kind. 
26. The result is an immense loss in the ability of a human to make rational decisions. It is ironic that at 
the time of the greatest development of rationality it is denied to most people in areas that vitally affect 
them. 
The cost of turning decisions of "how long?", "what conditions?" and "what risks?" into a battle is 
enormous. The costs to workers are quite well documented in the literature on the history of the 
working class and in occupational health and safety literature. It is also true that there are costs for 
capitalists. These are even more well documented in the human resource management literature on 
absenteeism, stress etc. 
Interestingly, the basis of the problem in the nature of bargaining over labour power is almost impossible 
to address. The solutions are thus merely palliatives. 
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calculation is invisible. Tradition determines the relationship. Some modes of production 
form a "calculated and calculating system" (Marx,1954:226-7). Slavery, in conjunction with 
the demands of international capital, was one such system. The brutality of the 
calculation was inherent in the estimation of the value of the slave in terms of his/her 
productive life. The brutality is not as evident within the capitalist system proper. Yet, it 
is equally "a calculated and calculatuig system". The wage is not set in terms of the "real" 
needs of the workers but is set in terms of market principles. It is the level of wage that a 
labourer can command at any time^? and is often the result of a battle. The labourers' 
possibihties in meeting their needs are calculated through market, not moraP*^, principles. 
The form should not be surprising. In capitalism, labour power is a commodity and so is 
treated like one. It is the capitalist form of calculation of the appropriate level of means of 
subsistence. 
The sale of labour power for a wage is carried on in the "free" market with the 
means appropriate to its settlements'^. Thus wage labourers and indeed capitalists use 
collective means to enhance their bargaining position. Moreover, wage labourers employ 
a series of tactics to ensure that their demands for the sale of their labour power are met. 
The whole range of phenomena recognised in industrial relations, from strikes to 
negotiations, are used. Equally, capitalists employ a similar range of tactics^'^'. The price 
that wage labour is able to command for its labour power is the result of the various tactics 
and strategies employed in the "free" market. 
27, The workers combine to give themselves more "market power". The ensuing battle is not a removal 
of free market principles but part of them. Equally, capitalists who combine to lower the wages of 
labourers, move to cheaper areas of labour, or attempt to influence public opinion against the workers' 
demands are engaging in free market behaviour. The free market is not a pleasant place, 
28, In the early part of the twentieth century in Australia there was an attempt to set a "fair" i.e. moral 
wage. However, the farcical nature of the endeavour soon becomes obvious (See Chapter 7), 
29. The sale of labour power for a wage is like the sale of all other commodities. It occurs in the "free" 
market. Like all other sales it is subject to the laws of supply and demand which are the result of 
strategic manipulations. However, unlike the sale of all other commodities, the strategic positioning to 
enhance the sale of labour power is generally regarded as unethical and even un-market like. 
30. As workers are most often in the position of needing to change the existing bargain they appear to be 
the instigators of trouble. No doubt the workers' position lends credence to the dominant view of the 
illegitimacy of their activity. However, it must be remembered that the pro-active position of labour is 
partly illusory. Capital both forces the change in needs and ironically requires it as well. 
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Bargaining over what is to count as a fair wage is a calculation of what will be the 
appropriate means of subsistence of labourers^L The "free" market and its attendant 
conflicts is the means that capitalism uses to apportion production to the various classes in 
society. It is neither attractive nor neutral. Nor is it only the place of individual choice, 
although that does occur. It is primarily the collective form of the distribution of the 
goods which we produce. As such, it produces certam possibilities for meeting needs. 
The process of calculation is continuous in capitahsm. It is a mode of production 
which has to continually create new needs. Capital, in order to remain as capital, must 
continually aim to create new commodities. However, the production of new 
commodities is useless unless there are buyers. As a result, there is a necessity within 
capitahsm of incessantly constructing new needs^^ n jg^  gg Marx notes, a mode of 
production in which there is: 
the necessity of forming needs, and creating the means of satisfying 
them, and of supplying quantities of produce well in excess of the 
traditional requirements of the workers. (Marx,1976:1026) 
As a result, there must be constant re-negotiation over the wage. As new needs are 
produced, it creates the demand that wages become commensurate with the ability to 
satisfy them^^. Therefore, the capitalist system will create both tendencies: the necessity 
31. At various times more than a wage may be part of the calculation. Social security, superannuation, 
and even education and health (etc) provided by the State may form part of the way the needs are met. 
These are essentially part of the wage in their function. It is well recognised by those who engage in the 
process of bargaining. In Australia, in the last decade there has been deliberate and ccmscious reference 
to the extended aspect of the wage. All elements come under the possibility of bargaining. The 
extended reference that the wage has acquired is indicated by its name: "the social wage". Even if the 
bargaining arrangements in any country do not allow a conscious calculation of the various elements they 
still form part of the wage. It is one clear way in which the State activity is immediately an aspect of the 
relations between capital and labour. There is no space between the two. In this respect it is a capitalist 
State. 
32. The study of that process would be a matter of exploring the apparatus of consumption. Here the 
needs of the labourers take the form of desire. It would be a matter of exploring the relation of desire to 
the objects of that desire - capitalist commodities. It would involve, in part, situating the management of 
marketing as the means of creating desire. 
33. There is the difference between the individual capitalist and the needs of capital. Capital requires the 
creation of new needs and the means to satisfy them. The individual capitalist, on the other hand, wishes 
to obtain labour as cheaply as possible. Hence, he/she will, bitterly, argue against the necessity of 
increasing wages. At the same time, the individual capitalist needs other workers to have sufficient 
funds to purchase his/her goods. Yet, all other capitahsts are working on the same principle as 
him/herself It is one of the absurdities of capitalism and one where workers very rarely come off well. 
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for the perpetual creation of new needs, and the continual unwillingness of individual 
capitalist to pay wages commensurate with them. The perpetually renewed calculation of 
the appropriate means of subsistence is a necessary part of the system. 
Capitalism, like all other modes of production, will produce social possibilities of 
needs and the means to meet them. Unlike all other systems, the mechanisms for 
establishing these is bargaining. It takes a double form because of the split within 
capitalism between needs and the means to satisfy them . Thus, both the wage, and the 
effort necessary to acquire it are subjects of calculation and hence, of bargaining. 
It is necessary to be very careful about the significance of bargaining. Marxists 
have traditionally eschewed such an approach, seeing it as producing conservative 
analyses. This analysis of bargaining, however, places it firmly within Marxism. It must 
be remembered that bargaining, itself, carries no theoretical or political overtones^^ ^ 
acquires these as a result of the theoretical and analytical parameters in which it is placed. 
This analysis situates bargaining in the context of domination and exploitation. It is 
constructed so that we can "see" the way bargaining has produced the specifically 
capitalist worker^^. 
We also need to be careful of how we understand bargaining within Marxism. 
Traditionahy, bargaining over effort has been understood as providing the rationale for 
analyses in the labour process. On the other hand, bargaining over wages has been 
considered in Marxist analyses of industrial relations. However, neither of these 
approaches to bargaining are the same as that taken here. The analysis of bargaining in 
the traditional Marxist literature has tended to preclude any examination of the effect of 
bargaining. It has been down played to be replaced by the concerns of control and 
34, As such, it is like the object of analysis "the activity of work". It has different meanings depending on 
the different theoretical contexts in which it is placed. 
35, The specifically capitalist worker has been seen as produced through the relations of subordination in 
the labour process. However, the problems inherent in such an approach are evident. It was clear that 
"socialist" workers were also submitted to the same forms of control (Taylorism) as capitahst workers. 
The capitalist worker is distinctive because of two inseparable features. There is the freedom of the 
worker which makes possible and which is reproduced in the relations in exchange. There is also the 
subordination which follows from the exchange. 
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conflict. This analysis seeks to position bargaining at the centre of a Marxist analysis of 
domination. 
Bargaining over the wage and bargaining over the use of labour power is the 
expression of the freedom of the labourer within capitalism. Labourers are free to sell 
their labour power to whom ever they choose. They are free to negotiate a wage as the 
price of their labour power^^. There is of course only an "apparent exchange" 
(Marx,l954:547) for, in reality, it is the means of the capitalist acquiring unpaid labour. 
However, its form gives capitahsm its specific quality and shapes the nature of the 
specifically capitalist worker. 
Capital is only able to be capital because of the freedom of the wage labourer. The 
free sale of labour power makes the production of surplus value possible, and hence is the 
basis of the formation of capital. However, equally, capital cannot be capital unless the 
commodities in which it is potentially held are consumed. Wage labourers are the 
consumer of the commodities as they freely choose what to buy from their wages. As 
Marx (1976:1006) remarks: 
Wage labour is then a necessary condition for the formation of capital 
and remains the essential prerequisite for capitalist production. 
We must not be misled into thinking that because wage labour is outside the 
process of production it is outside the capital/labour relation. Rather, it is an essential 
element within it. Marx (1976:1006) continues: 
Therefore, although the primary process, the exchange of money for 
labour power, does not as such enter the immediate process of 
production, it does enter into the production of the relationship as a 
whole. 
The freedom in exchange is thus a capitalist form of freedom. It ensures the 
domination of labour by capital. It is an aspect of the economic form of domination. It: 
merely ensures the perpetuation of the specific relationship of 
dependency, endowing it with the deceptive illusion of a transaction, of 
a contract between equally free and equally matched commodity owners 
(Marx,1976:1064 emphasis in original). 
36. Resistance, struggle and bargaining are the expressions of the freedom of the labourer within 
capitalism. They are the sign that we are dealing with a perverted form of freedom. 
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The apparatus of calculation will allow an analysis of the relations between capital 
and wage labour in exchange. The "elementary factors" (Marx,1954:174) of the apparatus 
of calculation, regarded as a capitalist activity, are: capital, wage labour, and need. It has a 
double form: involving both the conditions of labour and the wage. 
The name, the apparatus of calculation, is chosen because it highlights two of its 
significant aspects in relation to capitalism. The first refers to the social function which 
the practice performs. It sets the socially appropriate level of means of subsistence and the 
effort to obtain them. As well, the name points to the nature of bargaining within 
capitahsm. It is a calculative process wherein capitalists and labourers maximise their 
own bargaining position vis a vis the other. It is meant to emphasise the inhumane aspects 
of calculation under capitalism, where bargaining replaces rationality and co-operation. 
The apparatus of calculation is a social relation. It has no phenomenal existence. 
In order to "see" it, one must look for aspects of the exchange relation between capital and 
labour. These may occur at any empirical site. Workers may bargain at work, through 
job delegates. They may negotiate through arbitral arrangements, situated away from 
work. Apparatuses of the State may be involved. Moreover bargaining may not involve 
both parties being aware that it is occurring. Workers may bargain privately. Sabotage, 
absenteeism and pilfering can ah be seen as aspects of bargauiing. Managers continuahy 
engage in such one-sided bargaining, although it is not seen as such but rather is graced 
with the legitimacy of "managerial prerogative". The point is to pick out the aspects of 
exchange from these and other phenomena. The aim is to explore how wage labour is 
constituted in its relation of bargaining with capital. 
EXPLOITATION AND DOMINATION 
Exploitation never disappears while there is capitahsm. However, if we consider it 
only from the point of view of the ownership of surplus value it remains an abstract 
notion. It is thus eashy dismissed when the relations between capitalists and labourers 
take a hegemonic form. However, by considering capitalism as an economic form of 
domination, the real content of exploitation can be explored. It is possible to show how 
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capitalism shapes the very being of the worker through the normal processes of its mode 
of exploitation. 
The analysis of exploitation is at the heart of Marx's analysis of capitalism. 
However, though real, it is an abstract relation. Marx shows how, within production, 
more value is pumped out of labour than was exchanged for labour power in the sphere of 
exchange. The analysis of exploitation thus rests on recognising that social labour takes 
the abstract form of value within capitalism. Hence, exploitation itself is also abstract; it is 
not directly and phenomenally present. 
The abstract nature of exploitation makes it difficult to "see". Exploitation, as a 
relation between capital and labour, does not have a necessary immediate form. It can 
take the phenomenal form of consent, just as easily as coercion. If exploitation takes the 
phenomenal form of coercion then it will be felt in a physical way and necessarily be seen 
to be a problem. On the other hand, when coercion is replaced by consent then 
exploitation has no immediate reality^''. It is not surprising that workers and trade 
unionists and academics are not greatly concerned with exploitation in this context. 
A profound content can be given to the abstract notion of exploitation by 
considering capitalism as an economic form of domination. Here, the relation between 
capital and labour is viewed through the way that the specifically capitahst worker is 
consfituted. Within the labour process and the apparatus of calculafion the relation 
between capital and labour is no longer merely an abstract matter of the ownership of 
surplus value. 
Exploitation and dominafion are analyficahy separable, yet m their operafion the 
two feed into each other. Marx has explored their dual mode of existence in his analysis 
of the labour process. The basic periodisation for the changes m the labour process is 
given in terms of the double aspects of exploitation and domination. The production of 
37. Even when the relations between capitalists and labourers are consensual, coercion will exist. There 
will doubtless still be workers who are treated with brutahty and coercion and whose incomes will be 
insufficient to allow them to lead even an adequate life. However, there is a tendency for these workers 
to be hidden either in the third world or outside of the dominant capitalist/worker relations. 
131 
surplus value has two major forms - absolute and relative^^. The change from one to the 
other is brought about by, and constituted through a change in the nature of the labourer. 
With the advent of a legislative limit to the length of the working day, the form of 
production of surplus value moved from absolute to relative. The labourer's relation to 
work was transformed in the process. Knowledge, as it becomes visibly an aspect of 
capital, is separated from workers and changes in form . In the process, labourers are re-
shaped into a more suitable tool for the valorisation of capital. Thus, they are more 
thoroughly subordinated to capital. Their being as workers have been shaped by the 
requirements of capital. As weh, they are also more subjugated to capital. Speaking of 
the change from absolute to relative surplus value Marx (1954:478) claims: 
in the course of this development, the formal subjection-^^ is replaced by 
the real subjection of labour to capital. 
Marx is able to give exploitation a real content. At the same time, he is able to provide the 
real basis for the constitution of the labourer in the labour process. 
In linking exploitation and subordination in the labour process Marx is able to 
show how the constitution of the labourer is a result of the form of exploitation within 
capitahsm. As such, Marx was able to move from his "phhosophical" (Althusser,1979:158) 
position in his early work. In it, he had "read the human essence at sight, immediately, in 
the transparency of its alienation" (Althusser and Balibar, 1979:17). However, in Capital 
Marx Linked his concerns about the constitution of humans with the mechanisms of the 
capitahst form of exploitation. In doing that, Marx thoroughly grounded them in his 
analysis of production^O. 
38. Absolute surplus value is obtained by lengthening the working day while maintaining the same value 
of labour power. Hence a greater surplus value is produced. Relative surplus value is reached 
(Marx,!954:479) when the statutary limits placed on the working day "force" capitalists to find other 
means to increase their profits. They do so through increasing either the productiveness or the intensity 
of labour. In the process the nature of surplus value changes.from absolute to relative. 
39. "Subjection" is to be vinderstood as "subsumption" to clarify that the primary reference is to social 
relations. Marx, though, has the ability to grasp multiple levels of reality in one word. Thus "subjection" 
also contains a reference to the empirical reality of control. As the multiple levels of reality shift with 
time, the double reference is no longer as applicable. Care needs to be taken. 
40. It seems that Marx has fulfilled the task that Althusser (1979:158-9) claimed had to be still reached. 
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However, Marx has not addressed the way m which the needs of workers have 
been transformed through capitahsm. In his early work, (Marx,1977) "saw" the effect of 
the transformation of needs in capitalism. However, he never gave it a basis in the nature 
of capitalism itself 
The apparatus of calculation has been developed as a way of displaying the 
transformation of needs within capitalism. It is built around an analysis of the relation of 
needs to wage labour and capital. Thus, it can be used to show how the wage labourer is 
constituted, m terms of needs, through the very processes which ensure the exploitation of 
labour. 
The labour process and the apparatus of calculation are the two sides of the 
economic form of domination. Their exploration aUows us to give a profound content to 
the way the specifically capitalist form of exploitation constitutes workers'^L 
CONCLUSION 
The relations which constitute the specifically capitalist worker are to be found by 
exploring the economic form of dominafion. It involves an analysis of the relations in 
both the labour process and the apparatus of calculation, and an examination of their 
articulation. 
This chapter has outlmed the basic form of both the labour process and the 
apparatus of calculation. They rest upon Marx's view of the transhistorical features of 
humans. Humans, like all living things have needs. In order to fulfil their needs they 
must interact with the world around them. However, unlike animals (and plants), 
humans have the ability to be conscious of what they do. As a consequence, they 
continually transform the world in which they live and so they constantly generate new 
needs. 
Within capitalism, the needs and the work necessary to satisfy them are separated. 
The needs are attended to through money. In order to acquire that, labourers must sell 
41. The examination of the constitution of labourers and wage labourers is part of a critique of capitalism. 
Marx's analysis is always linked into an exploration of how the constitution diminishes the possibilities in 
human attributes. This is his real critique of capitalism. 
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their labour power for a wage. The process occurs in exchange. As a result, of the wage 
bargain the capitalist has the right to use the labour power. The activity of work is thus 
the property of the capitalist and it takes place in production. Capitalism is thus an 
economic form of domination, for subordination in production follows on from the 
financial relation in exchange. 
In order to explore the specifically capitalist worker it is necessary to explore the 
double relation of labour and capital. This chapter has argued that the two objects for its 
analysis are the labour process and the apparatus of calculation. Marx has developed the 
labour process for the examination of subordination. The most significant aspect of it is 
the way in which the consciousness, or knowledge, of the labourer, is related to capital. 
The chapter has also outlined the basic features of the apparatus of calculation. It is the 
object for the exploration of the relation of freedom within exchange. The most important 
aspect of it is the manner in which the needs of the labourers are related to capital. 
The fohowing five chapters analyse the economic form of domination in coal 
mining. They explore the domination of labour by capital in the coal mining industry in 
Queensland (Austraha). 
They show that up until the Second World War both labour and wage labour were 
formally subsumed under capital. Within the labour process knowledge appeared to 
belong to the miners and in the apparatus of calculation so did the needs of the labourers. 
The two aspects of the economic form of domination were hinged around the body 
of the labourer. The physical strength and dexterity of the labourer was central in the 
labour process. In the apparatus of calculafion, the needs of the physical body dominated 
bargaining - for subsistence and safety. The fine calculations of the physical needs of the 
miners were the means of guaranteeing their work. 
The labour process did begin to change, although it remained with the formal 
subsumption of labour. The changes which occurred around the bargahihig over safety 
began to alter the relations in the labour process. The legislation which was passed started 
the process of removing knowledge from labour to capital. However, the rest of the 
labour process was stih apparently under the control of the mhier. Hence, although 
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changes had begun labour remained only formally subsumed under capital until after the 
Second World War. 
In the middle of the century there were dramatic changes in both the apparatus of 
calculation and the labour process. First, the needs of capital and wage labour were 
removed from the apparatus of calculation. The "neutral, scientific" concepts of the 
economists stepped into their place. At the same time, the labour process was undergoing 
two dramatic transformations. First, knowledge was aligned with capital through the 
introduction of new technology and a new form of manager. As weh, a process was 
beginning through which the psychological attributes of the miners, their needs for 
security and recognition, were to become an object for management expertise. 
Work was ensured under the new form of domination through the splitting and 
transformation of need. As the needs of the miners disappeared from the apparatus of 
calculation they re-appeared in two forms. They surfaced within the labour process as a 
need for security. Additionally, they were transformed into the desires of mass 
consumerism. The double form of need was the new way in which work became a 
necessity for the labourers. 
The real subsumption of labour and wage labour was thus achieved after the 
Second World War. The process freed up the activity of capital which could make super 
profits and not have them related to wages. Yet, at the same time capital was guaranteed 
a labouring population. 
The apparatus of calculation and the labour process are now articulated through 
the "soul" of the labourer. The desires for consumerism and for security are now the 
aspect of the labourer which capital addresses and through which it domhiates. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DOMINATION AS DESPOTISM: INDEPENDENCE AND THE NEED 
FOR SAFETY 
In the liand mining period, work was almost entirely co-ordinated by the miners 
themselves. They had a remarkable degree of freedom, although it was hedged 
by the requirements of an exploitative mode of production. They were, 
nevertheless, subordinated to capital through their independence. The 
subordination, however, was purely formal, as the attributes of will power and 
knowledge which were needed for the production of coal were situated in tJie 
worker. 
However, miners bargaining over their need for safety began to shift the labour 
process to a more capitalist one. The apparatus of safety operated both to 
differentiate the manager from the miners as labourers and to constitute the 
manager as the (partial) site of co-ordination and discipline. Thus the new 
category of manager was aligned with capital, and a prior condition for the real 
subsumption of the attributes of labour into capital was set in place. 
Capital wih always dominate through the double relation in exchange and 
production. However, the form of domination changes as capitalism develops. In this 
and the next chapter the early stages of the domination of labour by capital, within the 
mining industry in Queensland (Australia), are explored. 
Capitalism remained in an undeveloped form in mining until after the Second 
World War. The labour process was co-ordinated by the miners themselves. Their own 
knowledge and wih power^ were used in the production of coal. As a result, a particular 
form of labour was constituted within the labour process. It will be called independent 
labour, for capital subordinated the muiers through their independence. Their freedom 
ensured that production was carried out, and even that it followed the necessities imposed 
by an exploitative relationship. Neither the mmers' comfort nor their well being, nor even 
their safety could be given due attention. However, the labour process was not 
1. When labourers are disciplining themselves, I will recognise it as an expression of their will power. 
When another's will is imposed on them, then I call it discipline. The two are different from the point of 
view of the labourer. 
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distinctively capitalist. The labourer remained much as he would have been had he been 
doing the work for himself Capital had not yet shaped labour into its image. Hence, we 
can say that capital had only formahy subsumed labour within the hand mining period. 
For capital to achieve its true form, it needs to be liberated from the restrictions of 
personality. It needs to make the attributes of labour into its own, and in the process 
transform them into suitable capitalist shapes. Consequently, the period of formal 
subsumption of labour is usually very brief However, within the coal industry, generally, 
it was prolonged, and particularly so in Queensland. Despite thaL a change did occur 
which pushed the labour process into a more developed capitalist one. 
As capitahst workers, miners bargained over both their wages and conditions of 
work. Within mining, safety was the most important condition of work, and bargaining 
centred around it. In this chapter the effect of bargaining over the need for safety is 
explored. It is claimed that it began to reshape the labour process into a more capitalist 
one. It led to the differentiation of the manager from the miners, and the beginning of the 
process of placing the knowledge of the labour process and the authority to co-ordinate it 
with the manager, rather than with the miner. As such, the miners activity of bargaining 
for a safer workplace, lead to their being more firmly subordinated to capital. 
INDEPENDENT LABOUR 
Hand mining was the earhest method of getting coal. It continued to be used well 
into the twentieth century. Machine mining, albeit of a shnple form, only became a 
technique in the British (Perm and Simpson,1986) and American (Wardell, Vaught and 
Smith,1985) coal industries from the 1930's onwards. 
The Austrahan coal industry remained caught in the hand mining period longer 
than most. Davidson, as Chairman of the Commonwealth Board of Inquiry into the Coal 
Mining Industry {Report,'[946:85), announced: 
In all classes of mechanisation in collieries, Australia has always lagged 
far behind other countries where coolie labour is not employed. 
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In 1944 only 36.92% of coal in New South Wales was machine cuL and only 20.08% was 
mechanically filled {Report,1946:88)^. Queensland was even more tied to hand mining. In 
1949 there was only one fully mechanised mine and only one other using mechanical 
loading for some of its coal (Powell Duffryn,1949:26). A staggering seventy five mines out 
of a total of one hundred employed no mechanical means, even to undercut the coal or to 
drih holes for explosives (Powell Duffryn,1949:35). 
The labour process in Queensland remained relatively unchanged for almost a 
century^. During the period of hand mining the miners themselves, both individually and 
collectively, were largely responsible for the co-ordination of the labour process. They 
had a remarkable degree of freedom in their work. It led some to describe the industry as 
more of a "cottage" (Editor of Coal Age, cited Goodrich,1977:19) rather than a capitalist one. 
During the hand mining period, work was organised as a series of relatively 
autonomous sites. The strata above the coal seam had to be supported. Hence, a 
common method, and the one generahy used in Queensland, was the bord and pihar 
system. It consisted of a tunnel driven into the coal seam. From it, and at right angles, 
levels are driven into the coal, and from them bords are developed (Poweh 
Duffryn, 1949:40). They are the working places. They are connected to other bords by 
narrow tunnels whose purpose is to provide for ventilation. Between the bords, pihars of 
coal are left standing as roof supports. Their size varies, from about ten to forty metres 
square depending upon the gradient of the seam (Poweh Duffryn,1949:41). As Wardell, 
Vaught and Smith (1985:43) pomt out the whole forms a pattern, not unhke that of streets 
on the surface^. Individual miners or, more often, pairs of miners, would be allocated to 
different bords or rooms. 
Supervision of the workforce was impracticable. As numbers of different bords 
had to be worked to supply the quantity of coal needed, the miners were spread over large 
2. This compared with 66% cut and 65% filled by machine m great Britain in 1944 {Report,19^6:88). At 
the same time America was mechanically in advance of Britain. 
3. Queensland was part of New South Wales until 1859. Prior to separation there was little coal mining. 
4. The pattern in hand mining is a very irregular one as it has to be worked to make hand hauling 
possible. Thus the streets are more like those of a medieval village than a new estate. 
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distances. Hence, constant supervision would have entahed hiring an inordinate number 
of overseers, which was not economically feasible. 
In addition, the darkness within the mine made the supervision of work an 
impossible task. Initially, miners used naked candles for light. These had to be placed 
some distance from the actual site of working and the light they threw on the working 
place was only minimal. As mines became deeper and the likelihood of an emission of 
firedamp (an inflammable gas, methane) increased, the use of safety lamps was made 
mandatory. However, though these lamps appeared to solve the problem of the ignition 
of firedamp, they exacerbated the general invisibihty as they produced only a fraction of a 
candle power of light. As a result of the lack of light in the mine, it was very easy to see 
the approach of any supervisor from some distance, but he could not see until he was very 
close. 
It was abundantly clear to the mine owners that they could not provide the 
supervision necessary to ensure work. They realised that it would be "prohibitive" in cost 
(Court of Industrial Arbitration, Queensland, Transcript of Evidence, No. 79 of 1920,p. 
15:QCA). Hence, miners had to supervise themselves. Consequently, they "(got) a great 
degree of latitude in regard to the way in which they (won) their coal" (Commonwealth 
Court of Concihation and Arbitration, No. 251 of 1938, Transcript of Evidence,p. 152:QCA) 
Pairs of miners would operate on their own in each of the bords or rooms. They 
co-ordinated the entire process of gettuig and filling and wheeling the coal from their bord. 
In the nineteenth century, coal was got by undercutting it to a depth of .5 to 1.5 metres by 
using a pick, then the block of coal would be brought down by the use of tools or wedges 
(Whitmore,1981:160). During the twentieth century, the process was changed in that the 
whole block of coal would be brought down by using explosives: a system known as 
"grunching". The coal would be holed near the roof and explosives would be inserted in 
the holes and tamped firmly in place, and the shot fired. The next task was pickmg the 
shattered coal from the face and shovelling that, and the coal on the floor, into the skips. 
While shovelhng, the coal had to be sorted from the stone, which had to be stowed 
underground. The skips of coal were hand wheeled, along wooden rails, to the main 
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haulage way and from there they would be taken to the surface and weighed. In addition 
to these tasks, the miner had to set the props which would support the roof as the coal face 
advanced. The miner was thus responsible for the co-ordination of all tasks in getting the 
coal. 
The miner also organised his own time and his own work mates. Miners could 
come and go from work as they pleased for there was no-one who could force them to stay 
in the mine. As Cassidy noted (Commonwealth Court of Conchiation and Arbitration, 
No.251 of 1938,Transcript of Evidence,p. 172:QCA): 
You cannot control them (contract miners) hke you can factory workers 
with a bundy clock 
Not surprisingly, they also chose to take their meal times when it suited them 
(E165/48/l:2). As well, it was accepted, apparently without question, that miners should 
chose their own working mates. The Royal Commission {Report,1929:59) understood that 
it was a central part of what it was to be a miner^. 
The labour process was buht around the miner's own practical knowledge. To a 
large extent, getting coal relied upon his physical strength and mobUity. It was certainly 
the case with shovelling and wheeling, drilling and undercutting. Within all these tasks, 
knowledge and judgement were interlaced with the use of strength. Shovelling and 
wheeling come close to being merely physical work, although even here considerable 
ingenuity and judgement were required. The roof generally was so low that it did not 
allow the men to stand upright. Shovelling, in such a situation, called for extreme skill in 
moving the body so that damage to it was minimised^. Wheeling, also was 
predominantly physical, yet the steep grades, the uneven floor, the low roofs, and the 
tendency for skips to tip, called for continual planning as to the best way to proceed^. 
5. The Royal Commission (1929:58) argued against the cavil (the miners' ballot for places on the coal) as 
a means of determining places of work. That method of selection, according to the Commissioners, 
prevented management from making "a proper adjustment of skill to the needs of particular places". 
Although the Royal Commission recommended that the cavil be stopped, it noted that men could still 
retain their ability to choose their mates, 
6. Of course, such skill is not recognised for it is of no use to capitalists. 
7. It is a feature of capitalism that the fine aspects of judgement which are associated with physical 
activity are denied. That is, of course, convenient, for it supplies a cheap labour force. It is ironic, that at 
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Fine judgement was also a necessary feature of other aspects of the miners' work. The use 
of explosives called for skilled workmanship. As Goodrich (1977:24) pointed out: 
In any form of mining, the blasting of the coal, calls for a degree of 
judgement but in the solid work, without the help of a cut to make the 
coal fall more easily, the decisions as to the placing of the holes, their 
depth and direction, and the amount of powder, are matters of special 
dehcacy. 
There was constant assessment involved in bringing down coal in a suitable condition 
without causing danger. However, the miners' greatest skills, or at least the most valued, 
were their knowledge of gases and roofs. The safety of the miners, and the value of the 
coal mine itself, rested upon their knowledge and assessment of conditions. 
Not only was the labour process in each bord co-ordinated by the miners, but the 
operation of the mine as a whole was, generally, in their collective hands. The miners, 
through their union, co-ordinated who worked in what places, the distribution of skips 
and even the amount of coal to be produced. What places were worked, and who worked 
them was determined with the involvement of the scrutineer, the union representative for 
the miners. Each quarter a cavh was held by the scrutineer. It was a lottery which 
distributed the pairs of miners to various bords. Before it was held the manager had to 
reach agreement with the scrutineer on both the suitability of places, and on any that 
would be considered deficient^. After the cavil, work places were set for three months. 
Any alteration to them had to be made through consultation and agreement with the 
scrutineers. In addition, the union was often involved in the control of the distribution of 
the skips inside the mine. A fair distribution was essential to enable all miners an equal 
chance of earning a wage. As weh, the union, at most mines controlled how much could 
be produced each day. A darg, or upper limit to the number of skips which could be 
filled, was imposed^. 
the same time, the beauty of the combination of judgement and physical prowess is adulated on the 
sports field, 
8, Deficient places were those which were unsuitable for contract miners to earn a wage in. These 
would be worked by shiftmen miners who were paid a daily wage. 
9. The purpose was to restrict production to that which was possible by the majority of the men. It 
acted to keep the piece wage in reasonable bounds for the owner could not use the most skilled as the 
standard for production. 
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Where managers sought to assert some control over the way work was done, 
miners resisted. Managers did not question the miners' method of getting coal. The only 
large area of dispute over the control of work, was in terms of the stone question. 
Managers wanted the miners to stow the stone underground, thus providing clean coal. 
The miners consistently refused the intrusion into their domain^^^ The resistance was 
always couched in terms of the mhiers' right to co-ordinate their own work. In an early 
agreement between the union^^ and the West Moreton Colliery Owners Association in 
1907 no decision could be reached on stowmg stone. The miners refused insisting on their 
right to work as they pleased: 
They (the mmers) however, refused to acknowledge that they were 
under any obligation to place it (stone) in any particular position other 
than suited their own convenience unless they were ahowed some 
"consideration" for so doing (Archives of Business and Labour 
(hereinafter ABL):E165/48/2, my emphasis). 
The right of management to tell the men what to do with the stone was not settled in 1918. 
Miners sought a ruling from the Committee of Management (hereinafter COM) of the 
union as: 
to whether the manager had a right to tell a man how to work his place 
(ABL:E165/42/9,COM Nov. 4th 1918 my emphasis) 
The problem of stone had not disappeared by 1929. Still the union was refusing to allow 
solutions which would undermine the right of the miners to manage their own place: 
(the union) would never agree to allow the fate of the men to be at the 
mercy of the manager (ABL:E165/42/19, COM, July 15th, 1929). 
The miners' independence in co-ordinating their own work was thoroughly 
embedded in them. It is httle wonder that managers rarely attempted to discipline the 
miners. As one manager, Birtnie, commented before the 1920 Award hearing (Court of 
Industrial Arbitration, Queensland, No. 99 of 1920, Transcript of Evidence, p. 24:QCA): 
10. There was an economic imperative acting on both sides. Managers wanted to pay for coal only. 
Miners did not want to waste their time, and money, on cleaning the coal. 
11. Initially, the union was called The West Moreton District Coal Miners' Union, but the name was 
changed in 1908 to the Queensland Colliery Employees Union (QCEU) (Thomas,1986), In 1915 a 
federation of all coal unions in Australia was formed called The Australasian Coal and Shale Employees 
Federation (AC&SEF), The QCEU became the Queensland branch of the federal union, and retained its 
name. 
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If you go into the working place too many times in a day they want to 
know what you are after. 
Managers knew that in such a climate, supervision was impossible. When the union, the 
Queensland Colliery Employees' Union (hereinafter, QCEU) sought an abolition of 
contract rates the employers opposed it. They argued that they could not provide the 
supervision which would be necessary to replace the incentive in contract work. Their 
argument is summed up m the judgment: 
such supervision would be a constant cause of friction, as even now any 
interference with their methods of working is resented by the miners 
(Court of Industrial Arbitration, Queensland, No.99 of 1920). 
It is remarkable for workers to be given so much freedom. However, we must not 
think that the miners' independence is like that of the craft worker within Feudalism. The 
independence was shaped by the needs of capital, and through it the miners were 
subordinated to capital. 
Despite the ability of the miners to co-ordinate their own work, the exploitative 
nature of the process asserted itself They were using their knowledge to get coal, not for 
themselves, but for the owners of the mines. That relationship meant that the miners were 
not entirely free to organise work as they would choose to, for it was shaped by their need 
for a wage. Time, as Benjamin Franklin asserted, was money (cited in Weber,l958:48) 
within capitalism. Not surprisingly, the miners took on this prime capitalist motive, for 
they were paid by the ton (tonne) of coal produced. 
As a result, the organisation of the labour process, even within the hands of the 
miners, displayed an exploitative rationahty. Both the miners and wheelers often worked 
with extremely low roofs and difficult grades. Narrow coal seams meant, low roofs as no 
extra time was spent on the "unproductive" labour of "brushing" the roof to make it a 
suitable height for working^^ xhe same logic determined that wheeling was often done 
along steep grades, for any adjustment was a cost against production. As a result, many 
miners worked in extremely cramped conditions, both in getting and wheeling coal. It 
12. There was, not surprisingly, a constant battle between owners and miners over the question of 
brushing. 
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appears this was particularly bad for those wheeling. Gordon Peck, a wheeler at a West 
Moreton coal mine described his experience (Thomas,1986:51-2) with grades of 1 in 4^^: 
at some places to get the skip moving up the grade, you had to bend 
down, hold onto the raUs with your hands and get your head against the 
wagon and shove with your head. 
When the roof was low the difficulty of wheehng became enormous. The 1946 report on 
the Coal Mining Industry {Report,1946:361-2) describes the wheeling at Ellengowan, a mine 
in the Maryborough District in Queensland: 
The temperature was high and the humidity was excessive. Roadways 
were so low that in places there was a height of only 2ft. 9ins. between 
the rail level and the roof Men with bare feet were wheeling, by hand, 
skips containing half a ton of coal for distances of 350 yards. In some 
instances the roadways were only 4 ft. to 5 ft. wide and the skip almost 
entirely closed the passage and the ventilafion. If the skip were derailed, 
no means of passing it would be possible^"*. 
One wheeler reported (Thomas,1986:53) that in a similar low seam at Box Flat cohiery: 
Men got fingers mangled from being caught between the wagon and the 
roof and, until you got to know the roads, you'd scrape all the skin off 
the knobs on your back rubbing against the roof. 
Even when the practices were curbed by legislation, the exploitative logic asserted itself. 
It was not until the late 1940's that the Coal Mining Act (Queensland) was amended to 
require roadways to be 5ft. in height^^. Even then, many of the smah mines were 
exempted. It was reasoned that they would suffer "financial strain" if they were forced to 
pay to have roadways brushed (Powell Duffryn,1949:43). Clearly, the logic is an 
exploitative one. 
The logic of exploitation is evidenced in many other aspects of the way the work 
was co-ordinated. Cost determined the care that was taken of the miners. Water was 
often not pumped out, or not efficiently pumped. Consequently, miners often worked in 
water, sometimes as deep as their waist or higher (Thomas,1986:56). Venthation too was a 
13. Many mines had higher grades. 
14. The report (1946:362) notes that the conditions were even more primitive in this colliery than in the 
others. However, it added, that they were also similar to the other mines in the district, 
15. This is still well below the average height of a man. 
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cost and was correspondingly poor, as all Reports mentioned {Report,1929; Report,\946)^^. 
A check inspector^^ recounted finding many places with not enough oxygen at the face to 
allow the flame in the carbide lamp to burn. Yet, men would be working there 
(Thomas,1986:58). The exploitative logic also meant that miners were "choosing" to work 
in thick coal dust. Their need to make money led them to return to their face soon after 
firing a shoL while the owners failure to put money into ventilation exacerbated the 
situation. 
Even when the miners ran the mines entirely on their own, an exploitative logic 
prevahed. In Queensland, many of the mines were run on tribute or collective contract, 
particularly during the depression!*^ (ABL:E165/42/6-21). When an owner could no 
longer profitably operate the mine, it was often handed over to the workers to be run on 
tribute. They would make some agreement with the owner whereby they would pay him 
so much per ton of coal, and he would provide, perhaps some surface labour, or the timber 
for props etc. The tribute party would mine the coal, and distribute the profits amongst 
themselves as they saw fit. At one stage the Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' 
Federation (hereinafter AC&SEF), the federal union for mine workers in Australia, 
advocated collective contract^^ as the solution to the instability in the mining industry 
(Ross,l970:333). The union attempted to ensure that all would share ahke, and that the 
union rules would be followed. Hence, in Queensland ah tribute agreements had to be 
approved by the executive of the QCEU until 1936^0. It was cahed an "experiment in 'co-
16. Ventilation within the mine would be poorly attended to and/or the fans which drove the air would 
be turned off when the miners were not working. 
17. A union appointed person with the legally recognised role of ensuring the safety of the men in the 
mines. 
18. There were still mines operating on tribute in the 1940's. 
19. There seems little difference between tribute and collective contract. Sometimes they are referred 
together as the same. Sometimes a difference is implied. It seems that the only major difference is that it 
is the union which advocates collective contract, and tries to insist on equal sharing. The employers, on 
the other hand, speak of the tribute. How the profits are shared is of no concern to them, 
20. By 1936 the QCEU was opposed to the system and claimed (Coal Mining Industry Award, Qld, 
Transcript of Evidence,28/5/36: QCA) that: 
from an union point of view it bred discontent and set member against member, 
thereby causing disunity. 
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operation'" by Ross (1970:334). However, the reality was far from thaL as he pointed out; 
"the collective contract system was bom in conflict and was seldom without it" 
(Ross,1970:334). 
The exploitative logic was accentuated in the system. It is best summed up by the District 
check inspector, Jack Pocock, in 1936 (cited in Thomas,1986:413): 
I have noticed that in all places that are worked on collective contract 
and tribute systems, the men will do anything to keep down expense, 
even to the extent of breaking the award in many cases. 
The tribute and collective contract organisation of work merely exaggerated the logic of 
exploitation which was also evident m the contract system^L 
The miners' independence, under any of these systems, was not linked into human 
needs, but into the needs of capital. Hence, the logic of exploitation shaped the 
possibihties for co-ordination. Freedom at work, in such a context, could not lead to the 
development of a whole worker. Rather the opposite was the case. Capital sucked up the 
life of the miners and left them a "wreck at forty", as Willis commented at a conference of 
New South Wales mine owners and the AC&SEF (22nd June,1919,p.4:QCA)22. The 
miners' freedom did not enhance their life but negated it^^ as The Miners' Next Move 
(ABL:E165/10/7,p. 11) argued: 
just examine a crowd of miners. Notice their sallow complexion, their 
protruding cheek-bones, their deformed legs, their curved spine, their 
grey hairs, and especially their age ...I may assure you the effects of the 
contract system will be recognised very forcibly. 
In 1936 the approval process for tributes and collective contract shifted to the Conciliation Board. It was 
set up under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Acts 1929-30 (Qld.) and chaired by Walsh. 
21. Tributers were in the ambiguous position of being aligned both to the union and the owners. 
Common Cause (1938,April,9:5) noted the irony during the strike at New Aberdare, The tributers had to 
pay 3d. in the pound out of their wages to the tinion as a strike levy. At the same, time they also had to 
pay 2/6 per ton to the owners to fight the strike. 
22. The matters before the conference were to be dealt with in Queensland, after they were settled in New 
South Wales. 
23. The miners valued their freedom. It is a sign of the lengths that a human will go to, to enjoy freedom. 
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THE FORMAL SUBSUMPTION OF LABOUR 
The mining labour process, which has been described, is one that is only formally 
subsumed under capital. The methods of working were similar to those used by slave and 
convict labour. However, in this case, the coal belonged to a capitalist who had it 
acquired it by the right of paymg a wage^^. Capital had merely, as Marx (1976:1021, 
emphasis in original) pointed out, "subsume(d) the labour process as it (found) it, that is to 
say, it (took) over an existing labour process, developed by different and more archaic 
modes of production." 
Usually, the labour process does not long stay in its earher form. It is merely a 
transition period for capitalism, for capital seeks out freedom of operation in order to 
valorise itself^^. Generally, the earlier forms of work are a fetter upon the operation of 
capital, and so there is a tendency to a shift to a more capitalist labour process. It was not 
the case in the Queensland coal industry. 
However, even within this period there was the development of a shift towards a 
more capitahst labour process^^. Ironically, bargaining over safety was the medium that 
produced the change. It had the effect of differentiating the manager from the miners, as 
labourers, and aligning the manager to capital, as the personification of control. The 
knowledge about work, and the wUl to do it began to be transferred from the workers to 
management. In the process, these attributes changed in form. The knowledge contained 
in management, centred on formal rather than practical learning. The wih to work, 
became in the hands of management, discipline. As knowledge and will power began to 
be aligned with capital, both the manager and the worker were re-shaped into a more 
suitable form for capital. 
24. There were some State owned mmes in Queensland. They were no different, and sometimes worse 
than, the capitalist owned ones. 
25. This tendency of capital is played out in the competitive behaviours of individual capitalists seeking 
the greatest possible return on their capital. 
26. In a capitalist labour process the attributes of labour become those of capital. Then capital is freed 
from the restrictions placed upon the use of these attributes when they are contained within a person. 
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Both Carson (1975;1979) and Hopkins (1988) have noted that factory and safety 
legislation reduced the autonomy of workers. Carson (1979) points out the way in which 
early factory legislation, the fore-runner of safety legislation, had the effect of disciplining 
the workers in terms of regularity and uniformity, and the way in which it aided the 
concentration of capital. Hopkins (1988) argues that the effect of safety legislation in the 
mining industry has been to lessen the autonomy of the miners because their 'pit sense' 
becomes incorporated in formal safety regulations. These approaches can be developed 
by considering capitahsm as an economic form of domination^^. 
Unlike other modes of exploitation, there is bargaining over safety within 
capitalism. In capitalism, the workers freely exchange their labour power for a wage. As 
a resuh, they can try to enforce both suitable wages and conditions of work to meet their 
needs. Thus the need for safety can become an issue around which bargaining occurs. It 
is particularly the case in mining, where the lives of the men were dependent upon the 
way the mine was operated. 
Bargaining over safety is part of the apparatus of calculation and, hence, an aspect 
of the economic form of domination. In many industries, it may have made httle impact 
in terms of the domination of labour by capital. However, in mining it was decisive. 
Ironically, the miners in bargaining over their needs for safety, embedded themselves 
further in capitahsm. It led directly to a change in the subordination of labour within the 
labour process. As managers were constituted in a capitahst form, miners began to lose 
their abihty to freely co-ordinate their work. 
Within the apparatus of calculation we can speak of an apparatus of safety. There 
are a specific set of practices which relate to safety, though they will vary over time. They 
include the practices of the inspectors, the courts, the managers and the union, the 
parhament and even medicine. They do not have any institutional setting. They do not 
agree on what they say. They have no other coherence except in their relation to the 
27. Quinian (1987:358) remarks that there has been little discussion of the relation of safety legislation to 
the labour process either within the literature on the labour process or on occupational health and safety. 
In order to explore the relation of safety to the labour process it is necessary to consider it as an aspect of 
the economic form of domination. 
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question of safety at work. However, in their operation, they produced what would count 
as the problem of safety, and its obvious solution: the certification of managers. 
MANAGERS:"A HIGHER CLASS OF MEN"28 
There were managers of many of the coal mines in Queensland at the end of the 
nineteenth century but they bear little resemblance to what we take to be a manager today. 
First, managers were not necessarily separate from owners, as many owners were 
themselves managers. Second, the managers were not fully differentiated from the 
miners. They were most often practical miners in that they had been employed as 
workers before taking the position of manager (Whitmore,1985). Indeed, it was the 
pracfical knowledge that qualified them for the position. More importantly, a manager 
could continue to engage in practical work in the mine which he was managing and he 
could manage more than one mine at a time. In general, he was neither fully 
differentiated from the capitalist nor from the worker and it was around the question of 
safety that the process of differentiation was to occur. 
At the turn of the century in other industries managers were undergoing a process 
of "professionahsation" due, in large part, to changes in technology and m the organisation 
of work29. However, neither of these changed significantly in the mining industry. It 
appears that the requirements of safety legislation forced a change upon a reluctant group 
of managers and altered their relation both to capital and labour. The irony was that it 
was the miners who, out of a need to find a solution to the real problem of death amd 
injury in mines, forced the legislation through parhament, often against the wishes of both 
managers and owners. 
28, This section dealing with safety legislation has been published elsewhere (Turner,1989), 
29. In many industries the existence of piece work generated a shift towards a new category of manager. 
It led to a "conscious and systematic' form of management supervision which was built on a division in 
knowledge with management becoming the site of a formal knowledge of the organisation of work. The 
process is epitomized by, but not confined to, Taylorism (Braverman ,1974). However, in the coal 
industry piece work was not the immediate site for the constitution of a new category of manager. 
Rather it was in the solutions to the problem of safety that a new category was produced. 
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There have been State imposed mine safety regulations in Queensland from 1881 
when a Mines Regulation Act was passed. During the last decades of the nineteenth 
century and the first decades of the twentieth century there were a nim:iber of major 
revisions (1889, 1898, 1910 and 1925). In part, these were a response to public pressure 
arising from disasters, in the same way in which the New South Wales Mining Regulation 
Acts were revised (Hopkins 1984: 180-1). In parL they were due to changing methods of 
mining. Each revision increased the number of both general and specific rules which had 
to be abided by in collieries. They also provided mechanisms whereby these rules could 
be enforced, primarily in the form of an inspectorate, but also as the stipulation of duties to 
an increasing number of levels of management (Braithwaite,1985; Fisher,1987; 
Sleeman,1980). 
Safety legislation raised the question of the manager in its concern to find a site of 
responsibihty for the enforcement of the legislation. The question of legal responsibility 
was solved in the 1889 Mines Regulation Act by making the manager prima facie 
responsible for any breach of the regulations with the proviso that he would not be guilty 
if he took "all reasonable means" to enforce the legislation and that it was "reasonably 
practicable" to carry out the regulation. However, the possibility of solving the problem of 
safety by producing managers as "a higher class of men" (Royal Commission,1900: xl) 
through State certification did not appear pracfical until there were deaths from explosions 
of gas. 
Coal can give off a gas, methane, which can in the presence of oxygen and a flame 
explode. Queensland coal mines did not experience explosions from the presence of gas 
until 1874 and the first disaster in Queensland from this cause was not until 1900 when an 
explosion of gas at Torbanlea killed five men. Disasters from explosions of gas had 
occurred earher in England and in Austraha an explosion at Bulh in New South Wales in 
1887 had kihed 81 men. The prevention of this type of disaster was seen to he in a 
knowledge of gases and of methods of ventilation which could be used to dispel them, 
thus rendering them non explosive. This form of knowledge had not been part of the 
practical experience of those miners whose work had been confined to Austraha. The 
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existence of disasters thus raised the possibility of State intervention to determine the 
capability of managers. In this process an examination of their formal knowledge of both 
gases and ventilation would assume importance. 
Initially the question of certification was raised by some managers but 
predominantly by the miners themselves and their advocates as a response to disasters 
elsewhere. Glassey, a former organiser of the miners, in the debate on the 1889 Mines 
Regulafion Act argued that the Bulli disaster proved that a system of certification was 
necessary for the protection of both miners and owners. However, his proposed 
amendment was defeated. 
The question of the certification of managers as a guarantee of their competency 
was raised again in the 1897 Royal Commission but it was not seen as a necessity. It 
seems obvious why the Commission took this position. There was a division in the 
opinions presented to the Commission between those who emphasized practical 
knowledge with no registration and those who advocated examination and certification. 
It is interesting to note that amongst those who advocated the necessity for formal 
knowledge were a group of miners. They claimed that there was "a consensus of opinion 
in the district" that managers should pass some examination and undergo some training 
because "The manager and, unfortunately, a good many more know absolutely nothing of 
mine gases" (Royal Commission,! 897:205). However, the gas referred to by the miners 
(carbon dioxide) did not raise the question of the safety of both the miners and the mine as 
it was suffocative rather than explosive in its effects. Perhaps that reduced the urgency of 
the issue^O. Disasters in Queensland coal mines were necessary before the State could 
enforce compulsory certification through examination. 
The decisive shift to a requirement that managers possess a formal knowledge 
occurred as a direct result of a Royal Commission. This was set up to enquire into the 
deaths from an explosion of gas at Torbanlea Cohiery in 1900 and into a similar death at 
Waterston which occurred while the Commission was sitting. The Royal Commission was 
30. The Commission did recommend a non-complusory procedure of examinahon and certification of 
managers and the 1898 Act incorporated the recommendahons. 
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concerned to explore the incidence of inflammable gas in collieries and organised most of 
the inquiry in terms of the adequacy of management supervision of the inspection of the 
mines for gas. They found that the lack of inflammable gas in many of the mines had led 
to a carelessness in inspection and supervision. They also reported that, on the other 
hand, even the continual appearance of inflammable gas at Torbanlea and Waterston had 
not led to proper practices at the first mine (Royal Commission,1900: xxviii) or proper 
discipline at the second (Royal Commission,!900: xxxvhi). Moreover, it was concluded 
that there had been a general disregard of inspectors' instructions and of the requirement 
of the Act to record the process of inspection. The Royal Commission thus concluded 
(1900:xl): 
in the majority of cases the persons employed to manage collieries are 
very much below the standard in inteihgence and knowledge of mining, 
that should be required of men filhng such responsible and important 
positions; and that the employment of a higher class of men as managers 
would not only do much to lesson the danger from accident but would 
also be advantageous to the owners, inasmuch as it would lead to the 
better working of their mines 
As a result of their findings the Royal Commission (1900:xli) recommended inter 
alia that the Mines Regulation Act should be strengthened. They suggested that where 
there were more than ten men employed underground certificates of competency or 
service for managers and undermanagers should be made compulsory^L 
The Royal Commission gave equal weight to both practical and formal knowledge 
in the process of State recognition of managers. They recommended that a manager 
should be required to hold either a Certificate of Competency or a Certificate of Service. 
The former would be granted to an apphcant who had suitable practical experience in 
mining and who had passed a series of examinations dealing with mine geology, 
arithmetic, gases and ventilation. However, it was also recommended that a person could 
hold the position of manager with only practical experience, recognised by the Certificate 
31, The impact of disasters through explosions can perhaps best be seen in the shift in attitude of one of 
the prominent mine owners, Lewis Thomas. During the parliamentary debate on the 1898 Mines 
Regulation Act he had opposed the introduction of an optional procedure of certification of managers on 
the basis that "such men spent all the shareholders money and did no good with it" (Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates,1899:1269). By the 1900 Royal Commission, of which Thomas was a member, he 
was advocating certification (Whitmore,1985:61). 
152 
of Service. These recommendations were not put in place until the Mmes Regulation Act 
of 1910 was passed. 
The 1910 Mines Regulation Act for the first tune made certification compulsory for 
a manager and required all future managers to possess both formal and practical 
knowledge. Though there was opposition from two sources to this move they were not 
effective. A deputation of owners and managers from the gold mining areas of the State 
appeared before the relevant minister claiming that owners should "be at liberty to employ 
whom they choose" {Brisbane Courier, 12 AugusLl910:5). As well the Upper House, the 
Legislative Council, initially opposed compulsory certification of managers even though it 
had been passed by the Lower House, the Legislative Assembly. However, the Legislative 
Assembly appeared to take it as self evident that managers should be required to be 
certified by the State. There was virtually no debate either on the bill or on their rejection 
of the Legislative Council's opposition to compulsory certification. 
The existence of disasters from explosions of gas made two changes possible. It 
raised the question of the competency of managers and it increasingly shifted the 
understanding of competency from that of a practical knowledge to a formal knowledge. 
In the process the category of manager altered. First, the requirement of a formal 
knowledge differentiated the manager from the miners who then possessed only a 
practical knowledge. Second, the category of manager itself became hierarchically 
organised through the question of safety and certification of competency. By the 1910 Act 
a certified manager and undermanager had been stipulated as necessary if there were 
more than twenty ordinarily employed underground. The 1925 Coal Mmes Regulation 
Act carried the process further with its requirement for the certification of a deputy or 
underground foreman whose duties of supervision were organised around questions of 
safety. 
In this way the apparatus of safety not only produced a differentiated and 
hierarchised management through processes of examination but it made possible another 
important change. It produced a shift in the function and form of co-ordination of the 
labour process from the miners themselves to the management. Thus a double process 
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occurred in which the manager was both differentiated from the miners as labourers and 
aligned with capital. 
MANAGERS: THE PERSONIFICATION OF CONTROL 
Marx (1976) claims that the capitalist has dual functions within the labour process 
as it is both co-operative in form and the means of valorisation. The capitalist is thus the 
site of the process of planning and co-ordination and of an authority over the labourers. 
However, the particular forms in which these functions occur are not set. In the 
nineteenth century mining labour process planning, co-ordination and discipline were 
organised through the labourers although the mine was owned by a capitahst 
(Marglin,1974). The apparatus of safety had a significant effect in that it produced a shift 
of the functions away from labour to capital by rendering the labour process visible and 
constituting the various levels of management as the site of discipline over labour. In this 
manner questions of safety aligned the manager with capital by producing him as a 
personification of controP^ 
The mining labour process was made more visible by the way in which questions 
of safety related to the non-spectacular causes of death and injury: falls of stone and coal. 
Throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century the safety inspectors continually 
remark on the fact that around half of the casualties in coal mining resulted from fahs of 
stone and coal and that the remedy lay in "method and supervision" {Lawrie,Queensland 
Government Mining Journal, hereinafter QGM/,1908:294). The wardens, in their 
recommendations following inquires into deaths in coal mines, and the inspectors 
frequently reiterated this solution. The method to prevent roof falls was timbering and 
spragging up to the mine face and not knocking props out while standhig underneath. 
Both of these methods, however, were problematic, especially under piece work. 
Timbering up to the face took time and hindered the getting of coaP^. 
32. At this time, the co-ordination of the labour process takes the form of control, for humans are at the 
centre of the labour process. 
33, It is not clear why miners continued to knock props down while standing underneath as there was a 
machine available which would have enabled them to pull the props down from a distance. One can 
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Safety legislation required that each manager draw up special rules for his colliery 
which would be approved by the Minister of Mines and which would then have to be 
enforced. These rules dealt amongst other things with regulations for timbering. As well, 
the safety legislation after 1919 required the registration of a deputy whose specific tasks 
were listed m the legislafion and included supervision of timbering. The effect of the 
legislative requirements, together with the continual advice of both mines inspectors and 
wardens, acted to make the immediate labour process of the miners more visible. Their 
work became subject to scrutiny in the name of safety. 
The increasing visibhity of the mining labour process was solidified in terms of the 
legislative requirement of recording the weekly process of inspection. The Mines 
Department provided books for the purposes of recording and the legislation insisted that 
the books be available to the inspector. Failure to record the process was punishable 
under the Mines Regulation Act and a number of prosecutions of managers and deputies 
were made on these grounds. 
Safety also ahowed the constitution of the manager as the site of an immediate 
form of control. As Lawrie, a mines inspector, (QGM/,1912:325) reported: "The occurrence 
of accidents is greatly favoured by lack of disciphne and inadequate supervision". The 
inability of the manager to maintain discipline was a source of continual concern 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century. The failure of managers is noted in 
Government Inspectors' reports and m Royal Commissions. The 1900 Royal Commission 
noted the extreme laxity in discipline which led to the deaths of miners. The 1921 Royal 
Commission, set up to enquire into the deaths of seventy five men at Mt. Muhigan 
(Queensland), was a record of a series of lapses in maintaining discipline which led to the 
deaths. The major concern in these reports was that the manager could not discipline the 
only speculate that perhaps not all coal mines had these machines or that at any mine there were not 
enough machines available to cover all the places where coal was being hewn. 
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miners. The target of the legislation, the inspectors and the Royal Commissions was the 
manager who in the interests of safety needed to become the site of disciplined'^. 
The manager, as the site of immediate control, was largely constituted through the 
apparatus of safety. The State through the Mines Regulation Acts enforced on the 
manager the necessity of producing rules for the cohiery. Fahure to enforce these rules 
meant that the manager was liable to prosecution and the inspectors used this as a warning 
in order to train the managers to discipline their workforce. The difficulties that 
management found in being the site of disciphne are evident in the fact that some, at first, 
used the system of State prosecution to discipline the miners. There is not a great deal of 
evidence about the extent of this procedure. However, in a number of years in the first 
part of the twentieth century the inspectors noted that prosecutions had been brought by 
managers against the miners under the Mines Regulation Act. This procedure was 
stopped in 1914 when a magistrate in the Ipswich Court of Petty Sessions (QGM/,1914:588) 
ruled that under the Act such prosecutions had to come from the Mines Inspector. 
Disciphne was thus thrown back onto the manager. 
The apparatus of safety had the effect of separating the manager from the miner via 
a differentiation of knowledge which was achieved through the requirement of 
examination and certification. Further, it had the effect of shifting co-ordination and 
authority within the mining labour process from the miners and the union to management. 
We can see that at the turn of the century the manager becomes caught in a web of 
disciplinary power. The State through the instruments of disciphnary power: observation, 
hierarchisation and examination (Foucault,1975:170), constitutes a new category of 
manager as both its immediate target and its effect. Moreover, the category of manager 
34. A concern with the link between safety and discipline was not only a feature of Queensland. In 1914 
(QGM/:247) a United States State Mining Inspector gave an address to the "Safety First" Conference in 
Nevada wherein he deplored the fact that mine foremen though competent were "sadly deficient in 
discipline". As well, in 1916 Coxe in addressing the topic of "Safety and Efficiency in Coal Mining" in 
Coal Age (cited in QGM/,1916:493) noted that "the first requisite for safety and efficiency is discipline ., 
from the top to the bottom". Again Beebe in Mines and Minerals (cited QGM/,1908:459) listed the steps 
that were taken to secure safety and gave as the most important step "vigilant supervision of ignorant 
labour". 
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had this position only because it served as a relay of the disciplinary power to the miners 
as labourers. 
In the process of differentiation of the manager the category of the miner as 
labourer also underwent a change. Hopkins (1988) has claimed that safety legislation led 
to a process of deskihing of the miners because their tacit rules were publicly formulated in 
the safety legislation. However, the change in the category of the miner as labourer was 
more complex. As the labour process became more visible to the manager and as the 
manager became more effectively the site of discipline the miners former autonomy in 
work was reduced. However, it did not completely disappear so the mhiers did not 
develop into the detail non-autonomous labourer described by Braverman (1974). This 
possibihty was excluded because although knowledge served as the means of 
differentiation between manager and miner it did not involve a complete spht in 
conception and execution. Formal knowledge certainly became solidified in the categories 
of the manager but practical knowledge remained a sphere of understanding for the 
labourer. In addition, safety legislation itself instituted a degree of control over work for 
the miners. They were permitted to have check inspectors who at first were elected by the 
workers at a particular mine and later were elected by all union members in a district. 
They had the right to examine both the mine and the books recording the State Mines 
Inspectors' reports. The legislation also made provision for check weighmen appointed 
and paid for by the miners to check the correct weighing of coal. The counter organisation 
to the manager meant that miners retained a considerable degree of control. As weh, 
outside of the safety apparatus the miners had autonomy. The union had some say in 
both where the miners worked, through cavihing, and how much they produced, through 
the darg. Though the apparatus of safety did not destroy the autonomy of the miners it 
did reduce it by making the labour process visible and by shifting responsibility and 
discipline to the category of manager. 
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THE CATEGORY OF MANAGER: ITS CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY. 
The process of achieving a safe work place in mining was both slow and 
inadequate. Parliaments and managers and owners moved hesitantly and often 
grudgingly to solve the problem of safety in mines. After all, it took more than twenty 
years for the compulsory certification of managers to be legislated for. Moreover, there 
was always a continual complaint that there were neither sufficient nor adequately trained 
inspectors provided by the State to enforce the legislation. This feature of the process is 
perhaps familiar. Yet another aspect strikes us in the last quarter of the twentieth century. 
It seems remarkable that the form of the solution to the problem of safety should centre on 
the manager. After all, the certification of the manager by the State is quite a remarkable 
degree of intervention into capitalist enterprises. As well, although the miners advocated 
the certification of the manager hi the interest of their own safety, it meant that capital was 
able to gain control over them through the manager. Some explanation of the 
phenomenon is needed. 
Doubtless, some of the explanation rests on the growing professionahsation of 
managers in other industries. However, this points to the general availabhity of that 
category but is not a complete explanation. We still need to understand how it was 
possible for the miners to pose the certification of the manager as a solution and how the 
State could assume responsibhity for the process. The answer to the puzzle lies in the way 
in which safety operated in mining. It was able to operate in a space which ahowed the 
interests of owners, managers and muiers to coincide. This was possible because health, 
as a personal concern of the worker, was not either conceptuahy or empirically linked to 
safety. As a result, safety could more easily operate in conjunction with interests other 
than those of the miners'. In fact, it became the site of both "moral and pecuniary 
concerns" (QGM/,1902:346). The double reference perhaps ahowed the manager to appear 
as an obvious solution in that it was the only place where aU interests could coincide. 
Moreover, the coincidence of interests made it possible for the State to intervene with quite 
far reaching legislation. It is perhaps significant that similar legislation was passed for the 
Maritime industry where safety also had a reference both to life and to property. 
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Health and safety could lead a conceptually separate existence at the turn of the 
century because they were considered in terms of mining as a whole. As a consequence, 
concerns about the miners' health centred on the existence of pulmonary diseases. A 
number of Royal Commissions and Reports, not only in Queensland but also in other 
Australian states and in South Africa, all indicated an excessively high death rate from 
these diseases amongst metalliferous miners. As a result of this form of inquiry coal 
miners were taken as healthy in that they had a lower incidence of deaths from all lung 
diseases compared to metalliferous miners (Table 1). 
Table 1 
Death Rates per 10,000 miners living from lung diseases, Ipswich and 
Charters Towers, 1881-1910 
1881-5 1886-90 




Charters Towers Metalliferous Miners 










Source: coUated from a table in the 1911 Royal Commission Report (Ixxxhi) 
The explanation for the differences in health of the two groups of miners was given by the 
Royal Commission (1911:lxxxv) as a consequence of the different types of materials 
inhaled. It was claimed that stone dust, from the metalliferous mhies, as a hard sharp 
dusL acted as a mechanical irritant which caused fibrosis limiting the workable lung area 
and setting up a predisposition for tubercular phthisis. On the other hand, coal dust was 
seen as a soft dust, which was not only not dangerous to the health of the miners but 
positively protected them against hifection from tuberculosis. The conclusion that coal 
miners were healthy was not apparently unique to Queensland. Dr Haldane, the Director 
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of a Research Laboratory set up by the Yorkshire Coal Owners in Britain (QGM/,1917:92 
and 1924:293) provided a medical explanation for the miners' health. He argued that the 
black spit of the miners was a sign of health for the "housemaid cells" in the lungs in being 
stimulated by the coal dust into rejecting it were making the cells more capable of rejecting 
harmful bacihi. As a result of the field on which the question of health was asked it was 
seen to apply only to metalliferous miners and not to coal miners. Thus safety and health 
were understood as conceptually separate. 
The way in which measures were introduced to promote safety in coal mines 
created a situation where health could arise as a concern of miners. However, the safety 
measures themselves created health problems. Thus the two continued to operate 
separately. This is clear in both the introduction of safety lamps to prevent explosions 
from methane and in the use of methods to minimize explosions from coal dust. 
Safety lamps were introduced both to give an indication of the presence of gases in 
the air and to prevent a naked flame from coming into contact with the gases and igniting 
or exploding them. During the first part of the twentieth century there was increasing 
regulation regarding the use of safety lamps due to the growing presence of methane in 
the mines as they became deeper. "Gassy mines" had to become safety lamp mines in that 
no naked light (candles, cigarettes or even matches) was permitted. 
As a consequence of the lack of light from safety lamps the uicidence of miners, 
nystagmus increased dramatically. OscUlations of the eyebah and blindness in certam 
lights as well as headaches, muscular tremors and loss of central vision were features of 
the disease. Prevention appeared to lie in the provision of better lighting yet this was 
problematic both from a safety and a pragmatic point of view. Greater illumination could 
be provided by the use of electric lamps but they could not show the presence of 
dangerous gases and they were very heavy to carry as the battery had to be large. Hence, 
in terms of the question of safety, as it concerned gas explosions, health and safety 
operated in an empirically contradictory manner. 
Health and safety also operated in a contradictory manner on the question of 
explosions from coal dust. Two suggestions were made in the 1921 Royal Commission to 
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minimize this type of explosion and both suggestions were incorporated in the 1925 Coal 
Regulations Act. It was recommended that dry and dusty mines should either be 
regularly watered to lay the dust or that they should be stone dusted to provide a less 
explosive mixture of dust. However, both methods led to health hazards. Stone dusting 
meant introducing into coal mines the very hard sharp dust which caused the mcreased 
rate of phthisis amongst the metahiferous miners. Watering created an atmosphere where 
a parasite Ankylostomiasis, or Hookworm, could easily breed and infestations of this 
parasite were quite common in mining communities. 
Because of the uncouphng of health and safety the latter was able to be linked to 
concerns other than those of the miners. In fact, in coal mining, safety operated as a site of 
both the "moral and pecuniary" (QGM/,1902:346) concerns of miners and owners and 
managers. 
Moral and economic concerns could coincide on a number of safety issues in 
mining and there are two obvious instances. First, there are numerous "deleterious"" gases 
in coal mines. Firedamp, or methane, is the most dramaticahy harmful. If liL it can either 
burn or explode injuring and kihing miners but also ruining machinery. Second, 
accumulations of coal dust can explode often with more serious consequences to both the 
miners and the mine than an explosion of firedamp. The coal dust explosion at Mt. 
Mulhgan (Queensland) in 1921 travelled along four mhes of underground tunnels and out 
the mouth of the mine. It killed all seventy five men who were below ground, including 
the manager. It also destroyed even very large mine machinery. Both the steel winding 
drums weighing two tonnes and the large ventilating fan were ripped from their housings 
and thrown more than twenty metres (Beh,1978). 
The double concerns of economy and morality operated together in the production 
of rules for cohieries and in the production of safety legislation. In 1919 the Mines 
Regulation Act was amended to require Deputies to hold certificates of fitness with regard 
to their abihty to test for the presence of methane. The QGM] commenting on the changes 
claimed: "These new provisions are being apphed as further safeguards to life and 
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property m coal mining". The double concerns were also foremost in the minds of the 
legislators when there were discussions to amend the mining acts. 
The way in which the moral and economic could operate together in coal mining 
appears to have led to the adoption of some safety provisions. It is significant that they 
were absent in other forms of mining where the two could not coincide. There was a lack 
of venthation in metalliferous mines, despite the excessive heat of these mines and the 
consequent discomfort to the mmers. The 1911 Royal Commission (Ixxviii) reasoned that 
in part, metahiferous miners suffered from excessive heat as compared to coal miners 
because coal mines were not as deep. More significantly they pointed to the better use of 
ventilation in coal mines because of the fear of explosions. 
It is also significant that moral and pecuniary interests had to operate together to be 
effective. This can be seen from a glance at the causes of death and injury 1882-1938 
(Table 2). 
Table 2 
Causes of death and injury in coal mines and 
works on surface, 1882-1938 
Causes 
Staging and shaft 
Falls of stone and coal 





























Source: Collated from the report of the Chief Inspector of coal mmes, QGM/,1938:122. 
Clearly the greatest number of deaths were due to explosions (48%). These deaths ohen 
take a very public form and are a matter of moral and administrative importance. 
However, the figures also reveal that 25% of deaths in that period were due to fahs of stone 
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and coal and that 28% of injuries were due to this. These, along with all the other 
categories, are the invisible deaths in the coal industry. In general they are neither 
publicly announced, nor publicly addressed: in Queensland, for example, they have not 
been the subject of Royal Commissions. They have, however, been a matter of concern to 
inspectors and the subject of rules in collieries. Despite their frequent occurrence there 
were few prosecutions under the Mines Regulation Act or the Coal Mines Regulation Act 
for lack of timbering or for not tunbering to the face; a procedure which would have 
minimized these deaths. The explanation for the difficulty in bringing these invisible 
deaths into pubhc scrutiny may lie, in pa r t in the way the moral cannot meet the 
pecuniary in this area. For the owners of the coal mine the supply of timber is an extra 
expense whereas a fall of stone and coal can be of httle economic importance. For the 
miners on piece work timbering meant loss of time for which they were not paid. From 
both sides of the economic relation there was no immediate economic imperative to be 
careful with regard to the rules. It appears the State accepted this in terms of 
prosecutions. 
A number of the features of the practices ui mhiing and of the discourses on safety 
and health made it possible for safety to be available as a concern for miners, managers, 
owners and pohticians. Doubtless, the coincidence of concerns on safety made it possible 
for the State to intervene in the quite dramatic form of stipulating that managers had first 
to be certified by the State. 
THE STRATEGY OF FAILURE. 
Traditionahy, the relation of safety legislation to the capital/labour relation has 
been explored through the question of its faUure. Commonly, the connection of safety 
legislation to the capital/labour relation is analysed in terms of the way m which it does 
not or cannot prevent death and injury at work. The "primacy of production" 
(Nichols,1975), the importance of profit (de Michiel,1983; Gunnhigham and 
Creighton,1980; Hopkms,1984; Nichols and Armstrong,1973; Qumlan,1987) and the 
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consequent need to control labour are seen as thwarting by direct or indirect means either 
the production of effective legislation or its appropriate implementation. 
Certainly, safety legislation is not totally effective. Injuries and deaths due to 
unsafe work practices continue to occur. Hopkins (1984:24) clauned that violations of 
safety regulations were found by almost ah inquires into mining fatalities in New South 
Wales, Australia and Braithwaite (1985:19) points to the universality of disregard of safety 
regulations. He noted that "sloppiness in relation to safety matters" was a common 
feature of those mines in the U.S., U.K., Austraha, Belgium and Zimbabwe which suffered 
disasters. Although, there is also considerable evidence that safety legislation, with its 
accompanying process of inspection and prosecution, has brought about a marked decline 
in both fatalities and injuries in coal mines in England, the United States and France 
(Braithwaite,1985:75-86). 
It has been argued that in mining the necessity for profit impels owners, and more 
particularly managers, whatever their individual morahty, to ignore, or even to insist 
upon, workers fohowing unsafe practices (Hopkins,1984; Hopkins,1988). Prosecution 
under the Safety Acts is understood as an outside force which can prevent this behaviour. 
However, as ;insafe practices continue to occur the fault is taken to he either in the 
legislation itself or in the enforcement procedures (Hopkms,1981; Hopkins and 
Pamen,1984). It has been argued (Hopkins and Pameh,1984:182-4) that safety legislation 
has been constructed since 1896 in New South Wales (Austraha) so that it systematicahy 
makes prosecutions difficult or impossible. These authors point to the "deliberate" 
insertion of "escape clauses" within the Act. These sfipulate that although managers are 
prima facie responsible for any breach of the safety legislation they wih not be guilty of an 
offence if they can show that they used "aU reasonable means" to produce comphance with 
the Act or if they can show that it was not "reasonably practicable" to observe the rules. It 
is argued thaL as a consequence, inspectors do not prosecute where they suspect that the 
"escape clauses" could provide a defence and that even if prosecutions are initiated they 
are difficult to carry through. Moreover, Hopkuis (1981) and Hopkins and Parneh (1984) 
claim that enforcement is made more difficult to achieve because inspectors use persuasion 
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rather than prosecution even when confronted with flagrant abuses of safety legislation. 
However, there are problems with these analyses. 
Doubtless the imperatives of capital, understood in the above senses, have affected 
the nature and outcome of safety legislation. However, in mining, at leasL there are some 
problems with these as a full explanation of the connection of safety legislation to the 
capital/labour relation. First, it is not clear that in mining there is any necessary 
contradiction between safety and production organised around profit. Braithwaite (1985) 
points to the high priority given to safety in five of the USA's major coal companies and 
the resulting low levels of lost time accidents at the mines of these companies compared to 
all other mines in the USA. As Braithwaite (1985:13) puts it: 
it is probably easier to straighten out an unsafe mine by having it taken 
over by U.S. Steel than it would be by adding Government inspectors 
This is not to argue that all companies or ah managers wUl give high priority to safety but 
it is to point out that the connection between safety and profit is not straight forward. 
Second, it is true that managers have argued for the insertion of "escape clauses". 
However, the fact logically cannot provide the link between safety legislation and the 
capital/labour relafion. It does not indicate that managers necessarily wih give lower 
priority to safety nor can it indicate that it was an imperative of capital rather than self 
interest which lay behind the managers arguments. Third, it is not evident, as assumed in 
the above argument, that the use of persuasion rather than prosecution points to the co-
option of the inspectors to the interests of capital. Serious consideration needs to be given 
to the claim made by Braithwaite (1985) that persuasion, rather than being a sign of the 
failure of the inspectors, is necessary along with prosecution as a means of enforcing safety 
legislation. 
It is obvious that safety legislation fails to prevent all injuries and deaths at work. 
As such it is necessary to analyse the causes of the failure. However, it does not follow 
that it should provide the starting point or the organising principle for the question of the 
connection of safety legislation to the capital/labour relation. When it is used in this 
manner, as was seen above, it produces analyses which offer a weak link at the analytical 
level between safety and the imperatives of capital. 
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When we consider bargaining over safety from the point of view of capitahsm, as 
an economic form of domination, another picture is available. We can see how it 
consistently led to a more thorough subordination of labour within the labour process. 
From this point of view, the question about the failure of the safety legislation is different. 
Rather than asking why the failures continue, we can ask what the effect of constant failure 
has been. It seems it constantly acted to solidify the subordination of labour to capital. 
Safety legislation was regarded as a failure from its very inception. In the passage 
of the 1889 Mines Regulation AcL just eight years after the first Queensland Act (1881), the 
Minister of Mines commented that the earlier Act 
had failed to a certain extent to carry out the intentions of Parhament in 
passing it - namely, the prevention of accidents and injuries to miners 
{Queensland Parliamentary Debates,1890:96). 
The claim was continually reiterated throughout the period. It is not surprising that such 
a perception should form the basis for analyses. However, there is another striking 
feature of the discourses around the failure of safety legislation which is largely ignored: 
the remarkable agreement on the possible solutions. 
At the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth, miners, 
pohticians, inspectors and royal commissions arrived at similar answers to the problem of 
safety. The causes of fahure were seen to lie in the procedures of enforcement, in 
particular the role of the uispectors, and in the managers' lack of ability to ensure the 
observance of the rules and regulations. The solutions revolved around the insistence on 
more competent managers, greater use of and greater powers to inspectors, more detahed 
rules and more emphasis on prosecutions. There was, of course, disagreement over 
details but there was agreement over a number of basic aims. FirsL there was a debate 
over the method of appointing an inspector. The miners argued that the inspector should 
be elected, whereas the owners opposed this procedure. However, within the debate the 
existence of the inspector and his role in enforcing the rules and regulations was taken for 
granted. Second, there was an agreed aim thaL for the purposes of safety, managers 
should be competent. The disagreement consisted in the miners' insistence on both the 
need for formal knowledge and certification and the desire of others to move slowly and to 
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require only a practical knowledge as a sign of competence. It is evident that the 
proposed solutions differed only on details. 
It is not surprising that the reforms which grew out of the sense of failure reflected 
the basic agreement. As has been seen they consistentiy acted to differentiate managers 
from miners and to transform them into the supervisory eye of the labour process and into 
being the site of discipline. It appears that the agreement on the failure is part of the very 
process which constituted the manager. Hence, the problem of the continual failure has a 
different role within this analysis. Rather being the organising principle it now is 
understood as part of a strategy which was aiming at a shift within the mining labour 
process. 
It is possible to describe the practices of the apparatus of safety as forming a 
"strategy" (Foucault,1978) although the whole was not planned by any individual, group 
or class. Despite the lack of an intentional coherence we can understand them as 
possessing a strategic unity for as Foucault (1978:95) claims: 
the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable...an implicit 
characteristic of the great anonymous, almost unspoken strategies which 
co-ordinate the loquacious tactics whose "inventors' or decision makers 
are without hypocrisy. 
Certainly, safety legislation acted to prevent the miners from extending their area 
of control. As well, it operated to draw back some of the responsibility for the co-
ordination of the labour process from the miners. The position is weh summed up in 
Justice McNaughton's judgment (Court of Industrial Arbitration, Queensland, No. 318 of 
1920) regarding methods of selection for re-employment: 
It seems that the proposed clause goes too far, as the provision for 
ballotuig and for employment in rotations would provide the manager of 
proper control in the selection of the men working under him and so 
hinder him in carrying out the onerous duties imposed on him by the 
Mines Regulation Acts, which might involve him in liability to criminal 
as weU as civil proceedings. 
The mining labour process underwent a change as the apparatus of safety was set 
in place. The relation between capital and labour altered as the manager was 
differentiated from the miners as labourers and ahgned with capital. 
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The literature on the labour process is organised around the change from formal to 
real subsumption of labour. Formal subsumption indicates the form of the labour process 
when it has been subordinated to capital but when the organisation of work remains as it 
was prior to that subordination. Real subsumption, on the other hand, refers to the labour 
process when all aspects of it come under the sway of capital and as such it is completely 
revolutionised and permanently changing (Marx,1976:1034-5). Understandably, most of 
the interest in the labour process debate has centred on the change from formal to real 
subsumption. However, this chapter has explored a process which occurred within the 
formal subsumption of labour but which can be considered as providing a prior condition 
for the estabhshment of the real subsumption of labour. 
Marx (1976:1026) points to the way in which the capitalist needs to ensure that only 
the sociahy necessary labour time is used by the labourers in making a product. As a 
consequence, Marx claims that the capitalist, within the formal subsumption of labour, will 
take over the role of supervision and discipline. This chapter is suggesting that the 
process whereby the capitalist acquires his/her position is not automatic. It appears that 
in the mining industry, at leasL safety legislation was necessary in order to make discipline 
a tool of capital in the person of the manager. It was the major mechanism through which 
formal subsumption of labour was "differentiated within itself (Marx,1976:1022). The 
labour process as an organisation of work remained unaltered but a prior condition for the 
real subsumption of labour under capital was achieved. 
At the turn of the century there was a shift in the relation of capital to labour. 
Burawoy (1985) claims that during this period the arbitrary power of capital, in the form of 
the manager, was curbed by the State and this changed the dominant form of the 
capital/labour relation from coercion to consent. The power of the manager may m fact 
have been "curbed". However, in mining, at least, a more fundamental transformation 
was takmg place. It has been argued that the intervention of the State into the 
capital/labour relation in the form of safety legislation has been significant. It had the 
effect of constituting the very category of manager as we know it today, and concomitantly 
beginning to transform the nature of labour. 
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The process of change which has been described is deeply ironic. The miners 
achieved the right to safety at work because they engaged in militant struggles which 
arose out of their real need to prevent injury and death. However, in this very process 
they lost a degree of autonomy in their relationship to work as the autonomy changed in 
form and was transferred to capital, in the new category of manager. The result was that 
the minhig labour process became a more capitalist labour process. Donzelot (1981/2:5) 
claims that these two tendencies operated generally at the end of the nineteenth century. 
He suggests that it was "as though the professional deskhling of the worker gave rise to his 
juridical requalificafion". However, contrary to Donzelot's (1981/2) claim, that the latter 
was the basis for the establishment of the former, this chapter has shown that the two 
processes are coterminous. 
CONCLUSION 
The labour process during the hand mining period was organised around the 
independence of the miner, and through it he was subordinated to capital. It was a formal 
subsumption of labour to capital, for the attributes which were called upon to produce coal 
were clearly housed within the person of the labourer. 
Knowledge and will are human attributes and are both needed for work of any 
kind. However, the forms they take are historicahy specific. Within the hand mining 
period both attributes are situated in the miner. It gives the appearance that the miner is 
independent in his work, and m one respect he certainly was. However, the attributes are 
shaped by the relations of production in which they operate. Hence, despite their 
independence, miners could not use it to enhance themselves as persons. Rather, it caught 
them within a logic of exploitation. 
The relations in which the miners were embedded constituted a particular kind of 
labour. We can cah it independent labour, to highlight the actual experience of work as 
freedom, and to pick out the key tool used by capital to ensure production within the 
labour process. 
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Duruig the hand mining period labour was only formally subsumed under capital. 
The human attributes of knowledge and whl were situated in the worker. Capital had 
certainly shaped the form of the attributes. However, as they were housed in the worker, 
they were still to some extent out of the control of capital. Later, these attributes take on a 
specificahy capitalist quahty, when they are removed from labour and re-appear in both 
management and technology. 
However, even in the hand muiing period, a shift occurred in which the human 
attributes of will power and knowledge begin to take a capitalist form. Bargaining over 
the question of safety within the apparatus of calculation had a decisive effect within the 
labour process. As a result of the activity of bargaining, legislation was passed which 
"produced" the manager. In the name of safety, the manager was gradually constituted as 
a site for discipline over the miners, and as the source of co-ordination and knowledge. 
The relations within the labour process thus began to change. Whl power and knowledge, 
in relation to work, started to be separated out from the labourer. The process was not by 
any means complete, but a change was underway that was puhing the labour process 
towards a more capitalist one. Ironically, it was the miners, themselves, who through 
their attempts to produce a more safe place, led to the transformation of both themselves 
and the manager. 
The independence of the miner and the authority of the manager were necessary 
for production. However, they would not, on their own, have guaranteed it. It was 
ensured by the way in which the relations in exchange articulated with those m 
production. 
Miners worked under piece work as an attempt to guarantee that they would 
produce the coal required. The payment form meant that miners could be relied upon (at 
least to some extent) to supervise their own work. It appeared the only available form of 
supervision avahable to capitalists at that time in mining. Its role was clearly recognised 
by the 1929 Royal Commission mto the coal mdustry {Report,1929:156) 
The difficulty of supervision in any underground operation makes rather 
hopeless the adoption of any system which eliminates piece work. 
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However, the process of guaranteeing production was much more calculative than 
merely using an incentive form of payment. The next chapter explores how bargaining 




DOMINATION AS DESPOTISM: A FINE CALCULATION OF NEED 
Production in the coal mining industry in Queensland was sporadic and work 
intermittent for almost all of tlie hand mining period. It is not surprising that, 
as a result, bargaining centred on the question of the needs of the loorkers, which 
however, were rarely met. Rather, the effect was, that the needs of capital were 
attended to through the gamble, which tied the workers to the mine, and enabled 
irregular production to exist. We can see how the apparatus of calculation both 
produced and reproduced the needy worker. Needs were attached to the ivage 
labourer, and tied him to capital. 
Production was sporadic, within mining, up until the Second World War and, as a 
result, labour was only intermittently required. The unstable combination was held 
together through the process of bargaining. 
A fine calculation of need within the apparatus of calculation ensured that there 
was a labouring population for the mining industry. Bargaining kept raising the miners' 
wages, as a means of coping with the effect of intermittent work. The miners remained 
poor, however, while production was sporadic but if production became continuous, and 
it occasionahy would, then their wages would be extremely high. The gamble on the 
"good times" was the major mechanism that kept many of the miners waiting on the 
possibihty of production. 
All people have needs but the form they take is historically specific. Within the 
apparatus of calculation the needs of the workers took on a particular form within the 
hand mining period. Need was embedded in the worker, and hence, seems natural and in 
that respect is natural. However, it was shaped by the exploitative relations in which the 
miners were caught. The needs of the miners and of their famhies were produced and 
reproduced through a process of calculation which ensured a labouring population at 
great cost to the miners, themselves. At the same time, their needs were also constituted 
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as being in a relation of both dependency and opposition to those of the capitalists. Need 
was pitted against need. 
Domination within both the apparatus of calculation and the labour process in 
hand mining took a subjective form. It operated through the constitution of both labour 
and wage labour as individuals possessing the attributes which were necessary for 
production. Knowledge and will were situated in the worker within production, and 
need was housed in the wage labourer. Domination was centred on the body of the 
worker. Not surprisingly, a personal antagonism between workers and capitahsts 
resulted, which frequently burst forth. It is domination as despotism. 
SPORADIC PRODUCTION 
Production m the Queensland coal mdustry was generally irregular up until the 
Second World War. Prior to 1883, the industry was so insignificant that it was not 
included in the Annual Report of the Department of Mines^. The mines were "small, 
shallow and short lived" (Whitmore, 1981:93)2. From 1883 to 1940 the Annual Reports of 
the Department of Mines (1983-1900) and the Queensland Government Mining Journal 
(1900-1940) detail the nature of coal production. The only period when production was 
moderately continuous and the industry regarded as generally prosperous was from 1906 
to 1914. However, even in the most prosperous years of 1910 and 1912 the mines could 
not work full time (g>GMJ, 1911-1914). For the remainder of the period the coal industry 
was depressed. Some of these years merely had "intermittent briskness and depression" 
(QGMJ, 1916:351). At other times there was so little production that intermittent work 
became "the general rule" (QGMJ. 1928:314) 
Production was sporadic because of two features of coal, in combination with the 
type of demand for it. First, the physical nature of coal, together with the irregularity of 
1. Coal was first mined in, what became known as, Queensland in 1843 (Whitmore,198L29). 
2. Lhe policy of granting relatively small leases for mining made it difficult to warrant sufficient capital 
for extensive development (Whitmore,1981). As well, Queensland did not develop an industrial base, 
nor could Queensland coal compete with the higher quality New South Wales coal for the shipping trade. 
Lhe coal industry thus remained quite primitive for a very long time. The position is entirely different 
now. 
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markets, led to peaks and troughs m production (Ross,1970:15). Second, the easy 
accessibihty of coal and the prohibitive costs of transport led to the constant development 
of new mmes. Overcapcacity and consequently discontinuous production resulted. 
Many of the markets for coal were irregular. The general low level of development 
of secondary industry in Queensland, made them particularly so. Some mines relied upon 
supplying the seasonal operations of meat works and sugar mills and thus were subject to 
fluctuations in demand-''. The most developed area, the Ipswich districL had a more 
diverse market. However, one third or more of Ipswich coal was involved in the shipping 
trade during the first decades of the twentieth century (QGM/,1900-1920) and so demand 
fluctuated. Discontinuous markets created a problem because of the difficulties involved 
in storing coal. 
Physical and financial obstacles to storage meant that coal had to be mined as it 
was needed by the markets. Long storage, and consequent exposure to the atmosphere, 
causes loss of weight (through loss of water content) and a deterioration in the abihty of 
the coal to produce heat. Thus it leads to a potential loss of income for the owner. In 
addition, most mines, had httle capital and thus no storage facilities'^. Storage also 
involved extra handling of coal which both added to the cosL and more seriously, had the 
effect of breaking up the coal. It was a particular problem in the Ipswich district as the 
coals were friable. Any handling could reduce them to slack, which was of little value. It 
is not surprising, that given these problems, the solution was to mine coal to meet market 
demand. As a result, coal production was irregular. The point was clearly stated by 
Cleghom for the employers before Mr Justice Edmunds (Commonwealth Coal Board, 22nd 
3. The mines in the Maryborough and Wide Bay regions, as well as those near Rockhampton were most 
linked into seasonal demands. 
4. Sometimes the railway waggons were used for this purpose, but the use was clearly limited. 
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May, 1918:Queensland Coal Association records)^: 
A colliery is not worked just as a factory every day for a certain 
requirement which is estimated daily. The demands of a colliery are 
variable. At certain times it is impossible to meet the requirements in a 
given time. (When a shipping order is completed) the coal that you turn 
out then is of no value for it is not required for that particular order. A 
colliery is not a churn. It depends on the demands of the trade. 
The second major reason for the existence of the sporadic production, was that 
there was a proliferation of mines beyond the requirements of the market. The coal 
industry has experienced continual overcapacity (Fisher,1987; Mauldon,1929; Report,1929)^ 
which was largely made possible by the accessibihty of coal. Most of the coal seams 
occurred as outcrops, which could be entered easily by a tunneF. Also coal was widely 
available throughout Queensland. As a result, it could be produced both cheaply in terms 
of capital equipment, and quickly (R^porL1949:163). Thus small adventurer capital was 
drawn to the industry. In the normal course of development, such overcapacity would 
have been reduced through competition. However, a number of particular features of the 
mining industry prevented the operation of the "invisible hand" and ensured a continual 
state of overcapacity and irregular production. 
The high cost of transporting coal encouraged the proliferation of mines. 
Transportation over land by cart was prohibitively expensive, even over small distances. 
For example, in 1915 the price of coal bought by the Railway Department from the Bowen 
State Coal Mine was 12/- per ton at the pit mouth^. However, the cost of carting coal, the 
mere 15 miles from that mine, to the railhead, was 30/- per ton (Thomas,1986:109). Rail 
5. The Commonwealth Coal Board was set up under the Commonwealth War Precautions Acts (1914-
16) to regulate the coal mining industry in Australia. There were difficulties involved with its operation 
in Queensland and both the QCEU and most of the employers sought State jurisdiction in September, 
1918. 
6. Periods of overcapacity are a "natural" aspect of the capitalist mode of production. However, special 
features of the coal industry led it to suffer excessively from them. 
7. The Maryborough Chronicle (4/10/ 1851) reported of the Ipswich tield; 
all that is required is the removal of a few feet of earth to expose the seam in almost 
any spot around. 
8. The normal practice was to quote consumers the cost of coal at the pit mouth. They would then be 
responsible for the cost of transporting the coal {Report,'\929). 
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and sea were less expensive but stih added considerably to the cost of coal^. The cost of 
transporting coal was a particular problem in Queensland. Many of the centres of coal 
use and production in the State were not linked by rail until quite late. The combination 
of high transport costs, and a relatively low cost per ton of coal made acquiring local coal 
almost a necessity. As a result, numerous small mines were opened, most of which had 
insufficient trade to create continuous productions*^. 
A further reason for the continuing overcapacity of Queensland mines throughout 
the first half of the century was that an expansion in the number of collieries, and 
consequently in productive potential, could occur at any stage of the economic cycle. 
There is a "natural" tendency for the numbers of mines to increase in periods of 
prosperity. The coal trade in Queensland, in the first decades of the twentieth century, 
was really only prosperous for any extended period from 1906 to 1914; a tune which 
probably did mark real growth within the State (QGM/,1907-1939). During this time, 
buoyed by optimism, the number of cohieries steadhy increased from 34 in 1909 to 45 in 
1914. However, despite the general growth in coal production, from 606,772 tons in 1906 
to 1,053,999 tons in 1914, the average output per cohiery did not significantly rise. It was 
22,252 tons m 1909" and only 23,422 tons m 1914 (QGM/,1908-1915). Doubtless the figures 
9. For example, rail cost for transporting coal only 39 miles from Lithgow to Katoomba (New South 
Wales) was 5/10 in 1929 {Report,1929:273). The further coal had to be transported by rail the more 
prohibitive were the costs. Sea transport was relatively less expensive, yet the final cost was exorbitant. 
The Royal Commission {Report 1929:281) estimated that coal delivered to the port of Melbourne from 
Newcastle would increase in cost from 25/ - (price quoted at the port, rather than the pit top) to 38/4. As 
well, additional expenses would have to be incurred by the consumer in carrying the coal to the site 
where it would be used. 
10. An indication of the significance of transport costs in terms of the effect on mining capacities can be 
seen in the Central District at the turn of the century. The Blair Athol mine was only 20 kilometres from 
the railhead and supplied the central railway but, because of the exorbitant costs of land transport, its coal 
was three times the cost of coal at the pit mouth in Brisbane. It is not surprising that when coal was 
discovered at Bluff which was only a few hundred metres from the rail line it was able to capture almost 
all the rail coal orders for that district. The viability of the existing mine at Blair Athol was destroyed 
(Whitmore,1985:283-90). It is instructive to note that the process was reversed in 1914. At that time the 
Bluff mine declined significantly in production, not due to the exhaustion of its capacity, but to 
competition. The Blair Athol field was re-opened with the advent of the railway into that area. 
(QGM/,1915:113). The process was reversed once again in 1922. There was "a considerable falling off in 
trade" at Blair Athol with the opening of the Bowen field and of the Baralaba mine {Report of the 
Department of Mines,1923:803) 
11. No figures are available for the numbers of collieries in 1906-1908. 
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represent a degree of overcapacity^^, xhe cheapness of mining outcrop coal meant that it 
could be sold at a reduced price, thus adventurer capital entering at times of prosperity, 
could secure some of the coal trade at a cost of overcapacity to the more established mines. 
Within capitalism, in general, periods of crisis often follow prosperity and provide 
a mechanism for sifting out the less "efficient" businesses and returning the rate of profit to 
a more acceptable level. However, the process almost worked in reverse in mining. 
When prosperity ended there was no end to the development of new mine capacity; rather 
it increased^^. Although there was a 32% increase in the number of mines during the 
period of prosperity and growing demand for coal (1909 - 1914), the increase was much 
greater during the period of crisis. From 1914 to 1933 there was a 17% decline in coal 
production, while there was a 93%) increase in the number of cohieries. As Mauldon notes 
(1929:152): 
Clearly an irregular development of Australia's coal resources has 
invited too many enterprises to try their fortunes in a lottery which 
promises, but fails in performance, to give prizes to ah. 
Usually, competition should force the less efficient mines to close. However, that 
did not occur. Small adventurer capital could survive because of two factors. First, the 
cheapness of mining the easily available coal, meant that smah new mines could be 
relatively viable even in a very depressed market. Second, it is certainly possible that as 
Mauldon (1929:155) suggests the high price of coal may have encouraged and supported 
adventurer capital to enter the field. The price of coal, in general, was not set in a free 
market but by Government decisions. 
12 The overcapacity would in fact be very high as a number of the large Ipswich collieries had bought 
mechanical coal cutters and even mechanical haulage systems and would have captured much of the 
increase (QGM/,1906-1915). 
13. If Queensland followed the pattern of New South Wales development, then the increase is almost 
wholly in small collieries (Mauldon,!929:154). Moreover, almost all collieries were small in Queensland, 
and some exceptionally so. In 1929 (Mauldon,l929:150) reported that 59% of Queensland collieries 
produced 90% of the output, leaving 41% of the collieries with only 10% . 
The continuing existence of mines even in periods of crisis is, in part, a result of the inability of owners to 
liquidate their stock at that time because of its industry specific use. As a result, as Mauldon (1929:155) 
argues, it was better for owners to maintain their mine and exist on occasional orders. 
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WAGE LABOUR AND NEED 
Labour, as a form of capital, takes on the shape most suitable to it. No-where is 
this more evident than in the coal mining industry. Throughout the early period of 
mining in Queensland until after the Second World War, labour employed in coal mining 
had a particular form - that of intermittent labour. It enabled capital to exist with sporadic 
production. 
The irregular nature of production went hand in hand with intermittent work. 
From details supplied by mine owners and managers to the 1920 hearing before the Fuh 
Bench of the Industrial Arbitration Court of Queensland (No. 99 of 1920) it is clear that in 
most collieries the men worked much less than full time^'^ (Table 3). 
14. There is only evidence, in some form, from 1919 of the number of days worked by miners and day 
workers. However, we can easily surmise that the pattern fits the earlier years, except perhaps for the 
period of growth from 1906 to 1914. 
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Table 3 
































































Source: cohated from evidence presented by mine owners to the Fuh Bench of the 
Arbitration Court of Queensland, No. 99 of 1920, (ABL:E165/48/l) 
Close to 70% of contract miners worked for less than three quarters of the working week. 
Day labour was better off, in terms of working time, although at no mine were they 
continuously employed. Some collieries were particularly bad. At Tannymorel, which 
employed one of the largest number of workers, the day men worked only 57% of the time 
while contract miners were working a mere 48% (Table 3). The amount of avahable work 
decreased during the 1920's and 1930's. It was only four shifts (out of six) per week from 
1919 to 1925 (Coal Industry Special Tribunal,Transcript of Evidence,l/7/25, p. 
ILQueensland Coal Association records)^^. In 1931 the intermittency had become much 
worse. The average amount of labour required then was only 2.6 days per week 
15. The Coal Industry Special Tribunal was set up under the Industrial Peace Act (1920). The Chairman 
was Charles Hibble. It was under Commonwealth jurisdiction and covered all coal mines in Australia 
except the brown coal mine at Morewell in Victoria {Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, No.83, 8th 
October, 1920). 
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(Southern Local Coal Board,23/2/31:Queensland Coal Association records)!^. At some 
mines the situation was even more extreme. Burgowan was providing only 4 days work 
per month to its miners in 1931 (Southern Local Coal Board,8/7/31 :Queensland Coal 
Association records). In 1935 the situation was equally bad with only 5 days per month of 
work (Conchiation Board, Coal Mining lndustry,ll /9/35:Queensland Coal Association 
records)^''. 
The effect of intermittent work was severe as both the miners and the day labourers 
were only paid for the work they actually did. Miners were on piece work and hence, 
were paid by what they produced. Day labour, although paid by the day, were only 
employed when there was the need to mine coal. 
Piece work was the dominant method of payment for those getting coal. Initially, 
it was used for many of the jobs at a mine. Gledson, for the QCEU, claimed that piece 
work had covered not only miners and wheelers but also horse drivers and pitheadmen 
(Court of Industrial Arbitration, Qld. No.99 of 1920, Transcript of Evidence, p. 
44:Queensland Coal Association records). However, by 1919 piece work was confined to 
miners^^ and almost all of them were employed on that contract form of payment. 
Indeed, one of the earhest tasks of the union, in the first decade of the twentieth century, 
was ensuring that ah those employed in the hewing, fihing and wheeling of coal were paid 
by piece work^^. 
16. The Southern Local Coal Board was set up under the Industrial Peace Act as a local coal board to deal 
with "the prevention or settlement of industrial disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection 
with the interpretation of any such award or order (of the Coal Industry Special Tribunal)". Its 
jurisdiction covered the South Eastern portion of Queensland, where most of the coal mines were 
(ABL:E65/48/2). Wearne was the Chair. 
17. The Southern Local Coal Board was reconstituted as the Conciliation Board, Coal Mining Industry 
under the Queensland Conciliation and Arbitration Acts 1929-1930. The Board first met 7/3/35. It 
covered the whole of the State including the State coal mines. Walsh was the Chair. 
18. In Queensland, unlike in New South Wales, those classified as miners did hewing, filling and 
wheeling and were on piece work. 
19. The QCEU Committee of Management minutes for this period record the role of the union in 
approaching numbers of mines, where mining was performed on a day work basis, to insist on piece 
work (ABL:E165/42/3, 5/6/1909, Aberdare; 18/9/1909, Donnybrook and Sugarloaf; ABL:E165/42/4, 
9/5/1911, Wattle Glen; 15/5/1911, Whitwood No. 4). 
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Day labour was employed to assist the contract miners^O. Initially, the contract 
workers made up a greater proportion of the workforce, but by the middle of the century 
there were approximately equal numbers of contract and day workers. In 1893 it appears 
that at one of the larger collieries, Aberdare, the ratio of miners to daymen was 150:60 
{Brisbane Courier,14/3/1893). By 1919 the proportion of daymen had increased quite 
dramatically with some mines even employing more on day work, than on piece work 
(Table 4). 
Table 4 





































































Source: Evidence presented to the Court of Industrial Arbitration of Queensland, No.99 of 
1920(ABL:E165/48/l). 
20. Such workers as underground and surface labourers, blacksmiths, winding engine drivers, 
carpenters, bracemen and pitheadmen and pitbottomers were paid by the day. 
21, The ratio is not constant. It varies considerably from day to day. At Blackheath, for example, the 
ratio was 116:113 on 22nd February, 1919, but 86:120 on 29th of the same month (ABL: E165/48/1) 
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As the century advanced the proportion of day labourers employed at the mines grew. In 
1938 Orr, in summing up for the AC&SEF case before the Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration22, pointed out that the percentage of off hand or day labour 
was then, more than 50% of the workforce (Commonwealth Court of Conchiation and 
Arbitration, No. 251 of 1938, Transcript of Evidence:1961). 
Neither form of labour was guaranteed a weekly wage. Many workers in other 
industries were on a guaranteed weekly wage for which the basic wage was the minimum 
rate of pay. It is, perhaps, surprising that the union did not give priority to a guaranteed 
weekly wage. However, the form of production in the coal industry seemed an 
insurmountable barrier. 
The QCEU did seek a guaranteed weekly wage along with the abohtion of contract 
in 1920. However, the impossibihty of this appeared to be evident to all. The employers 
argued that: 
provision would be made only for regular quantities required and no 
provision would be made for shipping and irregular orders and 
production would be absolutely discouraged (Court of Industrial 
Arbitration, Qld.No.99 of 1920, Transcript of Evidence, p. 15:Queensland 
Coal Association records) 
The Bench, itself could not see the possibihty. According to them it would "cut out" men 
from minhig and it would lead mines to shut down, not just for a few days per week, but 
for a whole week at a time (Court of Industrial Arbitration, Qld.No.99 of 1920, Transcript 
of Evidence, p. 42:Queensland Coal Association records). Even the union did not seem to 
consider it a likely decision. They appeared to use the argument, not to win a guaranteed 
weekly wage, but to impress upon the employers the need to stop hiring new mining 
labour whhe there was only "short time" work avahable. The Full Bench appeared to be 
aware of the union's real concern in their judgment. They decided not to award the 
demands of the union as they would not "aheviate the unemployment occasioned by the 
22. In 1938 all coal miners in Australia came vinder the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration. It dealt with matters arising from the operation of Federal awards and 
covered many workers in Australia. Previously, the miners had been either outside arbitral 
arrangements (particularly in New South Wales) and/or came under the jurisdiction of special arbitral 
bodies. 
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fluctuations in the industry" (Court of Industrial Arbitration, Qld. No.99 of 1920, 
Judgment). 
The only other early attempt to achieve a guaranteed weekly wage was made by 
the AC&SEF in a log of claims in 1920. It was presented to the newly formed Coal 
Industry Special Tribunal under the Chairmanship of Charles Hibble^^. Although a 
guaranteed weekly minimum wage was a part of the log of claims, the AC&SEF did not 
argue for it. Willis, for the AC&SEF, noted that it would only be feasible if the owners 
were willing to pool their coal. As they were not, he shifted the demand to one for: 
a wage sufficiently high at any rate to at least partly provide for losses 
through unemployment, slackness of trade, and that kind of thing. (Coal 
Industry Special Tribunal, Transcript of Evidence, August,1920, p. 
34:Queensland Coal Association records) 
The "impossibhity" of gaining a guaranteed weekly wage meant that both day and contract 
workers were paid only according to the work done. 
Payment was even more closely linked to the actual work done than is indicated by 
the absence of a weekly wage. Neither type of worker was even guaranteed a day's pay. 
On some days, though the men arrived at work, there were not sufficient orders to keep 
either contract or day labour employed for the whole day. Even when there were 
sufficient orders for a day's work, there was no guarantee of a day's pay. If production 
could not be carried on because of the breakdown of machinery, flood, fire, or insufficient 
skips, then the workers directly involved were not paid. Moreover, contract miners were 
not guaranteed their usual pay despite working ah day. This could occur when a contract 
miner's place became more difficult to work, because, for example, of the intrusion of stone 
or of a fault. Queensland, from 1914, (Award of the Coal Mining Industry Board for the 
South Eastern Division,1914) did have a clause in the award guaranteeing "make up" pay 
23. The Coal Industry Special Tribunal was not set up under the Commonwealth Peace Act until 
13/9/1920. However, it operated in a voluntary capacity in August of that year to hear claims by the 
AC&SEF, pending legislation. 
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to that of shiftmen miners^^ rates over a fortnight^S. The union objected to the "make up" 
clause operating over a fortnight as it meant an increase in work for the miners. Any 
deficiency on any day would lead the miners mto working harder on the next days in 
order to gain their usual pay. The miners, themselves, had to bear the cost (as a physical 
and financial burden) of any delays in production. As well, the provision only applied to 
the "fair average miner". What constituted a "fair average miner" was decided in the 
Court of Industrial Arbitration of Queensland (No.79 of 1919). The President ruled that in 
order to determine this, all that had to be considered was whether the miner, producing in 
"a workmanlike manner", was unable to earn wages^^. Wihis best sums up the effect of a 
similar rule on the South Coast District of New South Wales (Coal Industry Special 
Tribunal,1920, p. 5:Queensland Coal Association records): 
Apart from the man not getting his money, the thing that stinks in this 
matter is the insult, to say that a man who is sweating his life out earning 
a living in the bowels of the earth is to be branded as deficient because he 
is not earning what the officials think he should earn; he is branded as 
deficient not mentally, but physically. Why the women talk about him 
in the streets from one to another: you go to the court and the man's 
name appears in the paper as a deficient man 
Intermittency led to a situation of real need amongst the miners and their famihes. 
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century it is clear that, at times, the miners and 
labourers suffered extremes of poverty. In 1894, it was noted, that: 
miners view gloomily their declining prospects; intensified by the 
knowledge that no other avenue of industry lies open to them, a 
condition of things which, if not arrested, will in the very near future 
bring many a manly toiler desperately near to absolute want - if in some 
instances that stage is not already arrived at {Brisbane Courier, 9/5/1894). 
24. Shiftmen miners were men employed on a day wage basis to get coal, usually in deficient places - ie 
places where a contract miner could not earn "wages". 
25. Some other industries which were covered by piece work (including metalliferous mining) had 
clauses which guaranteed that piece workers would receive, at least, the equivalent of a day wage (Court 
of Industrial Arbitration, Queensland, No. 80 of 1919). In this case the Judge overlooked the precedents 
because contract miners had virtual tenure of employment for the three months of the cavil, and because 
the employers argued they needed the present system as supervision would otherwise be impossible. 
26. The case was a result of an appeal from the Local Tribunal. The Judge ruled that "though able he 
(Dillon) did not choose to exert himself to a reasonable extent" on the basis that his place was considered 
to be a "fair cavil" by the manager, overman, and the two union scrutineers. 
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In 1895 poverty was worsened by a reduction m the hewing rate of coal at some of the 
mines. Wakeman, at a meeting called to discuss the reduction, remarked on the ironic 
situation for "free" workers: 
It paid them to give slaves food to get work out of them: but the 
proprietors of the collieries did not care whether they got food for their 
families or not {Brisbane Courier, 28/1/1895). 
The degree to which the mmers' wages feh below, what was accepted as, a living 
wage was visible when the Commonwealth and State basic wages were set. In 1907, in 
Australia, Judge Higgms in the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration^^ in 
the "Harvester Award" determined the basic wage below which no worker was to be 
paid^^. It consciously calculated the value of labour power in terms of the needs of the 
worker and his famhy. Judge Higgins, in determining what was a "fair and reasonable"^^ 
wage and in the absence of any guidehnes decided: 
The provision for fair and reasonable remuneration is obviously 
designed for the benefit of the employees in the industry; and it must be 
meant to secure to them something which they cannot get by the 
ordinary system of individual bargaining with employers...The standard 
of "fair and reasonable" must, therefore, be something else; and I cannot 
think of any other standard appropriate than the normal needs of the 
average employee, regarded as a human being living in a civilised 
community (2 CAR 3 cited in Huston,1971:42)) 
Although the basic wage was the central element in the process of wage fixing m 
Australia for over fifty years, it did not play this part in the coal industry. Judge Beeby (40 
27. The Commonwealth Government set up the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration in 
1904 to settle disputes extending beyond the limits of one state. 
There was a tendency for the States who, by the second decade of the twentieth century, had their own 
arbitration or wages board systems, to follow the lead of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration in the determination of the basic wage. 
28. From 1907 until 1967 there was a double system of setting wages. All wages within the jurisdiction of 
the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration contained the basic wage and some contained a 
margin above that for skill. The basic wage was determined for adult males, and the famale and youth 
wages were set as a proportion of that. 
29. The criterion of "fair and reasonable" was set outside of the arbitration system in the Excise Tariff Act 
of 1906. Manufacturers could be exempt of a charge equal to that of the Tariff on imported machinery if 
they could show that they paid a "fair and reasonable" wage (Huston,1971). 
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CAR 283 at 284) recorded as late as 1939 that its award had been made without using the 
normal calculations of the Arbitration Court^'l 
Despite the fact that the miners did not fall under the basic wage it was understood 
by the miners, employers and the arbitral bodies as a standard against which their wage 
was measured. For example, in 1919 the QCEU argued for an increase in pay on the basis 
that the workers suffered real need as their wages were below the basic wage. The QCEU 
claimed that in 1919 the average weekly pay for a contract miner was £3/13/7 and for day 
men was £2/19/1 (Court of Industrial Arbitration, Qld., No. 99 of 1920, Transcript of 
Evidence,p. 39:Queensland Coal Association records)'^L If we consider the basic wage of 
£4 /5 / - as set for the South Eastern District32 (Court of Industrial Arbitration, Queensland, 
No. 728 of 1920) then the level of need of the miners is very visible. They were, on 
average, receiving 87% of the basic wage, and day labourers only received 69% of it. As 
the basic wage was supposed to represent the standard below which no family should be 
30. fudge Beeby was attempting to adjust the wages of workers following a reduction of hours of 
employment from forty eight to forty four. In other industries such an adjustment would have been a 
"simple matter of mathematical calculation." However, this was not the case with the award for the coal 
industry. He noted that it did not have any margins fixed, nor did it have specific allowances for 
holidays or underground work. Moreover, the wage had been fixed according to a level of intermittency 
in employment within the industry. As a result, fudge Beeby was "forced to make an arbitrary fixation" 
(40 CAR 283 at 4). 
31. The employers argued that the miners, if not the day labourers, were receiving the same as, or more 
than, the basic wage (see the employers' exhibit before the Full Bench of the Court of Industrial 
Arbitration, Queensland (No. 99 of 1920, ABL: E165/48/1). However, this is not a true picture of the pay 
of the miners. The employers presented the average weekly earnings for contract miners in terms of their 
gross pay. A more accurate assessment of the wages comes from the net pay. Contract miners, in fact, 
paid part of the cost of production. Deductions were made from the miners' pay by the employer for 
payment to him of the cost of explosives used by the miners for that week and the cost of oil and tallow 
for their lights. Deductions were also made for the checkweigh levy which was to provide a benefit for 
the workers in the form of the employment of a person to check the company's weighing of the coal. 
However, in Queensland in many of the mines the checkweighman was the only person to weigh the 
coal. Hence he could be considered to be of direct benefit to the company (Coal Industry Special 
Tribunal, Transcript of Evidence, 13/3/1923, p. 6:Queensland Coal Association records). When these 
deductions are allowed for the average pay is very close to that submitted by the union. 
There were other deductions from the miners' pay: for doctor, hospital, ambulance levies. As well there 
were union fees and most often a levy set by either the AC&SEF or the QCEU, either for a strike fund or 
for unemployment relief. It appeared impossible for the employees to argue that these should be 
considered when assessing the actual pay. The distinction between cost of production, and the cost of 
the reproduction of the worker is clearly a fluid boundary. 
32. The Court of Industrial Arbitration, Queensland, set a basic wage to cover those awards it dealt with. 
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forced to live the poverty of the mine workers was obvious. It is not surprising that 
Gledson, for the QCEU could comment: 
no man either from an economical point of view or a human point of 
view would consider that a man could live in comfort and be of value to 
the industry if he had to live on the wages that these men have been 
earning. (Court of Industrial Arbitration, Queensland, No.99 of 1920, 
Transcript of Evidence, p. 40:Queensland Coal Association records) 
The level of need was in fact even greater than that indicated by the relationship 
between the basic wage and that of the miners' wage. Although the basic wage provided 
a standard by which need was measured, it did not provide an adequate measure of real 
need because it was not a living wage. The Commonwealth Basic Wage Commission of 
1919 under the Chairmanship of Mr Justice Piddington unanimously agreed that £5 /6 /2 
was the amount necessary on the existing prices "to provide for 'a standard of living below 
which no employee should be asked to live'" (Court of Industrial Arbitration, Queensland, 
No.728 of 1920). Although this was the agreed hving wage it was decided that it was 
impossible to pay. The Queensland Court of Industrial Arbitration bore this in mind 
when setting their basic wage. It was set at 4 / 5 / - which is 80 %> of what was taken to be a 
hvmg wage at that time. 
The worker with needs is the object that is constantly addressed within the 
apparatus of calculation. In a sense it is a simple object for it almost^^ coincides with the 
empirical object of the worker. It is also simple for the needs are very visible - they are the 
physical needs of subsistence as they are variously defined. The object which is produced 
and reproduced will be called the needy worker. The reference to "need" is double. First, 
it refers to the constitution of a certain type of object within the apparatus of calculation. 
The object does not have an empirical reference, though it is real. It holds the possibilities 
for forms of bargainhig. Second, the name is meant to pick up the empirical reahty of 
poverty that was produced by the processes of bargaining over the needs of the workers 
and their families. 
33. Of course, it never quite coincides, partly because of the varying marital statuses of the workers and 
because of the various numbers of children workers might have. 
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The needy worker was produced and reproduced through the practices of the 
unions, employers, arbitral bodies, governments and royal commissions. They all 
accepted the obviousness of the needy worker as the object of calculation, although there 
was no agreement on what constituted need, or on what would be the appropriate 
solutions to need. 
The union consistently argued their cases in terms of the needs of the workers. As 
Phillips, for the QCEU, claimed before the 1922 sitting of the Coal Industry Special 
Tribunal (8/12/22,p. 8:Queensland Coal Association records): "We have to live seven days 
a week as well as anybody else". This was evident whatever the demand. Increases in 
wages and a guaranteed weekly minimum wage was argued for from the question of need 
(Court of Industrial Arbitration, Queensland, No.99 of 1920; Coal Industry Special 
Tribunal,1920; Coal Industry Special Tribunal,1925; 40 CAR 367). Even the mmers' 
demands for the re-organisation of the coal industry and for an enquiry info the owners' 
profits were equally related to the question of the needs of the workers. Willis, the 
General Secretary of the AC&SEF in a meeting with the Prime Minister, Mr. Hughes in 
1920 to discuss the estabhshment of a Commonwealth Tribunal for the coal industry and 
the need for reorganisation based his argument on the need for "a living wage" (Austrahan 
Archives (ACT), A461/1, item C321 / l / l , p . 4). 
The needy worker was also the obvious object of calculation for the employers. 
They did not accept, in general, that the worker was needy, but rather argued that the 
workers' needs were being adequately met. In No. 99 of 1920 (Court of Industrial 
Arbitration, Queensland) both the union and the employers argued the question of wages 
based on assessments of the contmuation of need amongst the workers. The union argued 
that wages were well below the basic wage and the employers pointed to the recent 
increases in trade as a reason to believe that the state of affairs would be short lived. 
Even when the employers argued for a reduction in wages before the 1922 Coal 
Industry Special Tribunal their argtm:ients centred on human needs. They argued that 
there should be a reduction because of a decrease in the cost of living and because the basic 
wage had been reduced. As well, they pointed to the fact that the existing rates allowed 
men on the Maitland Seam in New South Wales to "make big wages" (Coal Industry 
Special Tribunal, 21/7/22 Transcript of Evidence,p. 247:Queensland Coal Association 
recordsj^"^. 
The arbitral bodies also made decisions with reference to the needy worker. At 
times, their attention centred on the empirical object of the worker with needs. No where 
is this more evident than in the 1922/23 Coal Industry Special Tribunal case which even 
over-rode the calculation of needs in the general arbitration system. The TribunaP^ 
refused to ahow an owners' log for a reduction in the mine workers' wage, on the basis of 
the existence of need amongst the workers. The Chair, C. Hibble, noted that he could not 
reduce the wage even though the basic wages in the State and in the Commonwealth had 
been reduced: 
After weighing all considerations very carefuhy I consider that the 
intermittency of employment offering outweighs the present case for 
reduction of the wage. (Australian Archives (ACT) A461/1, Item 
C321/1/1; Coal Industry Special Tribunal, Judgment, p. 2) 
At other times, there was a more complex relation of the arbitral bodies to the object of 
calculation. In the judgment of the Full Bench in the Court of Industrial Arbitration in 
Queensland (No.99 of 1920) the size of the wage increase was determined by a precise 
calculation. It balanced the obvious needs of the workers, against the dangers that too 
large a pay increase would lead to even greater need. The Bench gave a 1/ - per shift 
increase for day workers and a 6%) increase on contract rates. No greater increase was 
awarded because: 
if the wages were made much higher than those in New South Wales, 
which up to now have been followed here^^, there would be a still 
34. Trade had increased and so intermittency in New South Wales was not as bad as previously. 
35. The situation in Queensland was even more extreme than indicated in Hibble's judgement. The level 
of wage was so low in Queensland that many of the collieries were not a party to the application for a 
reduction in the wage. However, Thomas from the Queensland Colliery Proprietors Council was 
involved because of the need of the New South Wales colliery proprietors to create an interstate industrial 
dispute so that their claims could be heard (Coal Industry Special Tribunal, Transcript of Evidence, 
9/6/22: Queensland Coal Association records). 
36. It was a matter of concern to the AC&SEF that the QCEU had taken these claims to the Queensland 
Court despite an agreement between the AC&SEF, the employers and the Prime Minister, Mr. Hughes 
that they would wait for Commonwealth jurisdiction. Willis, the General Secretary of the AC&SEF made 
the point: "I must confess the difficulty Mr Cleghom (Secretary of the Queensland Colliery Proprietors' 
Council) is in. Our Queensland Branch did go to the State Court, but they did not have any sanction 
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greater influx of miners from there, which would mcrease the existing 
struggle for work, from which the Bundamba miners are suffering at 
present. (Court of Industrial Arbitration, Queensland, No.99 of 1920:461) 
The calculation of the workers' needs extended beyond him to his family. The use 
of the basic wage as a standard makes reference to a family consisting of a husband, wife 
and three children^^. The extended nature of the worker with needs is consciously 
addressed in the Coal Industry Special Tribunal case of 1922-23. The AC&SEF called 
women as witnesses to comment on the adequacy of the wage in meeting the needs of the 
family. Their evidence is remarkable and wih be quoted at some length. It shows the real 
need of the families, and the mean quibbling over what should count as "need" by the 
employers. Mary White, a witness from Kurri Kurri in New South Wales (Coal Industry 
Special Tribunal, Transcript of Evidence,23/2/23:Queensland Coal Association records) 
claimed she found she was worse off in 1922: 
If you want to educate the children you have to clothe them decently. 
You have to put your money on the children. If you do not educate 
them you will only have to let them go in the mine like their father 
She explauied that she had a "little girl very clever at the piano" but she could not afford to 
let her go on. Later, the employers' advocate questioned the size of her electricity bill and 
suggested: 
I suppose practicing the piano and things hke that would make you use 
more electric hght? 
Mary White replied with a bitterness that can be heard over sixty years later: "Not in the 
last twelve months." 
Mary Ann Brown of Cessnock in New South Wales, the wife of a surface labourer 
and mother of twelve chhdren is clearly far worse off (Coal Industry Special Tribunal, 
Transcript of Evidence,23/3/23:Queensland Coal Association records): 
Yes I cannot really exist on it, I have had to go out washing to help keep 
the house. I had three boys at the war, one got killed, one died of 
wounds and the other came home lame. 1 have just had to baffle 
alone 1 am getting too old to battle as I used to and my husband is not 
from us." (cited in Court of Industrial Arbitration, Queensland, No.468 of 1921, Transcript of Evidence,p. 
3:Queensland Coal Association records) 
37. This was the standard for the Queensland basic wage. In other States and in the Commonwealth 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration the standard did vary in terms of the number of children the wage 
was supposed to support. 
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getting any younger and the chhdren are growing up and they cost more 
for clothes and books etc. 
The extended nature of the worker with needs becomes even more obvious when 
the question of the "fair" wage for boys was considered. Anyone under 21 was considered 
a boy, and received payment that was a fraction of the adult rate. From 1920 the AC&SEF 
began a campaign to have youths over eighteen paid adult wages. This raised the whole 
question of "who" was being paid, for the youth was unlikely to be married. The 
employers were "amazed" that the union could ask for an adult wage for a youth "whether 
he was married or noL whether he has chhdren or not" (Coal Industry Special Tribunal, 
Transcript of Evidence, 9/7/25:Queensland Coal Association records)^^. 
The whole apparatus of calculation centred on the body of the worker and his 
needs for subsistence. However, this does not mean that the needs of the workers and 
their famihes were met. Rather there was a fine calculation of need which ensured that a 
labouring population would exist for the coal industry. 
A CAPITALIST FORM OF CALCULATION 
Within capitalism no compulsion or legal or other forceful means are employed to 
ensure that people will work. There is no other tie between the capitalists and their 
labourers other than a purely economic one, through the wage contract. Thus it is that the 
relations within capitalism appear freer, and in this respect are freer, than in other modes 
of production. Compulsion appears only in the form that the worker needs a wage in 
order to buy the means of subsistence, and as such must seh his/her labour power to 
capital. However, this does not guarantee for any particular capitalist or even any 
industry that labour will be available. Nor does it guarantee, that even if labour is 
available, that it wih work at the appropriate pace. 
The coal industry shared, perhaps in an exaggerated form, these twin problems 
within capitalism. A solution was found in a very precise calculation of the wage. It 
38. The existence of single men and of married men without three children equally became a problem 
within the general arbitration system, for the "real" object of the wage did not coincide with the arbitral 
object. The solution offered by the Piddington Royal Commission was the introduction of child 
endowment. The payment by the State for all children would remove the question of children from the 
process of wage fixing. 
191 
enabled the relation to remain one between free economic subjects, yet at the same time 
made it possible that the capitalist would both maintain a workforce, and that the 
workforce would, in fact, work 
The immediate solution to the problem of securing a labouring population for any 
capitahst lies m offermg an attractive wage. In Queensland coal mining, some districts 
found it particularly difficult to acquire labour. In order to attract labour, higher wages 
were offered in the Northern and Central Districts^^. h is clear that such solutions, 
although increasing the likelihood of securing workers, do not guarantee it. In fact these 
areas of the State continued to have problems both recruiting and maintaining labour 
despite the wage differentials. 
The general problem of securing a labouring population within capitalism was 
accentuated within coal mining. As we have seen, the form of production was sporadic 
and hence labour was intermittent. So that capitahsts could maximize the chances of 
meetmg the fluctuating demand for coal and thus maximize profiL they required a 
labouring population which would be ready for work at any time. Thus for capital to 
operate effectively, labour was, as Hibble put it, "obliged to stand by a colliery" (Coal 
Industry Special Tribunal, 1922, Judgement,p. 2, Austrahan Archives (ACT): A461/1, item 
C321/1/1) even when work was not avahable, as: 
The men cannot leave a pit that is working slack time and seek 
employment elsewhere, at least not beyond a few individuals, for 
otherwise when the whistle blew for work there would be insufficient 
men to work the colliery. 
Because the wage was tied so closely to the actual work performed, it often left the miners 
and their families earning well below the minimum wage for unskilled work. Thus 
securing labour was a particular problem in coal mining. 
39. Non economic forms of domination still exist within capitalism but are usually associated with 
extraordinary circumstances. One such case was the way in which the State "manned" the coal mines 
during the Second World War. The war enabled the freedom of the economic relations within capitalism 
to be overwritten by forms of non-economic compulsion. During the Second World War when there was 
a desperate need for coal, the State moved miners to the northern coal fields. The option for the miners 
was work in the coal mines in the north or be called up to war. Many men chose working in the North. 
Of course, the compulsion was justified in terms of patriotism, which allowed the QCEU to accept the 
transfers of the men. 
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The attachment of the miners to the mine was achieved primarily by forms of 
compulsion or paternalism in the nineteenth century. Until the middle of the century, 
convicts were used in the mines in New South Wales'^'^. The forced labour of the convicts 
made them "to all intents and purposes" slaves (Ross,1970:ll). Convict labour, of course, 
is a form of completely bonded labour and hence securing a labouring population is not a 
direct problem. After the use of convict labour ceased, the attachment of miners to the 
mine continued, although in a freer form. 
The bonds between capital and labour became economic. At an early stage, long 
pay periods existed^L They effectively tied the workers to the mine for their duration, for 
workers were paid after the work period was completed^^. A more paternalistic, but 
perhaps more decisive, form of economic attachment came with housing. The largest 
mine by the 1880's was Lewis Thomas's Aberdare mine. He advanced the miners money 
to build their own "trim, clean and comfortable looking wooden cottages" {Brisbane 
Courier,l/9/85;24/9/90) and so the miners became economicahy bonded to Thomas. The 
dangers inherent in the practice are evidenced in the case of another mine - New Chum. 
Its idylhc "wooden, white painted cottages each containing four commodious rooms, and 
provided with a tank for the reception of rainwater" {Brisbane Courier,l/9/85) became a 
trap for the miners. They were erected by the mine owners on mine property. 
Consequently, when the New Chum miners became the centre for union action in 1886, the 
40. At that time New South Wales covered what later came to be known as Queensland. 
41. In 1861 the length of time between pays for miners at Redbank, the only regular producer at that time 
(Whitmore,l 981:70), was more than one month. The miners made a number of demands upon their 
"Master", one of which was for monthly pays {Maryborough Chronicle,\A/6/186\). The case which was 
known as "The Redbank affair" caused quite a sensation for it involved a group of miners banding 
together to improve their pay. At this time such action was viewed as a conspiracy and subject to 
imprisonment {Maryborough Chronicle,\\/G/\86\). The miners, subsequently were found to be not guilty 
by the jury, perhaps, in part because the Judge found the Crown's case to be "defective". It is interesting 
to note that a "small demonstration of popular satisfaction" greeted the result, but that it was "promptly 
suppressed" {Maryborough Chronicle,S/8/61). 
42. It is not surprising that one of the early, and indeed continuing, demands of the miners was for 
shorter pay periods. By 1885 it appears that a month is the accepted pay period, perhaps won by the 
Redbank strike {Brisbane Courier,6/12/86). It took almost another fifty years to reduce the pay period to 
fourteen days, although by this time it did not operate as a means of attaching the labourers to the mine. 
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owners could evict eight of the miners and their famihes with only seven days notice 
{Brisbane Courier,6/12/86). 
Although the wage may have acted as a means for the attachment of labour in the 
nineteenth century, it becomes the dominant tool in the first part of the twenfieth century. 
The wage was called upon to play quite a remarkable role in securing labour of the kind 
required by capital within mining^^. 
As we have seen, in the coal mining industry, wages were set bearing in mind the 
degree of intermittency of employment. The actual wages that mine workers received 
were often well below what was counted as the poverty line. However, the effect of 
setting the wage on hitermittency meant that if work became continuous, the wage became 
very high. The possibhity of a large wage was always present, though it might only 
infrequently eventuate. Even in the poorer pits, a large wage could occur for perhaps a 
few weeks, or even for a few months. Sometimes, there were such extraordinary "good 
times", usually due to a strike in New South Wales or to war, that work would continue 
around the clock, and wages would be extremely high. 
The very possibihty of the "good times", made being a mine worker a gamble. The 
possibility of the "jackpot" could entice the men to hold themselves available for work, 
even through the leanest times, thus maximising the possibihty of profit for the owners. 
Luck was the form taken by the economic tie between capital and labour within early 
mining and it proved to be as effective as any form of compulsion44. 
43. The wage was not the only way in which labour was secured. It was secured also, or as well as, 
because of the lack of other choices on the part of the miners, and their desire for independence at work. 
Often the miners lacked the education to enable them to gain a better paying job. In conjunction with the 
absence of any real income, apart from that derived from work, a low income on the coal fields would be 
preferable to none. The independence of the miner was a positive feature of the work which made it 
more appealing for many, despite its low pay. 
44. Two points need to be made. First, there is no evidence that the wage was deliberately set with the 
gamble in mind. It appears that the wage was set in order to give the mine workers an adequate wage in 
the face of intermittent work. The point is that, in turn, this acted as a means of securing an attached 
labouring population. Second, other forms of attachment operated in the twentieth century. The union 
was largely responsible for these. Its seniority system worked on a mine basis. If a miner left a mine 
and returned to his original mine he was regarded as a "new starter" (ABL:E165/42/6, Special Committee 
of Management Meeting Minutes, 10th Dec.,1914). In Queensland this would affect the time it would 
take that person to "get on the coal", in New South Wales it would have affected the order of 
retrenchment which was on a "first to come, last to go" basis. Doubtless the seniority system played 
some part in securing a labouring population. 
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We see, in this case, how the very character of the worker is produced by the form 
of capital. The mine worker, as gambler, was as necessary a feature of coal mining, as was 
the coal itselL The character was necessary for those on day wages, although its most 
exaggerated form was for those on piece work. For both types of workers there was 
always the chance of full time work, and "the jackpot". In addition, for piece workers 
there was the ever present possibility of an easy place on the coal which would maximize 
their earnings. It is little wonder that gambling so permeated the culture of mine 
workers'^^. 
The size of the labouring population was, in general, not a concern for the owners 
as long as it provided sufficient labour to meet coal orders. As Haenke, an employers' 
representafive on the Conchiation Board (4/ll /37:Queensland Coal Association records) 
so clearly put the needs of capital: 
it was ...in the employers' interests to have a sufficient number of men 
employed even if on part time as if he did not some of the men might 
leave the district and leave him short handed. 
At times coal owners even increased the size of the attached workforce, despite the 
desperate situation of the existing workers. In 1920 they employed labour from New 
South Wales, thus accentuating the intermittency of work, and then objected to paying a 
higher wage to cover the intermittency which they had exacerbated. Judge McNaughton 
dryly commented on the transparency of their practices: "I suppose you hke to have a large 
supply of men about the mines" (Court of Industrial Arbitration, Queensland, No99 of 
Also, the unions' concern to limit the miners to mining as their occupation effectively helped produce an 
attached labouring population. However, in some areas the union was unsuccessful in achieving this, 
and even in 1939, in the Maryborough District, it was noted that "mining was secondary to farming" 
(Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, No.251 of 1938, Transcript, p. 1597:Queensland 
Coal Association records). 
45. Metcalfe (1988:75-79) produces a wonderful account of gambling and the nature of the miner and 
what he calls the "larrikin mode of class struggle". 
Gambling is a feature of working class culture generally but it is also at the heart of all capitalist activity 
(no more so than on the stock exchange). It is interesting that while one form is praised, the other is 
derided (except in the formal aspects of gambling, where the State can benefit or capitalists can). The 
effects of both are harmful. For money is squandered and decisions are made on the basis of a gamble 
rather than on rationality. 
195 
1920, Transcript of Evidence, p. 17:Queensland Coal Association records)'*^. At times also 
the QCEU itself was responsible for effectively increasing the size of the attached 
population beyond that which could be reasonably supplied with work. In order to 
provide some work for all their existing members at times of depression in the coal trade, 
they sought for and won the possibility of sharing work (Court of Industrial Arbitration, 
Queensland, No.80 of 1919, Queensland Government Gazette, Vol. CXI 11, No. 171, pp213-
215)47. 
As the attached population increased in size and the coal trade failed, the wage also 
had to be increased to provide the miners with sufficient to hve on. Each time the 
adjustment was made, it allowed the population to remain and increased the size of the 
"jackpot", and the gamble was accentuated. The result, in Queensland*^ was a large 
attached population, which was sufficient to cope with most of the fluctuations in the coal 
trade, and thus was a suitable labouring population for the parficular needs of mining 
capital'49. 
Whhe the intermittent form of labour remained, the increases in the daily and piece 
work rates did not lead to any real increases in the actual weekly wages of mine workers. 
However, they did lead to an increasing cost in the production of coal. This would 
normahy be a concern for capitahsts, however, in coal mining it tended not to be, because 
46. In this case the union was arguing for a weekly wage. They saw it as providing the solution to an 
excessive attached population, as it would make the problem one for the employer, rather than for the 
worker. 
The union could not control membership of their union as a means of preventing excess labour as the 
Trade Union Act prohibited a union refusing membership (Court of Industrial Arbitration, Queensland, 
No.99 of 1920, Transcript of Evidence,p. 13:Queensland Coal Association records). 
47. The practice had been engaged in by consent before this award but it was inserted to make it legal 
(Court of Industrial Arbitration, Queensland, No.80 of 1919, Queensland Government Gazette, Vol. CXIII, 
No. 171, p. 214). The AC&SEF, on the other hand, was opposed to the imion sharing work, although it 
was forced to accept this at the two Hebburns (New South Wales) "with bad grace". They argued that it 
"forced the men to hold themselves for work when it was available" (Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration, No.251 of 1938, Transcript of Evidence, p. 2084) 
48. It was also the case in New South Wales. Judge Beeby was scathing of the practice whereby "the men 
hung on in the hope of better times" (29 CAR 387 at 393). 
49. However, it could not, by its very nature, provide sufficient work for any of the mineworkers who 
made up its body. 
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of the way the wage was tied to the selling price of coal. The link meant that the size of 
the wage was not a concern for mining capital, rather it enabled them to maximize their 
profits. 
The wage was linked in some form to the selling price throughout the first half of 
the twentieth century^*^. Initially, there was a direct link which was made by the miners 
and owners themselves. An agreement in Queensland in 1907 tied the wage of the miners 
directly to the price of coal guaranteeing an automatic increase in wages of one third of 
any increase in the sehing price of coal (Archives of Business and Labour (ACT): 
E165/48/2). It is not clear how long the arrangement lasted, although it probably was not 
long. The major difficulty was in keeping the mine owners to theh agreement on the price 
of coal, as there was a natural tendency for them to undercut each other. Despite the 
instabihty of the hnk it tended to be "at the back of everyone's minds" when wages were 
set. Its presence was evident in the second decade of the twentieth century, when the 
State established the price of coal^L 
The direct link between the wage and the selling price was broken in 1916 under 
Justice Edmunds^^ (Coal Mining Board, Order No.3, 1916, Archives of Business and 
Labour (ACT): El65/48/2). However, a modified relation between wages and the selling 
price of coal continued. The State, at times, stepped hi and set the price of the coal in 
relation to the mine workers' wage. The aim was to increase the miners' wages, but in 
such a way that the owners' profits would be untouched. For example, after increases had 
been given to miners in 1920, a Royal Commission was set up to enquire into what the 
50. Miners have traditionally followed a "labourist political economy" (Fisher & Smethurst,1978:114). 
They have attempted to gain some control over their wages through controlling the product rather than 
the labour market. The aim of tying wages to the price of coal, in what was commonly known as a vend 
(Fisher,1973), was to obtain an adequate return for both the workers and the owners for their investments 
in labour and capital. The ideology which lay behind the vend arrangements has continued to inform 
the bargaining tactics of the miners long after the demise of the vend itself (Fisher,l987:361). 
51. The battle over the needs of capital and labour was subsumed under those of the State as a result of its 
own needs particularly in railways and in shipping. 
52. The link between the wage and the selling price remained strong for some years after the agreement. 
During the 1922/23 case before the Coal Industry Special Tribunal, the AC&SEF frequently attempted to 
discuss the price of coal. They were equally frequently reminded by the employers that they had 
forfeited the right to discuss this after 1916 (Coal Industry Special Tribunal, Transcript of Evidence, 
9/12/22, p. 4:Queensland Coal Association records). 
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sellmg price of coal should be "as if the award had not been made"^^ {Commonwealth of 
Australia Gazette,30/9/20,p. 1283). The selling price was set in this manner at a Federal 
level in 1917, 1919 and 1920 (40 CAR 367 at 395-8)^4. Even when the sellmg price was not 
directly addressed, it was still seen as being set in relation to the mmers' wage. As Hibble 
noted m 1923 (Coal Industry Special Tribunal, 16/1/23, p. 22:Queensland Coal Association 
records): 
the two matters, miners' wages and the cost of coal, never mind whether 
we have jurisdiction to deal with the cost of coal or not, are irretrievably 
mixed up, conjoined. 
The wage/selling price link created a relationship of mutual dependence between 
capitalists and workers. The needs of both miners and capitahsts could be addressed 
together, and at the expense of the "public" who had to buy the coal^S. As Graham, for the 
Attorney General, before Justice Edmunds argued, the question of the pay of the mmers 
becomes the question "What is the price the pubhc must pay to keep (them) alive" 
(Commonwealth Coal Muimg Board, Transcript, 22nd May, 1918, p. 179:Queensland Coal 
Association records). 
Although the two parties were thus linked together in mutual need, the relation 
was also one of antagonism. The miners were constantiy aware of the profit levels of the 
coal companies in relation to their own wages, and suspicious of them. In 1920, in a 
discussion with the Prime Minister about the coal problem, Wihis, the Secretary of the 
AC&SEF claimed that the miners "believe that (the coal companies) have made more than 
they are entitied to" (Australian Archives (ACT): A461/1, item C321/1/1). In 1938 Drake-
Brockman (40 CAR 367 at 383) examined the financial position of the coal companies. He 
53. The Royal Commission consisted of Hibble, Jobson and Ling. They gave an interim report in 1920 
(Australian Archives (ACT) A460/1, item A5/42) upon which the Prime Minister, Mr. Hughes acted by 
increasing the selling price of coal in NSW by 4 / - per ton (Commonwealth of Australia 
Gazette,8/10/1920,p. 1309). Queensland coal selling prices were set shortly after. No final report of the 
Royal Commission can be found. 
54. During the Second World War it was pegged under the National Security (Economic Organisation) 
Regulations. Queensland effectively set a selling price for its coal with the passage of its Coal Production 
Act of 1933. 
55. Drake-Brockman (No. 251 of 1938, Transcript of Evidence, p. 1972: Queensland Coal Association 
records) called the practice "a rake off". 
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gave two reasons which display the antagonism between the parties relating to wages and 
profits: 
The first is the contention of the owners that the financial state of the 
industry is such that it cannot afford the cost which would result from 
granting the employees' demands. The second is the very strong 
suspicions voiced by the unions that the alleged financial unsoundness 
of the industry is more apparent than real. 
Additionally, the wage/selling price link meant that the profits of companies were 
a concern to both the miners and to the State. As a result, the owners' needs, themselves, 
came under scrutiny. Their rate of profit was examined a number of times. The profits of 
owners were examined and judged in 1918, in Queensland (Commonwealth Coal Board, 
Transcript of Evidence, 1918, p. 254:Queensland Coal Association records)^^. In 1929 the 
Royal Commission investigated the profits of companies in New South Wales^'^. Even as 
late as 1938 the practice was stih possible. Drake-Brockman called for the books of thirty 
major collieries and four shipping companies for investigation in the hearing of the miners' 
claims before the Commonwealth Court of Concihation and Arbitration (40 CAR 367). 
Calculation of what constitutes "need" or an adequate supply of the means of 
subsistence is a feature of any form of production. However, where class relations exist 
the calculation takes the form of a battle and "need" is determined by it. "Need" is not set. 
It appears that it can in fact be nothmg or everything - as witnessed by , what may be 
called, the redundant populations of the world, and by the fabulously wealthy. It, 
however, does acquire a certain lower limit within some nation states, but even then it is 
quite elastic, a fact which is evident in the early period of the mining industry in 
Queensland. 
56. As a result of the increases in wages and reduction in hours granted in 1917, Lt. Col. Ling was 
appointed to enquire into the coal owners' profits. It appears that Ling's report was not satisfactory as 
there was no agreed basis for calculation. Moreover, the companies had not kept detailed records of 
their expenses. As Cleghom, for the proprietors pointed out "Bundamba is a poor man's field, and the 
accounts are not kept to a high standard of accountancy'" The Government argued for a reduction of 1 /6 
on the 31 - recommended by Ling. The President, Mr. Justice Edmunds, left the discussion as it was 
"useless". 
57. It found that (/^eporf,1929:253) in numbers of cases, "heavy reserves had accumulated" and that in the 
flourishing period substantial profits had been made, and distributed. However, they concluded that 
those who had purchased shares in late 1929 could only hope for a "moderate return ". 
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The capitahst nature of the calculation of need was revealed at two points during 
the period of hand mining. First, during the depression it became obvious that the 
workers' level of need was set by what capital could pay, rather than by what workers' 
needed. Second, as work ceased to be intermittent in the late 1930's, it became obvious 
that the calculation of need had more to do with producing a desire to work than with 
workers' needs. The latter point will be explored in the next chapter. 
At the height of the depression when, it was claimed, the "public" could no longer 
afford the price of coal, the dominance of the needs of capital became apparent. Although 
at this time the needs of the mine workers were at their greatest, the employers were able 
to argue successfully that they should be ignored in favour of the needs of capital. Wages 
had been reduced for New South Wales miners in 1929 for the Northern District and in 
1930 they were reduced for all New South Wales districts. In the 1930 decision applicable 
to the majority of districts in New South Wales, Judge Beeby (29 CAR 387-398) clearly 
showed the dominance of the needs of capital. Although he recognised the real needs of 
the miners, he found that the solution was not a higher wage. He argued that "The real 
problem from the miners point of view is the intermittency of employment". However, he 
found that no court had to deal with a case where there was an excess number of 
employees. As such he made the reduction, based on profits of mines, and left the 
question of the excess number of miners to the legislature. The Southern Local Coal 
Board, in Queensland, similarly found that the poverty of the workers was not sufficient 
reason to reject the reduction claimed by the proprietors. The Board agreed with the 
argument of Thomas, for the proprietors that it 
could not take any notice of the figures regarding the number of days 
worked or the earnings because the industry employed more men than 
required. (Southern Local Coal Board, Transcript of Evidence, 
25/2/31 :Queensland Coal Association records). 
"Need" is an aspect of all people. However, it always has some historically specific 
form. During the hand mining period in the coal mdustry "need" was shaped by the 
relations between capital and labour within the apparatus of calculation. It was 
embedded in the worker, first as the need for subsistence, and second as a relation of 
mutual dependency and antagonism with capitahsts. The needy worker was the object of 
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calculation which was constantly produced and reproduced. Whhe it enabled capital to 
find the kind of labouring population it needed, it also had built into it a permanent 
tension: the antagonistic relations between capitahsts and workers. 
DOMINATION AS DESPOTISM 
During the hand mining period calculation took, what might be called, a subjective 
form. It was subjective, not because it lacked objectivity, but because its objects were 
human subjects. At the centre of the whole apparatus of calculation were the objects 
which it both used and produced. The objects of calculation never can coincide with the 
empirical objects of workers and capitalists. Yet, during this period they almost do. The 
needy worker is clearly not equivalent to any particular worker, yet it is close to him. It is 
close because its reference is to human attributes of famhy and to physical need. We 
might say that, because the object of calculation is close to the empirical object of the 
worker, that it is a simple object. 
The capitalist with needs, as the other half of the object of calculation, is just as 
simple an object as is the family man. It also almost, perhaps even more so, coincides with 
the empirical object. The needs of capital were clearly understood as referring to the 
profitabhity of individual capitalists. 
The economic form of domination as a whole takes a subjective form within the 
period of hand mining. The apparatus of calculation situates need in the worker and in 
opposition to the needs of the capitalists. The labour process, equally houses the 
attributes of wih and knowledge within the person of the labourer. Moreover, the two are 
hinged around the body of the worker. The physical needs of the worker and his famhy 
drive him to work, and to work in the manner in which capital requires it. Both produce 
the most simple form of the capitalist/labourer relation. 
The economic form of domination during the hand mining period can be described 
as despotic. It constitutes opposing subjectivities in the capitahst and the worker. It 
opposes wih against will and need against need. Hence, there is also a tendency for 
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antagonism to appear in the empirical relations between capitalists and workers^^. No 
where is this more evident than in the coal mining industry. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the relations within the apparatus of calculation in the 
coal industry during the hand mining period. It shows how "need" was shaped by the 
relations between capital and labour. It was situated within the worker and extended 
beyond him to his family. Moreover, it was constructed as a need which both depended 
upon capital, but was also antagonistic to it. The need was so finely calculated that it 
enabled capital to operate with the sporadic form of production. YeL at the same time it 
created a state of permanent tension between capitalists and labourers. 
Chapters 6 and 7 have explored the two aspects of the economic form of 
domination during the hand mining period. They show how domination was achieved 
through the constitution of the worker both as independent labour, and as the needy 
worker. The attributes of the worker remain in his body but begin to be shaped by the 
operation of capital. The domination it leads to can be called despotic for it opposes the 
will and need of the worker against that of the capitalist. 
The form of domination of labour by capital changes dramaticahy after the Second 
World War. The next chapter explores how the apparatus of calculation is reshaped as 
production becomes continuous and mechanised. In turn, the wage labourer is 
constituted in a different form, more suited to the new requirements of capital. 
58. Antagonism in the empirical relations between capitalists and workers is likely to occur, but not 
necessary. Moreover, when it occurs, there will be a strong tendency for it to take the form of a personal 
antagonism. It is possible that it will also take the form of paternalism, for it is the "positive" side of the 
possibilitites of relations that are constructed on a basis of a personal dependency and antagonism. The 
social relations within the apparatus of calculation have produced these as empirical possibilities. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DOMINATION THROUGH HEGEMONY: THE DISCIPLINARY WAGE 
LABOURER 
Around the middle of the century the relations between need and effort and the 
wage became unbalanced. The early form of the apparatus of calculation had 
become unhinged from the requirements of production. As an attempt to 
restore the balance, rights for workers were introduced. They, however, both 
increased the tensions and at the same time began to produce the new apparatus 
of calculation. It replaced the old divisions based on status and need with a 
homogenised and finely graded division of wage labour. The disciplinary wage 
labourer was constituted as the object of calculation. 
The early form of the apparatus of calculation had established an equilibrium 
between need and effort which ensured that the requirements of production in mining 
would be metL However, once production became continuous towards the middle of the 
century the precise calculation no longer fhled its purpose. Rather than ensuring work, it 
made leisure possible, and the miner chose that. 
Governments, capitalists, the union and the arbitral bodies ah reacted to the growth 
oL what was cahed, the indiscipline of the miners. As solutions to the problem were 
introduced, they both exacerbated it and at the same time transformed the apparatus of 
calculation. The relations between the wage and need, and between it and effort were 
spht apart through the granting to the miners of a whole range of employment rights. The 
process let the wage float free and a new form of calculation was estabhshed. 
The new apparatus of calculation created an homogeneous field for bargaining. 
The divisions which had existed between capital and labour were replaced with the needs 
of the economy, and in particular the productivity of the mining industry. On that ground 
the differences between workers assumed importance. The status distinction between 
1. Of course, it did not guarantee that all coal orders would be filled but only that, on the whole, the 
needs of production would be fulfilled. 
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contract miners and day workers, which was a feature of the early apparatus of 
calculation, was supplanted with a series of fine gradations between wage labour. A new 
apparatus of calculation was set in place which used the mechanisms of disciplinary 
power and which re-constituted the wage labourer. The disciplinary wage labourer 
stepped into the place of the needy worker. 
AN IMBALANCE BETWEEN NEED AND EFFORT 
In the hand mining period a fine calculation of the wage solved the capitahst's 
double problems of supervision and irregular coal orders. The piece work wage, which 
was at the heart of the system, provided the incentive for the miner to supervise himself 
The calculation of its value ensured that need acted as a means of keeping a labouring 
population at hand. However, the balancing of need and effort which had been achieved 
within the apparatus of calculation was undermined towards the middle of the twentieth 
century. 
The most immediate change to the need/effort relation was brought about by the 
end of intermittency. Production ceased to be sporadic in many Queensland mines by the 
late 1930's. In 1933, as a response to the severe problems in the coal industry in 
Queensland, both a Central Coal Board and District Boards were set up whose purpose 
was to set quotas and to organise distribution^. Their curtailment of free market 
principles brought some degree of stabihty to the industry. The Under Secretary of Mines 
reported in 1940: 
The activities of the District Coal Boards have stabilised coal production, 
with the result that employment in the industry has continued to 
increase, and the trade generahy has materially benefited (QGM/,1940) 
Many of the mines in the West Moreton, Central and Northern Districts began to work fuh 
time, although those in the Maryborough and Darling Downs Districts remained with 
irregular production (QGM/,1934-41). The Second World War sohdified the change to 
2. The boards were set up under the Act to Provide for the Regulation and Facilitation of the Production, 
Supply and Sale of Coal (Qld) 1933. 
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continuous production for almost ah mines in Australia^. With the advent of full time 
work the fine equilibrium between need and effort was upset. 
The end to intermittency created a major problem for the coal owners^. The 
contract miners' wage had been a finely calculated balance between need and effort in the 
context of irregular production. It had been loaded for intermittency so that contract 
miners could earn a "living" wage from a few days work. However, there was no 
mechanism to ensure that miners would work for all the available time once production 
became continuous. The high wages which were then possible induced the miners to 
restrict their working time. Their independence, so necessary to capital during the 
periods of sporadic work, became a fetter once production became regular^. 
The relation between need and effort was further unbalanced towards the middle 
of the century when the needs that miners had to meet through their wage were 
diminished. The introduction of a miners' (old age) pension, of increases in coverage of 
compensation payments and paid annual holidays, all upset the old calculation which had 
ensured work. 
During the nineteenth century and the first few decades of the twentieth century 
the miners' wages had to cover almost all needs for themselves and their famhies. They 
had to be sufficient to provide for their working life and also for periods of non-work 
which included short time, unemployment, sickness and injury, old age and holidays. 
3. The output of coal, in Queensland, increased each year during the war. The Royal Commission 
(1946:379) recorded: 
the total output for the four years 1941-44 inclusive was the highest ever reached in 
the State for a similar period, and in each year the output was far greater than any 
annual quantity prior to the war. 
4. This was particularly the case with the New South Wales mines which were the most significant in 
terms of production. However, it also occurred in Queensland in the major coal producing centres 
although some mines in the Darling Downs district still suffered from sporadic production, even during 
the war years (Thomas,l 986:312). That, while being a local concern, was not significant in terms of 
changes within the apparatus of calculation. 
5. There was no other way to organise production than by mechanisation and that was a physical and 
financial impossibility for most mines at that time. Hence, the contract system had to remain despite its 
obvious failure to produce the incentive required to meet the demands for coal. 
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Doubtless the extensive needs induced a desire to maximise earnings when they were 
available, and to be thrifty; both of which would encourage work. 
There was some help for non-work periods but it was meagre and uncertain. 
When no wage was avahable the population had, where they could, to fall back upon 
charitable support. Outdoor relieL which was provided for the poor, but excluded the 
able bodied unemployed, was given generally in the form of "relief in kind" 
(Kewley,1973:10) although some cash could be given for rent. From time to time the 
Government was forced to provide for the unemployed, generally through the provision of 
relief work (Kewley,1973:21). However, it was very infrequently and somewhat 
haphazardly granted and certamly was not a guaranteed right of any worker. As Kewley 
(1973:22) comments "Relief works started at times when the demand for them by the 
unemployed became too strong for the Government to resist"^. 
There was also an old age pension in Australia from 1908 when the 
Commonwealth Invalid and Old-age Pension Act was passed (Kewley,1973:73). h, 
however, was of little value and operated more as a charity than as a right. In 1926 Page 
(Commonwealth Treasurer) spoke of it as: 
a charitable dole, given only to those who cannot live without it. It is as 
much a charitable institution as the poorhouse or the soup kitchen (cited 
m Kewley,1973:145). 
As well, the miners had access to some income when they could not work. The 
AC&SEF, as with a number of other unions, provided cash benefits to cover ih health, 
medical expenses and funeral expenses. The miners would contribute each pay into the 
scheme run by the union. In 1947 the "stump"^ included 6/- per fortnight for a sick and 
death fund, and 3/9 per fortnight to cover hospital, doctor and ambulance expenses (CRB 
No. 436, Transcript of Evidence, p. 536: Coal Industry Tribunal records). There was also 
6. Queensland, unlike other Australian States had introduced unemployment insurance in 1922 
(Kewley,1973:151). However, it was designed to meet the needs of seasonal workers and so was difficult 
to apply to the miners who worked intermittently (Archives of Business and Labour (ACT): E165/42/16, 
QCEU Committee of Management minutes, 10/3/24). Moreover, it only granted payment for 15 weeks 
unemployment in any year (Schedule to The Unemployed Workers Insurance Act). 
7. Union deductions from the pay. 
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some unemployment rehef provided by the union, although at the time of the greatest 
need (the depression) it became impossible to continue^. 
In the middle of the twentieth century the necessity for the miner to calculate for all 
needs changed dramatically. The AC&SEF under the new Communist Party leadership of 
Orr and Nelson set out to transform the union into a "fighting class organisation" 
(emphasis in original, Ross,l970:359). They aimed to have social benefits provided by the 
Government rather than have the union operate as a Friendly Society. Hence the 1938 log 
of claims contained demands for a change to compensation payments, the introduction of 
(old age) pensions for miners and paid annual holidays (Ross,l970:373). 
Pensions were granted for ah miners over sixty and the waiting period for 
compensation payment was reduced. New South Wales followed the recommendations 
of the Royal Commission on Pensions set up, as a response to the miners' claims, and 
introduced a pensions act (Ross,1970:378). It granted a rate of £2 a week for the miner, £1 
for a wife and 8/6 for each dependent chhd under sixteen. The total amount that could be 
received by any miner was £4 /5 / - . In Queensland, where a simhar act was passed, the 
benefits were the same except for a shght variation with the total set at £5/5 /6 
(Thomas,1986:363)'^. The pension was considerably higher than the Commonwealth 
Invalid and Old Age pension which, at that tune paid only a maximum of 20/- for a single 
person and £2 if both husband and wife were eligible (Kewley,1973:134)^'^. The level of 
need was also altered with changes to The New South Wales Compensation Act in 1942 
(Royal Commission,1946:125). The period before compensation was granted was reduced 
from seven to three days^^ thus removing some of the burden of saving to offset accidents. 
8. Li 1929, the combination of very short work and the need to raise a levy of 12.5% for the 9,750 men 
who were locked out of the mines in the Northern District of New South Wales drove the AC&SEF to 
decide that there would be no unemployment rehef for miners (Archives of Business and Labour (ACT): 
E165/42/19, QCEU Committee of Management minutes, 25/3/29). 
9. The schemes were financed through contributions from employees, employers and the Government 
(Ross,1970:362-3). 
10. Moreover, the miners' pension was available for all those over sixty, whereas under the 
Commonwealth pension a male had to be sixty five to qualify. 
11. In Queensland the period of waiting for compensation had been set at three days for some tmie (The 
Workers Compensation Acts 1916-1935, Section 9 (2) and had not led to the problems noted by the Royal 
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Both schemes in reducing the needs of the miners were seen as diminishing the 
desire for work. The Royal Commission (1946:127) was quite clear about their impact. 
The miners' pension, it claimed, "removed the incentive to save for the future". The effect 
of the changes to the Compensation Act appeared even more troublesome to employers 
and the Royal Commission. They argued that workers were actually encouraged to be 
idle as the changes allowed miners to make more money on compensation than by 
working^2; 
a warning must be given that if in any circumstances the amount of the 
compensation accorded enables an injured man to obtain better financial 
reward by remaining idle than may be gained by workuig, the 
temptation to trickery is often too much for the weakness of human 
nature to stand (Royal Commission,1946:126). 
Ten days paid annual leave was granted in 1939 (40 CAR 367)^3 thus further 
diminishing needs. Prior to it the miners had to save to provide for themselves and their 
families when the mines had shut down over the Christmas/New Year period. The 
employers argued for the continuation of that practice claiming that contract workers 
could earn enough to tide them over the holidays. However, Drake-Brockman pointed to 
the position of day labourers as a reason for granting the claim: 
Whether they wish it or not the well paid miners are able and do in fact 
force on theh less fortunate co-workers at least a fortnight's hohday in 
each year. 1 have little doubt that this practice imposes considerable 
hardship on the lower paid workers and their famihes (40 CAR 387). 
The decision reduced the need for the miner to work, particularly just before and after the 
Christmas shut-down, a fact that became abundantly clear later in the 1940's. 
Commission in regard to new South Wales. However, as New South Wales was the dominant coal 
producer the impact of a shorter period (whether real or imagined) was significant. 
12. If the accident occurred on a Friday or late on Thursday, the compensation covered both Saturday and 
Sunday. Thus miners who were married and had three or more children would lose £2/8/2 in wages 
over these days but gain £2/11/5 in compensation. A shiftman miner would gain even more for the 
compensation payment was the same but the earnings would have only been £1/9/1 (Royal 
Commission,l 946:126). 
13. It was subject both to completion of twenty five shifts for each day of leave and to penalties for 
stoppages and refusal to work on Saturdays when required. One day of leave was deducted for each 
sectional stoppage which did not have the permission of the management or for strikes which were 
unauthorised by the Central Executive of the State Executive of the Union. As well a half a day annual 
leave was to be deducted for either holding pit top meetings during ordinary hours of work or refusing to 
work on Saturday when required. 
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The meticulous calculation of need in relation to effort was even further 
umbalanced because of the existence of greater taxation in the middle of the century. The 
Commonwealth Government had taken over taxation from the States in 1942, as part of a 
programme to deal with the Second World War (Kewley,1973:173). Taxation on middle 
and low income earners was greatly increased with the setting up in 1943 of the National 
Welfare Fund which was to resource the payment of social benefits (Kewley,l946:234-5)14. 
The extra taxation which was imposed to set up the fund further unsettled the balance 
between need and effort. The Royal Commission (1946:162) concluded that it was the 
greatest source of absenteeism in both Queensland and Victoria and a major source of it in 
New South Wales. So much extra tax was deducted that the miners tended not to work 
the last two shifts in any fortnight as they were of little economic value to them (Royal 
Commission,1946:154)15 
Perhaps, all of these changes to the calculation of need could have been held within 
the old calculus of the wage, if it had been possible to increase desire. Then need would 
have expanded and with it the incentive for work would have remained. However, 
rationing prevented that occurring. The Royal Commission (1946:126) openly exposed the 
imbalance between need and effort which had been produced: 
Owing to more limited spending power occasioned by rationing and 
other such restrictions, the desire of some men on piece work to earn 
high wages has in some degree ceased, and the scale of payments for 
compensation and other social benefits enables many miners to satisfy 
their needs with a minimum of work. 
Towards the middle of the century not only had the calculation which previously 
ensured work been upseL but the piece work wage itself was no longer able to provide the 
14. Kewley (1973:235) claims that the aim of the National Welfare Fund was not social justice but an 
attempt to use taxation as a means of curbing spending and in order to reduce the employment of labour 
on civilian purposes and free it up for the war effort. Indeed, there was always a large surplus in the 
National Welfare Fund during the 1940's and into the 1950's (Kewley,!973:247). Only minor social 
welfare benefits were at first introduced: funeral benefits for aged and invalid pensioners and a maternity 
benefit (Kewley, 1973:237). 
15. The Royal Commission (1946:156) pointed out that taxation on the lower income earners was a 
general problem (not confined to miners) in reducing the desire to work: 
Throughout the community there is a noticeable tendency to discover the optimum 
beyond which the reward for additional work becomes inadequate. Thus morale is 
lowered and public prejudice is engendered. 
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kicentive it once had. In mining, where piece work was used in a situation of greatly 
varying conditions, the "necessity" arose for both managers and miners to compensate for 
any difficulties. For the union the policy was that the "manager should make it 
convenient or pay" (Local Reference Board, Transcript of Evidence, 1/6/45: Queensland 
Coal Association records). Thus miners won consideration payments for conditions 
which in any way hindered the hewing, filling and wheeling of coal. By the middle of the 
century there were "dozens of such allowances" (Fisher,1987:40)l^ with the effect that an 
increasing proportion of the wage came from them. Consequently, "tonnage ceased to 
play such a large part (in the wage)" (CRB No. 436, Transcript of Evidence, p.186: Coal 
Industry Tribunal records)!^ and so its abihty to produce work through a financial 
incentive was reduced. 
Not surprisingly, the failure of the calculation of the wage to ensure work, 
particularly in the context of the freedom and independence of the miners, led to a real 
problem in coal production both during and after the Second World War. As the 
requirement for coal escalated, and as the mines remained generally unmechanised, the 
burden of extra production fell on the miners. However, their independence once a 
necessary feature of work became a fetter. When the fine calculation between need and 
effort was destroyed the miners chose leisure over work. The piece work form of wage 
had after all engendered in them "a sense of liberty, independence and self control" 
(Marx,l 954:520). When they had completed their darg or earned sufficient for a week or 
fortnight they stopped work. As a New South Wales employer bemoaned "leisure time is 
more attractive to the miner today than earnings are" (CRB No. 463, Transcript of 
16. Consideration payments covered such conditions as: brushing, wet work, breaking off boards, 
wheeling timber, wheeling distance, dropping tops, varying heights and weights of timber, installation of 
cogs, construction of pack walls, special places, yardage. 
17 It was claimed that in Richmond Mam (New South Wales) consideration payments had constituted 
only 4% of the miner's wage in 1923 but by 1947 they amounted to 24% (CRB No. 436, Transcript of 
Evidence, p.186: Coal Industry Tribunal records). 
210 
Evidence, p. 186: Coal Industry Tribunal records). Independence became indiscipline and 
it confronted all the parties involved in coal production!^. 
The miners' indiscipline was the constant target of government activity during the 
Second World War. The Commonwealth Governments^ had assumed control of the 
production and distribution of coal in Australia m February 1941 (under the National 
Security Coal Control Regulations) with the setting up of a Commonwealth Coal Control 
Board (Royal Commission,1946:19)20. Hence, the disciplming of labour was directly in the 
hands of the State and it employed extraordinary measures as a means of achieving it. 
The first attempt, on the 19th February 1942, initiated fines and imprisonment (for default 
in payment) for failure to work. The possibihty of prosecutions continued throughout the 
war and workers were fined and went to jah (Australian Archives: E267/707, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 20/4/43). They were, however, quite useless in dealing with strikes as a 
mass refusal to work (Australian Archives: E267/707, Sydney Morning Herald, 22/10/43). 
On 4th Aprh 1942 a further "disciplinary" regulation was passed which specifically aimed 
to curb strikes and pit top meetings, /^ny worker who "refus(ed) or fail(ed) to attend for 
work" would be called up for military service and some were (Royal Commission,1946:22). 
However, once again, the regulations were not effective in producing discipline (Royal 
Commission,1946:22; Australian Archives:A472/1 item W24768 AH2) as there was 
difficulty in enforcing them against the combined opposition of the miners. Indiscipline 
increased during 1943 and the government searched for ways to control it and extreme 
practices were seriously considered. A report to the Attorney-General's Department from 
the Commonwealth Investigation Branch recommended a refinement of the punishment of 
mhitary call up. It advocated that fear generated by secrecy would provide a means of 
ridding the coal industry of its "hresponsibles" (Austrahan Archives:A472/1 item W24768 
18. The miners clearly had a different sense of value of time from the employers. They had not learnt 
'time discipline" (Thompson,1967), as had almost all other workers during the previous two centuries, for 
it had not been necessary for production. 
19. The Australian Labour Party held Government from 1941 onwards. 
20. in August 1941 it was replaced by the Commonwealth Coal Commission with extended powers 
(Royal Commission,l946:20). 
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AH2, p.4) who were seen to be young men "whose outlook (was) limited to S.P. betting, 
greyhounds, billiard saloons and street lounging" (Australian Archives:A472/l item 
W24768 AH2, p.l)^!. Such a scheme may well have been implemented, even prior to the 
report being submitted to the Attorney-General^^. However, even this attempt was not 
successful for the problem of indiscipline increased during 1943. In 1944 the Government 
had found a much more "simple method of enforchig discipline (which was) very 
effective" (Royal Commission,1946:28). Under the Coal Production (War-time) Act No. 1 
of 1944 miners were fined, from £2 to £10, as a deduction from their pay, for any fahure to 
obey an order or to attend work. 
The AC&SEF and the QCEU also centred theh attention on disciphning the miners. 
The AC&SEF had considerable Communist influence on its Central Counch and so when 
Russia was invaded in June of 1941 it swung behind the war effort^^. They were 
interested in both good production and in a disciplined union and so in 1943 the union 
itself undertook to control the miners in terms of their work. In response to the threatened 
cah up of some of their members in New South Wales, the union set in place a system of 
fines and expulsions for those who were guilty of causing stoppages which were not 
21. The extent of the deviousness of the suggestion can be seen in the following details from the letter: 
To stabilise the industry we need only concentrate on the larger and more efficient 
mines. From previous reports, from absentee records, from managements and 
from under-cover contacts, names can be secured of the irresponsibles in the 
industry When reports are submitted to the Attorney-General care should be 
taken that individuals are not called up immediately following a stoppage, but are 
gradually and quietly called up in such a way that no certainty can be placed on 
their call up being due to the part they played in a particular stoppage. The 
mystery of the call up is the key to the success of the scheme. Suspicion will arise 
in the minds of the men, but no proof will be available. Strikes may occur but if the 
Government does not compromise, fear and uncertainty will drive all the men back 
to work (Australian Archives:A472/l item W24768 AH2, p.4). 
22. The Newcastle Morning Herald, (19th Iune,1943) reported that miners had been called up in New South 
Wales following a stoppage. It pointed out that a reason which was put forward for the call up was that 
"the Government intended to withdraw from industry men considered responsible for the stoppages" 
although the union denied any link (ABL: E207/708). 
23. They met the Prime Minister and employers in 1942 and developed the "Canberra Code" which set up 
production committees at each mine and established a grievance procedure. It was hailed by the Royal 
Commission (1946:23) as the first sign m the coal industry of a "co-operative relationship" and the 
beginning of "modern methods". 
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sanctioned by the AC&SEF (Archives of Busmess and Labour (ACT): E207/708, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 22nd June, 1943)24. 
In Queensland the discipline of the miners was ensured through the combined 
threat from the employers of initiating prosecutions and the activity of the union. The 
QCEU undertook to discipline the men who were working too slow 
(Ellengowan,27/10/43), who were fhlhig dirty coal (Torbanlea,l 1/11/43; 
Burgowan,24/3/44), who were failing to stay in the coal mine and produce eight hours a 
day (Burgowan,24/3/44; Rylance,30/8/44) or who were continually absent from work 
(Maranoa, 21/2/46) (Local Reference Board, Transcript of Proceedings:Queensland Coal 
Association records). 
As the independence of the miner came into contradiction with the requirements of 
production the problem of indiscipline arose. During the war the solution lay not with 
managers, but with Governments and the union. The extraordinary circumstances 
allowed both of these to act as caricatures of a nineteenth century capitalist. 
The fines and prosecutions may have provided some continuity of production but 
they did not alter either the relation in the labour process or the apparatus of calculation. 
The body of the labourer was still the hinge around which production was achieved. The 
labour process remained organised around the miner's knowledge, although his 
independence was curbed. The apparatus of calculation centred on the needs of 
capitahsts and workers, although the neediness of the workers was beginning to change. 
However, both the apparatus of calculation and the labour process began to change after 
the Second World War as new means were sought to deal with the problem of indiscipline. 
The level of indiscipline amongst the miners presented an insurmountable barrier 
to the new production requirements. The removal of war time controls highlighted the 
24. The union appears to have collected a considerable amount in fines. Thomas, for the Queensland 
Coal Owners Association, claimed that the AC&SEF had collected £1500 in fines (Transcript of Evidence, 
13/7/44: Queensland Coal Association records). The amount is not certain, although it seems reasonable 
given that by 23rd October, 1943 it was claimed that the AC&SEF had collected £600 in fines (Archives of 
Business and Labour (ACT): E207/709, Newcastle Morning Herald, 23 rd October, 1943). At this time in 
Queensland the Local Reference Board continued to have employer and union representation although it 
was under the Central Coal Authority. All other Local Reference Boards in Australia consisted of just 
one person. 
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problem m a particularly acute form. The Royal Commission (1946:42) could only see a 
"repetition of the soul-destroying cataclysms of the past" if other controls were not set in 
placets. There was, according to the Royal Commission (1946:23) no self discipline and so 
the "road was laid for disorder, anarchy and tyranny". 
However, the Royal Commission was too swift in its condemnation as the question 
of self discipline was more complex. The miners had quite a remarkable degree of self 
discipline but it was no longer in a form suited to the requirements of production. Once 
the capitahst balance between need and effort was upset, it became evident that the 
mhiers' self discipline was too closely tied to the wishes of the miners themselves. The 
problem was that their desires no longer coincided with the capitahsts' and Government's 
need for production. From a capitalist point of view what was once self discipline had 
become hidiscipline. What is remarkable is that within ten years of the publication of the 
Royal Commission, a new form of self discipline which constituted a more docile and 
useful worker was set in place both within the apparatus of calculation and the labour 
process. Moreover, no-one aimed to produce the new kind of worker. It resulted from 
the efforts of all parties to adjust to the new possibhities of contmuous production. 
THE FRACTURING OF THE WAGE AND EFFORT LINK. 
Prior to the middle decades of the twentieth century the coal miners' wage had 
been linked directly to the work they performed. However, the relation was split asunder 
through the introduction, within the arbitral process, of various "rights" for the workers. 
Paid annual leave which had been initiahy granted in 1939 was increased under the 
Central Industrial Authority in 1946 (CRB No. 382) to fifteen days, five of which were titled 
recreation leave and were subject to a worker's attendance for a minimum of 225 shifts in a 
year. In 1947 this was amended to ahow the five days to become annual leave and to 
25. A major cause was seen to lie in the Communist doctrines and practices of some of the leaders of the 
AC&SEF. The Royal Commission (1946:315) concluded that most of the problems in the coal industry 
were due to a number of factors of which the first was listed as: 
a spirit of restlessness and disorder stimulated in the workers by political agitators, 
a small but increasing number of whom are Communists and other malcontents m 
the industry. 
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soften the conditions attached to its being awarded, although it was still tied to continuity 
of service (CRB No. 426)2^. Paid annual leave may well have been granted for 
humanitarian reasons and /or for the practical reason of trying to induce greater 
production within a basic industry via a system of reward and penalty. Certainly, the 
International Labour Organisation had recommended it for the mining industry. Also 
there appears to have been a movement towards paid annual hohdays in the middle of the 
century. Whatever the motives for their introduction, their impact was dramatic for it 
altered the link between wages and work. 
There was a great deal of anxiety as to how work would be performed when pay 
was unrelated to it. The employers saw the decline in output per manshift (OMS) as a 
direct result of the introduction of paid annual leave: 
if there is any inference to be drawn from the figures (of OMS) it must be 
....that these concessions only result in a slackening of effort because the 
employee is not required to work as hard, in that he is given money for 
work not performed (CRB No. 414, Transcript of Evidence, p. 34: 
Queensland Coal Association records) 
The crucial time for coal owners was clearly just before the Christmas holidays as extra 
coal had to be produced to satisfy the consumers during the period of the mine shut down. 
Unpaid holidays had provided the mcentive for the contract workers to produce that. 
Once holidays were paid, the employers could not imagine how the coal would be 
produced in sufficient quantities: 
leading up to the Christmas hohdays the men won the additional money 
for the purposes of tiding over Christmas. After they came back from 
the Christmas hohdays they want the additional money on account of 
the bareness of their cupboards at home. I put it to you that if you give 
them a weeks additional money for nothing, part of the incentive which 
existed in bygone years is gone, and I would forecast that the additional 
five days, and this year another ten days and the possibhity of some sick 
leave, whl destroy the incentive for the men to try to fide themselves 
over the hohday period (CRB No. 426, Transcript of Evidence, p. 77: 
Queensland Coal Association records) 
Because of the fear about production as weh as tying holidays to service, as was 
general m all industries, in the mining industry penalties were attached to them in order to 
26. The five days leave was granted either on the accrual of 225 shifts or on conhnual service from 9th 
fune to the relevant date in December. A proviso was also added which allowed absences for "good and 
sufficient" reasons to incur no penalty (CRB No.426). 
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induce greater regularity of production. Fisher (1987) has argued that the penalties which 
the Coal Industry Tribunal attached to all rights during this period were designed to 
transform the worker: 
(it used) wages and conditions awards as a means of behavioural control. 
The tribunal in effect set out to transform contract workers into routine 
production workers, to compel them to attend work regularly, to 
abandon the strike weapon and to accept managerial authority: in other 
words (the Coal Industry Tribunal used) the powers of the State to alter 
the labour process in ways which would improve industrial disciplme of 
the miners (Fisher,1987:275). 
The penalties are certainly remarkable, and so is the role of the State in imposing 
them. However, one must not over-estimate the significance of these penalties. It is 
certainly true that the arbitral decisions were aimed at producing a regular workforce and 
that a more routhie workforce was produced in the coal industry by the 1950's. However, 
whether the change was a result of tymg conditions of continuity of work to rights is 
debatable, although they would have played some part in inducing more disciplined 
behaviour. However, the more profound change lay in the breaking apart of the old wage 
calculus and the formation of a new one and, with thaL a transformation of the wage 
labourer. That was made possible, not so much by the penalties, (for they belonged to the 
logic of a system where the wage was still related to the work performed), but by the split 
of the wage from both needs and effort. 
The introduction of payment for statutory hohdays, for sick leave and of long 
service leave extended the split between the wage and the work performed. In 1947 (CRB 
No. 414) the miners were granted paid statutory holidays even though it was an 
"innovation"27. In 1946 (CRB No. 382)2^ the mhiers won the right to payment of sick leave 
for up to five days per year at a rate of one half day per twenty five shifts worked. The 
27. Payment had previously not been granted where workers were on a daily or hourly pay rate, as the 
miners were. 
28. The employers felt that Willis who made the determination did not know enough about other 
industries and had consequently made a mistake. They pointed out that Willis' judgment was in 
contradiction to that of ludge Drake-Brockman's, who in 1944 had refused sick leave on the basis that 
there was a loading for intermittency within the ordinary pay which covered such exigencies. The 
employers argued that this was still the case in 1946 and that if Willis were to grant sick leave he should 
at the same time reduce the intermittency loading in the pay (CRB No. 427, Transcript of Evidence, p. 43: 
Coal Industry Tribunal records) 
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grounds for taking sick leave were, however, restricted to "any employee who is absent 
from his work on account of personal illness or on account of injury by accident arising out 
of and in the course of employment" (CRB No. 382). The quantity of sick leave was 
subsequently increased to ten days per year in 1947 (CRB No. 427) and its coverage 
extended to any injury or hhiess which was not a result of wilful act by the miner. It is 
worthwhile quoting from a discussion on the interpretation of the Sick Leave Award, for it 
indicates both how different sick leave was when it was first introduced and how hesitant 
employers were about granting it. Thomas (representing the Queensland Coal Owners 
Association) in trying to come to terms with the implications of the award reveals the 
mean and petty calculations which marked its introduction: 
If five men had a bit of a wild party and had a keg of beer and started 
fighting amongst themselves and one of them hit another member of the 
party over the head with a bottle, then 1 would say that man is not 
entitled to sick leave If a man deliberately threw himself under a 
motor car, taking the extreme case, he would not be entitled to sick leave, 
but if he accidentally fell down the back steps, probably he would be 
(CRB No. 515, Transcript of Evidence, p. 4: Coal Industry Tribunal 
records) 
In 1949 long service leave was awarded to the mmers (CRB No. 599). Thirteen 
weeks leave on full pay was granted after ten years of service. It is certainly true that, as 
Fisher (1987) notes, the form of the award was deliberately made so that it would operate 
as a means of producing regularity in work. Gallagher, the Chairman of the Coal Industry 
Tribunal, found that other long service leave awards were related to "continuity of service, 
as distinct from continuity of employment" (CRB No. 599 at p.6). Further, he noted that as 
it was not "easy to impose a constant supervision and discipline" within minhig it was 
necessary when introducing long service leave to make sure that it would "secure regular 
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attendance"29. As a result, he ruled that leave was to accrue at the rate of one eighth of a 
shift for every five consecutive shifts worked'^^. 
The long service award was significant. Its disciplinary aspects were unusual. 
Long service leave had not been granted for very many employees by 1949. Generahy it 
had been confined to public servants (by statute rather than by arbitration) and to 
employees of quasi governmental services (by way of arbitration) (CRB No. 599 at p.4). It 
had been extended to some employees in the private sector whose work was virtuahy 
identical to that performed in government instrumentalities. The provision of long service 
leave to coal miners was thus another innovation^L Moreover, it accentuated the 
disconnection between pay and effort. 
The greatest impact on the relation between the wage and work performed was the 
result of the change from contract32 and dahy hire to weekly hire in 1948 (CRB No. 515). 
Its introduction, although dramatic in effect, was surprismgly understated. Although ah 
other rights were demanded by the AC&SEF with, perhaps, the support of the Joint Coal 
Board, weekly hire was originahy suggested by the Chairman of the Coal Industry 
Tribunal (CRB No. 436, Transcript of Evidence, p. 550: Coal Industry Tribunal records) and 
reiterated strongly in the judgment: 
I think the industry would be much more attractive for employees than it 
is now if the employers were to give security to the employees by 
abandoning the present method of payment by contract and by daily 
rates, substituting instead a weekly wage or annual salaries...(CRB No. 
436atp.5). 
29. Indeed, such was the determination of Gallagher to secure regularity of employment that the draft 
award stated specifically that the provisions of the award would be suspended if there was a District or 
Commonwealth strike. It seems that this was one of the major immediate reasons for the seven week 
long strike which began 22nd June 1949, for the union saw the clause as effectively removing the right to 
strike. The provision was also included in the award handed down after the strike. 
30. Allowance was made in the award for absences due to incapacity to work and other "justifiable 
reasons" such as holidays or days absent for the purpose of being a witness before a court or commission 
or tribunal. 
31. It was an even greater innovation as this was the first time that a long service award had been made 
in the absence of the consent of all the parties (CRB No. 599 at p.5). 
32. Contract employment continued but the miners were guaranteed a week's pay if they were ready and 
willing to work. 
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Moreover, there was very little debate surrounding its introduction, a point noted by the 
employers^^. 
Weekly hire had a dramatic effect on both day and contract workers. One 
significant aspect of the change was that responsibility for work was placed on the 
manager. Miners were to be paid if they were "ready and wihing" to work, rather than for 
the work they actuahy performed. The weekly hire provisions of the award only allowed 
two concessions to the general duty. The first was that there would be no payment for 
work not performed as a result of a strike. As weh, if after four consecufive days 
fohowmg a breakdown of machinery no "useful employment" could be found for the 
employee, then the employer was exempt from the duty to pay (CRB No. 515). The 
weekly hire provisions of the miners' award were similar to those in other awards, 
although it was more liberal in some respects. It guaranteed weekly hire to the miners 
even when there was no work due to causes outside the control of the managements^ 
The Chairman of the Coal Industry Tribunal made the point clearly in 1953 when he 
reiterated the general duty: 
I desire to emphasize the mere circumstance that the failure to provide 
work is not hi any way attributable to the fault of the employer does not 
operate to relieve him of his liability under weekly hiring (CRB No. 
1009). 
The weekly hire provisions thus firmly separated the wage from effort. 
33. In part, the ease with which the weekly hire provision was introduced followed from the fact that, 
since 1938 in New South Wales, work had ceased to be intermittent. According to the Chairman of the 
Coal Industry Tribunal (CRB No. 515), this had been the largest difficulty in the way of introducing a 
form of employment which had been the normal practice of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation 
and Arbitration in other industries. It was also perhaps easy to introduce weekly hire because it offered 
the AC&SEF and the employers a number of shared benefits although for quite different reasons. Both 
were interested in the possibility of eliminating pit top meetings, in controlling absenteeism and 
unauthorised stoppages. 
It is interesting to note that weekly hire shifts the burden of how variable demand will be met. It appears 
to displace the burden from labourers to capitalists. That is certainly part of its affect. However, more 
interestingly, it transforms a collective burden for labour (sharing work/intermittent work) to an 
individual one (retrenchment). Neither solution is a happy one for the workers. 
34. The Metal Trades Award, the most significant one in the arbitration system, allowed for stand downs, 
for example, when there was insufficient work available to employ everyone following the rationing of 
power (CRB No. 515, Transcript of Evidence, p. 16/17: Coal Industry Tribunal records). 
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Weekly hire had the effect of turning contract workers into virtual time workers. 
The continuing existence of some intermittency in Queensland meant that the question of 
the role of contract workers within the weekly hire provisions was of particular 
importance. It was as if the coal owners could not believe that contract miners could be 
weekly hire workers. The Chairman of the Coal Industry Tribunal was asked by the 
Queensland Coal Owners Association to decide if contract miners were to be covered by 
the clause. In reply, he repeated an earlier ruling that he had made from a simhar request: 
In holding that a contract worker is an employee within the meaning of 
the clause to which 1 have just referred (weekly hire), I am guided by the 
fact that contract miners are under the control of the employer; they can 
receive directions from the manager, the under-manager, the deputy, or 
from any other superior employee. The hours of work of a contract 
miner are regulated in the same way as those of other employees. These 
features, in my opinion, constitute evidence of control and make them 
employees within the meaning of the clause (CRB No. 972). 
The introduction of sick pay, long service leave, payment for statutory holidays and 
annual holidays, all raised the question of how a fair amount of work would be done once 
the wage was separated from effort. The weekly hire provisions, however, gave real 
urgency to the question. The employers were genuinely and deeply puzzled as to how 
both dahy hire labourers and contract miners would work in these new circumstances. 
The concern was voiced during the discussion on the introduction of weekly hire. It is 
worth quoting at some length in order to show how weekly hire fundamentahy broke the 
relation of wage to work and left in its place an apparently insolvable dhemma. 
At present the care and maintenance of the mechanical equipment in 
collieries is carried out by members of various unions, and due to the 
nature of the industry many pieces of this equipment are scattered and 
widely dispersed in the mine underground and it is difficult for the 
manager to give constant and close supervision to their work, but under 
the present conditions of daily hire the employees whose duty it is to 
maintain and use this equipment have the incentive to keep it in working 
order because they realise that their earnings depend upon their 
efficiency and the efficiency of the machines they maintain and use and 
they know too that they incur the displeasure of their workmates who 
are thrown out of work when breakdowns occur. 
For example, a loco driver who ih uses his loco to the pouit of incapacity 
throws himself and others out of work, but under the new clause, or the 
proposed clause, a little carelessness by that loco driver and he stands 
the chance of securmg for hhnself and his mates four or five days on full 
pay without any work (CRB No. 515, Transcript of Evidence, p. 10: Coal 
Industry Tribunal records) 
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The rights of workers were translated into conditions of employment in terms of 
sick leave, payment for annual leave and statutory holidays, long service leave and weekly 
hire. Their effect was doubtless to make working conditions more humanitarian and 
doubtless, they had some impact on the disciplining of the miners. However, the real 
transformation of the relations between labour and capital was to follow from the way in 
which, by the 1950's, they had spht apart the direct relation of the wage to the work 
performed. At the same time, they exacerbated the spht between need and effort for they 
all acted to reduce the miners' needs. The effect of the changes was that the wage no 
longer tied need to effort, nor did it centre on the body of the labourer. The wage floated 
free from its old relations established within the apparatus of calculation in the hand 
mining period. It opened the possibhity for the transformation of the mode of calculation 
of the wage and consequently the change in the form of the wage labourer within the 
apparatus of calculation. 
CALCULATION REWORKED: THE WAGE AND PRODUCTIVITY. 
The calculation of what is an appropriate wage is always the result of a battle 
between the needs of the labourer and the needs of the capitahst. However, it takes 
different forms at different times. In the hand-mining period the wage was determined 
with reference both to the physical subsistence needs of the labourers and the profit needs 
of the capitalists. After the Second World War the calculation was re-worked. In place of 
the balancing of the profits of capitahsts and of the subsistence needs of the labourers there 
was a "scientific" calculation using economic indicators of the capacity of the whole 
industry to pay. 
The profits of capitahsts become insignificant for the purposes of wage calculation 
in the middle of the century. Both the AC&SEF and the employers made attempts to argue 
for the relevance of profits but the arbitral bodies rejected them. Drake-Brockman m his 
1939 judgement (40 CAR 367 at 384) made it abundantly clear that the lack of profits for 
mining companies was of no relevance to him in determining conditions of work. Both the 
AC&SEF and the employers had presented arguments based on the profitability of the coal 
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industry. The employers had argued that coal companies had consistently made losses 
and indeed they had. The AC&SEF presented a counter argument to the effect that the 
losses were not real in that the "real owners" - the shipping companies and merchants -
deliberately manipulated the low coal prices in order to make their profits from trade. 
After examinmg the books of three shipping companies, Drake-Brockman concluded that 
their profits were not excessive^^. Although he was thus left with a conclusion that the 
coal companies were not profitable, he refused to take it into account in determining 
conditions. Drake-Brockman blamed the owners themselves for the situation as the "root 
causes" (40 CAR 367 at 384) were over capacity and mtense competifion. As a result, he 
came to the conclusion that: 
the employees should not be deprived of proper conditions of work 
merely because of unwise methods adopted by owners. Inherently the 
industry is capable of providing the additional costs of reforms provided 
in the awards issued herewith. If existing owners cannot provide the 
finance then the time has come for them to make way for others with 
wiser ideas as to finance and trading operations (40 CAR 367 at 384) 
Drake-Brockman had ruled that the question of profits was irrelevant on what may 
be termed moral grounds. By the late 1940's and early 1950's "moral" reasons were not 
needed to exclude profits from wage calculation. The question of profits was raised in the 
1954 log of claims (CRB No. 1034) but the Chairman of the Coal Industry Tribunal 
confhmed its irrelevance to wage calculation. The AC&SEF had argued that many coal 
companies were making large profits and thus they could afford to meet the claims of the 
union. However, the Judge found that the existence of large profits did not indicate any 
necessity to adjust wages and conditions. The Judge could not see that there would be 
any exploitation which would need to be adjusted by wage increases, as profits were fixed 
by the Joint Coal Board, via their setting of the sehing price of coal. 
In the late 1950's the Joint Coal Board loosened its control on profits. They were 
thus again avahable for consideration in the calculation of the wage. However, by that 
time other means of settling the question of wages and conditions had been developed. 
35. The "best result" was from a company whose coal transactions accounted for half its trade but only 
19% of its profits. 
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with the result that profits remained absent^^. Productivity and other economic indicators 
had taken their place. 
When productivity first entered the apparatus of calculafion in 1938 it was 
understood in terms of its effect on labour. Drake-Brockman (40 CAR 367 at 377) in his 
1938 judgement on hours gave some attention to the question of productivity. He argued 
that unemploymenL which had followed from the rapid improvement in productivity due 
to technological change in Europe, was also bound to occur in Australia. There were no 
figures on productivity or unemployment in the coal industry but he pointed out: 
there is no doubt that what is happening elsewhere is also happening 
here and we are faced with a permanent army of unemployed unless 
some means can be devised of providing work for them. 
However, Drake-Brockman's understanding^^ of the effect of productivity on labour did 
not continue. 
After the war productivity was used in a remarkably different manner. The 
increasing levels of productivity, together with full employment meant that by the late 
1940's its meaning had changed dramatically within the apparatus of calculation. It 
became an indicator of the abihty of capital to grant benefits to wage labour. 
Debate about productivity as a measure of a capitalist's abihty to provide benefits 
for workers entered the apparatus of calculation in mining through the policies of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). The AC&SEF used a declaration made by the 
Coal Mines Committee of the ILO to the effect that wages should be provided: 
at rates which will support an income attractive as compared with 
income in industry generally so as to provide adequate manpower and 
hnprove the standards of living (CRB 436 (wages), Transcript of 
Evidence, p. 512: Coal Industry Tribunal records). 
In using the ILO policy the AC&SEF also introduced the question of productivity mto the 
apparatus of calculation, for each ILO principle was subject to the over-riding one that: 
36. From time to time the question of profits were raised by the union but they were not included in the 
mode of calculation. 
37. He did shorten the hours of all mine workers to 40 per week. However, he was conscious that this 
was not sufficient to provide a means of stopping unemployment. 
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These ahns are fundamentally dependent on the maintenance of a high 
standard of productivity on the part of all concerned in the industry 
(ILO,1946:10). 
Although productivity had entered the process of wage fixing with the meaning which it 
was to carry in the future, it did not immediately provide the calculus for wage and 
condition fixing. Rather, benefits were granted to the workers tied not to productivity, but 
to attendance. 
Arguments around producfivity were not immediately possible for either unions or 
employers. The union did not take up the question despite their introduction of it into the 
debate, because productivity was declining in the mining industry^^. Also the employers 
were mitiahy not concerned with productivity for they were interested in total production. 
The selling price of coal was set by the Coal Boards so the profits of the mining companies 
came from their ability to meet the demand for coal. As demand exceeded supply, until 
the early 1950's, it is not surprising that the employers, the Joint Coal Board, and the Coal 
Industry Tribunal all found that the level of production was the major concern. 
By the early 1950's the economic position of the coal industry had changed. There 
was an over supply and the high price of Australian coal had become a concern for the 
Joint Coal Board^^. The solution to the second problem appeared^'' to lie in the full 
mechanisation of the mines and, in particular, m the mechanical extraction of pillar coal. 
In this context, productivity became an important element in the calculation of wages and 
conditions. 
The capacity of the coal industry to pay wage increases and grant improved 
conditions became an issue in the 1952/53 log of claims. The Chairman of the Coal 
38. The union pointed out that the causes of productivity decline were out of the control of the workers. 
The increased use of off-hand labour as compared to workers at the coal face, and the generally poorly 
managed mines and their long travelling distances with no mechanical means of transport were the major 
problems, according to the union. In these conditions workers might work as hard or harder than before 
but productivity would still decline. 
39. The loint Coal Board argued that competition from other fuels had seriously undermined the market 
for coal. They claimed that four new oil refineries had been built in Australia and that oil was replacing 
coal in the two industries which had relied upon coal: gas making and the railways (CRB No. 1034). 
40. The AC&SEF had opposed mechanical extraction of pillar coal ostensibly on the grounds of health 
and safety. Perhaps their major concern was the fact that full mechanisation would increase the supply 
of coal dramatically thus causing closures of the older mines which could not mechanise and hence 
causing unemployment and dislocation for mine workers. Their concern was well founded. 
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Industry Tribunal ruled that, in the determination of the claims, regard had to be given to 
"two things - national economy and also the economy of the industry" (CR No. 1034, 
Transcript of Evidence, p. 159: Coal Industry Tribunal records)*!. They were understood, 
not in terms of the profits of the capitalists as they had been, but as a series of economic 
mdicators drawn from the general arbitration system. Thus the union argued about levels 
of employment, hivestments, production and productivity, overseas trade balances and 
profits (CR No. 1034, Transcript of Evidence, pp. 159-162: Coal Industry Tribunal records). 
The entry of capacity to pay criteria changed the way wages were calculated. The Coal 
Industry Tribunal gave precedence to productivity in its decision on the 1952/3 log of 
claims-^2. In return for the AC&SEF withdrawing its objection to the mechanical extraction 
of pillar coal43 n- awarded wage increases to all employees. Gallagher had determined that 
"in the present circumstances of the industry, it would be dangerous to increase wage 
rates" (CRB 1034) but consideration of possible productivity increases allowed him to grant 
wage increases: 
I feel if the workers in the industry play their part towards full 
mechanisation and so increase productivity they should become entitied 
to increased remuneration (CR 1034). 
The AC&SEF were able to use productivity based arguments in their apphcation 
for reduced hours in 1960. The impact of full mechanisation, particularly in New South 
Wales, had an hnpressive effect on productivity, as the union pointed out: 
41. This followed from decisions in the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration on the 
1952/3 Basic Wage Case. The Court determined that in setting the basic wage attention had to be given 
to the capacity of the economy to pay. For this purpose seven economic indicators were listed: 
production and productivity, employment, investment, overseas trade, overseas balances, competitive 
position of secondary industry and retail trade (Hagan, 1981). The capacity of the economy to pay had 
been a consideration of the Court from 1931 when it reduced most wages by 10%. However, until 1940 
capacity to pay had been ascertained in large part by studies of the books of large companies (Hagan, 
1981). Productivity as an index of capacity to pay replaced the seven economic indicators 
(Plowman,1986:17) though there was no agreement either on how it was to be measured, or to what it 
should apply. 
42. Romeyn (1981:457) describes the approach of the Coal Industry Tribunal as "productivity bargaining". 
43. The mines in New South Wales had been able to mechanically extract pillar coal following a decision 
by the Coal Industry Tribunal in 1950. The decision effectively over-ruled the clause in the New South 
Wales Coal Mines Regulation Act which prohibited mechanical extraction of pillar coal except with the 
permission of the Minister of Mines. However, no mine was able to do so because of opposition from the 
AC&SEF (Romeyn,l981:436-439). Mechanisation was so little established in Queensland at the time that 
the problem did not arise. 
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So from 1951 to 1959 the annual production per average man employed 
m the South Maifland field (NSW) went from 482 tons to 811 tons -
almost double. Will anyone try to deny that these figures are dramatic! 
(CR No. 1405 (hours). Transcript of Evidence, p. 322: Coal Industry 
Tribunal records). 
Even in Queensland where hand mining still dominated, the productivity of workers had 
increased. Only minor mechanisation in the form of the use of conveyor pans and the 
reduction of miners doing their own wheeling had been introduced (CR No. 1405 (hours). 
Transcript of Evidence, p. 569: Coal Industry Tribunal records). The Coal Industry 
Tribunal recognised the contribution of the employees to the industry in the form of "more 
regular attendance at work and mcreased productivity" (CR 1405) and awarded an extra 
week's annual leave rather than a reduction in hours. 
The entry of economic indicators of capacity to pay had the effect of replacing the 
visible presence of the capitahsts and their needs for profits with "scientific" measures. 
Yet, surprisingly, there was considerable doubt as to how to gauge the chief indicator: 
productivity. 
Initially, from the point of view of labour there was confusion between production 
and productivity. After all, the terms belonged to two different modes of calculation and 
had quite different implications for labour. In the 1952/3 log the union appeared 
confused as to the difference: 
productivity has not fallen....Production on the whole I have submitted 
shows that (CR No. 1304, Transcript of Evidence,p. 160: Coal Industry 
Tribunal records) 
In their attempts to clarify the difference, the union appeared to be even more confused. 
They pointed out (CR No. 1034, Transcript of Evidence, p. 4409: Queensland Coal 
Association records) "Production is the output per man shift (OMS) and productivity is the 
capacity of the whole industry". The AC&SEF was not alone in its confusion. Workers' 
representatives from the United Kmgdom and the United States of America on the sub-
committee on the International Labour Organisation's Mhieworkers Charter were equally 
uncertain. They only agreed to the insertion of the clause regarding the relation between 
high productivity and improved conditions when: 
it was made clear that the pohit emphasised was productivity and not 
total production (International Labour Organisation, 1946:10). 
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The employers, on the other hand, were very clear about the need to differentiate 
production and productivity, as although production had increased dramatically it was 
claimed that productivity had fallen. However, they were less clear about how it should 
be measured. Thomas (for the Queensland Coal Owners' Association, CR No. 1304, 
Transcript of Evidence, p. 4114-5: Queensland Coal Owners Association) pointed out that 
economists were not able to "suitably qualify it" and he cited the various possibilities 
canvassed in the 1953 Basic Wage Case before the Arbitration Court: 
There are a number of different conceptions of productivity. It may be 
the measure of the money value or of the volume of production of a 
community or of an industry or group of industries by relation either to 
the population of the community, or by relation to its "workforce" ie. to 
the number of those either, in fact, employed or avahable for 
employment 
This was not the only source of confusion. The Joint Coal Board had released figures on 
output per manshift (OMS) but Thomas was not confident in these as an indicator of 
productivity. He felt that: 
The overall OMS which is not so reliable a guide to productivity 
perhaps as the OMS at the face, although that might be debatable (CR 
No. 1304, Transcript of Evidence, p. 4120: Queensland Coal Owners 
Association records)^^. 
The difficulties confinued into the 1960 (Hours) case. Thomas argued that a 
comparison of OMS between different periods was of httle value unless the "two periods 
are identical", which he argued they were not (CR No. 1405, Transcript of Evidence, p. 
2160-1: Coal Industry Tribunal records). He cited, among other things, major difference in 
the form of the introduction of coal washing which altered the quantity of refuse discarded 
from the coal produced, the retirement of men under the pensions act and the consequent 
younger workforce, the change in mechanisation and the opening of new mhies. The Joint 
Coal Board itself had reservations about comparisons using OMS as the basis of a measure 
of productivity. In particular, they pointed to the change in the length of the shifl worked -
44. Doubtless the uncertainty was due to the preponderance of contract mining in Queensland for under 
that system only face workers were understood as productive. 
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largely due to the ending of contract muring and its accompanying dargs (CR No. 1405, 
Transcript of Evidence, p. 1834: Coal Industry Tribunal records)'*^. 
It is little wonder that the measurement of productivity should appear problematic 
when it was first used as a measure of capacity to pay. The New Palgrave 
(Eatwell,1987:1010) clahns that "conventional measures of productivity are only a distant 
and murky reflection" of what is aimed at by the measure. Moreover, it warns that "the 
hst of potential problems is long and overlapping". What is surprising is the confidence 
with which it came to be used in wage calculation. 
Moreover, though it was accepted that productivity should relate to wages, there 
was httle discussion on how it should. There was debate as to the sources of productivity 
mcreases, and also argument as to whether it was the input of capital or of labour that 
created the growth in productivity. However, the relative value of the inputs of capital 
and labour were not explored. As Romeyn (1981:471) remarks: 
despite detailed statistical evidence with respect to increased 
productivity, there was no attempt to systematically or objectively 
determine the value of the employees' contribution to productivity. 
The uneasy "scientific" existence of productivity is puzzling given the fact that it 
transformed the calculus surrounding the wage. 
When the wage became tied to productivity measurement, the needs of both 
labourers and capitalists were removed from the apparatus of calculation"*^. In the new 
45. Confusion over productivity was also evident, indeed to a greater degree, in the general arbitration 
system. As late as 1978 the question of how to measure productivity was before the Arbitration 
Commission. It relied on the Report of the Working Party on the Measurement of Labour Productivity 
which concluded that it could be measured: 
by reference to the long term trend of the market sector rather than the whole 
economy, adjusted for changes in terms of trade, hours worked and 'the quality of 
labour' (cited in Fisher, 1983:130). 
The measurement had changed again but once again there was uncertainty. The Report noted that 
adjustments for "quality of labour" were "tentative". 
46. Fisher (1983:213-4) notes that within the general arbitration system: 
The key social relations came to be those between the receivers and implementers of 
ideology in the state, and the unions, rather than direct relations of conflict between 
capital and labour. 
He is correct. The thesis is trying to outline the shape of these new relations. 
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wage calculus the capacity to pay, understood in terms primarily of the productivity of the 
workforce, replaced the reference to the needs of capitalists and workers with those of the 
economic system^^. h substituted for an antagonistic relation of opposing needs a neutral 
field of action: the economy'**^. Moreover, within it the needs of all could appear to 
coincide. 
The transformation in the calculus of the wage appears to have enabled capitalists 
to acquire a greater share in the wealth generated. There is no direct evidence of a 
redistribution of wealth in the mining industry from labour to capital, although it appears 
to be true for other industries. Fisher (1983:57) claims that during the post war period 
"there was a redistribution of the rewards of production in favour of non-salary and (non-) 
wage earners". Griffin (1986:236-238) drawing on similar source concurs. She points out 
that while real wages rose by 29% between 1948-49 and 1968-69, real GDP per employed 
person rose 62%. The result was that "technical change and increases in productivity have 
retrogressively redistributed income from employees to employers" (Carey cited in Griffin, 
1986:238)4^. Given the general well being of the coal mining industry after 1950 it seems 
reasonable to suppose that the same process of redistribution was at work. 
The change in the mode of calculation of the wage was a key factor in producing 
the possibility of a reduction in the proportion of wealth going to labour. The process of 
the distribution of wealth was hidden within the new apparatus of calculation. Capitalists 
were released from the visibility of the size of their profits and in mining, in particular, 
from the tie between profits and wages. As well, for some years, workers enjoyed 
47. Ironically, the shift came as much as a result of demands from the union as from the practices of the 
arbitral bodies. Fisher (1983:102) sees the change to the incorporation of productivity into the calculation 
of the basic wage (in the general arbitration system) as a "great advance for the union". It was certainly 
an advance in that it enabled higher wages to be gained. Yet, at another level it had a much more 
profound effect: it was a major aspect of the transformation of the apparatus of calculation, and with that 
the possibilities for the relations between labourers and capitalists. 
48. Emmison (1983) has explored the way "the economy" entered discourse carrying its fetishistic present 
meanings of a neutral force with "powers and needs of its own". 
49. It is Fisher's (1983) point that the re-distribution resulted through the practices of the arbitral bodies. 
It appears, however, to have resulted from the entire transformation of the apparatus of calculation which 
removed the question of the share in profits from the agenda. In that process all parties are equally 
involved. 
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mcreases in wages and buying power, which is, of course, what made it a desirable form of 
wage fixing for the unions. 
THE DISCIPLINARY WAGE LABOURER. 
From the point of view of the apparatus of calculation its object is the wage 
labourer. Within the hand-mining period calculation centred on the body of the labourer 
and his and his family's subsistence needs and produced as its object the needy worker. 
After the Second World War there was a radical change in the object of calculation which 
was brought about by a series of modifications to the processes of wage fixation. In 
themselves they were often relatively insignificant, but their effect was spectacular. 
Wage determination was largely a local matter m the first half of the century. It 
was particularly so in New South Wales. /Vn indication of the variations in wage rates 
that this led to can be gathered in Drake-Brockman's 1939 (40 CAR 367 at 424) award. 
Prior to the award there had been from 1914 to 1937 no general codification of the local 
agreements on wage rates hi New South Wales. When Drake-Brockman listed the 
minimum rates for classifications the variations were apparent. The first class shiftman's 
rate, for example, varied between and even within Districts. Thus in the Northern District 
of New South Wales in the Newcastle field they received 2 1 / - per shifL whereas in the 
Maitland field they were paid 22/8 per shift. Queensland, on the other hand had a 
general award which covered most mines and which had been carefuhy maintained. 
However, it had been developed without reference to New South Wales Wage with the 
exception of contract rates^^l Moreover, within the award, there were variations between 
districts for wage rates for day labour and for contract workers as loadings were given to 
cover disparifies in the cost of living and to compensate for climate. As weh, the general 
award did not cover some of the privately owned mines, nor did it cover the state owned 
ones. 
50. Consideration payments, however, were locally based for they were set by agreement at each mine. 
In Queensland the more significant of them were brought to the attention of the local reference board and 
incorporated in the award on a district basis. 
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No attempt had been made to bring about uniform rates of pay within the coal 
industry despite the existence of central arbitral bodies. Neither the Commonwealth Coal 
Board nor the Coal Industry Special Tribunal had any systematic approach to wage 
determination. They operated according to Drake-Brockman on "political expediency" (40 
CAR 367 at 373) and a policy of "appeasement" in order to ensure coal producfion. Even 
when the coal industry came within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration in 1930 it did not lead to the imposition of any "logic" (40 
CAR 367 at 373)^^ but was used to reduce miners' wages by 12.5%52. 
Despite the recommendation of the 1929 Royal Commission that some order be 
made of the immense local variations which were the source of "irritation and dispute in 
the industry" (40 CAR 367 at 373) nothmg was done about it unth 1939^3. The coal 
industry had again come under the Commonwealth Court of Conchiation and Arbitration 
in 1938 to hear the miners' log of claims, although not everyone was a willing party. The 
Victorian Railways Commission (who owned the State Coal Mine at Wonthaggi in 
Victoria), some small companies in Victoria and Tasmania and the Queensland Coal 
Owners' Association had ah sought exemption from the award. Drake-Brockman refused 
to grant it^ '^  on the basis that uniformity was necessary: 
This ensures uniformity and eliminates causes of friction arising out of 
differential treatinent (40 CAR 367 at 385). 
51. Of course, there was a clear logic in the setting of the wages - it was merely quite different from that of 
most other industries. One might even say that the logic of wage setting in the coal industry made 
visible the underlying logic of all wage setting: that wages are determined against the level of needs of 
capital. 
52. The award applied to New South Wales, 'Victoria and Tasmania. Queensland was not a party to it. 
However, the Queensland Southern Local Coal Board did reduce miners' wags by 10% in 1931 (Transcript 
of Evidence, 6 /3 /31: Queensland Coal Owners Association records). Those collieries which were not a 
party to that award had their rates reduced by 10% in the Industrial Court of Queensland on the 1st July, 
1931 {Queensland Industrial Gazette,p. 183). 
53. Drake-Brockman (40 CAR 367:373-4) found the situation quite "extraordinary". It was this failure 
which led him to make what has become his celebrated comment on the coal industry: 
The history of the coal mining industry in Australia from its very inception may be 
described as an unbridled and unregulated contest between employers and 
employees without restraint and actuated only the rules of the jungle. 
54. He did delay its application through consent and excluded some small companies in Victoria. 
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The first step towards making uniformity possible was in 1939 when Drake-
Brockman set out the minimum rats of pay for each district and expressed all time rates as 
daily rates of pay^^. As well, he fixed one minimum rate for mechanics and youths across 
all New South Wales districts. Later, as Chairman of the Central Reference Board he 
commented on the difficulties: 
This step was necessary only in the State of New South Wales and was 
really accomplished only with respect to the Northern District of that 
State. The mformation today is stih very scanty for the Southern and 
Western districts of New South Wales. Employers and employees in 
those districts have apparently been unable to make the necessary 
information available to enable this Board to properly obtain its avowed 
intention of levelling wage rates where such an approach to minimum 
rates is possible and practicable. It is hardly necessary to add, it is 
always desirable (my emphasis CRB No. 107)^6. 
As well, the award (40 CAR 367) for the first time brought almost all mines in Australia 
under its coverage. 
In 1942 the Coal Reference Board carried the process of creating uniformity further. 
A number of significant classifications (for example, first class shiftman, contract 
machtneman working on shiftwork, and contract wheeler working on shiftwork) were 
given minimum rates across all districts in New South Wales with the exception of the 
Maitland field. Drake-Brockman (CRB No. 107 at 4) noted that it would have been 
desirable to make these wages apphcable across all States as he could see "no justification 
in principle for the rates being different from district to district", but he was unable to at 
that point. 
The process of achieving a uniform system of wage classification continued 
sporadically across the New South Wales districts (for example CRB No. 357; CRB No. 626) 
but it was not until the 1950's that emphasis was placed on securing a nationahy uniform 
scale. The first classification in the industry to be involved in national levelIhig of wages 
in the mining industry were the deputies, shot firers and colliery staff^ '^ . The application 
for deputies and shot firers was made by the AC&SEF on behalf of those members in 
55. Some time rates had been expressed as hourly rates. 
56. Full New South Wales variations were not included in the award until 1946 (CRB 336). 
57. Colliery staff in all states came under a separate award from that of miners. 
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Queensland^^ and the levelling of their wages to the New South Wales rate was granted 
(CRB No. 685). 
The differences m classification rates between Queensland and New South Wales 
were brought to the Coal Industry Tribunal by the AC&SEF in 1949 '^*. Williams noted 
that Queensland needed "a great deal of attention" (CRB No. 740). It "seemed strange" to 
him that although Tasmania was the smallest coal producing state it had the same wage 
levels as m New South Wales whereas Queensland, the second largest producer, did not. 
The Coal Industry Tribunal m its judgment (CRB No. 740) recorded its concern that a 
number of classifications in Queensland were in receipt of lower rates than in New South 
Wales and re-affirmed the general principle of achieving uniformity. The matter was 
referred to the Local Reference Board for recfification^O. The Coal industry Tribunal 
subsequently altered rates for almost all classificafions whose minimum was less than m 
New South Wales (CRB No. 880; CR No. 1057)6L 
By 1954 there was general uniformity hi the wages set for various classifications 
throughout Austraha. Moreover, the basic difference between contract miners and day 
labourers, as far as wage setthig was concerned, had ceased to exist. Whereas the 
58. They were not covered by the miners' award in New South Wales. 
59. The AC&SEF used the notion of uniformity to upgrade rates, generally to that which obtained in the 
Northern district of New South Wales. Their aim, as clearly spelt out in the 1953 log of claims (CR 1034, 
Transcript of Evidence, 60-1: Queensland Coal owners Association records) was: 
that payments made by agreement in each district should be incorporated in the 
award and made uniform throughout Australia. 
60. The Local Reference Board was in turmoil at this time and consequently agreement was difficult to 
reach. In part this was due to the fact that contrary to general practice it had determined to reduce the 
hewing rate by 4d. per tone at Willeroo when pneumatic picks were introduced (Local Reference Board, 
Transcript of Evidence,3/7/51: Queensland Coal Owners Association records). The action of the union 
in calling a ballot for strikes was seen by the Chairman (Murray) as the union "being prepared to jettison 
the system of arbitration through which they had won many benefits in past years" {Queensland Times 
25/8/51). The press saw in it evidence of communist activity. The editorial of the Courier Mail (4/9/51) 
pleaded that "Against exploitation by communist bosses in their unions they (the miners) must protect 
themselves by getting rid of the leaders who are for every trying to involve them in stoppages". Rolling 
stoppages did not prevent the Local Reference Board re-affirming its decision and work had to resume at 
Wileroo at the reduced rate. 
61. Lhere were still differences between districts but the were codified as set amounts. 
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apparahjs of calculation had centred on contract miners in the early period, by the middle 
of the century they were peripheral to the wage fixing process. 
There was little political space for arguments based on contract rates. As 
intermittency had ceased (except in a few places in Queensland) the wage of contract 
miners was often quite high. Hence, their general welt being, compared both to day 
labourers and to workers in other industries, precluded the possibility of organising wage 
increases around them^2 Moreover, it was strategically difficult to argue for increases 
based on contract miners when many did not work the full shift. 
Most importantly, there were very few piece workers employed in New South 
Wales by 1954. The mechanisation of mines transformed the miner into a day labourer. 
Contract miners still existed but were concentrated in Queensland. However, that did not 
affect the way they appeared within the apparatus of calculation. New South Wales was 
the dominant producer of coal and so the apparatus of calculation was organised around 
the possibihties which it allowed. As a result during the period immediately after the 
Second World War the strategy of the AC&SEF could not be organised around the contract 
miner as it had been in the hand-mining period. 
By the early 1950's the structure of relationships between wage labourers within 
mining had undergone significant transformations. Uniformity of classifications and rates 
had replaced the diversity of local variations and more importantly, there was no longer a 
massive division between contract workers and day labourers. Within this context, the 
pattern of differences between the rates for various classificafions assumed importance. 
A division of wage labour has always existed within capitalism. As well, there has 
been a continual battle over the appropriate relative positions within the wage structure. 
However, the form of calculation has not always centred upon these. 
62. This was distinctly different from the hand-mining period when contract miners were both crucial to 
production and impoverished because of intermittency. 
234 
Table 5 
Divisions within day wage labour and rates of pay, 1907*^ 3 
Men employed at the surface 
Underground labourers other than miners 
Men employed as miners 
Men taken from the coal face 
Boys on the surface 







Source: West Moreton Coal Mining Conference agreement, 1907 (Archives of Business and 
Labour (ACT): E165/48/2). 
At the beginning of the century there were only six different classifications of work 
in coal mining in Queensland (Table 5). However, by the middle of the century there were 
twenty one different classifications (excluding age differences) in the Queensland award 
for the Southern Division (40 CAR 411). New South Wales was simhar. The rates for the 
various classification had been arrived at through local negotiations^^. Doubtless, in 
arriving at the appropriate local rate, there was argument about the relative value of the 
position and also, doubtless, there was an attempt to maintain at least some form of 
uniformity. However, the process was only a minor theme within the early form of the 
apparatus of calculation, subsumed under the theme of opposing needs. 
In the middle of the century the divisions between wage labour asscmied much 
greater significance. The first time that an attempt was made to systematically explore 
wage rates was in 1947. The union argued to the Coal Industry Tribunal (CRB No. 436, 
Transcript of Evidence, p. 519: Coal Industry Tribunal records): 
In view of the absence of any real treatment in the mode of fixation of 
wages for this industry, this claim must be considered from the basis that 
it is the first tune that there has been an attempt by any independent 
authority to really fix wages of the various classifications on any 
scientific basis. 
63. The payment is per shift. 
64. The "boys" received 6d increase for each year of age from 14 to 21, when they would receive adult 
rates. 
65. It was the case even in Queensland where an award had been in existence for most of the first half of 
the century. 
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The AC&SEF had asked for a 5/- increase for all classifications below shiftman miner and 
4 / - for all above as a means of equahsing pay rates. If it had been granted, it would have 
maintained the divisions in wages, but reduced the difference between the lowest paid 
(those below shiftman miner) and the highest paid. However, the basis for wage 
settlement within the general arbitration system relied on the "iron law of relativities" and 
that was drawn into the wage process in the coal industry^^. Despite the aim of the 
AC&SEF to equalise pays they were forced into the logic of arguing on the basis of 
difference. In presenting their 1947 wage case the AC&SEF therefore had to emphasise the 
gradations in skill, danger and responsibility of the workers. Each classification was 
carefuhy differentiated from another, largely in terms of the physical distance from the 
(coal) face worker. The quite remarkable accounting of differences within their case is 
worth noting. Mhlar (M) was a witness for the AC&SEF. His task, on being questioned 
by Wihiams (W), acting as advocate for the AC&SEF, was to describe the occupations in 
the coal mines in Queensland. Each is carefully differentiated along a continuum: 
W. And therefore the hazards of the mdustry fall more particularly on 
those employed at the coal face? 
M. Yes 
W. What is the next classificafion to the miner in your opinion in 
importance? 
M. 1 would say that the shiftman miner is next in regard to importance 
and responsibility 
W. Do you consider (brattice man) important work? 
M. ... the man who erects brattice should be competent and understand 
the ventilation system....I do consider the work of brattice men to be very 
important. 
W. What is the next order of classificafion you consider of importance? 
M. I would say the next important...is the rope rider. (CRB No. 436, 
Transcript of Evidence, p. 852-855: Coal Industry Tribunal records) 
66. Wages within the general system, at that time, consisted of two parts: the basic wage which was set in 
relation to "needs" and formed the greatest proportion of the wage, and a margin generally granted for 
skill. Lhe coal miners did not have a bifurcated wage and hence, while the basic wage continued in the 
general system, the union had difficulty in arguing about their margin for skill. 
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Williams and Mhlar continued the careful gradations out of the mine to the surface 
labourers. They were, of course, merely repeating the differences which had been 
operating for some time. However, the significance does not lie in their existence, but in 
their incorporation into one of the main themes of the new apparatus of calculation. For 
the first time, the divisions of wage labour within coal mining were publicly displayed for 
scrutiny^'^. 
The decision on the 1947 case reaffirmed the significance of the division of wage 
labour. The Chairman of the Coal Industry Tribunal (CRB No. 436) rejected the attempt at 
equalisation and awarded 3 / - to all workers with the exception of mechanical unit 
employees who received 3/6 "because of the special skhl which their work requires". 
Hence, the relative position of all mine workers was preserved. Moreover, the chairman 
extended the calculation of relative position to that between coal miners and workers in 
other industries. The increase was awarded on the basis of preserving the "relative 
position of workers in this industry and others". 
WTiile the miners were caught up in the logic of relativities it never became as 
strong as in other industries. First, the comparison to other workers never gained 
dominance in the coal industry. After 1947, the Tribunal was not as willing to compare 
the mining industry with others. In the 1954 decision (CRB No. 1034) the chairman 
reaffirmed an earlier point about the lack of easy comparability. He argued that while 
mining wages had risen less than in other industries, it could not be seen as upsetting the 
relative position of mine workers with others. The miners' wages had been set apart from 
the normal procedures of the general arbitration system. In particular, they had been 
loaded for intermittency which had subsequently disappeared, without any reduction in 
wages. Thus, he claimed, it was virtually impossible to find a point of comparison 
between coal mining wages and those of other industries. As a result, "the maintenance of 
relativities with external groups was not a dominant concern" within the coal industry 
(Romeyn,1981:420). 
67. No real analysis, however, was made of the division of wage labour until the work value case in 1968 
(CR No. 1888). 
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Moreover, the careful gradations along the basis of skill did not become as crucial 
in the coal mdustry as in others. In part, it was due to a continuance of an ethos that 
belonged to the hand mining period. The tradition of equality, evident particularly in the 
sharing of pay between each pair of contract miners, continued long after the ending of 
contract mining. In the 1950's the union consistently sought to minimise differences in 
wage labour, particularly by demanding flat rate increases to wages^^. As well, they 
managed to secure equal pay for ah underground workers in a number or mines, despite 
the differences in classification and wage rates. 
Despite the practices which existed and which acted to minimise the effect of the 
division of wage labour in the coal industry, it was significant. The Coal Industry 
Tribunal was always very careful not to endanger relativities within the mining industry. 
Though their decisions might diminish the difference in terms of a wages gap between 
classifications, the gaps always remained. As well, the union often rehed on a strategy 
which ensured the continuance of relativities. Wage rises were sought by raising the 
wages of one classificafion level. When it was achieved, they could then argue that in 
order to maintain the proper relative position of all workers, that other wages had to rise 
as well. Moreover, the new positions which were created as a result of mechanisation had 
wage rates determined by reference to the gap between their (technical) skih and the skills 
of other mine workers. 
As a result all wage labour was divided along a continuum of skill, danger, and 
distance from the coal face. All three categories tended to be run together as skih was 
defined as dealing with danger which was greatest at the coal face. The codification of the 
divisions meant that the divisions became visible. Between each classification and its 
wage rate was a carefully calculated gap which marked its distance in terms of skill from 
the next classification. 
Though the gap was precise the determinafion of the distance was not. After all, 
the judgment of what is skhl is a result of a social process. The relative strengths of 
68. The Coal Industry Tribunal also aided steps towards equalisation by granting flat rate increases. 
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occupational groups have as much to do with the recognition of skill as any "scientific" 
assessment of it. As Marx (1954:192) notes: 
The distinction between skilled and unskhled labour rests in part on 
pure illusion (.) 
What becomes significant is not skill itself, but the way in which it serves as the basis for 
the fine gradations of wage labour. 
Within the hand mining period there had been two massive divisions around 
which the apparatus of calculation operated. There were the opposing needs of labour 
and capital and the status distinction between contract and day labour. Only contract 
labourers were seen as productive labour. All work depended upon the contract 
labourers' willingness to work, all organisation of work revolved about their needs. They 
had the status of freedom and independence as opposed to the dependency of day labour. 
The apparatus of calculation was transformed during and after the Second World 
War. A collective, homogenised form of wage labour had been constituted by the 1950's. 
In place of the divisions between labour and capital there was the homogeneous neutral 
field of the economy. As weh, the difference between labourers was re-worked. During 
the middle of the century the mine workforce ceased to be divided along status lines. As 
contract labourers declined in number and became marginal within the apparatus of 
calculation a new form of segmentation developed. In place of the single massive division 
between contract labourers and day workers there arose the fine gradations of the division 
of wage labour. 
Foucault has argued that the relations of power now take the form of disciplinary 
power. Its instruments are "humble" and "minor": "hierarchical observation" and 
"normalizing judgement" both of which are contained in the examinafion (1979b,170-194). 
They produce power not through any show of force (though that may occur) but by 
rendering subjects visible, to others and to themselves. Through their operation subjects 
are combined in an homogeneous field and differentiated according to some norm. The 
process is both subtle and pervasive. It creates mdividuals who in maintahiing their 
individuality also reproduce the relations of power. Individuals are subjected in both 
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senses of the word while power itself appears to disappear for "it is the apparatus as a 
whole that produces 'power'" (Foucault,1979b:177). 
Disciplinary power has become "the general formula of domination" m modernity, 
claims Foucault (1979b:137)69 j^ g ability to constitute subjects as both docile and usehjl 
has led to its proliferation (FoucaulLl979b:211). Foucault has detailed its form within the 
penal system and shown its use in the army, schools, factories and hospitals. We can see 
its extension into the relations in exchange between capital and wage labour. 
The apparatus of calculation in the middle of the century subjected the wage 
labourer to hierarchical observation and normalising judgment. It compared, 
differentiated and homogenised. It produced the wage labourer as a place on a 
continuum of skill. Each division could be compared and differentiated. In the process it 
constituted a new form of individual. The wage labourer was no longer the needy worker 
but what we can cah a disciphnary wage labourer. He was an individual produced by the 
techniques of a disciplinary form of power (Foucault 1977h)'^^. 
69. Foucault does give accounts of other modes of operation of power in his work: "governmentality" 
(1979c) and "bio-power" (1978). 
70. Bargaining will never be absent from capitalism, it will merely have different characteristics. Hence 
within the newly forming apparatus of calculation, bargaining (with all of its attendant tactics of strikes, 
go-slows etc) continued. The miners are militant and have always had impressive campaigns 
surrounding their national log of claims and have continued to fight in the local arena as well over 
production bonuses and work issues. 
Indeed, production bonuses became an increasingly significant element in the miners' wages from the 
middle of the 1960's onwards (Fisher,l987:330). Fisher (1987:294) sees them as providing "a focus for and 
a stimulus to lodge organisation and local militancy". Doubtless his assessment is true. However, thev 
are at the same time another prachce which shaped the newly forming apparatus of calculation. While 
miners employed considerable industrial strength in obtaining very significant bonuses, they were also 
fitting themselves more firmly into a hegemonic relation with capital. After all, bonuses effectively link 
workers and owners into the common goal of the enterprise and its profitability, whatever the rhetoric of 
the miners in their struggles. 
Social practices tend to reproduce social relations but are never merely mirrors of them. The relation 
between the two is one of tendencies (Bhaskar,1979). While a new social relation was being produced 
within the apparatus of calculation after the Second World War, the actual practices of bargaining also 
held within them references to an earlier period. No where is this more evident than with the miners. 
They have continued, up until very recently, to engage in militant tactics which are often linked in 
ideology to the struggles in the first part of the century. However, one must not be misled into thinking 
that they reproduced the key social relation within the early form of the apparatus of calculation: the 
needy wage labourer. It is the contention of this thesis that the effect of the bargaining after the war, has 
been to transform the wage labourer. The struggles no longer situate need either within the worker or 
within the capitalist. Nor do they hold the needs as fundamentally opposed. The tendency is for the 
once antagonistic relations to be replaced by more consensual ones where the needs, if they appear, are in 
the transformed form of combined concerns. 
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CONCLUSION. 
In the middle of the century a new apparatus of calculation was set in place. The 
transformation occurred as responses were made to the contradictions between the early 
form of calculation and the new requirements of production. No-one designed the new 
apparatus of calculation, yet we can read back over the practices of all the parties in the 
middle of the century and see how they seem to lead inexorably to it. Within it the old 
antagonistic relation between the needs of capital and labour was replaced with a neutral 
field of bargaining: the economy. As weh, a series of fine gradations between wage labour 
was substituted for the great binary division between contract miners and day labour 
which had existed in the early form of calculation. The disciplinary wage labourer was 
born. 
At the same time as the apparatus of calculation was being re-shaped, so too was 
the labour process. The next chapter explores the way in which the knowledge, whl and 
the needs of labour were re-constituted in a more capitalist form within the labour process 
as mechanisation was introduced into mining. 
An analysis of how production bonuses produce a hegemonic relation, and the effect of the continuing 
political idelogy of miners within that context, would be interesting. 
241 
CHAPTER 9 
DOMINATION THROUGH HEGEMONY: CAPITAL'S SUBSUMPTION 
OF LABOUR. 
After the Second World War there was a concerted attempt to meclianise the 
mines in Australia. The nature of labour was transformed within the new 
organisation of work. The miner lost his earlier independence of will and 
knowledge as they were re-shaped and held within management and technology. 
With that the real subsumption of labour into capital occurred. At tlie same 
time, another aspect of workers, their psychological needs, began to become 
available to capital, as a tool over labour, and the possibilities for the 
subsumption of labour into capital deepened. 
Most industries had mechanised production by the turn of the century, but mining 
did not until after the Second World War. Coal was the crucial fuel for post war 
development and so, in the face of capitalist tardiness, the State stepped in to ensure that 
the industry would become modern. 
The shift in the labour process from formal to real subsumption was greatly 
delayed within mining. It was not until the late 1950's and into the 1960's that a new form 
of labour process became obvious. Then a double transformation took place. First, those 
attributes of knowledge and wih which had been housed in the miner in the early period, 
were re-worked and removed from his dominion. They re-appeared, as visibly forms of 
capital, in the new machines and the expanded role of management. At the same time, 
another attribute of the worker was called up by the "human relations" school which 
"discovered" the workers' needs for recognition and security. They could, h was argued, 
be addressed by managers to produce a new co-operative team which would work in the 
interests of the enterprise. The subsumption of labour into capital was deepened when 
the workers' psychological attributes were caught up m a stratum of personnel or human 
resource managers and an academic discipline to service them. In the process, a new form 
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of labour was being constituted: one whose subjection was accomplished through 
subjectivity. 
TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION. 
At the end of the Second World War capitalist countries embarked upon ambitious 
programmes of mdustrialisation. It was hoped that economic weh being would follow 
from mass production and mass consumption and a generally healthy cycle of economic 
activity would be set in train. Concomitantly, there was a fear on all sides of the political 
spectrum that the glorious vision for the future would not eventuate and that another 
great depression would follow. Much of the programme of industrialisation was a 
concerted attempt to prevent such an occurrence. 
The economic well being of the whole nation, and even the success of capitalism, 
depended upon expanding and rehable supplies of coal. Coal was (initially) the crucial 
fuel for development, for it was essential for the internal transportation of goods (the 
rahways), and more importantly for electricity generation upon which all industries rehed. 
Yet, the industry was not in a fit state for providing a continuous supply, let alone for 
expansion. Not only was it unmechanised, but it had difficulties with acquiring sufficient 
labour and with maintaining continuous production from those who were working. 
The organisation of work in the coal mdustry in Australia, after the Second World 
War, was virtually the same as it had been throughout the previous century. Coal was 
sthl predominantly hewn by hand, then loaded into skips which were wheeled by the 
labourers themselves. As the Royal Commission {Report,1946:346), noted "mining 
technique in ah the states was very backward". 
New South Wales, the dominant producer of coal, was poorly mechanised. In 1944 
only 37% of coal was produced with machines, and only 21% was mechanically fhled 
{Report,1946:88). Even as late as 1951, only 38% of the coal was machine loaded and cut 
and only 13 of the underground mines were fully mechanised. 
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Queensland was even more "backward". In 1949 The Powell Duffryn report 
(1949:43)^ found that there was only one mine which could be classified as fully 
mechanised in Queensland, and even it used primitive methods. Mechanisation at the 
face consisted only of the use of power drills rather than hand boring. Coal was loaded 
and transported to the surface with the aid of technology, however, it was limited in its 
possibilities by being still tied to the capabhities of the contract miner. Only one other 
mine in Queensland hi 1949 had mechanical loading of coal (Powell Duffryn Technical 
Services,1949:44-45) and only three were using coal cutting machines. The report stated 
that a few mines used power borers and /or pneumatic picks, but that the majority had not 
even this rudimentary form of technology. 
The Royal Commission {Report,1946) asserted that one reason for the greater lack of 
development in Queensland mines was the operation of the Central and District Coal 
Boards. They were set up in 1933 under The Coal Production Regulation Act with the aim 
of preventing "ruinous" competition between companies and drastic levels of intermittent 
work for the employees. They regulated the production, sale and distribution of coal in 
Queensland, setting quotas, coal prices and even determining who could buy what coal. 
The Royal Commission {Report,1946:378) scathingly connmented on what it saw as a 
"comfortable" arrangement between mine owners, mine workers and the State: 
The ingenious devices involved in this statutory effort to avoid the evils 
of competitive cutting of prices within the State in case of slackness of 
demand, appear to function with comparative satisfaction to everyone 
engaged in the coal industry. BuL with every respect to the originators 
of the plan, there are imphcit in it the elements of stagnation and decay. 
It {Report,1946:378-9) found that as coal producers were restricted to their district for the 
sale of coal, and penalised 1 / - per ton for coal produced in excess of their quota (plus some 
small allowance for deviation), and as quotas remained with those who were in the coal 
industry in 1933 there was an inbuht tendency to restrict improvements of any kind. 
Consequently, it {Report,1946:379) claimed that: 
Perhaps the combination of all these factors is playing an important role 
in the persistence throughout Queensland of mining methods, working 
1. Powell Duffryn Technical Services were commissioned by the Queensland Government to carry out a 
survey of the Queensland coal industry. 
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practices and, in some places, living conditions on the coal fields that 
constitute improper and distasteful anachronisms. 
Probably the greater reason lay in the paucity of capital generally within Queensland as 
the first Queensland Coal Board report (1952:10) observed. The boards were doubtless 
merely reflecting the possibhities of capital, although their policies may, in turn, have 
limited its investments as well. 
The lack of labour was also significant. The first report of the Joint Coal Board 
(1947-48:pomt 122\3) clahned the industry in New South Wales was short of 1200 men. 
What made the situation worse was that those who were employed did not work full time. 
The Joint Coal Board fijrther pointed out that 12.29% of possible producfion was lost 
through strikes and commented "in view of the present coal shortage in Austraha (it) is 
fantastically high". 
The problems of a shortage in supply of labour and capital were linked, but seemed 
unsolvable through the "normal" processes of free enterprise. Capital was unable and 
unwilling to invest, and labour was unwhling to work hi the primitive conditions. The 
free market could not bring about the transformation required. It is not surprising that the 
State should step in to solve the problem. 
The most significant intervention was in New South Wales. The Joint Coal Board 
was set up in 1947 following the passing of the Coal Industry Act (Commonwealth) and 
the Coal Industry Act (New South Wales)^. The Board had "extremely wide" (Joint Coal 
Board, Annual Report,1947-8:5) powers over production, distribution and pricing of coal. It 
could take action: 
(a) To ensure that coal is produced in the State in such quantities and 
with such regularity as will meet requirements throughout Austraha and 
in trade with other countries; 
(b) To ensure that the coal resources of the State are conserved, 
developed and worked and used to the best advantage in the public 
interesL 
(c) To ensure that coal produced in the State is distributed and used in 
such manner, quantities, classes and grades and at such prices as are 
2. Acts had to passed at both levels of government as the Australian constitution does not allow the 
Commonwealth Government to control the coal industry in a particular state, or even in all states, in 
peace time. As the coal industry in New South Wales was of national significance and needed 
Commonwealth funds for its rejuvenation both levels of government were willing to be involved. 
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calculated best to serve the public interest and secure the economic use 
of coal and the maintenance of essential services and industrial activities; 
and 
(d) To promote the welfare of workers engaged in the coal industry in 
the State. (Section 14 of C'Wealth Act and Section 11 of the NSW Act 
cited in Johit Coal Board, Annual Report, 1947-8:5) 
Queensland declined to be involved in the joint undertaking with the 
Commonwealth and New South Wales governments, despite requests that it do so. Its 
refusal arose from a fear of Commonwealth incursion into the area of State's rights 
(Australian Archives: CRS A432, item 49/1140 part 1). However, the fear of being too 
closely linked to the much more mdustrially turbulent and economically powerful New 
South Wales industry also played a part. In 1948 Queensland set up its own board to 
control its coal industry^. The Coal Industry (Control) Act of 1948 constituted and gave 
powers to the Queensland Coal Board which were virtually the same as those in New 
South Wales except that it was charged with the additional function of: 
(encouraging) the highest degree of co-operation between management 
and workers so as to ensure maximum efficiency and production 
(Section 18 of the Coal Industry Control Act cited in Queensland Coal 
BoaTd,Annual Report, 1949-52:2) 
Both the Joint Coal Board and the Queensland Coal Board set about modernising 
the industry^. The Joint Coal Board assiduously pursued mechanisation. It provided 
3. It did not have any powers over the three State owned mines in Queensland - Ogmore, Collinsville 
and Mount Mulligan. 
4. While considerable expense was incurred mechanising production neither board put as much effort 
into modernising the social environment of the workers. The miners charged both coal boards with 
being tardy on providing for their welfare ( foint Coal Board, Annual Report 1947-8:20; 
Thomas,l986:424). Despite the extreme poverty in social conditions for Queensland miners the 
Queensland Coal Board never engaged in any extensive programme of welfare. It confined itself to 
subsidising local authorities for the cost of setting up water and electricity supplies to isolated mining 
townships. The joint Coal Board, on the other hand, was much more active. It helped establish 
community facilities such as football grounds, halls, libraries and playgrounds, baby health centres 
and holiday camps for the children of miners. It also supplemented educational facilities with 
equipment and even funded training in "domestic science" for girls as it claimed ( |^oint Coal Board, 
Annual Report, 1953-4:20): 
Good cooking contributes to the miners' health and to a better approach to his 
work. 
The Joint Coal Board also set up and financially assisted Co-operative Building Societies and a Saving and 
Loan Society. 
The boards were systematically, albeit slowly, re-shaping the miner by changing his social environment 
and even his family. It is reminiscent of the social programmes directed at the family in the nineteenth 
century (Donzelot,1979). 
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fuiancial and technical assistance, and more importantly provided a pool of mechanical 
equipment for collieries to buy or hire^. The Queensland Coal Board, to encourage 
mechanisation, lent money to collieries at a low rate of interest and payable on a 
production basis (Queensland Coal Board, /4nnual Report,1952-3:13). However, the Board 
did not aim for rapid mechanisation. In the first few years of its existence it operated with 
a double strategy which recognised the "primitive" nature of the Queensland coal industry. 
It attempted to prepare for the future by conducting drilling operations to determine the 
extent of coal on the leases so that systematic layouts of mines could be planned - a pre-
requisite for full mechanisation. However, it was also faced with the reality of poorly laid 
out mines suitable only for hand-mhiing techniques. Consequently, it tried to make these 
operate more effectively within that context. As the Board claimed (Queensland Coal 
Board, Annual Report,1957-8:13) "(its) policy on the matter of colliery mechanisation (was) 
one of 'hastening slowly'". 
The Queensland Coal Board thus acted within the framework of hand mining. It 
insisted that all mines have power borers and pneumatic picks and attempted to eliminate 
hand wheeling^. The changes made the jobs of contract miners and wheelers less 
arduous, and potentially made an increase in output possible^. However, they did not 
fundamentally alter the nature of work and the contract miner remained central to 
production 
Though the dominant form of organisation of work remained hand mining up until 
the end of the 1950's in Queensland, there had been a change to fuh mechanisation at the 
State owned Cohhisvhle mine in the Northern field. It was the largest mine in the State 
and was fully mechanised by 1953-4 through a direct grant from the Government which 
5. The process of getting mining equipment was difficult because there was a very short supply. 
6. It was not altogether successful in the latter task, for as late as 1959, the Board could only claim that 
"hand wheeling has been considerably reduced" (Queensland Coal Board, Annual Repwrt,1958-9:3). 
7. The increase in output however, was not guaranteed because of the continuing centrality of the 
contract miner. Most mines had dargs, some of which were mutually agreed upon. The darg limited the 
output of the miners with the result that most could leave work before they had completed the shift. 
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allocated close to £472,000 in 1951 for the purposes {Queensland Government Mining 
jour rial,1951:266)^. 
However the technological transformation at Collinsville did not provide any 
impetus for development in the privately owned mines in the State. They did not have 
the same government money*^ available for their mechanisation and they were unwilling to 
finance it themselves. Additionally, the coal from Cohinsville was not in competition with 
that from the major producing district: West Moreton. Consequently, the mechanisation 
at Collinsville provided little stimulus for change. 
One mine in the West Moreton District did mechanise shortly after the war but it 
too had little effect on other mines. In 1951 Box Flat introduced coal cutters, scraper 
loaders, joy loaders and conveyor belts. However, even the appearance of mechanisation 
within the major producing district did not feed into an imperative for others to follow. 
The policies of the Queensland Coal Board eliminated the normal effects of competition. 
The pricing practices of the Queensland Coal Board tended to discourage 
mechanisation. The Board set district prices for all coal and periodically adjusted these to 
accommodate changes in costs. Any wage and award variations, any hicreases in prices of 
stores and materials, and the cost of mine development were taken into account 
(Queensland Coal Board, Annual Report,1949-52:19)^^\ The aim was to fulfil the 
requirement of The Coal Industry (Control) Acts, 1948 to provide an equitable return for 
owners and to ensure that coal was sold on an "economic" basis (Queensland Coal Board, 
Annual Report,1953-4:30)^^. The result, however, was that there was little necessity to 
8. State coal mines were all controlled by the State Mining Department. 
9. The Queensland Coal Board had distributed, as loans to fifteen privately owned collieries, £10,988 in 
1952 and £73,753 in 1953 (Queensland Coal Board, Annual Report,\9^9-S2:\\; 1952-3:13). 
10. These were calculated from returns from coUieries which gave the costs of production, distribution 
and administration. 
11. The State could intervene in peace time in the control of colliery profits because: 
it (was) obvious that a stable coal industry operating on a sound financial basis (was) essential to 
the general well being of the State (Queensland Coal Board, Annual Report,\9A9-S2:\9). 
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mechanise as a means of making or increasing profits, as reasonable profits were 
guaranteed. 
The process of mechanisation was also hindered by the Board's policy of allocating 
quotas. Even if a colliery mechanised, there was no guaranteeing that it could expand its 
quota to its new productive capacity. The Queensland Coal Board carefully controlled 
quotas m the West Moreton, Darling Downs and Maryborough districts. They were 
varied in terms of the grades and types of coal and the ability of the cohieries to produce 
the required tonnages. Certainly, it had also specified "target mines" which had been 
helped with mechanisation and quotas were established for them which were Imked into 
their productive possibihties (Queensland Coal Board, Annual Report,1949-52:13). 
However, the Board's flexibility was not that of the free market, for it also attempted to 
give "equal treatment" (Queensland Coal Board, Annual Report,1952-3:7) to ah cohieries. 
The existence of quotas during the 1950's was probably necessary for a stable industry, as 
they would work in favour of the majority. However, in reducing the rewards to 
capitalists for mechanisation, they doubtless also played a part in holding it back. 
The situation was not entirely stable. There was producer and consumer pressure 
on the Board to release its control over prices and quotas. Not surprisingly, a number of 
cohieries found their productive capacity greater than their quota allocation and so there 
was an attempt to break the system in 1958. Some proprietors oversupphed their 
customers and "the position quickly got out of hand" (Queensland Coal Board, Annual 
Report,1958-9:ll). However, the Board reasserted its control over quotas "in the best 
interests of the utdustry and the majority" (Queensland Coal Board, Annual Report,1958-
9:11). As well, the coal consumers were increasingly dissatisfied with having to take 
inferior coal from mines. They were concerned with the quantity of ash in the coal, 
particularly as it created problems for the new furnaces which were being used (especially 
in the electricity industry). There was also a general pressure to free up the quota system 
from customers who could not get sufficient coal. Consumption of coal in the Southern 
Division of the State steadily increased from 1,601,968 tons m 1952 to 1,791,615 tons in 1959 
(Queensland Coal Board, Annual Reports,1955-6:9; 1959-60:13) but m five of the eight years 
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there was insufficient coal to meet the demand. It had to be imported from other divisions 
at considerable cost to the consumers. There was thus intense pressure on the Board from 
many sources to free up the system of quotas. There was also the ever increasing threat 
that consumers would turn to other fuels if coal was not readily and cheaply available. 
The railways, most importantly, but also other establishments, were beginning to use oil 
based fuels instead of coal. The Board consequently modified both their pricing and quota 
policy in 1960. 
A rapid change to mechanisation of the Queensland mines followed from the 
change in policy. In 1961-2, 32% of coal produced from underground mines came from 
completely mechanised ones {Queensland Government Mining journal,1961-2:2) and by 1970 
it was 95%) {Queensland Government Mining }ournal,1969-70:15). 
Doubtless, the rapid transformation was also due to the technological break 
through with the development of the continuous miner. Though mechanical means had 
been available for each of the tasks in mining, the processes were not linked. Much 
ingenuity had been employed in attempting to overcome these technical gaps. The 
continuous miner provided the solution as it combined digging and loading and the 
cutting of the coal^^ Jt became avahable after 1952 (Woomer,1953:391) and was very 
quickly adopted. By 1959 half of the production in New South Wales was being won by 
continuous miners (Ross,1970:492)l-3. 
THE REAL SUBSUMPTION OF LABOUR. 
The most primitive forms of mechanisation did not fundamentally alter the labour 
process. The power driven tools which were introduced were simple - essentiahy a motor 
12. Initially it presented a number of problems, particularly in that it produced very fine coal which was 
not welcomed by the consumers. As well, it was hindered in reaching its possibilities by the fact that the 
transport of coal was slow in relation to the production. The new technical disharmony in production 
meant that continuous miners were not initially used in thick seams where there was a "narrow margin 
(in production) between conventional and continuous mining" (Woomer,1953:391). 
13. Queensland was slower in development as, at that time, only Box Flat had installed a continuous 
miner. The workers were very concerned about the threat it posed to their jobs. "Vickers (QCEU) in a 
report to Common Cause (October, 3rd, 1959:1) claimed that its introduction "could mean the closure of ten 
other mines". 
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was added to an existing hand tool. The "subjective" form of co-ordmation of work was 
unaltered, for the contract miner remamed at the centre of the labour process with all work 
organised around him. The organisation of haulage both in terms of the timing of the 
arrival of skips and in terms of the layout of the mine was determined by the needs of the 
pair of contract workers. As well, the knowledge and whl necessary for production 
continued to belong to him. Certainly, the new tools were no longer the miner's personal 
property but that of the capitalist^'^. Yet, he could still claim to have command over them, 
as became evident in the long running dispute at Willeroo in 1951. The Local Reference 
Board (Transcript of Evidence,3/7/51: Queensland Coal Association records) had reduced 
the tonnage rate for contract miners using pneumatic picks, although that had not 
occurred anywhere else in Australia. In retahation the men returned to using hand picks 
and so were locked out of the mine. Millar (for the QCEU) before the Local Reference 
Board asserted the old authority of the contract miner over his tools: 
if the miners do not desire to use pneumatic picks no law in the land can 
force them to do so (Local Reference Board, Transcript of 
Evidence,21/8/51: Queensland Coal Association records) 
The Chairman of the Reference Board confirmed the point (Local Reference Board, 
Transcript of Evidence,24/8/51: Queensland Coal Association records): "I cannot make an 
order as to what tools the men will use". Even though the pick had been modified, it still 
held its old relation to the miner. It was the miner who used the tool. Ah the essential 
features of the formal subsumption of labour were stih in place. 
The introduction of scraper loaders, conveyor belts and coal cutters pushed in the 
direction of a large change within the labour process. Each of the old tasks remained, 
although they were performed with the aid of machinery. The coal was still hewn, but the 
coal cutter lightened the work involved. It continued to be picked from the fioor and 
transported to the surface, but the shovel was replaced by the scraper loader and the 
conveyor belts subsfituted mechanical for hand wheehng. However, the context of work 
was altered dramatically for the unit of co-ordination was transformed. The pair of 
14. Li the earlier period of hand mining contract miners had to supply their own shovels, picks and 
borers. 
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contract miners formed the co-operative shape of work within hand mining. It was 
supplanted by a new structure which had a technical form: the "mechanical unit". It was 
made up of the group of men whose activities were necessary to the operation of the 
system of pieces of machinery. The steps that were necessary for getting coal were not 
changed. The coal still needed to be undercufi holes bored for explosives, shots fired, coal 
taken off the "solid" and loaded onto conveyor belts. YeL the advent of the very simple 
technology altered the form of labour. It literally took the knowledge of the miner and 
distributed it amongst those employed on the mechanical unit. As well, it constituted a 
capitalist form of co-ordination, dictated by the possibihties of technology, for the earlier 
one organised around the capabhities of humans. Not surprishigly, there was also a 
tendency for management to assume more authority to oversee the whole process (Penn & 
Simpson,1986:343). 
The possibilities of increased production within the new organisation of work, 
together with the gaps in it which hindered its fuh realisation, produced the necessity for 
further technical changes. The continuous miner, which was developed to overcome the 
bottlenecks, revolutionised the production of coal. 
The transformation of the labour process which was underway with the use of 
scraper loaders and conveyor belts was solidified and deepened with the advent of the 
continuous miner. Not only was the contract miner made obsolete, but so too was "labour 
for cutting, labour for boring, labour for shooting^^^ labour for laying roads". They ah had 
become "cast-offs" just as the contract miner had (CR 1405, Hours, Transcript of Evidence, 
July,1960: Coal Industry Tribunal records). Once again the "technical necessities" of the 
machine shaped the organisation of work. Each continuous miner had a team of eight 
miners whose jobs were connected with its functions (Joint Coal Board, Annual 
Report,1959-60:29). The tasks of the various members were brought together, but in quite a 
different fashion from that under the contract miner. The integration was as Penn and 
Shnpson (1986:345) remark "to the team rather than the individual craftsman". And the 
15. The continuous miner eliminated the necessity for shooting down the coal which meant that there 
was a huge savings not only on the labour employed in boring and shooting, but also on explosives. 
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team took its shape from the "technical necessity dictated by the instrument of labour 
itself (Marx,1954:365)l6. 
There was also an expansion of management's knowledge and control of the labour 
process, and with that a transformation of the managers themselves. The continuous 
miner and the re-shaping of the production unit put the responsibility for planning and 
supervision more firmly in their hands. They had, like the workers, to change to 
accommodate to the technical transformation, for their previous qualifications were seen to 
be as obsolete as those of the contract miner. Managers were exhorted to obtain a 
technical education commensurate with the new demands placed upon them. The Royal 
Commission (R^orf,1949:185-6) strongly argued the need for change: 
This special stress upon practical knowledge (for managers) may have 
some merit up to a point; but it emphasises the parochial outlook that for 
years has retarded the progress of the Industry....Practical competence 
alone can rarely impart that broader vision which a high class scientific 
training can add and which is becoming every day more necessary and 
appreciated in every efficient industry (the) Coal Industry is sfill firmly 
in the grip of tradifional and archaic ideas. In modern conditions to 
ensure success, practice must be linked with science^^. 
The continuous miner transformed the labour process by fundamentally altering 
the relation of labour to capital. Within the hand mining period the miners kept 
command over the knowledge needed for production, their whl to produce and the tools 
used. Earlier changes in the labour process had certainly pushed knowledge and will 
towards management, but while contract mining continued that could not be complete. 
The continuous miner changed the possibhities. Production no longer revolved around 
the knowledge or will of the miner^^. These attributes did not disappear with the advent 
16. The machine has a host of possibilities contained within it as Braverman (1975:230) points out. 
However, those which are called up within the capitalist labour process: 
are only an expression of that side of its possibilities which capital tends to develop 
most energetically: the technical ability to separate control from execution. 
17. The Royal Commission (Reporf,1949:186,190) argued for the need for the development of specialised 
instruction in coal mining in engineering faculties at universities. It also advocated the introduction of 
diploma courses under the Department of Technical Education. 
18. No worker, not even on the assembly line, loses all ability to think in relation to work, although it can 
become almost non-existent. The miners maintained a considerable amount of knowledge, although it is 
also true that its centrality diminished. 
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of the continuous miner, but they did become peripheral and insignificant compared to the 
"knowledge" and "wih" contained in the whole process^^. The individual worker was then 
only a small part of producfion. The miners' abilities had been transformed into the 
machine, management and mto the whole organisafion of workers. In that process the 
nature of the social relations of production altered. Essential human attributes had taken 
on a capitalist shape and so stood over the worker as alien objects. The transformation 
marked the real subsumption of labour. 
Real subsumption occurs when the attributes of labour take on a visible capitahst 
form. Because of the wage exchange all attributes that are required for production are 
effectively forms of capital. Under formal subsumption they are housed in the body of the 
worker and he/she has control over them. With real subsumption they are transformed, 
appearing in a new guise as forms of capital and so dommate labour. 
The knowledge, the judgement, and the wih, which though in ever so 
small a degree are practised by the independent peasant or 
handicraftsman, these faculties are now only required for the 
workshop as a whole. Inteihgence in production expands in one 
direction, because it vanishes in many others....the labourer is brought 
face to face with the intellectual potencies of the material process of 
production, as the property of another and as a ruling power 
(Marx,1954:341). 
The transformation of the labour process frees capital from its previous human 
fetters and sets in place a specifically capitahst form of production (Marx,1976:1024). The 
first result is an enormous increase in productivity^O. The AC&SEF pointed this out 
before the Coal Industry Tribunal: 
19. The miners could joke about their knowledge being superceeded by science. A cartoon by Toby 
lackson, {Common Cause,3'lst October,1959:5) depicting the setting of props, has the caption: 
According to theory it should go over there, but according to this bloody crook roof, 
it should go here. 
20. It is a form of social progress of considerable magnitude. However, because it is in the context of 
capitalism the progress is experienced as "a social calamity" (Marx,l 954:458) for it makes the old forms of 
labour redundant and the labourer "superfluous" (Marx,l 954:457). 
This was certainly the case within mining. The mechanisation of mining and the mechanical extraction 
of pillar coal, together with a decline in the need for coal, produced a situation of over-capacity. The 
Governments tried to ameliorate the crisis by stockpiling coal but by 1954 it could no longer be contained. 
The Joint Coal Board started a policy of closing small mines by refusing them contracts and lowering 
prices (Ross,l976:449). However, that did not solve the problem of over capacity and mine closures 
continued. In 1955 to 1957 there were large scale dismissals and closures of even major mines and at the 
end of the period there were 2000 fewer men in the industry (Ross,1976:466). There were also dismissals 
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When one takes in consideration that the good average miner working 
on the coal face prior to the advent of mechanisation and relying solely 
on his pick and shovel, boring machine and explosives for his productive 
capacity produced 10 to 12 tons every day, a production revolution has 
taken place in the coal mining industry (because) the output of the 
continuous miner (is) up to 600 tons per shift (CR 1405, Hours, Transcript 
of Evidence, July,1960: Coal Industry Tribunal records). 
The second effect of the transformation to real subsumption is that it institutes a 
permanent state of change within the labour process. As Marx (1976:1035) points out so 
clearly: 
With the real subsumption of labour under capital a complete (and 
constantly repeated) revolution takes place m the mode of production, in 
the productivity of the workers and in the relation between workers 
and capitalists (my emphasis). 
Usually, within the labour process hterature, real subsumption has been taken to mark the 
end of the development of the constitution of the labourer. It is rather, the beginnmg of 
the transformations that labour will undergo within capitahsm. 
When Marx claims that real subsumption occurs when all aspects of the capitalist 
labour process come under the open sway of capital we must be conscious that this 
statement has an historical reference^L Real subsumption refers to the sucking up into 
capital of those attributes of labour which are historically available. When Marx was 
writing they were the qualities of will and knowledge. However, in the middle of the 
twentieth century another aspect of the worker becomes available to capital - the needs of 
the labourer. 
One of the conditions of possibility for the avahabihty of needs was the new 
organisation of work. It instituted a form of disciplinary power. The miners had been 
homogenised by the requirements of the technology and then differentiated within the 
in Queensland throughout all of the mining fields, with a quarter of the miners in the Burrum field 
(Maryborough District) sacked in 1958. 
Meanwhile the quantity of coal that was produced increased each year, with a smaller number of 
workers. In 1947 - 48, 14,969,000 tons of black coal were produced with the employment of 22,856 men. 
By 1960 22,588,000 tons were produced with only 17,689 miners (loint Coal hoaTd,Annual Report,1969). 
While in 1947 each worker effectively produced 655 tons of coal, by 1960 he was producing 1277 tons. 
The discrepancy, of course becomes even greater with the more thorough development of mechanisation 
and the change to large c:>pen cut mining from the late 1960's. 
21. We must be careful with the use of Marx's categories for they are all historical (the transhistorical 
categories are few and are themselves historically bound). They are based on Marx's understanding that 
as the historical features change, so too will the categories that seek to grasp them (see chapter 4). 
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new division of labour it had called up. Concomitantly, they had become more subject to 
the disciplinary gaze of management. That made it possible for a new "object" to appear: 
Knowable man (soul, individuality, consciousness, conduct, whatever it 
is called) is the object/effect of this analytical investmenL of this 
domination-observation (Foucault,1979b:305). 
Foucault has described its appearance within the system of punishment and indicated its 
proliferation. We can see its emergence within the organisation of work. 
DEPENDENCE THROUGH SUBJECTIVITY 
Labourers have always had needs. Yet how they are understood and used in 
terms of their role within the capital/labour relation can differ quite remarkably. During 
the hand mining period it was the physical subsistence needs of the labourer (and his 
family) which provided a crucial link between labour and capital. They were the means of 
ensuring that work was performed: a link which was made within the apparatus of 
calculation. However, the introduction of rights for the workers in the form of social 
insurance, paid holidays and sick days and weekly pay split the relations apart. The 
needs of the labourers floated free. At the same time, processes were beginning which 
would transform them. Rather than appearing as subsistence needs within the apparatus 
of calculation, they were changing into the psychological needs for security and 
recognition within the labour process. 
The physiognomy of the labourer was gradually to be metamorphosed through the 
development of a new discourse centring on the psychological attributes of the workers. 
The Hawthorne studies in the United States "discovered" the importance of the informal 
group and interpersonal relations. They claimed that these influenced worker behaviour 
more than financial incentives or changes in work conditions (Quinian & Bohle,l 991:55). 
Their "findings" opened up the possibhity of the psychological attributes of the workers 
becoming an object of management practice. 
The Second World War was a catalyst for the development of the techniques 
surrounding the psychology of the individual and the group. Miller & Rose (1989:180-1) 
and Qumlan and Bohle (1991:55) commenL respectively, upon their use m England and 
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Australia. The apparent success of the techniques during the war, indicated the 
possibihties for their extension into the civilian workforce. The lessons were spelt out to 
mine owners in an article by Whliams (1947:186) in the Queensland Government Mining 
journal: 
Today we suffer from a tragic paradox. We are taught by our political 
leaders that it is silly to expect our workers to see in their work anything 
but money, or to do more work except for money. At the same time, the 
sons and fathers of these same supposedly hard-bohed workers, fighting 
over there in Iwo Jima, France and Germany were walking gladly to face 
death itself. Why? Because we paid them money? No they faced 
death gladly because as they walked, they felt certain of your recognition 
and my recognition of their nobility. 
At the same time we go through hell gladly for the man who asks of 
us our outmost and then enables us to think better of ourselves in full 
proportion" (my emphasis). 
The needs of workers became the object of managerial practice in two ways. The 
need for personal recognition and value was the key object of the practices surrounding 
the discussion of safety. Also more general needs and desires for security became the 
target of managerial intervention. Both forms of need came together in their effects and 
their aims, as they reconstituted the relations between capital and labour in the labour 
process. 
Within the coal muiuig industry, the "surface of emergence" (Foucault,1972:41) of 
the new object - the labourer with needs for recognition and a sense of self worth - was 
safety. The issue of safety was not new for it had been a continual concern of 
management, miners and governments from the late nineteenth century in Australia. 
What was new, after the Second World War, was the way it came to be understood in 
terms of the desires of the miners for recognition from management. 
The discussions of safety after the Second World War centred upon the 
development of trust between workers and deputies (foremen). Earlier in the century, it 
was understood that proper discipline was the appropriate means of producing safety. 
However, after the war the discourses were transformed dramatically. Safety was to 
result from leadership (Holmes,l945:320) of a particular kind. It seemed that it had to 
become an interest and a desire on the part of the mmers themselves, for without that it 
was claimed any safety programme would fah (Forbes & Ash,1950:182); a point that might 
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have been made at any time. However, what is of interest was the method by which it 
was to be achieved. It was not to be the union in their relation to the workers that secured 
safety, nor the disciplinary practices of management. Rather it was to follow from a new 
form of "human" relation between managers and miners. The solution to the safety 
problem thus was seen to lie in the adequate training of deputies in more than the 
knowledge of safety regulations. The essential part of the training was to involve the 
teaching of how to have a "sincere interest" in the miners themselves (Stahl,1951:124). It 
was to be achieved by showing the miner that he was recognised by publicly 
acknowledging any achievement, and even by using his name: 
A man's name (can be used as it) is what distinguishes him from his 
fehows and it is only human for him to appreciate being singled out 
personally by means of it (Stahl,1951:127). 
The route from leadership to safety was quite devious. Interest in safety was to be 
produced via a trust in management, which would follow from the mhiers responding to 
their needs for personal recognition. As McPherson, manager of the Tivoli Colliery at 
Ipswich (West Moreton District) proclaimed in an address to the Australasian Institute of 
Mming and Metahurgy {Queensland Government Mining journal,1954:399)'^'^: 
The under officials have to win the confidence of the men under their 
charge....The human element therefore, plays such a vital part in the safe 
working of the mine. 
The transformation of the discourse on safety made the needs of the labourers available to 
management intervention. 
More general needs of the workers also became the objects of managerial expertise. 
It appeared to management that labourers had needs beyond those of pay. The prime one 
"discovered" by the new discipline of industrial psychology was for security. Thus it was 
argued that: 
employees want to feel secure in their jobs, and to know that if they do 
their part, the company wih in turn, do ah it can to give them steady 
employment (Jones,1951:698). 
22. Many of the articles on safety were taken from either American or British coal journals and re-printed 
in the Queensland Government Mining journal. It thus acted as a conduit for the new modes of employee 
relations which were being developed in America and being spread throughout the "advanced" capitalist 
countries (Carew,1987). The discourses were picked up by the Queensland coal owners, as is evidenced 
in the above address. 
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Security also referred to the psychological needs for community. Trist and Bam forth 
(1951:10) recognised that the early form of group-belonging within hand mining had 
disappeared with the advent of mechanisation and had not been replaced at the time of 
their writing23. It seemed imperative to all analysts that a new form of group relatedness 
had to developed. As Jones (1951:699) argued the "needs and desires of the employees" 
were inter alia for "a feeling of belonging on the team"24. However, the team was not to be 
one based on the "responsible autonomy" of the pair of contract miners as Trist and 
Bamforth (1951:38) had envisioned, but one that was reshaped around management. 
Browne^S (1953:313) plainly articulates the requirement: 
Above all to improve production, management and men must pull 
together, in a new and corporate undertaking, where each understands 
the place of the other, and his own share in the partnership (my 
emphasis). 
No doubt some part of the transformation came from the possibhities inherent in a 
mechanised system. It concentrated production in a few places (both with longwall and 
the continuous miner) so that if there was a breakdown "serious losses" would result 
{Queensland Government Mining journal,1954:371). Thus mechanisation necessitated a 
workforce which was cohesive and under the auspices of management planning. At the 
same time, it produced the possibihty of re-shaping the older independent groupings. It 
was eulogised as such by an American manager Konnerth {Queensland Government Mining 
journal, 1948:388): 
The trend towards mechanisation in ah mines offers a splendid 
opportunity for fostering a spirit of teamwork and co-operation among 
closely knit crews of workers. 
The needs which were produced and reproduced by the practices of managers and 
the new "human relations" school of industrial psychology were different. One line 
23. They were analysing the new occupational group surrounding the three shift working of the longwall 
method. 
24. He (Iones,1951:699) decided the needs "without actually consulting (the workers)", but was confident 
that they were probably correct. 
25. Browne was Director General of the National Coal Board, U.K. The speech was the Cadman 
Memorial Lecture to the Royal Society of Arts, April,1953. It was reprinted in the Queensland Government 
Mining journal. 
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targeted the individual needs of employees for personal recognition, while the other aimed 
at the need for security which could be met through interpersonal relations within groups. 
Both concerns, however, joined in the tactics in which they played a parL and in their 
effects. 
The mining industry, after the Second World War, was faced with the twin 
problems of a shortage of labour and an existing form which did not match the new 
possibilities of production. All industries experienced an undersupply of workers but the 
problem was particularly acute in coal. In addition, the worker of the hand mining period 
was, as we have seen, a gambler and an independent labourer - a character called up by 
the necessity of the intermittent nature of work. He carried his habits with him into the 
period of rapid technological change. However, his once so valuable qualities then took 
the form of absenteeism and a tendency to strike. As well, the "old" miner also, naturally, 
resisted the new forms of mechanisation which made both his job and his character 
redundant. He was a hindrance to the possibihties contained in the new form of 
production in the coal industry. The double problem required some solution. 
"Human relations" techniques were used in the coal mining industry as part of a 
tactic to produce a "new" labouring population. The aim of the industry was to change the 
nature of the jobs as the Queensland Government Mining journal Editorial at the end of 1949 
made clear: 
The public at large needs to be convuiced that coal and metalliferous 
mining are not just "horny handed" pick and shovel occupations, but 
scientific remunerative and highly mteresting careers, as well as work of 
the utmost national and economic importance^^. 
But if mining was to appear an interesting career then, among other considerations, the 
antagonistic relations between workers and owners had to be overcome. The new 
techniques centring on the psychological needs of the workers were offered as a means of 
26. One wonders if the editorial was merely a re-working of a paper from an American author which had 
been printed in the journal a few months previously. It had argued similarly for America that: 
The public at large must be convinced that the coal mining industry is not 
populated by shovel weilding immigrants but red-blooded Americans belonging to 
a profession as dignified as any other and requiring the same degree of ability and 
intelligence (Konnerth,1948:389). 
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achieving it. Their needs for recognition and security were to be met by an aware well 
trained management team and in the process a new spirit of co-operation would arise: 
A carefully planned, well organised personnel relations programme is 
the most effective means of obtaining these desirable attitudes (Jones, 
1951:702). 
In turn it would attract a "desirable" form of labour (Jones,1951:699). 
Another aim, not quite as innocent, appears to have been part of the introduction of 
the "human relations" methods. They were employed as a means of aligning the workers 
with management, rather than the union. The practices surrounding the psychological 
attributes of the workers themselves were regarded as new, only in the fact that it was 
management which was applying them. It seemed that the unions had always addressed 
the needs of their members and knew how to do it naturally; whereas management did 
not: 
All too few supervisors know these techniques, therefore they should be 
trained. Labour unions know how to train men in these techniques. 
Why should not management be equally alert to the necessity and 
develop the techniques essential to a sound training programme (Stahl, 
1951:124). 
It appeared to writers at the time that if management learned how to address the needs of 
workers, then they could undermme the union. Wihiams (1947:185-6) was quite specific 
about the possibilities. He argued that the unions have "got us ah thinking that the labour 
problem is full of big issues, historic gaps which inevitably separate employer from 
employee" whereas, he claimed, the matter is much more simple. It was merely a matter 
of "close contact" with the worker, a technique which he saw the union as possessing and 
thus enabling it to gain the support of its members. But management could also show the 
same concern and, if they did so, then the "historic gaps" would disappear and with them 
the "pressures" that the union placed on management. The expectation, so openly 
expressed by (Wilhams,1947), was quite general. Miher & Rose (1989) pomt to it as a 
significant dimension of the activity of the Tavistock Programme which was concerned 
with psychological solutions to the problem of increasmg productivity m the United 
Kingdom after the Second World War. They claim that there was a belief that "practices 
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could be introduced withm the enterprise which would effect a genume resolution of 
labour troubles". 
"Human relations" techniques may well have been introduced into companies as 
solutions to their problems of labour shortage and union militancy. They tend not to be 
the primary motives now, for they have become the natural and normal way of organising 
work. The techniques were generalised quite rapidly and are now pervasive. Doubtless, 
their proliferation followed from the new way in which they enabled the interests of 
companies and workers to coincide. 
Within capitalism there is necessarily a mutual interest between workers and 
capitalists. The fact that the livelihood of the workers depends upon the profitabihty of 
companies assures this, but how it is understood varies. As we have seen, in the hand 
mining period the correspondence of interests tended to occur in the apparatus of 
calculation, especially through the wage/selling price hnk. It caught up the needs of 
workers and capitalists as combined, yet oppositional. After the Second World War the 
mutuality of interest is re-worked quite dramatically in the apparatus of calculation and in 
the labour process. The "human relations" techniques enabled a link to be made outside of 
the question of the wage, and internal to the organisation of work. The psychological weh 
being of the employees, produced by management's attention to their needs would in itself 
produce a more efficient organisation of work. Miller & Rose (1989:186) point out "the 
psychological principle of health....was at the same time a managerial principle of 
efficiency". 
In the process the physiognomy of the labourer changed dramatically. Prior to the 
entry of "human relations" techniques the object of managerial intervention was the body 
of the labourer both under formal and real subsumption. The difference in the two forms 
lay in the relation of knowledge to the worker and his relation to the tool. Management's 
seizure of knowledge, which marks the advent of real subsumption, did not alter the object 
of their attentions. Rather it made it possible for a much fhier calculation of the use of the 
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body and its capabhities^^. The entry of the practices surrounding the techniques of 
"human relations" both produced and reproduced a new object. Management no longer 
centred upon the body of the labourer but on his/her psychological attributes. We can 
say, following Foucault (1979a:101) that their target was the soul of the labourer, although 
it must be remembered that this is not the same soul that Christianity addressed, but its 
"worldly" replacement. It substituted for the "other worldly" concerns of the church, the 
new ones suitable to economic relations: 
health, well being (that is sufficient wealth, standard of hving), security, 
(and) protection against accidents (Foucault,1982:215). 
Braverman (1974) understood human resource management in terms of 
manipulation. It would be hard to deny this, although it does not pick out what is most 
significant about the entry of a science and a management of psychological attributes into 
industrial hfe. They have been the major mechanisms through which the disciplinary 
form of power (Foucault, 1979a) was perfected within the organisation of work. They 
employed techniques which in addressing themselves to the needs of the workers had the 
effect oh 
categoriz(ing) the individual, mark(ing) him by his own individuality, 
attach(ing) him to his own identity, impos(ing) a law of truth on him 
which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him 
(FoucaulLl982:212). 
The worker thus becomes "the principle of his own subjection" (Foucault, 1979a:203) and 
hence the mechanisms of power can become very light mdeed. It is not an iron cage 
which traps us, but our own subjectivity. 
CONCLUSION 
The transformation of the object of managerial mtervention created new relations 
between labour and capital. Real subsumption occurred when all aspects of the labour 
process are taken visibly into capital. In the nineteenth century generally, but not unth 
much later in mming, knowledge and whl were the crucial aspects which were subsumed 
27. It is most evident in time and motion studies, but also in studies of fatigue. These were the major 
academic discourses on production relations in the finst part of the century. 
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by capital. In the middle of the twentieth century another aspect of the worker becomes 
"visible": their psychological needs. They too are taken up by capital, in a capitalist form, 
and used as a tool over labour. Their entry into capital was marked by the advent of a 
new stratum of management.- personnel/human resource managers - who would make 
their living from their knowledge of the needs of workers. 
One cannot suppose that the process is by any means complete. It certainly is not 
in the mining industry. Old forms of resistance, old antagonisms still continue, but the 
tendency towards government through subjectivity is visible, even in such an unpromising 
industry as coal mining. What has been analysed, is not the total transformations in the 
labour process within the coal mining industry, but the way in which the possibilities 
begin to emerge. By the middle of the 1950's, the shape that the labour process was to take 
for the rest of the century was clear. 
However, the transition was not easy for those in the coal industry. The new form 
of domination which would operate through hegemony, was born in misery, coercion and 
hatred. Like capitalism itself it came into being "dripping from head to foot, from every 
pore, with blood and dirt (Marx,1954:712). 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE ECONOMIC FORM OF DOMINATION 
Capital dominates labour in the process of exploiting it. It does so through a 
double relationship, within exchange and production, which marks it off as a specific form: 
that of economic domination. Within its two aspects, the apparatus of calculation and the 
labour process, capital constitutes the social relations which contain the possibihties for 
our action in relation to bargaining and work. 
In the early form of domination, labour is closest to its "natural" form. The 
quahties which are necessary for work are held within the person of the worker. Needs 
for subsistence and knowledge and will are under the dominion of the miner himselL We 
can, following Burawoy (1985), cah this a despotic form of domination. It produces both a 
labouring population and the desire to work through personal relations of power. It pits 
need against need, and whl against will. It may never produce barbarous relations, 
though it will tend to, for coercion and force are its reigning qualities. 
After the Second World War the nature of the economic form of domination 
changed dramatically. Bargaining within the apparatus of calculation was arranged 
around the neutral field of "the economy" in which wage labour was both homogenised 
and then differentiated along fine gradations. The key relations of wage labour were then 
organised horizontally, though the play of dhference may well be cast within the form of a 
strike against capitalists. 
The labour process also underwent a transformation. Mechanisation removed the 
forms of knowledge and will that had been necessary in the earlier period. They 
reappeared in their transmuted form in technology, in management and hi the new 
relations at work between fragmented labours. They have visibly become aspects of 
capital and stand over against the workers who, in the process, have lost their 
independence. The real subsumption of labour is set in place. At the same time, another 
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aspect of labour, the psychological needs for recognition and security, began to be 
reshaped and made available to capital through discourses on safety and "human 
relations". As they were taken up they too lost their "natural" connection to workers and 
become a "perverted" new social form in the shape of a managerial stratum. As a resuh, 
the worker is constituted as a subject in the same movement which also subjects him/her 
more deeply to the operation of capital. The process of real subsumption has deepened. 
The double change within the apparatus of calculation and the labour process 
produced a new form of economic domination. It is hegemonic, not because ah the 
relations are necessarily consensual, though they will tend to be, but because the relations 
of domination are accepted as natural and normal. Capital continues to fohow its needs, 
irrespective of the impact on workers. They too continue to resist the pace and nature of 
change. But we can call the economic form of domination hegemonic for ah the relations 
are contained within capitalism. What battles there are, over redundancy! or wages, for 
example, are contained within the rules of the game^. 
The transition from one economic form of domination to another will tend to be 
traumatic. Within cmy economic form of domination, there needs to be an articulation 
between exchange and production, so that production is assured. At a time of transition it 
is easy for the two to become dis-articulated, as they did in the coal mining industry in the 
middle of the century. The transformation of the labour process had been quite rapid, but 
it did not keep pace with the changes in the apparatus of calculation. While the apparatus 
of calculation had removed the calculus based upon need, the labour process was stUl 
organised around independent labour. There was thus no longer any compulsion for 
workers to produce in the quantities desired by others, and every imperative for them to 
assert their independence. 
1. For an example of redundancy within the mining industry, produced within the context of hegemonic 
relations see Turner (1988). 
2. The change is very evident now when the economic form of domination is much more developed. It 
is clear in the absurd claim, espoused by most managers and even many trade unionists, that "win/win" 
bargaining is possible. It is also evident in the change in name from "industrial relations" to "employee 
relations". Neither title makes a great deal of linguistic sense, but the latter is particulariy cumbersome: a 
sure sign of an uneasy relation with reality. 
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The two parts of the economic form of domhiation were in contradiction with each 
other, creating havoc for the miners, the owners and even the State. It is not surprising 
that the tensions that were produced eventually erupted in what is recognised as one of 
Australia's most significant strikes. Though there were some "after shocks", following the 
1949 strike, the major tensions which it encapsulated had been dissipated by it. Within a 
decade a new economic form of domination was in place whose two aspects were once 
again in balance, although hinged around a new object, the soul of the labourer, and 
ensuring production through a reformed link between need and work. 
The coal hidustry went through a particularly acute crisis in the middle of the 
century . The tensions within the economic form of domination were severe. They were 
exacerbated by the fact that the coal industry was also the site for the political battle 
between two ideologies, communism and social democracy. The two contradictions, one 
economic and the other political, came to a head in the 1949 strike. 
In 1949 the workers involved in the coal industry^ started what was going to be a 
seven week long strike. Ostensibly, it was about the failure of the owners, the Joint Coal 
Board and the Governments of New South Wales and the Commonwealth to reasonably 
consider the log of claims of the mining unions^ for long service leave and a 35 hour week. 
In 1948 the AC&SEF had, at its National Convention, endorsed both the claims^ and the 
necessity to achieve them through direct bargaining (Sheridan,1989:270). They were 
subsequently endorsed by the CMU and bargaining began in 19th May, 1949. Despite 
3. The greatest number (approximately 18,000) were miners, and members of the AC&SEF. There were 
also close to 5000 other workers in the coal industry who belonged to other unions but who took part in 
the strike (Deery,1978:85). 
4. The six unitms involved in black coal mining had formed a Coal Mining Unions' Council (known as 
the CMU) to prosecute the log of claims. 
5. It included improvements in pit and town amenities and increases in wages, both of which were 
withdrawn from the bargaining. 
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numerous meethigs from then up until the conference on 26th July no agreeable solution^ 
could be found. Although there were elements of disagreement between the parties, the 
crucial point of dissension was over the connected questions of the right to strike and the 
necessity to use arbitration. It was thus primarhy a dispute over how the labour 
movement should seek gains. While the Government, the Coal Industry Tribunal and the 
owners were insisting on arbitration, the miners, in particular, were refusing it-^ . Largely 
as a result of the intransigent attitudes of the other parties, the CMU unanimously called 
for aggregate meetings to recommend a general strike and declared their right to hold stop 
work meetings and to take industrial action (Deery,1978:42). So on 27th July one of 
Australia's "most devastating" strikes began (Gollan,1975:239). 
The CMU, from the outset, was faced with formidable opposition. The extent to 
which the labour movement, both pohtically and industrially, were willing to go to curb, 
what they saw as. Communist Party disruption in a basic mdustry was remarkable. On 
the second day of the strike the Australian Labour Party controlled Commonwealth 
Government, passed retrospective legislation prohibiting the use of union funds to assist 
6. The CMU had made numbers of concessions during the negotiations. They had reduced their claims 
to just two: long service leave and an in principle agreement to a thirty five hour week (with the miners 
continuing to work the forty hour week until the shortage in production was overcome). They also had 
stated that they would discuss mechanical extraction of pillar coal if their claims were accepted 
(Shendan,1989). The foint Coal Board could well have been sceptical of the reality of the miners' 
intention to negotiate on this crucial issue. The miners had said they would consider it in the light of 
safety issues. Yet, it was precisely on the question of safety that they had been able, through legislation, 
to have mechanical extraction of pillar coal prohibited in New South Wales (Industrial Relations Research 
Centre, Industrial Relations and Labour History Archives: 5/1017, minutes of conferences (re 1949 strike) 
25th and 26th luly, 1949). 
During the process of the negotiations the coal owners and the Joint Coal Board had hardened their 
positions. The Joint Coal Board insisted on both continuity of employment for long service leave and 
agreement on the mechanical extraction of pillar coal. The Chairman of the Coal Industry Tribunal 
(Gallagher) had also taken an exceptionally strong stance insisting that penalties would be enforced if a 
strike were held and that the long service leave award which was in a draft form would be withheld if 
there were a strike, or aggregate meetings (Sheridan,1989). 
7. The miners with a good deal of justification saw that their gains had come from direct action and so 
"they never (would) rely upon orthodox arbitration systems to safeguard and improve working 
conditions" (Industrial Relations Research Centre, Industrial Relations and Labour History Archives: 5/8, 
minutes of meeting of the Central Council of the AC&SEF, 3rd and 7th May 1949). 
The disagreement seems ludicrous now, for clearly workers have always used both strikes and arbitration 
to secure their gains. However, the absurd dichotomy gained its meaning in 1949 because it crystalised 
the different goals and tactics of the Communist Party and the Australian Labour Party and their Cold 
War antagonism over who would lead the labour movement. 
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the general strike in the coal industry. A number of unions, including the AC&SEF 
withdrew their money from the banks. As a result union officials, including from the 
AC&SEF, Whliams (General President), Grant (General Secretary), Parkinson (New South 
Wales Southern District President), Fitzgibbon (New South Wales Southern District 
Secretary) and King (New South Wales Western District Secretary) were prosecuted under 
the act and, on their fahure to return the money, were gaoled for a year (Thomas,1986:377). 
The labour Governments m Queensland and New South Wales also worked against the 
chances of a victory. They immediately introduced power restrictions, despite the lack of 
any necessity to do so. They thus effecfively created large unemployment in other 
industries as workers were laid ofL and hence minimised the general support for the strike 
(Thomas,1986:373; Sheridan,1989:292). Much of the labour movement was also against it, 
including the peak counch of Australian trade unions (the ACTU) and importantly, the 
transport unions who shifted coal in New South Wales which had been declared "black" by 
the AC&SEF. The CMU also had to face the opposition of the Australian Labour Party 
which undermined the solidarity of the strike by actively campaigning in the coalfields for 
a return to work on the basis that the strike was communist inspired. The final and fatal 
labour blow came from the Commonwealth Government when they used troops to work 
the open cut coal mines in Northern New South Wales. Throughout the whole period the 
strikers, not only had to face the powerful and relentless opposition of the ALP but also, a 
hosthe press which carried out a frenzied crusade portraying them as dupes of the dictates 
of Russia. 
Given the virulence of the attacks upon the strike it is amazing that it lasted as long 
as it did and with so much cohesion^. However, the ranks did break. The weakest place 
was in Western Australia which had only a tenuous link with the AC&SEF. Queensland, 
too was problematic with most mines in Rosewood working and also some mines on the 
Darling Downs (Thomas,1986:376-383). The real problem was the threatened return to 
8. In itself this was evidence that the workers were not "dupes" of the Communist Party, whatever the 
intentions of that Party. The workers had their own agendas which they were willing to fight for against 
the opposition of most, including former allies: a point made by most writing on the coal strike now, 
though not expressed during the strike (Gollan,1975;Deery,1978; Thomas,1986; Sheridan,1989) 
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work of miners in Northern New South Wales. It forced the issue of aggregate meetings, 
where the workers rejected the Central Counch decision to remain on strike and so there 
was a return to work on 15 th August^. 
Ironically the miners gained very little from the strike. Long service leave was 
granted through arbitration, shortly after its conclusion. However, it was in the same 
form as had been ready to be handed down by the Coal Industry Tribunal prior to the 
strike. It was stih tied to continuity of service and there were penalties for stoppages. 
The thirty five hour week claim was not granted. The miners not surprisingly tried to 
portray the outcome as a victory. Ross (1949:2) chose to see the strike as "an outstanding 
success" as the workers had boldly moved to "retain the inifiafive" against the employers in 
their first "battle of the pre-crisis period". Even Thomas (1986:388) cifing the Central 
Counch of the AC&SEF argued that long service leave had been won as a result of the 
"perseverance and struggles" of the miners. It seems however, that it was won because of 
the miners' general ability to resist, rather than as a result of the 1949 strike. 
How is such an event to be understood? It has a numinous quahty for it stands out 
as a significant moment in labour history. As Deery (1978:xi) noted "it is one of the very 
few strikes in Australia that has passed into folk memory". YeL it has proved difficult to 
capture its importance. 
Its significance has tended to be sought in its pohtical aspects (Deery, 1978:xii; 
Gollan,1963:235). There can be no doubt that the 1949 strike was a battle ground between 
9. In Queensland, for some miners, the strike continued. The employers had dismissed their workers 
on the second day of the strike as a means of avoiding payments into the pension fund. After the official 
ending a number of mine owners refused to re-employ some of their men. In total 206 miners were 
victimised and the strike continued at those mines (Thomas,1986:390). The Chair (Murray) of the Local 
Reference Board (Transcript of Evidence, 28/8/49: Queensland Coal Owners Association records) had 
originally claimed that the employer had the right to reject certain men who: 
can be proved to have gone beyond the usual limits and by their conduct have 
indicated that they will continue to refuse to be bound by arbitration. 
At a later Local Reference Board meeting (Transcript of Evidence, 2/9/49: Queensland Coal Owners 
Association records) which was attended by Williams and Grant (AC&SEF) Murray reversed his decision 
and all miners were re-employed except those at Selene (a small, isolated mine). The strike continued 
there for some months. The QCEU finally called a one day stoppage for the 2nd November. It was 
pooriy attended but seems to have been the impetuous which forced a solution. On 11th November all 
parties including the Queensland Coal Board went to Selene and the miners had their jobs restored (Local 
Reference Board, Transcript of Evidence, 30/11/49: Queensland Coal Owners Association records). 
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the ideologies of communism and social democracy and their hegemony over the labour 
movement. Both the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) and the Australian Labour 
Party (ALP) were determined to show that their methods should prevail. The members of 
the CPA had clearly stated their intention of using the miners as a means of showing 
Australian workers that reformism was flawed and that they held the correct approach. 
Communists saw the coal industry as a: 
key to the Party's fight against reacfion in this country; that coal is a 
weapon, and we must see that it is our weapon in ensuring that the 
mining union in this country plays a more and more important and 
decisive role in the big issues .... in accordance with the best traditions of 
the mining industry (speech by Ross^O to 15th National Congress of the 
CPA cited m Deery,1978:38). 
As Deery (1978:30) commented: 
By 1949 the CPA sought to politicise strike action and expose reformism; 
to weaken the influence of the Labour Party in the working class 
movement and thereby win the masses to its side. 
The communists sought to use the coal strike for their own ends but so also did the Labour 
Party^L The Austrahan Labour Party both in and out of Government was whling to go to 
unprecedented lengths to ensure that the workers returned to arbitration and that the 
communists were defeated. Ross (1970:423) claims^^^ y^jt^ justification, that: 
There is no doubL that the leaders of the Labor Party had determined to 
use the situation to destroy the Communist Party's influence and teach 
the Australian working class the lesson that major industrial action to 
achieve economic demands would not be tolerated. 
Neither the CPA nor the ALP fully won in their battle for the hearts of the workers. 
The Communist Party was the immediate loser as its role in trade union affairs diminished 
considerably after the strike, and its political possibhities were equally curtailed. It 
became a minor left party within the labour movement. The Australian Labour Party lost 
10. Ross was the editor of Common Cause, the journal of the AC&SEF. 
11. Neither group were working in circumstances of their own choosing. It appears that the CPA were 
not united on the necessity for the strike, or for its timing (Sheridan,l989:365, footnote 106). As well, 
though the ALP were to so vehemently oppose the strike those supporting the ALP on the AC&SEF 
Central Council and on the CMU had voted for it. 
12. Clearly, Ross as a leading member of the CPA could well be biased in his assessment. However, 
many ALP members campaigning on the coalfields, or speaking from their official positions within the 
labour movement, declared their aims to be the destruction of the communist influence and the return to 
arbitration. 
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as well, although it won the battle over ideology. The ALP lost the federal election at the 
end of 1949 and remained out of power (federally) for 23 years^^. The cost of the battle 
over the competing ideologies was enormous. It handed political power to the 
conservatives for the next two decades. 
There can no debate about the significance of the 1949 strike in terms of the 
transformation of the political hegemony in the labour movement. But has the strike any 
other importance? Those who do not concentrate on the political aspects of the strike tend 
to be left with very little to say about its significance. Fisher (1987:274), for example, can 
only make the rather mild statement that: 
Perhaps the clearest result of the strike was that there would be no 
single, monolithic arbitral/industrial control of the coalfields (.) 
Yet, this would have been the case even without the strike, as it is in any other industry. 
Its significance does not lie there. 
The 1949 strike stands out amongst others because it condensed the major tensions 
of the time. It is a nodal point^'^ around which the contradictions in society and within the 
coal mirdng industry congealed. The first great tension it held has been generally 
acknowledged: that between two opposing modes of organisation for the working class. 
That opposition was at the heart of the Cold War in Australia and most "advanced" 
capitalist countries and it became crystahsed in the miners' dispute of 1949. But the strike 
held other contradictions as well which had more to do with the miners themselves. 
The 1949 strike contained within it the contradictions between the apparatus of 
calculation and the labour process. The apparatus of calculation had, by that time, 
generally been transformed, but the labour process was still largely caught within the hand 
mining period. The two aspects of the economic form of domination were not in 
harmony, but rather operated in constant contradiction. It produced the problem of 
13. The ALP remained out of office because of political divisions within its own ranks between the left 
and the right which led to a split in the 1950's, from which it did not fully recover until the late 1960's. 
14. I have taken the terms from Freud (1976:383-390). He has used them to capture the specific quality of 
dreams. It seems some social events have the same kind of "over determined" quality and so 1 employ 
his terms to discuss them. 
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mdiscipluie from the point of view of the Government and the owners, and the problem of 
arduous work in antiquated conditions from the point of view of the miners. 
The disharmony between the apparatus of calculation and the labour process fed 
through mto tensions within the miners themselves. The 1949 strike held within it the 
contradiction between the old form of labour so necessary to the getting of coal in the hand 
mining period and the new form which was being shaped through the apparatus of 
calculation and hesitantly in the labour process. The hand mining period had cahed up 
certain characteristics within the labour force, both producing them and enhancing those 
that existed. Independence, physical strength, endurance, self discipline and the 
willingness to take a gamble had been crucial to the mining of coal. By 1949 they were of 
little value, indeed they had become a hindrance. The miner whose qualities matched the 
earlier economic form of domination found himself out of place. His character had 
become redundant, very soon his job would as well. 
The coal strike of 1949 held contradictions at all levels. It was at the nodal point of 
the transformation of political, economic and personal relations. It was a great eruption of 
the contradictions held within the minhig labour force at that time. Yet, there is no neat 
dividing line between sets of possibilities. The 1949 strike did not end the influence of the 
Communist Party or communist beliefs, nor did it resolve the contradictions within the 
economic form of domination, nor completely transform the character of the miner. Ah of 
these contradictions continued to be held within the coal minhig industry for some years 
after the strike but they never again acquired the power of the 1949 cataclysm. 
Shortly after the strike a new equhibrium between the apparatus of calculation and 
the labour process was established. It was forced into place as much by rewards 
(attendance allowances and bonus schemes) as by penalties (loss of rights relating to long 
service, holiday and sickness pay for absenteeism and stoppages and, of course, 
redundancies). Once the balance was reworked, the elements of force were no longer 
necessary and many of the "negative" features of the transition period were graduahy 
removed. 
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In capitalism, attachment to work is assured through need which can only be met 
by a wage, but how this operates is variable. In the first part of the century it was 
achieved by a careful calculation of need and relied on the gamble. After the Second 
World War, the attachment changed, although it sthl operated through need. Need 
disappeared from the apparatus of calculation but re-appeared in a double 
transubstantiated form which provided the new mechanism to ensure production. It 
resurfaced in the labour process in the form of the psychological attributes of workers. 
Our needs for recognition and security through work, come more and more to define our 
status and value and so they tie us inexorably to production. As well, need appeared in 
consumption as infinite desire which capital both cahs up and produces. Our need to 
maintain our life style through endless consumption, as a means of affirming our worth, is 
the other capitalist form of need which links us into production. 
The hinge around which the economic form of domination articulates has been 
changed and we are more deeply enmeshed within capitalism. In the earher period the 
body of the labourer provided the point of articulation. It left a space for existence outside 
of the workings of capitalism. Now, however, it is increasingly through the soul that 
domination is achieved. The worker is subjected to a disciplmary form of power in both 
aspects of the economic form of dommation. Capitalists have disappeared from view and 
the possibility of open class conflict over opposing needs is closed, for the time being at 
least^^. As a result, workers have become both more economically useful, while at the 
same time more pohticahy doche (FoucaulLl979b:221). In the process we have lost the 
sense of the dangers inherent in the operation of capital, for the chains which bind us have 
become almost invisible. 
15. We thought we could see the class relations between capital and labour on the surface of society. 
Forms of coercion and personal power relations appeared to visibly display the antagonistic class 
relations in which we are embedded. While that provided a necessary position of criticism and political 
activity it led us into a trap. Once those relations disappeared from view we could no longer see the 
usefulness of a class analysis, and marxism became unfashionable both politically and academically. 
The analysis of the economic form of domination may help us both explain that shift and to regain an 
analysis of the effects of capital on labour. We see that what we took as antagonistic class relations were 
merely the particular form in which capital and labour were constituted: as opposing needs of capitalists 
and workers. From such a point of view perhaps we can see that class relations have not disappeared 
but have merely changed their mode of appearance. How to appropriately analyse them m either form 
of the economic form of domination is still to be done. 
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The powers of a thmg "capital" have become prodigious but those of humans have 
not been so developed. We cohectively produce incredible wealth but it does not seem to 
arise from us, but from the investment of capital. We can neither acknowledge our 
cohective endeavour, nor take any control over planning it. We produce a world but do 
not feel responsible for it. It relieves us of that burden, but at the same time diminishes us 
in our potential. We have increasingly become atomistic individuals working with only 
part of our potential, and limiting our desires to those which are produced by the needs of 
capital. Our power is contained in the tenuous claims of status in work and life style, and 
we create our relation to others in terms of competition. The danger is that we become so 
weakened by our loss of power, so bemused by the ihusory nature of our needs and 
desires, so charmed by the fairy floss satisfaction of security and self esteem that we fail to 
address the problem of our mode of being. 
However, the present economic form of domination is transitory. There are 
contradictions within it. There will be growing internal contradictions as the gloss of 
security and consumerism produce emptiness rather than fulfilment. The reality without 
wih also tend to force its nature upon us. The unemployed, the despotic relations in the 
"third world" and increasmgly within sections of the "advanced" capitalist countries and 
the pohuted environment are all effects and conditions of the hegemonic regime. They 
create tensions which will assert themselves. Maybe, resistance whl arise to the 
hegemonic form of dominations^, from within its boundaries, though what form that will 
take is not quite clear at the moment. Perhaps, it wih be a refusal of those forms of 
subjectivity through which capitalism entraps our possibihties now. Perhaps, it whl take 
the form of linking the possibihties that capitahsm has called up, to other more spiritual or 
co-operative forms of understanding. 
However, we respond to the present economic form of domination wih determine 
our new possibihties. That is the human condition. Chief Seattle (cited in 
16. There will always be resistance within the economic form of domination, but shaped by its 
possibilities and in general reproducing it. 
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Campbell,1988:34) spoke of the relation of "man" to all life and it is equahy true of our 
relation to any one aspect, including economic relations^^: 
Man did not weave the web of life, he is merely a strand in it. Whatever 
he does to the web he does to himselL 
The transformation in the economic form of domination which I have described in 
relation to the coal industry is a description of a general tendency within capitalism. Can 
such a tale be told from the relations between capital and labour in one industry? Yes. 
The analysis, it must be remembered, is of social relations. The contingent and peculiarly 
local events have been analysed in order to bring out that which is more permanent. It is 
also true that any pattern of social relations which are produced will tend to be spread 
throughout most industries, although the timing and the local peculiarities whl differ. As 
well, the social relations in the coal industry are perhaps more transparent than in others. 
In the early period they were more extreme and continued for much longer than in other 
industries. As a result, the transformation to a new economic form of domination was 
both brutal and clear. It must be remembered too that there is general agreement that a 
transformation from despotism to hegemony, or from coercion to consent has occurred. 
What has been debated is not its existence, but the way to analytically grasp it. 1 have 
merely sought to lay out the relations m terms of the economic form of dominations^. 
17. It is easier to say that humans have created their social world and not their natural one (though 
because it is also caught up in our understanding, that distinction is not quite as simple). However, at 
the point of any action, we are confronted with a social world, which stands before us with the facticity of 
nature. 
18. The description of the economic form of domination cannot be applied to any empirical situation as 
though it were a stencil. It is a description at a particular level of generality, that of social relations, and 
of a specific field, economic relations. Its relation to the world of contingent events is one of possibilities. 
Thus it seems to me that there are two forms of academic relation to such an analysis. Either new work is 
done which will show that another way of grasping the social relations makes more sense. Or, if the 
description rings true, there is the possibility of exploring its more general application and/or the 
particular manner in which a general tendency is reproduced through mechanisms which are quite 
specific to it. That is a great social mystery and very under explored. There is unfortunately a strong 
predilection within the social sciences to forever begin again in "theory", or to rely on the glorification of 
the contingent. 
As Strauss (1987:13-4) asserts: 
theory is misused (if it)....is not really checked out in further enquiry, (if) it is only 
applied like a label to one's data. The practice almost totally relieves the researcher 
of three very important reponsibilities: of (1) genuinely checking or qualifying the 
original data; (2) interacting deeply with his or her own data; and (3) developing 
276 
The miners have often been studied. Certainly, at times, they have crystalised the 
relations between capital and labour and so are very valuable "subjects" for analytical 
purposes. They also offer much more. Their tenacious grip on freedom and their 
striving for collectivity m adverse circumstances is a tribute to the strength of the human 
spirit. 
new theory on the basis of a true transaction between the previous and newly 
evolving theory. While the practice of its citations may flatter the theorist, and may 
give the illusion of adding to "knowledge" it really does not advance the collective 
scientific enterprise. 
It seems that there are two steps we need to take for the development of stronger theory in the social 
sciences. A more humble relation to theory is called for. We need to recognise the value in some 
theoretical account and build on that, rather than dismissing it or merely applying it for the sake of 
academic credibility. Connected to that is the second requirement. It appears to be imperative that we 
recognise that "theory" is actually merely another level of description. We need to distinguish between 
social relations and relations between things. If we do not we will be forever caught in the impossibility 
of generating theory. If we do, we can begin to capture the wondrous aspect of humans: their abilitv to 
produce both great variation and order. 
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